Khmer Intelligence News - 19 August 2008

19 August 2008

Ranariddh plots to topple Hun Sen (2)

CPP and Funcinpec leaders have in their possession a tape recording a recent phone conversation between self-exiled prince Norodom Ranariddh and Sao Rany, a prominent member of the Norodom Ranariddh Party (NRP) and a high-ranking official of the Interior Ministry. In the conversation the two politicians discussed about a plot to topple Hun Sen from power with the support of Vietnam and a faction of the CPP hostile to the current Prime Minister.

Thaksin prepares his comeback with the support of Hun Sen (2)

Former Thai Prime Minister and business tycoon Thaksin Shinawatra has recently signed an official deal with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen to purportedly develop the Cambodia's south-western maritime province of Koh Kong.

In fact, Thaksin wants to secure very convenient Cambodian-based facilities to prepare his political comeback in Thailand. Hun Sen is well aware of Thaksin's hidden agenda but the pair have many things in common.

The current tension between Cambodia and Thailand about Preah Vihear temple is in part due to false assurances given by Thaksin to Hun Sen in the past about border delineation. A possible additional reason for the tension is pressure exerted by Vietnam on Hun Sen to prove his loyalty toward Hanoi (see news above: "Ranariddh plots to topple Hun Sen"). From this perspective the current tension is reminiscent of the anti-Thai riots in Phnom Penh in January 2003 which were organized by the most pro-Vietnamese elements within the Cambodian government.

Real results of Cambodia's recent elections (2)

Independent observers recognize that the July 27, 2008 national election in Cambodia was marred with two serious irregularities: the issuing of forged voter identification documents to illegitimate voters in order to inflate votes for the ruling CPP, and the disenfranchisement of a significant portion of the electorate in order to reduce votes for the opposition (see KI News, 20 May 2008: "CPP's new strategy: disenfranchisement of non-CPP voters").
Reasonably adjusted for these two forms of fraud, the election results would be as follows:

• CPP: 2.99 million votes (instead of 3.49 million); 75 National Assembly seats (instead of 90).
• SRP: 1.84 million votes (instead of 1.32 million); 36 seats (instead of 26).
• HRP: 0.55 million votes (instead of 0.40 million); 7 seats (instead of 3).
• NRP: 0.48million votes (instead of 0.34 million); 2 seats (unchanged).
• FUNCINPEC: 0.43 million votes (instead of 0.30 million); 3 seats (instead of 2).
• Six other parties combined: 0.23 million votes (instead of 0.16 million); 0 seat (unchanged).

Underlying estimates for the above adjustment: the CPP votes were unduly inflated by roughly 0.50 million votes; the opposition votes were unduly reduced by roughly 1.00 million votes.

To check methodology and estimates and to enter different estimates/assumptions for sensitivity analysis, please click at http://tinyurl.com/63zuyc

Hundreds of CPP commune chiefs could be jailed for forgery (2)

Just before and on Voting Day, CPP commune chiefs throughout the country illegally issued an unprecedented number of 1018 forms which are substitute ID document and serve as voting card valid in a specific commune. There is evidence showing that the CPP methodically issued those 1018 forms to illegitimate voters in order to inflate its votes. Illegitimate voters are under-aged people, non-registered citizens, migrant workers unable to return to vote in the commune where they were originally registered, and foreigners with no voting rights. Through forged 1018 forms the CPP gave illegitimate voters the identity of "ghost voters" who are officially on the voter list but do not exist or are not present. These "ghost voters" are deceased people, twice-registered voters and voters who have permanently moved away from the commune.

In what was presented as a "cleaning-up" process that started in 2007, "ghost voters" were deliberately kept on the voter registry while names of legitimate voters known as non-CPP supporters were deliberately deleted from the voter registry. The CPP-controlled National Election Committee killed two birds with one stone: On the one hand it built up a reserve of hundreds of thousands of "ghost voters" for the CPP, and on the other hand it disenfranchised hundreds of thousands of opposition supporters (see news above: "Real results of Cambodia's recent elections") .

All the forged 1018 forms were certified, with signatures and official stamps, by CPP commune chiefs from all over the country.

The uncontrolled issuing of the 1018 forms did have a significant impact on the election results: As few as 4 fraudulent (1018-form-related) votes for the CPP per polling station could deprive the opposition of one parliamentary seat.

Article 49 of the Criminal Law states, "Any elected official or civil servant [who is involved in the forgery of public documents] shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of five to fifteen years."

See examples of 1018 forms by clicking at http://tinyurl.com/6cmh94
_________________________
20 May 2008

CPP's new strategy: disenfranchisement of non-CPP voters (2)

It has become obvious now that the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP) is implementing a new strategy, which was successfully tested in 2007, to secure another election victory even before Voting Day on 27 July 2008. In the voter list "clean up" process conducted by the CPP-controlled National Election Committee (NEC), some 600,000 names have been deleted from the voter registry. Names which should be deleted (ghost voters, foreigners with no voting right) have been kept on the list whereas names of real and legitimate votes have been deleted because related to those identified by CPP-affiliated village chiefs as non-CPP supporters.

Over the last five years, from the 2002 commune elections to the 2007 commune elections, the CPP has dramatically lost ground. In 2007 as in 2002, the CPP collected 61 percent of the popular votes. But there is a big difference between the two elections: in 2007, the voter turnout was only 65 percent whereas it was 87 percent in 2002, meaning that support for the CPP computed on the basis of the whole electorate dropped from 53 percent in 2002 to 39 percent in 2007. It was only through a massive disenfranchisement of non-CPP voters that the CPP could maintain its positions. The CPP is resorting to the same strategy in 2008.

[End]