Pankaj K Jha
Institute for Defense Studies & Analyses (India)
In his December 22, 2009 speech on the eve of Vietnamese People’s Army (VPA) Day, President Nguyen Minh Triet urged the Army to develop defence industry, improve tactical skills and upgrade weaponry to counter the high-tech weaponry and enhanced military strength of Vietnam’s enemies. Though no particular reference was made to China, the underlying theme was the need to counter the increasing assertion of Vietnam’s bigger neighbour. This was a stark departure from the posture adopted in the defence white paper released two weeks earlier.
Vietnam’s third national defence white paper (the first two were released in 1998 and 2004 respectively) shows its commitment to greater transparency in defence modernization and strategic planning. It clearly articulates the priorities for Vietnam but is quite restrained with regard to outlining policy and strategic plans for the future. The foreword by Defence Minister General Phung Quang Thanh categorically states that
“on the basis of the thorough grasp of the party and the state's guidelines of independence, self-reliance, peace, cooperation and development in external affairs and the foreign policy of openness, multilateralization and diversification in international relations, the Vietnamese people’s army should enhance defence diplomatic activities; expand and consolidate ties and cooperation with all countries (first and foremost with neighbouring and regional ones, and other major partners etc.), and conduct deepened, effective, stable, sustainable , mutually confident international relations that contribute to the successful implementation of the party and state's foreign policy, and meet the needs of building the Vietnamese People Army (VPA) under new conditions.”.1
The white paper makes only an indirect reference to China on the issue of military strategy, galloping defence expenditure, advanced weapon systems and technologies. It also lays emphasis on the increasing gap in defence capabilities between the major powers and developing countries. The white paper also discusses the issue of natural disasters and non-traditional threats in general.
The 155 page document is divided into four sections. The first section deals with the security situation and configuring the national defence policy. The white paper lists the country’s major achievements in terms of demarcating the land borders and the settlement of maritime borders with China in the Gulf of Tonkin. However, subsequent passages refer to Vietnam’s sovereignty over and security concerns in the South China Sea. The paper cautiously asserts Vietnam’s sovereign rights over the East Vietnam Sea (otherwise known as South China Sea), which includes the Spratly and Paracel islands. It stresses the importance of building national power through resources and people. It categorically abjures joining any military alliances and maintains the policy of not allowing any country to use its military bases for carrying out activities against a third country. Most interestingly, there are repeated references to developing defence ties with all countries through mutual respect, independence and sovereignty. The one striking example of benefits of defence diplomacy has been cooperation between Vietnam’s defence intelligence agency and its counterparts in other countries on strategic and defence issues. The white paper also discusses Vietnam’s role in peacekeeping operations, though here it expresses the need to gain further knowledge about legal systems and legal liabilities in UN peacekeeping operations.
Part two of the defence white paper discusses comprehensive national power including the whole gamut of factors and actors in building the national defence capability. Here, stress has been laid on developing the science and technology base. The white paper also provides details of the functions of the various departments and the role of leaders and their functional responsibilities. There is also a section devoted to the historical timeline of the development of the VPA and how the divisions were constituted during the First Vietnam War. This section also encapsulates the process of reunification of Vietnam in 1975 and the building of a unified country. It also clarifies the conditions under which Vietnam was forced to invade Cambodia.
The white paper also specifies that the strength of the Vietnamese people's Army (VPA) to be about 450,000, with five million reservists. It clearly states that Vietnam’s defence expenditure was Dong 16,278 billion in 2005 (approximately US $0.997 billion) and that it increased to 27,024 billion Dong ($1.8 billion) in 2008. Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP is in the range of 1.8 to 2.5 per cent.
In the defence white paper, an effort has been made to provide information about the various wings of the defence forces. Their areas of operation and responsibilities are also clearly demarcated. While stress has been laid on building the politico-spiritual strength of the personnel, there is no roadmap for providing them with enhanced training. The white paper lays great stress on enhancing the country’s technological capability, developing domestic defence industry and procuring advanced weaponry. It expresses clear apprehensions about the technical depth of the national defence industry and its capability to supply the military with advanced weaponry. A separate section is dedicated for broadening and intensifying international defence cooperation.
The last part of the white paper emphasises upon management of local defence units, strengthening them, training them and building greater awareness about among them about the emerging challenges. The concluding section highlights the need for greater convergence and integration. It also emphasizes the need for developing better relations with neighbours and the importance of striving for peace, democracy and progress in society. The appendices provide information about the country’s defence set up.
