Hun Sen has it all now as rivals take a fall
VERGHESE MATHEWS
Posted on News Straits Times (Malaysia)
FOLLOWING the changes in the political landscape of Cambodia, Prime Minister Hun Sen is better placed to deliver good governance and nurture more reform-minded leaders, writes VERGHESE MATHEWS.
Hun Sen will now concentrate on elevating the international image of Cambodia and consolidating his position as prime minister
Political observers will look back at 2006 as a defining year for Cambodian politics — as the year when the political landscape changed in a manner few had anticipated. Yet the changes were long in the offing and, in hindsight, there was a definite trend that escaped scrutiny amid the usual distractions of political infighting, shifting allegiances and debilitating one-upmanship that have been characteristic of Cambodia since the United Nations-sponsored elections in 1993.
To appreciate the changed political landscape, it may be pertinent to look back to the general election of July 2003. That post-election period, which saw a repeat of the madness of the previous two elections, was particularly significant in that the frustrations of 11 wasted months of futile negotiations to form a coalition government was etched deep in the collective memory of Prime Minister Hun Sen and his Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). The party claimed that the opposition Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) and the royalist Funcinpec Party (FCP) led by Prince Ranariddh took unfair advantage of the democratic process.
The CPP decided then to never allow the losers in an election hold the winners to ransom because of a loophole in the constitution.
In the event, the CPP had performed handsomely, winning 73 of the possible 123 seats, but could not form a government as it was nine seats short of a two-thirds majority — the constitutional requirement for a party to form a government by itself.
The FCP, which had gone into the elections badly factionalised, limped home with 26 seats — a far cry from the 53 seats it secured in 1993 and the 43 seats in 1998. The Sam Rainsy Party, the smallest of the three parties, did comparatively well capturing 24 seats, a creditable jump from the 15 seats it held in 1998.
Following the elections, the the Sam Rainsy Party and the FCP formed a loose alliance to prevent the CPP from forming a government without them gaining political concessions for themselves. What followed were the 11 wasted months before the FCP finally broke ranks and joined the CPP in a coalition on July 15, 2004.
The cosy personal and working relations between Hun Sen and Ranariddh following the formation of the coalition government deteriorated soon enough. In a pique for various intended and perceived irritations, Ranariddh resigned as chairman of the National Assembly, leaving his party embroiled in ugly infighting and weakening his authority as party leader. It was downhill after that for this very personable prince.
Meanwhile, all was not well in the SRP either, following the stripping of the parliamentary immunity of Sam Rainsy and two other party members in February 2005 to face criminal defamation charges earlier filed by Hun Sen and Ranariddh.
Rainsy fled Cambodia and remained abroad for a year, returning only after Hun Sen accepted his apology and the withdrawal of his earlier allegations against Hun Sen. Rainsy’s continued self-exile had worked against him; he is believed to have decided on the compromise because, in his absence, some rivals had been eyeing his post in the party.
The SRP’s compromise with the CPP was the turning point in recent Cambodian political history. It suited Rainsy’s immediate needs and dovetailed superbly with the CPP’s long-term strategy. Under the bargain, Rainsy would move a constitutional amendment in Parliament to lower the seat requirement for forming a government. In return, Hun Sen would drop all court charges against his nemesis and seek the king’s pardon to absolve Rainsy from the 18 months imprisonment term for defamation he had been handed in absentia.
On March 2, 2006, the National Assembly overwhelmingly voted in favour of resolution allowing for a new government to be formed with a simple majority. Hun Sen and the CPP no longer had to chase the elusive tail of the two-thirds monster. Neither did it need the FCP to give the government a kinder face. However, it was still in its strategic interest to see the FCP once again become viable as a counter to the Sam Rainsy Party, which remains the potential long-term threat for the CPP.
The SRP is rebuilding itself for the commune elections in April and the general election next year. It has just appointed former FCP Women’s Affairs Minister Mu Sochua, who crossed over, as its new secretary-general — in what some think was probably the party’s best move last year. Although the SRP has lost some of its lustre and appeal, it remains the only credible opposition at the moment.
