Hun Sen prevents temple resolution

Hun Xen locked in an embrace with Thaksin (Photo: Reuters)

Hun Xen locked in Nguyen Tan Dung's hug (Photo: DayLife.com)

May 18, 2011
A. Gaffar Peang-Meth
PACIFIC DAILY NEWS

I learned during my service in the Khmer People's National Liberation Front from 1980-1989 that the Thais are fearful of sharing Thailand's borders with Vietnam and they would be happy to have Cambodia as a buffer between the two countries -- a reason Bangkok supported the Cambodian resistance elements that opposed Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia.

I have written several columns in this space about the Feb. 4-7 border fighting between Thai and Cambodian troops related to the long-standing dispute regarding sovereignty over areas surrounding the 11th century Temple of Preah Vihear, a temple awarded to Cambodia in a June 15, 1962, ruling by the International Court of Justice.

"It was not the first armed conflict on the border dispute around the Preah Vihear Temple, nor will it be the last," I wrote, and "If both armies don't withdraw their trigger-happy troops, new rounds of armed conflict are waiting to happen." It's a matter of common sense.

As fanatics on both sides trade vitriolic barbs, parties on both sides have accumulated documents and maps purporting to show to whom the temple belongs. I was impressed with the vast knowledge some of those people hold about the history of the temple and the ICJ's verdict. Then I realized it was not what they know but how they think that causes voices of reason to give way to loud, unproductive emotional rhetoric.

I read with satisfaction that increasing numbers of Thai academics call on their government to accept that the temple is Khmer, was built by Khmers and belongs to Khmers. Then I saw Cambodian expatriates' petitions and rallies condemning the Thai "invasion." Some Cambodians would not accept any mention of a "disputed area" and cast you as an enemy if you persist in use of the phrase.

Premier Hun Sen loves this: talk of Thai aggression/invasion reliably rallies Cambodians to fight the Thai invasion and deflects attention from other concerns.

It takes two to make war or peace.

Thai Premier Abhisit has been under fire from the so-called Yellow Shirt political movement, whose adherents brought him to power and who now think he's not up to the task to "win" the temple for Thailand. The next election is around the corner for Abhisit in July. Meanwhile, the Thai military is concerned that it might lose influence in Thai politics.

Cambodian Premier Hun Sen, too, is less than two years away from his own election, and domestic problems have not abated. His restless people needed to be pulled into line.

Hun Sen has found it useful to deflect Abhisit's insistence on bilateralism by pushing for regional or international -- United Nations -- involvement in resolving this crisis. He wanted Indonesian observers posted on the border, but Thailand refused. Hun Sen beats the drum of nationalism loudest to meet the emotional needs of his people and draw their attention from other problems confronting him.

On April 22, the deadly border fighting resumed. Initial skirmishes with small arms at Ta Krabey and Ta Moan to the west of Preah Vihear ended with an exchange of Thai artillery barrage and Cambodian BM-21 rockets that rained over each other's territories. Reports say a Thai military aircraft flew overhead and Thai troops used cluster bombs, which are banned by over 100 countries.

And, of course, each side accused the other of shooting first -- as if this would absolve them for causing losses of lives and creating property damage and hardship for residents on both sides of the border.

On April 27, self-exiled opposition leader Sam Rainsy circulated an "open letter" declaring that the Hun Sen government "must step down so that Cambodia may avoid war and territory losses with both Thailand and Vietnam." Rainsy accused the Hun Sen regime of using the conflict with Thailand in the west as a "political ploy to divert the attention and the anger of the Khmer people from the aggression by Vietnam in the east, ... and from its systematic corruption when it associates itself with dubious foreign companies to grab lands ... and to plunder our national riches."

Two days later, the Hun Sen government said it has asked the ICJ to clarify its 1962 verdict. Until the clarification arrives, the question of keeping the two neighbors from fighting a war is primary.

Even after the deaths of 20 troops and the displacement of up to 85,000 villagers on both sides of the border, Abhisit and Hun Sen, who held talks in Jakarta under the mediation of Indonesia's president, refused to withdraw their troops.

According to one press report, during the ASEAN ministerial meeting on May 6, ASEAN officials were surprised by Premier Hun Sen's and his foreign minister Hor Nam Hong's belligerent attack on Thailand as an "aggressor." As host, Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa stepped in to stop Hun Sen's verbal assault before irreparable damage was done.

I learned during my service in the Khmer People's National Liberation Front from 1980-1989 that the Thais are fearful of sharing Thailand's borders with Vietnam and they would be happy to have Cambodia as a buffer between the two countries -- a reason Bangkok supported the Cambodian resistance elements that opposed Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia.

So, when Hun Sen appointed a Thai political fugitive, former Premier Thaksin Sinawatra, as economic advisor to the Cambodian government, Hun Sen directly challenged the Abhisit government. In addition, Hun Sen has all but placed Cambodia at the disposal of the Hanoi regime, a further threat to Thailand that no doubt contributes to the uncompromising vehemence of the Thai government's position regarding the disputed border territory.

No solution to the Thai-Cambodian border problem can be found so long as Hun Sen remains at the service of Vietnam, a country Thailand continues to consider a regional threat.

A. Gaffar Peang-Meth, Ph.D., is retired from the University of Guam. Write him at

peangmeth@yahoo.com.