Thailand is using Cambodian Muslims as scapegoats for its southern violence

April 13, 2007
Thailand: Southern Violence and the Scapegoat Next Door

Stratfor (USA)

Summary

The Thai government is seeking a scapegoat to distract from its problems. It has settled upon Cambodian Muslims again.

Analysis

The Thai government is attempting to divert the Buddhist majority's attention toward a scapegoat previously used by the government of ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. The move comes as Thailand's military-backed government is suffering a crisis of confidence and floundering from internal regime divisions, meaning finding someone to blame for continued violence in Thailand's south would be most useful.

Bangkok has selected Cambodia to fill the role of scapegoat. It is portraying Cambodia as a fertile ground for Islamism, fueling the ongoing conflict in Thailand's south. More than once, as public anger over the number of deaths and injuries suffered by Buddhists in the south and at government incompetence at quelling this violence has risen, the government has pointed toward Cambodia. And this probably will not be the last time Thailand points toward its southeastern neighbor to deflect attention from its own internal problems.

The Thai government faces numerous challenges at present, including rumors that the prime minister will resign, threats from the military that the armed forces will impose emergency rule in Bangkok, opposition warnings of mass demonstrations and a public that lacks any faith or trust in the government. The final countdown before a controversial draft constitution is finalized April 19 also makes diverting public attention appealing for Bangkok.

The widely circulated sensationalist Thai-language daily paper Kom Chad Luek published a story April 4 claiming that almost 20,000 Cambodian Muslims have entered southern Thailand over the last two years, with less than one-fifth of them returning home. The newspaper added that Thai police officials have observed a huge influx of young Cambodian Muslim men, usually traveling in groups of 10-12, entering Thailand through eastern Cambodian provinces such as Kampong Cham. The migrants then change vans in Bangkok to avoid detection, before finally heading to Thailand's three restive provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat.

When questioned about the reason for their travel, the Cambodians have offered suspiciously similar alibis, including claims that they are visiting relatives/traveling to pursue studies in Thailand's south or en route to search for jobs in Malaysia. Throughout the Kom Chad Luek report, the implied message is clear: southern Thailand faces a flood of large groups of dishonest young Muslim males who often overstay their visa periods. Although no direct link was made between the Cambodian Muslims and the southern insurgents, the piece was clearly designed to sway its typically Buddhist Bangkok-dwelling readers into anger against these foreigners and to link them with the southern insurgents.

This effort is heavily reminiscent of the former Thaksin government's actions in May 2005. At the time, Thaksin faced increasing pressure over the controversial sale of his stake in Shin Corp. and falling public support. Just when his need to muster support was at its greatest, a similar uptick in violence in the south occurred.

Almost identical stories began circulating in Bangkok regarding an unusually large number of Cambodian Muslims slipping across the Thai-Cambodian border. A deputy immigration chief at the Aranyaprathet border crossing reportedly claimed to have seen a rise in the groups of poor young Cambodian Muslim migrants, usually led by a cleric who appeared responsible for the group's expenses, and expressed fears that they "might have been lured by the southern insurgents to take part in their activities." Reports of vans full of smuggled Muslims also appeared in the press. Again, no direct link was made between the southern violence and these Muslims' reportedly suspicious behavior. Still, the simple yet suggestive incorporation of both issues in one mass media news report obviously was designed to convey a connection between the two. Rumors went as far as suggesting they were being groomed as potential jihadists in Thailand's south.

For Thai governments unable to quell the complicated situation in the south, internationalizing the problem constitutes a quick fix. And poor, internally troubled Cambodia represents an inviting target for several reasons:

• Its location on Thailand's southeastern border
• Its large Muslim population, estimated at more than 1 million out of total population of 12 million
• Its history of violence during the Khmer Rouge era, when floods of refugees poured across the Thai-Cambodian border
• Its lack of international clout
• Its disproportionately young and unemployed population, with over half its people aged 18 or less and the majority of males who turn 18 each year (about 300,000) unable to find jobs to keep them occupied
  

The only other geographically and demographically suitable alternative would be Malaysia -- provided Bangkok did not need its support to keep the Thai-Malaysian border under control and to suppress the smuggling that contributes to the complex web of southern violence.

Despite Thailand's efforts to blame Cambodia, the causes of violence in southern Thailand are complex, with religious, criminal and political elements -- making any short-term quick-fix a mere propaganda exercise.

Despite publicity regarding Cambodian Muslim migrants, Thailand will not start deporting all Muslim Cambodians from its southern borders any time soon just as Thaksin made no such effort -- even though Cambodia could do little to stop Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont if he chose to do so. By feeding such stories and pointing their fingers outside Thailand's borders, the government is merely seeking someone to blame in the event an explosion of southern violence ever spills over into the rest of the country, pushing Bangkok into aggressive countermoves.