Vietnam's Invasion of Cambodia, 1978

Excerpt from: The Responsibility to Protect, Background Research - Section B: PAST HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS
By: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)
Ottawa, Canada
Release Date: December 2001

Click here to read the full document.

VIETNAM'S INTERVENTION IN CAMBODIA, 1978

After a lengthy civil war, the Khmer Rouge came to power in Cambodia in April 1975, with the intention of "purifying" Cambodian politics(83) Commentators estimate that 1 to 2 million people were murdered by the government or died from malnutrition or disease(84) Amnesty International (AI) estimated that the figure of those calculatedly murdered, as opposed to those who died in other ways, amounted to hundreds of thousands(85) Minorities were especially subject to victimization, and "more than half of the total 1975 Cham population of 400,000 was killed."(86) Under the weight of such devastating figures, it seems unnecessary to detail the broad and systematic violations of other rights, such as the right to liberty, freedom from slavery and slave-like practices, the right to a fair trial, the right to privacy and family life, and the right to freedom of expression (87).

Immediately after their assumption of power, the Khmer Rouge began a series of cross-border attacks on Vietnam. During the summer and autumn of 1978, heavy fighting occurred along the border, with both the Cambodian and the Vietnamese governments blaming the other for acts of aggression. Vietnam ultimately invaded Cambodia with more than 100,000 troops, supported by 20,000 soldiers of the newly formed National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia. The Vietnamese troops quickly overran most of Cambodia, and by January 7, 1979, Phnom Penh fell. On January 8, the United Front formed a People's Revolutionary Council.

Because mass murder in Cambodia had been well documented, by the autumn of 1978, it could be argued that rescuing people from one of the most extraordinary examples of mass murder in the 20th century would be an outstanding example of humanitarian intervention. However, when Vietnam justified its conduct before the Security Council, it did not claim such a right. Rather, Vietnam invoked the right of self-defence because of Khmer Rouge aggression against Vietnam since 1975 (88) What Vietnam termed a "border war" justified its use of force in self-defence. Vietnam argued further that the "inhumane policies" of the Khmer Rouge regime, which had made Cambodia a "living hell," had caused the people of Cambodia to rebel against the regime and that it was this people's uprising which "overthrew the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique." There had been, in other words, two wars in Cambodia: "one, the border war started by the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique against Viet Nam," with regard to which Vietnam used force in self-defence; and "the other, the revolutionary war of the Kampuchean people." (89) With regard to the second, it was the Cambodian people themselves, Vietnam claimed, who had overthrown the Khmer Rouge regime.

Vietnam therefore did not describe its presence in Cambodia as a use of military force to pursue humanitarian objectives. In fact, Vietnam did not mention its presence in Cambodia at all. In none of the Vietnamese statements to the Security Council did the government acknowledge that Vietnamese forces were actually in Cambodia, let alone a presence of some 100,000 troops. Indeed, the Vietnamese representative referred to the "alleged invasion of the Vietnamese Army." (90) The disingenuousness of the Vietnamese argument undoubtedly stunned most members of the Security Council. However, neither the Soviet Union nor the other Eastern-bloc countries acknowledged the invasion (91). Each argued that the Cambodian people themselves had overthrown the Khmer Rouge regime (92). The presence of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia was never formally acknowledged (93).

The Western countries participating in the debate rejected Vietnam's claim to self-defence, and then went on to address the issue of whether a humanitarian claim could have been legitimate. None of the five NATO countries that spoke - France, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the US - thought that Vietnam's intervention could have been justified. Four of them expressly raised the issue of human rights and said emphatically that even massive violations would not have justified military intervention. Given what was known about abuses by the Khmer Rouge, Western responses are worth examining more closely. For instance, Norway said,

The Norwegian Government and public opinion in Norway have expressed strong objections to the serious violations of human rights committed by the Pol Pot Government. However, the domestic policies of that Government cannot - we repeat, cannot - justify the actions of Vietnam over the last days and weeks. The Norwegian Government firmly rejects the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State (94).

France agreed:

The notion that because a regime is detestable foreign intervention is justified and forcible overthrow is legitimate is extremely dangerous. That could ultimately jeopardize the very maintenance of international law and order and make the continued existence of various regimes dependent on the judgement of their neighbours. It is important for the Council to affirm, without any ambiguity, that it cannot condone the occupation of a sovereign country by a foreign Power (95).

