After the ice age, the great thaw [between Cambodia and Thailand]

August 25, 2010
By Tulsathit Taptim
The Nation

Opinion polls have shown that Thais in general are more concerned about the border tension erupting into something worse than about losing territory to the Cambodians

Nobody saw it coming, but the sudden warming in Thai-Cambodian diplomacy bears all the characteristics of the unique bilateral relationship between the two neighbours.

Two weeks after Phnom Penh petitioned the United Nations for help, accusing Thailand of threatening to renege on its acceptance of Cambodia's rights over the Preah Vihear Temple - triggering a heated Thai response - the thin line between war and romance unexpectedly dissolved.

What's happened? Hun Sen has never been known as a man who budges easily. His past attacks on Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva suggested that all the bridges had been burnt. It appeared as though normalisation of relations between Phnom Penh and Bangkok was impossible as long as Abhisit remained in power.

Some say diplomacy is the art of saying "good doggie" until you can find a rock. Certain cynical Thai observers think that a reverse of that might have been what was happening to Cambodia. Thaksin Shinawatra, goes this theory, used to be a rock, but isn't any longer. In other words, Cambodia had bet on him but has since been disillusioned by his failure to make a quick political return here.

Too simple, other analysts say. Whatever happened that prompted Phnom Penh to do a 180 must have happened after the UN protests, they note. No matter how unpredictable the relationship has been, Cambodia would not have gone to the UN if it had planned to send an ambassador back to Bangkok in two weeks' time.

Did China have anything to do with it? This tantalising question stems from two key factors - Beijing's influence over Cambodia and the growing Sino-Thai mutual attraction. According to this second theory, as Phnom Penh ran to the United Nations, Thailand lobbied the neighbour who really matters. The results then were no surprise: Cambodia got the UN's typical and polite "we can help if asked" response, while Thailand had the ears of Big Brother.

It could yet be a combination of Theory One and Theory Two. When Thaksin hugged Hun Sen in November last year, sending bilateral ties into a tailspin, it was not quite clear who was using whom. That, again, represented the unique nature of the two countries' love-hate relationship. The burning of the Thai Embassy in Phnom Penh took place during Thaksin's premiership and there were times when his name was unfavourably associated with anti-Hun Sen manoeuvring in Cambodia. The world-famous embrace, therefore, reflected anything but true friendship.

Whatever his motives were, Hun Sen must have then considered Thaksin an asset, or a good bet at least. But the Cambodian leader must have also been frustrated at how one of his top national priorities - the registration of the Preah Vihear Temple as a World Heritage site - became so intertwined with Thai domestic politics. Few would consider it a coincidence that the temple conflict flared up when the rival camps in Thailand were at each other's throats.

The temple controversy will drag on. But "de-Thaksinisation" may help calm tempers. The issue was already complicated by different maps, disputed claims and re-demarcation that was going nowhere, so getting Thaksin out of the picture can only be a good thing. Both countries have lately admitted, albeit unofficially, that without proper diplomatic communications channels, the border situation has become unnecessarily dangerous.

Abhisit will still have the hardline elements of the yellow shirts to worry about. But in the big picture, improved relations with Cambodia will benefit him politically. Opinion polls have shown that Thais in general are more concerned about the border tension erupting into something worse than about losing territory to the Cambodians. Moreover, normalised ties will make it easier for Abhisit to pre-empt any territorial disadvantage in the first place.

The third theory as to why Thaksin is no longer Cambodia's "economic adviser" came from his aide Noppadol Pattama, who claimed his boss was too busy to fulfil the job. There is one little hole in that claim, though, as Hun Sen made it clear from the start that the appointment was a political, sympathetic gesture for a friend who had been persecuted in his own country. Thaksin was never expected to lead a national drive to push up Cambodia's GDP.

There has also been an argument that Thaksin needed to quit the advisory job because it was impossible for him to do anything without sparking controversy. That claim, however, resonated with the very first warnings from those opposed to the appointment, all of which fell on the deaf ears of both the appointer and appointee.

With Thaksin "let go" or "removed" or "kicked out", depending on various newspaper headlines, the hard part is now seemingly over for Abhisit and Hun Sen. Here comes the harder part, on which Abhisit may have a bit more experience than his Cambodian counterpart: Dealing with his "ghost".