Is Thailand ready to settle down?

2010/02/17
W.SCOTT THOMPSON
New Straits Times (Singapore)

The real question has been whether Thaksin could just be worn down. The courts will decide next week whether to confiscate his long-frozen assets, and that might be a turning point.

In the meantime, he has popped up everywhere, lowering his image to the almost farcical by aligning himself with anyone who will give him a visa, almost marginalising himself by allying with Hun Sen, the leader of Thailand's traditional enemy, Cambodia.

BANGKOK. The city is manifestly booming again, despite the unsettledness of the past four years. The long-time foreign minister Thanat Khoman once said to me that the economic miracle here was because the government let the (Chinese) businessmen run the economy, quite separate from whatever conflict roiled the top places of power.

But this has been different. When international airports are shut down and riots figure regularly, not just tourism is affected. There has been all but a war between Thaksin Shinawatra's Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts loyal to the King and the old establishment. It's come close to civil war.

Sometimes conflicts end -- according to very carefully calibrated formulae -- when both sides just tire of it. The Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s is a classic case, where the end was in fact predicted by that formula, when the cost had come close to a trillion dollars.

It's not clear if that's the case now among the Thai players, but something significant has happened in the audience.

A recent poll of 6,000 respondents in 28 provinces reveals that now, at last, there are more neutrals than either of the parti pris. More are fed up with the silliness of it all than want to join in the conflict. Traditionally, everywhere, when that happens, good things develop and take hold. The problem is that the three sides aren't talking to each other.

It's not that there haven't been real stakes. Thaksin was a master politician and he knew exactly where to base his appeal -- in the poorest provinces. He did things for the peasantry; they re-elected him over and over. Meanwhile, he ruled with an iron fist in Bangkok. But even the results of his imposing "order" at the expense of freedom had dubious results.

I have learned that his dragnet on the drug lords owed to a family bitterness about the effects of drugs on a member of his inner family.

But as with so much else that he did, appearances deceived; yes, probably several thousand drug dealers were summarily executed but, apart from the human rights issues, it seems this just eliminated the little guys at the street corners, ridding the city of all competition for the big guys.

This cleared out the dirty corners, leaving the big dealers a free hand and higher prices at the table. Thaksin's "solutions" here had messier results than is generally realised.

The worst thing he did was to go after his enemies, the Democrat Party, in the south, their base outside of Bangkok. This eliminated all the infrastructure of mediation between government and the mostly Muslim population. The entire intelligence network was ripped to pieces.

Until 2004, there were a few manageable terrorist incidents a year; after this, the region became off-limits for tourism, investment and safety. It's a war. All thanks to Thaksin. It now will take another decade even to return to the status quo ante.

Of course, it is also true that the Yellow Shirts aren't heaven and apple pie. They have swept aside democratic niceties to stay in power courtesy of the First Army and the approbation of the "Very Highest Person", as the king is referred to with arms ascending upwards.

A bright political scientist now exiled has written a book, A Coup for the Rich, that is a hot black-market seller. It details just how much the Bangkok upper class benefited from the 2006 coup.

But good governance is slow to return. A senior civil servant told me his minister was "out of control" in corrupt practices. I have long respected "Mark" Abhasit, the prime minister, as a savvy and smart politician (Oxford-trained, of course); I just wondered if he were tough enough. In any event, he certainly can't keep his ministers in line.

At the Asean summit last year, when a few gunmen got past a very easy place to control forcing the cancellation of the summit, he suffered humiliation. A highly placed friend of mine says Abhisit Vejjajiva was "betrayed" at the summit. Maybe this toughened him up. He's shown skills in governance since. Respect has grown, even among the tough, older, seasoned politicians who tend to dominate things. He might just survive.

The real question has been whether Thaksin could just be worn down. The courts will decide next week whether to confiscate his long-frozen assets, and that might be a turning point.

In the meantime, he has popped up everywhere, lowering his image to the almost farcical by aligning himself with anyone who will give him a visa, almost marginalising himself by allying with Hun Sen, the leader of Thailand's traditional enemy, Cambodia.

Thaksin's transmission of large assets to Red Shirt allies is now daily headline news. My guess is, those will also be confiscated.

The interesting thing to contemplate is who represents what. The very smart Communist cadre, whose party was betrayed by China under Deng Xiaoping and then marginalised by Thailand's economic success, is attempting a comeback via Thaksin. In his heart -- and some of his proclamations -- Thaksin is a republican, of course; his competition mano a mano with the king is what undid him.

His supporters understand this. They don't buy into royalty and all that goes with it. So the stakes would be enormous if Thaksin had a serious chance of returning.

But even in Bangkok, some of the smarter rich are on his side. "He's the only one trying to do anything for the poor," said a former student of mine from a very prosperous family.

As Thaksin's assets diminish (along with his ability to get them to his supporters) and Abhisit's ministers become more accomplished, Thailand can get back to the virtuous road of economic development, not just construction booms. The government must follow up in the provinces what Thaksin started.

Everybody can benefit, but the Red Shirts will be unhappy campers for a long time to come.

The First Army is determined that it's "never again" for the erstwhile premier. And the great high leader sitting in his palace can be thankful that the job is done, at whatever cost.

In the best-case analysis, it's now a mopping-up operation. The next few weeks, with crucial tests of Thaksin's control of his forces and funds, will tell.

The writer is professor emeritus at the Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, Tufts University