Portugal also agreed:

Neither do we have any doubt about the appalling record of violation of the most basic and elementary human rights in Kampuchea ... [Nonetheless], there are no nor can there by any socio-political considerations that would justify the invasion of the territory of a sovereign State by the forces of another State ...(96)

The United Kingdom (UK) also put the matter emphatically: "Whatever is said about human rights in Kampuchea, it cannot excuse Vietnam ... for violating the territorial integrity of Democratic Kampuchea." (97) Of the other Western states in the debate, Australia also raised the human rights issue and put the matter every bit as categorically as NATO members: "We cannot accept that the internal policies of any Government, no matter how reprehensible, can justify a military attack upon it by another Government." (98)

All five of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) participating in the Security Council debate argued that Vietnam's intervention was unjustifiable. Given suspicions about Vietnam's long-standing expansionary behaviour in the region, reactions from these neighbouring countries were united in their rejection of the intervention. Only Singa-pore directly raised the issue of massive human rights violations:

It has been said by others that the Government of Democratic Kampuchea has treated its people in a barbarous fashion. Whether that accusation is true or false is not the issue before the Council ... . No other country has a right to topple the Government of Democratic Kampuchea, however badly that Government may have treated its people (99).

Without mentioning the human rights situation in Cambodia explicitly, Indonesia argued that, "[W]e may not like, we may even abhor, the political and social system in a country, but that fact cannot justify an armed intervention with the aim of changing that system." (100) Malaysia and the Philippines, not even mentioning the issue of human rights violations directly, argued that intervention was unacceptable for any reason (101).

Among other countries participating in the debate, Bolivia and Jamaica referred to the issue of massive human rights violations by the Khmer Rouge but argued that they could not justify Vietnam's intervention (102). Without referring directly to the human rights situation in Cambodia, Nigeria and Yugoslavia both argued that a domestic situation could not be used as a justification for foreign intervention in any form (103). Bangladesh, Kuwait, Sudan, Gabon, and Zambia emphasized the importance of the nonintervention principle (104).

The only countries that supported Vietnam's intervention were the Soviet Union and its political allies. Of the remaining 22 states, half directly addressed the issue of whether substantial human rights violations could justify a military intervention and argued emphatically that such violations could not. The debate ended on January 15, when a draft resolution calling for the withdrawal of all foreign (that is, Vietnamese) forces from Cambodia, although supported by 13 members of the Council, was vetoed by the Soviet Union.

Some time later, ASEAN countries requested the inclusion of an agenda item about Cambodia at the next autumn session of the General Assembly. Fifty-two countries presented their views during three full days of debate. Aside from the Socialist bloc and Soviet allies, Vietnam found no support but somewhat shifted the justification for its use of military force. Vietnam continued to claim to the General Assembly that it had acted in self-defence and that the Khmer Rouge regime had been overthrown by the Cambodian people themselves, but now it also admitted that its forces had in fact assisted the Cambodian people in their overthrow of the regime - without, however, at any time acknowledging the massive nature of Vietnamese assistance (105). Vietnam was, once again, supported by the Soviet Union, other Eastern-bloc countries, a number of Soviet political allies, and Grenada - a total of 17 countries, essentially on the ground that the Khmer Rouge regime had committed aggression against Vietnam.

Particular note should be taken of arguments used by three of Vietnam's supporters, the German Democratic Republic, Laos, and Afghanistan. After detailing Khmer Rouge human rights violations and arguing that such violations had reached genocidal proportions, each state claimed that intervention under such extraordinary circumstances had a legitimate character. For instance, the German Democratic Republic claimed that "the assistance of Vietnam in the struggle for a new Kampuchea was primarily a humanitarian matter. It rescued the Kampuchean people from total destruction." This was one of the few occasions when any state clearly supported the view that the use of military force could be legitimate if it had the humanitarian objective of preventing substantial loss of life of people who were not the intervening state's own nationals (106).

Approximately 20 states participating in the General Assembly debate directly addressed the issue of whether substantial human rights violations could provide a justification for intervention; and they argued that they could not. In the presidency, Ireland presented the viewpoint of the European Community. The members were aware that "basic human rights" were "grossly violated" by the Khmer Rouge regime, which behaved with "unparalleled brutality." Nonetheless, the violations did not justify Vietnam's intervention, which was "in contravention of fundamental principles of the Charter." (107) Austria, Bhutan, Pakistan, and Zaire agreed, as did the US and Australia, repeating views that they had expressed some months earlier in the Security Council.

