China never had to exert massive military might or economic investment to gain influence in Southeast Asia. After the US extended diplomatic recognition to the mainland in 1972, members of the Association of South-East Asia Nations (ASEAN) followed suit. During the Cold War, the US aimed to dilute Soviet influence in the region and encouraged collaboration. With the US increasingly distracted in the Middle East, China has deepened its roots in Southeast Asia through extended engagement and economic diplomacy. “China has gained its influence in Southeast Asia less by ‘muscles’ and more by skillfully exploiting changes in the international and regional environment, absent any wise and strong US engagement with the region,” writes Singapore-based analyst Sheng Lijun. As the ASEAN summit convenes in the Philippines, members remain divided about the balance of power in the region: Some welcome China’s growing influence, while others long for a US counterweight. ASEAN expects to be the driving political force in Southeast Asia, so the two powers must likewise pursue balance, neither pushing too hard nor neglecting the region. – YaleGlobal
Is Southeast Asia Becoming China’s Playpen?
As China gains strategic advantage in Southeast Asia, the region seeks balance
Sheng Lijun
YaleGlobal, 11 January 2007
Southeast Asia, here we come: Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing arrives in the Philippines for a summit meeting with ASEAN leaders, where China's profile is rising
SINGAPORE: China’s diplomatic success in Southeast Asia has often been fortuitous. Changes in the international and regional strategic environment, together with US absent-mindedness and negligence of the region, have played a major role in a closer embrace of China and Southeast Asia.
History shows how the international as well as the regional strategic landscape can change overnight.
That happened with US rapprochement with China in 1972, forcing Association of South-East Asia Nations (ASEAN) nations such as Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines to swiftly change their respective policies on China and establish diplomatic relations with Beijing, despite no fundamental changes in China’s Southeast Asia policy and no massive increase in China’s military muscle and economic attractiveness.
When Deng Xiaoping stepped into power in 1978, eager to open China up and push into Southeast Asia, a blessing in disguise soon followed – Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia from 1979 to 1989. China made good use of this “occupation” and effectively kick-started its initial cooperation with ASEAN. This engagement, lasting more than a decade, laid a solid foundation for relations in the subsequent years. The US, concerned about Soviet influence in the region, acquiesced and even encouraged this strong engagement. Once again China succeeded in going deeper into Southeast Asia without massive increase in its military muscle and economic attractiveness.
Just as ASEAN put the Cambodia issue onto a backburner, the Cold War ended and new uncertainties emerged in the region. Deciding against a passive wait for changes, ASEAN took the initiative and actively pursued engaging all the major powers in the region. Up until the end of the Cold War, ASEAN attempted policy that would push all extra-regional big powers out of the region. Realizing that it was impossible to push them out of the region, ASEAN, from the 1990s, began what it called “constructive engagement” with all of them. Under the policy, major powers balance one another while ASEAN is the primary driving force for a constructive balance. For this purpose, ASEAN needed China’s political backing to play its role as the primary driving force in this process. Under this backdrop, China scored an easy diplomatic success by building its first official ties with the ASEAN grouping in 1991.
The ASEAN-China relationship in the early was tentative at best. Not long after came a big push: the Asian economic crisis in late 1997. While the US, for its own reasons, was slow to come to rescue, China readily responded to ASEAN’s acute need, with an immediate promise not to devalue its currency, the Renminbi, and further destabilize the region. By November 1997, the lukewarm relationship evolved to the level of annual ASEAN+China summits.
This momentum receded as ASEAN countries withstood the shockwaves of the economic crisis, but then came another boost: The 9/11 terror attacks, which plunged the US into a seemingly endless war against terrorism. The increasing focus of the US on homeland security, Central Asia and the Middle East was accompanied by a negligence of Southeast Asia. In 2001, China made a diplomatic masterpiece by proposing a free-trade agreement with ASEAN to accelerate its cooperation with ASEAN, thus maintaining and even building its momentum in Southeast Asia.
The brief examination of recent history tells us that China has gained its influence in Southeast Asia less by “muscles” and more by skillfully exploiting changes in the international and regional environment, absent any wise and strong US engagement with the region – together providing strong “pulls” for ASEAN toward a China that is more than willing to “push” into the region.
Many observers have noted only the Chinese “pushes” without seeing ASEAN’s “pulls” and their strategic background. Without such “pulls,” however, China’s “pushes” will not get far and may backfire. Take the warming in China-Indonesia relations for example: The two nations have declared each other as strategic partners, which may have a lot to do with Muslim Indonesia’s intention to use China to balance the excessive US pressure against Islamic extremists in the country. Indonesia’s overture to build defense ties with China and buy Chinese weapons can be interpreted as a tactical rather than a strategic re-orientation, a means to pressure the US to lift its arms embargo on Indonesia.
Myanmar and Cambodia both have close relations with China. In the case of Myanmar, the US has chosen not to engage with its government, likewise rejecting trade or investment. US trade sanctions and embargo against Myanmar still stand. China is Cambodia’s top investor and trade partner. The US, for political reasons, still has no significant trade or investment in Cambodia. If the US changes its policy and prioritizes these two countries, China may find it difficult to maintain its primacy there.
While there is less public talk of a “China threat,” Washington can take some comfort from the fact that distrust of China remains deep-rooted in the region and may grow if a rising China enters too deep. ASEAN countries have not joined the China bandwagon but “hedge,” engaging China while developing robust ties with the US and other extra-regional powers to balance China. Asian countries generally do not have much trust for one another and the US is perceived as the least distrusted of all major powers. Asian nations need the US as a balancer and double insurance when they develop their relations with China. ASEAN is aware that without a strong relationship with the US, China may take ASEAN for granted.