While the effort has been commendable, the white paper suffers from a few shortcomings. It falls short of identifying the major external and internal security challenges. While an attempt has been to be more transparent, the white paper does not give any information about the status of weapons, personnel training, and of the defence industry in terms of production. Although the white paper provides a comprehensive overview of the historical developments as well as the need for upgrading the defence forces and making them more efficient, it ignores the importance of network centric warfare and new modes of training like simulation, scenario building and war gaming. And finally, while Vietnam has the political will and national mandate for building strong, powerful and efficient defence forces, in terms of articulation there is a wide gap between perception and projection.
1. Vietnam National Defence, Ministry of National Defence, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Hanoi 12,2009.
Vietnam’s third national defence white paper (the first two were released in 1998 and 2004 respectively) shows its commitment to greater transparency in defence modernization and strategic planning. It clearly articulates the priorities for Vietnam but is quite restrained with regard to outlining policy and strategic plans for the future. The foreword by Defence Minister General Phung Quang Thanh categorically states that
“on the basis of the thorough grasp of the party and the state's guidelines of independence, self-reliance, peace, cooperation and development in external affairs and the foreign policy of openness, multilateralization and diversification in international relations, the Vietnamese people’s army should enhance defence diplomatic activities; expand and consolidate ties and cooperation with all countries (first and foremost with neighbouring and regional ones, and other major partners etc.), and conduct deepened, effective, stable, sustainable , mutually confident international relations that contribute to the successful implementation of the party and state's foreign policy, and meet the needs of building the Vietnamese People Army (VPA) under new conditions.”.1
The white paper makes only an indirect reference to China on the issue of military strategy, galloping defence expenditure, advanced weapon systems and technologies. It also lays emphasis on the increasing gap in defence capabilities between the major powers and developing countries. The white paper also discusses the issue of natural disasters and non-traditional threats in general.
The 155 page document is divided into four sections. The first section deals with the security situation and configuring the national defence policy. The white paper lists the country’s major achievements in terms of demarcating the land borders and the settlement of maritime borders with China in the Gulf of Tonkin. However, subsequent passages refer to Vietnam’s sovereignty over and security concerns in the South China Sea. The paper cautiously asserts Vietnam’s sovereign rights over the East Vietnam Sea (otherwise known as South China Sea), which includes the Spratly and Paracel islands. It stresses the importance of building national power through resources and people. It categorically abjures joining any military alliances and maintains the policy of not allowing any country to use its military bases for carrying out activities against a third country. Most interestingly, there are repeated references to developing defence ties with all countries through mutual respect, independence and sovereignty. The one striking example of benefits of defence diplomacy has been cooperation between Vietnam’s defence intelligence agency and its counterparts in other countries on strategic and defence issues. The white paper also discusses Vietnam’s role in peacekeeping operations, though here it expresses the need to gain further knowledge about legal systems and legal liabilities in UN peacekeeping operations.
Part two of the defence white paper discusses comprehensive national power including the whole gamut of factors and actors in building the national defence capability. Here, stress has been laid on developing the science and technology base. The white paper also provides details of the functions of the various departments and the role of leaders and their functional responsibilities. There is also a section devoted to the historical timeline of the development of the VPA and how the divisions were constituted during the First Vietnam War. This section also encapsulates the process of reunification of Vietnam in 1975 and the building of a unified country. It also clarifies the conditions under which Vietnam was forced to invade Cambodia.
The white paper also specifies that the strength of the Vietnamese people's Army (VPA) to be about 450,000, with five million reservists. It clearly states that Vietnam’s defence expenditure was Dong 16,278 billion in 2005 (approximately US $0.997 billion) and that it increased to 27,024 billion Dong ($1.8 billion) in 2008. Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP is in the range of 1.8 to 2.5 per cent.
In the defence white paper, an effort has been made to provide information about the various wings of the defence forces. Their areas of operation and responsibilities are also clearly demarcated. While stress has been laid on building the politico-spiritual strength of the personnel, there is no roadmap for providing them with enhanced training. The white paper lays great stress on enhancing the country’s technological capability, developing domestic defence industry and procuring advanced weaponry. It expresses clear apprehensions about the technical depth of the national defence industry and its capability to supply the military with advanced weaponry. A separate section is dedicated for broadening and intensifying international defence cooperation.