On this occasion, the ASEAN states spoke more emphatically about intervention on human rights grounds than they had earlier in the Security Council. In the Council only Singapore had directly addressed human rights, and it had argued that intervention was not permissible, "however badly [the Kampuchean] Government may have treated its people." (108) Singapore was joined in this viewpoint by Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Malaysia, for example, argued, "No country has the right to intervene in the affairs of another for whatever reason or on whatever excuse. Admittedly, there is evidence that the Pol Pot government had been committing large scale violations of human rights in Kampuchea." Although Vietnam relied on such claims, according to the delegate, "This is a justification that no self-respecting country could accept. If it were to be accepted, no country could feel secure." (109) If anything, the Philippines put the matter even more emphatically. Having first declared that the Khmer Rouge regime was "genocidal," (110) the Philippine representative went on to argue,

At the same time - and we underscore this point - we cannot accept any pretext that armed intervention is necessary, justified and desired on the basis of whatever is happening within a country or under a regime ... . Neither do we agree that a human rights justification, as in the universal condemnation of Pol Pot and his regime, should be used as a basis to justify political action such as armed intervention and the conquest of a neighbouring State (111).

At the conclusion of the debate, on November 14, the General Assembly adopted the ASEAN-inspired Resolution 34/22 by a vote of 91-21-29, calling for the immediate withdrawal of foreign forces from Cambodia and appealing to all states to cease interfering in its internal affairs. Although not mentioned by name, the intention was to censure Vietnam, the only country with forces in Cambodia. The resolution was supported by, in addition to ASEAN, all Western countries, most Latin American countries, and a range of others. It was opposed by Vietnam, the Warsaw Pact countries, and such Soviet political allies as Cuba and Ethiopia (112).

References:
83. The junta referred to themselves as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.
84. African Research Bulletin, May 1997, p. 12695; see also, "Kabbah Urges ECOWAS Leaders to Restore Him to Power," Panafrican News Agency, September 2, 1997.
85. Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN SCOR, 52nd Session, UN Document S/PRST/1997/29 (1997).
86. Organization of African Unity Council of Ministers Sixty-sixth Ordinary Session May 28-30, 1997, Harare, Zimbabwe, Draft Decisions, CM/Draft/Dec.(LXVI) Rev.1, p. 18.
87. Given the circumstances on the ground in Sierra Leone, and the nature of the Nigerian mandate, it is clear that Nigeria intended to enforce the peace.
88. Economic Community of West African States Revised Treaty, Article 58 - Regional Security, July 24, 1993.
89. Portions of the aforementioned analysis were extracted from Levitt, "African Interventionist States and International Law" in Oliver Furley and Roy May, eds., African Interventionist States: The New Conflict Resolution Brokers (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001).
90. Secretary-General Pledges Support of United Nations in Helping Sierra Leone Leave behind Unfortunate Chapter in Country's History, UNPR, 53rd Session, UN Document SG/SM/6481 - AFR/44 (1998).
91. UN Document S/PRST/1998/5.
92. Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, UN SCOR, 53rd Session, UN Document S/1998/249 (1998).
93. S/1999/20, January 7, 1999, para. 10.
94. United Nation Security Council, Third Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, UN Document S/2000/186, March 7, 2000, para. 10.
95. Ibid.
96. Douglas Farah, "Diamonds Help Fill Rebel Group's Arsenal," Washington Post, April 17, 2000.
97. Robert Block, "Diamonds Appear to Fuel the Fires in Sierra Leone," Wall Street Journal, May 12, 2000.
98. Reuters, May 2, 2000.
99. Douglas Farah, "Rebel Leader Exploited UN Weaknesses," Washington Post, Foreign Service, May 15, 2000.
100. Major-General Vijay Jetley, Report on the Crisis in Sierra Leone, May 2000, para. 9.
101. Doug Brooks, "Sierra Leone Burns While the UN Fiddles," South African Institute of International Affairs Intelligence Update 21/2000, November 16, 2000.
102. Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998), p. 357.
103. David Binder, "Bush Warns Serbs Not to Widen War," New York Times, December 28, 1992.
104. The New York Times described this as a "deliberate ambiguity" necessary to allow Russia to support the resolution: Barbara Crossette, "Security Council Tells Serbs to Stop Kosovo Offensive, " New York Times, October 24, 1998.
105. Madeline Albright, press conference on Kosovo, Brussels, October 8, 1998,
106. Michael Evans and Tom Walker, "NATO Bombers on Alert for Order to Hit Serbs," Times, October 12, 1998.
107. Javier Solana, press conference at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, October 13, 1998,
108. UN Document S/1998/991, Annex.
109. UN Document S/1998/978.
110. UN Document S/PV.3937 (1998), pp. 14-15 (China).
111. Youssef M. Ibrahim, "UN Measure Skirts Outright Threat of Force against Milosevic," New York Times, October 25, 1998; and UN Document S/PV.3937 (1998), p. 12 (Russia), p. 14-15 (China).
112. UN Document S/PV.3937 (1998), p. 15 (US).