On the other hand, by mid- 2006, the FCP was almost a dysfunctional party with insiders alleging that Ranariddh’s absences from the country, his falling out with Hun Sen and his preoccupation with personal problems were serious impediments to the party’s growth. In October a rival faction, reportedly with strategic advice from friends in the CPP, removed Ranariddh from the presidency and replaced him with his sober brother-in-law, Ambassador Keo Puth Rasmey.
Ranariddh, now heading a fledgling small party, is being sued by his wife for adultery and by his erstwhile party colleagues for allegedly misappropriating funds he had obtained by the sale of party assets. Ranariddh’s lawyers have challenged this and have pointed out that the sale was not unilateral and that the funds are accounted for. Neutral observers see the charges as being politically motivated. It has been a bleak 2006 for the prince.
The overall result of these almost choreographed developments is that Hun Sen is the single most powerful person in Cambodia today. If any challenge should emerge this year, it can only be from within his own party but no such likelihood is in sight.
Hun Sen will now face much lesser internal opposition to move up more competent second-echelon leaders, many of whom are reform-minded. However, the albatross continues to be the pervasive corruption in the country; the challenge continues to be the need to introduce good governance.
Those close to him privately suggest that Hun Sen, the longest-serving Prime Minister in Southeast Asia, will want to concentrate now on raising the international image of his country, now that Cambodia is accepted in the region, and in the process, consolidate his position as prime minister.
* The writer, a visiting research fellow with the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, is a former ambassador to Cambodia and may be reached at mathews@iseas.edu.sg
Hun Sen will now concentrate on elevating the international image of Cambodia and consolidating his position as prime minister
Political observers will look back at 2006 as a defining year for Cambodian politics — as the year when the political landscape changed in a manner few had anticipated. Yet the changes were long in the offing and, in hindsight, there was a definite trend that escaped scrutiny amid the usual distractions of political infighting, shifting allegiances and debilitating one-upmanship that have been characteristic of Cambodia since the United Nations-sponsored elections in 1993.
To appreciate the changed political landscape, it may be pertinent to look back to the general election of July 2003. That post-election period, which saw a repeat of the madness of the previous two elections, was particularly significant in that the frustrations of 11 wasted months of futile negotiations to form a coalition government was etched deep in the collective memory of Prime Minister Hun Sen and his Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). The party claimed that the opposition Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) and the royalist Funcinpec Party (FCP) led by Prince Ranariddh took unfair advantage of the democratic process.
The CPP decided then to never allow the losers in an election hold the winners to ransom because of a loophole in the constitution.
In the event, the CPP had performed handsomely, winning 73 of the possible 123 seats, but could not form a government as it was nine seats short of a two-thirds majority — the constitutional requirement for a party to form a government by itself.
The FCP, which had gone into the elections badly factionalised, limped home with 26 seats — a far cry from the 53 seats it secured in 1993 and the 43 seats in 1998. The Sam Rainsy Party, the smallest of the three parties, did comparatively well capturing 24 seats, a creditable jump from the 15 seats it held in 1998.
Following the elections, the the Sam Rainsy Party and the FCP formed a loose alliance to prevent the CPP from forming a government without them gaining political concessions for themselves. What followed were the 11 wasted months before the FCP finally broke ranks and joined the CPP in a coalition on July 15, 2004.
The cosy personal and working relations between Hun Sen and Ranariddh following the formation of the coalition government deteriorated soon enough. In a pique for various intended and perceived irritations, Ranariddh resigned as chairman of the National Assembly, leaving his party embroiled in ugly infighting and weakening his authority as party leader. It was downhill after that for this very personable prince.
Meanwhile, all was not well in the SRP either, following the stripping of the parliamentary immunity of Sam Rainsy and two other party members in February 2005 to face criminal defamation charges earlier filed by Hun Sen and Ranariddh.
Rainsy fled Cambodia and remained abroad for a year, returning only after Hun Sen accepted his apology and the withdrawal of his earlier allegations against Hun Sen. Rainsy’s continued self-exile had worked against him; he is believed to have decided on the compromise because, in his absence, some rivals had been eyeing his post in the party.