The last part of the white paper emphasises upon management of local defence units, strengthening them, training them and building greater awareness about among them about the emerging challenges. The concluding section highlights the need for greater convergence and integration. It also emphasizes the need for developing better relations with neighbours and the importance of striving for peace, democracy and progress in society. The appendices provide information about the country’s defence set up.
While the effort has been commendable, the white paper suffers from a few shortcomings. It falls short of identifying the major external and internal security challenges. While an attempt has been to be more transparent, the white paper does not give any information about the status of weapons, personnel training, and of the defence industry in terms of production. Although the white paper provides a comprehensive overview of the historical developments as well as the need for upgrading the defence forces and making them more efficient, it ignores the importance of network centric warfare and new modes of training like simulation, scenario building and war gaming. And finally, while Vietnam has the political will and national mandate for building strong, powerful and efficient defence forces, in terms of articulation there is a wide gap between perception and projection.
1. Vietnam National Defence, Ministry of National Defence, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Hanoi 12,2009.
11 comments:
India is one of Vietnam's secret helper. Not about just it is about to defreat China which India dreams of. There will be a big war in Asia around 2029 or so. Many million and million people will die.
Vietnamese are the most brutally savage and too evils on the planet.
May GOD defeat these beast Vietnamese and destory them from our planet earth. Amen
3:14AM You are one of the most Bull shits Viet.
The next war Viet Nam has Shits to pay for the war, the last war your Viet Cong still own more than 20 BILLION dollars.
The world have learned your bull shits. Cheats, Lies and Bull-shits that are your trade mark!
Don't worry folks. When the war between China and Vietcong erupted, Ah Sihanouk and Ah Hun Sen will defend and defeat Ah China. Both of them will help Vietcong again for the Indochina war. Ah Sihanouk helped Vietcong in the past to fight American and now Vietcong paid him back by taking our land.
Lightning should strike both of these individuals and the rest of CPP members.
Buddha shall protect Mr. Sam Rainsy and her people and country from the Vietcong and Ah Hun Sen enemies of the Cambodia
Oh please! What is so special about the Vietnamese Defense White for Paper 2009? Not all the shit in the Vietnamese Defense White paper will become reality! This is about talking all fancy which cost too much money to achieve!
Don't forget that China is a big whale among whales and Vietnam is a small shrimp among whales! ahhahahha
The Vietnamese are so paranoid and so afraid of China these days and every fucken time the Vietnamese think about go to war against China and the Vietnamese resort to thinking about how the whole world can help them win China! ahhahhahhah
It is amazing that the Vietnamese mentioned the word “Cambodia” only one time in their Defense White Paper! These Vietnamese think that they can win American without Cambodia involvement in the Vietnam War! They are so foolish!
It is very funny how the Vietnamese claimed that they were force to invade Cambodia but who force them to withdraw from Cambodia? Ahahhahahhah Didn’t the Vietnamese claimed that they can defeat anybody including Kubla Khan the Mongol, the French, the Japanese, the American , the Khmer Rouge….but they choose to withdraw from Cambodia after the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan.
Here we go again the so called the Vietnamese invincibility! ahahahhah
China might has big trouble if the war between China and vietnam were happened because:
1- China did not have fighting experiences in the past.
2- China does has many strong alliances.
3-China just became a supper power it means that China doesn't have strong foundations.
4-China might fall into vietnam tricks and tactics because China has a lot of ethnics group,vietnam will use those ethnics against China as viet used to utilize Khmer vietminh against Khmer Rouge from 1975 to 1979 back government by China and from 1979 up to present in Cambodia by dropping invisible viet's knife onto Khmer's hands.
5-In the old way of war vietnam can not defeat China but in modern war China would hardly defeat vietnam.
6-vietnam is preparing the high-tech first and waiting for the two tigers wounded and weak then vietnam grab benefits.
7-If the U.S vs China,vietnam rather want to see American win the war over China so that vietnam has no longer thread by China.
correction.
2- China doesn't have.
In Khmer porphetcy show that Viet thief will reduce to size, it will happen since Vietname has bad reputation there will be nobody to help them.
So go to hell you evil brutal beast.
To 10:55AM
I don't know what the hell you are talking about! ahahhahhahha
Listen up fool! Look at geography and you will find that Vietnam is next to china door step and the Chinese don't need to chase down the Vietnamese world wide like the Al Qaeda! ahahhahhaha
This is the war of attrition and the war of economic and the war of economic embargo!
Hello everyone,
where can I get a copy the subject paper? or does anyone have a copy to share?
Thanks,
Khmer boy jealous cause they so god damn poor
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