A vigorous but balanced relationship with the US is seen as not only security insurance but also an incentive for China to offer more economic sweeteners. Barring a sudden and major change in the international strategic landscape and a disaster in US Southeast Asia policy that would unexpectedly boost China’s influence by default, the more China pushes in deepening its relations with ASEAN, the more ASEAN may feel that it needs a strong relationship with the US and other extra-regional power to keep the balance.
The US is, thus, still favourably poised to keep and enhance its position in this region. However, as illustrated by recent history, success depends less on “muscles” and more on “brain” that can quickly exploit any changes in the strategic environment, less on how many resources a country has but on how much it is willing to spend. Washington does not lack the resources, but the willingness to use them profusely for the region, at least for now.
How deep can China push into Southeast Asia? At the moment, there is an active balance in the region, and any power that seeks dominance will likely push other powers, together with ASEAN, into a stronger resistance to maintain this balance. Any success China has in pushing further is less likely due to its growing “muscles” but more due to an ever-changing international and regional strategic environment that may suddenly multiply those “muscles” for a much deeper penetration. In this sense, continued US negligence of the region and absent-mindedness to the ever-changing strategic environment in the region will cost it dearly.
Sheng Lijun is a senior fellow of international relations at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.
Is Southeast Asia Becoming China’s Playpen?
As China gains strategic advantage in Southeast Asia, the region seeks balance
Sheng Lijun
YaleGlobal, 11 January 2007
Southeast Asia, here we come: Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing arrives in the Philippines for a summit meeting with ASEAN leaders, where China's profile is rising SINGAPORE: China’s diplomatic success in Southeast Asia has often been fortuitous. Changes in the international and regional strategic environment, together with US absent-mindedness and negligence of the region, have played a major role in a closer embrace of China and Southeast Asia.
History shows how the international as well as the regional strategic landscape can change overnight.
That happened with US rapprochement with China in 1972, forcing Association of South-East Asia Nations (ASEAN) nations such as Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines to swiftly change their respective policies on China and establish diplomatic relations with Beijing, despite no fundamental changes in China’s Southeast Asia policy and no massive increase in China’s military muscle and economic attractiveness.
When Deng Xiaoping stepped into power in 1978, eager to open China up and push into Southeast Asia, a blessing in disguise soon followed – Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia from 1979 to 1989. China made good use of this “occupation” and effectively kick-started its initial cooperation with ASEAN. This engagement, lasting more than a decade, laid a solid foundation for relations in the subsequent years. The US, concerned about Soviet influence in the region, acquiesced and even encouraged this strong engagement. Once again China succeeded in going deeper into Southeast Asia without massive increase in its military muscle and economic attractiveness.
With the 1997 economic crisis, China responded to ASEAN's acute need, promising not to devalue its currency and destabilize the region.
The ASEAN-China relationship in the early was tentative at best. Not long after came a big push: the Asian economic crisis in late 1997. While the US, for its own reasons, was slow to come to rescue, China readily responded to ASEAN’s acute need, with an immediate promise not to devalue its currency, the Renminbi, and further destabilize the region. By November 1997, the lukewarm relationship evolved to the level of annual ASEAN+China summits.
This momentum receded as ASEAN countries withstood the shockwaves of the economic crisis, but then came another boost: The 9/11 terror attacks, which plunged the US into a seemingly endless war against terrorism. The increasing focus of the US on homeland security, Central Asia and the Middle East was accompanied by a negligence of Southeast Asia. In 2001, China made a diplomatic masterpiece by proposing a free-trade agreement with ASEAN to accelerate its cooperation with ASEAN, thus maintaining and even building its momentum in Southeast Asia.
The brief examination of recent history tells us that China has gained its influence in Southeast Asia less by “muscles” and more by skillfully exploiting changes in the international and regional environment, absent any wise and strong US engagement with the region – together providing strong “pulls” for ASEAN toward a China that is more than willing to “push” into the region.
Asian nations need the US as a balancer and insurance when they develop their relations with China.
Myanmar and Cambodia both have close relations with China. In the case of Myanmar, the US has chosen not to engage with its government, likewise rejecting trade or investment. US trade sanctions and embargo against Myanmar still stand. China is Cambodia’s top investor and trade partner. The US, for political reasons, still has no significant trade or investment in Cambodia. If the US changes its policy and prioritizes these two countries, China may find it difficult to maintain its primacy there.
While there is less public talk of a “China threat,” Washington can take some comfort from the fact that distrust of China remains deep-rooted in the region and may grow if a rising China enters too deep. ASEAN countries have not joined the China bandwagon but “hedge,” engaging China while developing robust ties with the US and other extra-regional powers to balance China. Asian countries generally do not have much trust for one another and the US is perceived as the least distrusted of all major powers. Asian nations need the US as a balancer and double insurance when they develop their relations with China. ASEAN is aware that without a strong relationship with the US, China may take ASEAN for granted.
Washington does not lack the resource, but the willingness to use them profusely for Southeast Asia, at least for now.
The US is, thus, still favourably poised to keep and enhance its position in this region. However, as illustrated by recent history, success depends less on “muscles” and more on “brain” that can quickly exploit any changes in the strategic environment, less on how many resources a country has but on how much it is willing to spend. Washington does not lack the resources, but the willingness to use them profusely for the region, at least for now.
How deep can China push into Southeast Asia? At the moment, there is an active balance in the region, and any power that seeks dominance will likely push other powers, together with ASEAN, into a stronger resistance to maintain this balance. Any success China has in pushing further is less likely due to its growing “muscles” but more due to an ever-changing international and regional strategic environment that may suddenly multiply those “muscles” for a much deeper penetration. In this sense, continued US negligence of the region and absent-mindedness to the ever-changing strategic environment in the region will cost it dearly.
Sheng Lijun is a senior fellow of international relations at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.
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