The SRP’s compromise with the CPP was the turning point in recent Cambodian political history. It suited Rainsy’s immediate needs and dovetailed superbly with the CPP’s long-term strategy. Under the bargain, Rainsy would move a constitutional amendment in Parliament to lower the seat requirement for forming a government. In return, Hun Sen would drop all court charges against his nemesis and seek the king’s pardon to absolve Rainsy from the 18 months imprisonment term for defamation he had been handed in absentia.
On March 2, 2006, the National Assembly overwhelmingly voted in favour of resolution allowing for a new government to be formed with a simple majority. Hun Sen and the CPP no longer had to chase the elusive tail of the two-thirds monster. Neither did it need the FCP to give the government a kinder face. However, it was still in its strategic interest to see the FCP once again become viable as a counter to the Sam Rainsy Party, which remains the potential long-term threat for the CPP.
The SRP is rebuilding itself for the commune elections in April and the general election next year. It has just appointed former FCP Women’s Affairs Minister Mu Sochua, who crossed over, as its new secretary-general — in what some think was probably the party’s best move last year. Although the SRP has lost some of its lustre and appeal, it remains the only credible opposition at the moment.
On the other hand, by mid- 2006, the FCP was almost a dysfunctional party with insiders alleging that Ranariddh’s absences from the country, his falling out with Hun Sen and his preoccupation with personal problems were serious impediments to the party’s growth. In October a rival faction, reportedly with strategic advice from friends in the CPP, removed Ranariddh from the presidency and replaced him with his sober brother-in-law, Ambassador Keo Puth Rasmey.
Ranariddh, now heading a fledgling small party, is being sued by his wife for adultery and by his erstwhile party colleagues for allegedly misappropriating funds he had obtained by the sale of party assets. Ranariddh’s lawyers have challenged this and have pointed out that the sale was not unilateral and that the funds are accounted for. Neutral observers see the charges as being politically motivated. It has been a bleak 2006 for the prince.
The overall result of these almost choreographed developments is that Hun Sen is the single most powerful person in Cambodia today. If any challenge should emerge this year, it can only be from within his own party but no such likelihood is in sight.
Hun Sen will now face much lesser internal opposition to move up more competent second-echelon leaders, many of whom are reform-minded. However, the albatross continues to be the pervasive corruption in the country; the challenge continues to be the need to introduce good governance.
Those close to him privately suggest that Hun Sen, the longest-serving Prime Minister in Southeast Asia, will want to concentrate now on raising the international image of his country, now that Cambodia is accepted in the region, and in the process, consolidate his position as prime minister.
* The writer, a visiting research fellow with the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, is a former ambassador to Cambodia and may be reached at mathews@iseas.edu.sg
4 comments:
Yes, he really does have it all. His oppositions are simply too fragmented to take anything away from him.
SiS
How long does it last? Life is scary comes to think and saw Saddam was hanging.
For all the hotheads on this forum this should be mandatory reading. This is the best analysis in a long time. I wouldn't be surprised if Hun Sen succeeds in achieving those goals, which might lead directly into making him leader of Cambodia for life, as he has, perhaps only half-jokingly, indicated. It appears as if he can manipulate the electorate in such a way as to give him a clear majority for a long time to come. The only risk for his downfall might be a disgruntled crony who takes out a hit on him.
Hi 11:19 PM. I would have not made these statements if I were you.
The public opinions are not different from taking a poll or as a purpose for analysis or feedback etc..
You can call everybody hotheads as you want but the facts remain.
Why Hun Sen has been in power for too long, there are more reasons into that.
Who created KR and/or Hun Sen and who ceded Khmer land to the Vietnamese? And what kind of a person that the Vietnamese chose to fullfil the job that the Vietnamese wanted. etc.. Without the Vietnamese protection Hun Sen may have not been lasting to this far.
For nearly 5000 body guards, and mainly the men whom the Vietnamese assigned to protect Hun Sen is not an accident, and don't forget the coup in 1979 and the treaty made between Hun Sen (CPP) created by Vietnam and Hun Sen themselves.
So to say Hun Sen downfall might be a disgruntled crony is sure wrong. Without the Vietnamese force behind Hun Sen, yes may be.
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