Chinese Diplomacy Off Course

By overreaching in the South China Sea, Beijing has drawn the U.S. irrevocably into the debate.

Tuesday, August 3, 2010
By BARRY WAIN
The Wall Street Journal

The People's Liberation Army sent a clear signal with last week's live-fire exercises in the South China Sea: In the words of a defense spokesman, China's claims to sovereignty over the sea and its islands are "indisputable." Warships from all three of its fleets were involved, along with fighter jets and missile launches against long-range targets.

The exercises violate the spirit if not the letter of commitments China made to its neighbors eight years ago. Beijing joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in signing a "declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea." The signatories foreswore the threat or use of force to enforce their rival claims and promised to engage in cooperative confidence-building measures. But it has gradually become clear that Beijing has instead used the agreement to keep the territorial disputes off the regional agenda while it strengthened claims to sovereignty over almost the entire semi-enclosed sea.

Angered by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent declaration of American "national interest" in the South China Sea and her call for a multilateral process to resolve the islands' sovereignty, Beijing has bared its claws. Along with the unprecedented large-scale military exercises, the state-controlled media have unleashed a torrent of commentary reiterating their extravagant claim.

The show of force is meant to hammer home the message that China thinks the U.S. has no right to get involved in the area, where China, Taiwan and four Southeast Asian countries have a tangled web of territorial and jurisdictional claims. But it is likely to be read negatively in the region. Much of Southeast Asia, which has become increasingly concerned about China's assertive behavior in the South China Sea, will see it as another example of Beijing's high-handedness.

While little is expected to come of Mrs. Clinton's offer to facilitate a multilateral dialogue on the complex claims, the promise of a more active U.S. security role is welcomed, especially among the Southeast Asian claimants. They have been reluctant to upset Beijing by insisting that the China-Asean agreement be honored.

When signed in Cambodia in 2002, the "declaration on the conduct of parties" represented a compromise after the two sides failed to agree on a code of conduct in the South China Sea. Asean sought a code following China's stealthy construction of an outpost on Mischief Reef, off the coast of the Philippines, in the mid-1990s. In the end, China and Asean pledged to abide by international law and refrain from any action that might "complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability."

Essentially a political document, however, the declaration was full of holes. No geographical scope was mentioned, a sop to Beijing, which objected to the inclusion of the Chinese-occupied Paracel Islands, claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan. Asean also agreed to delete a clause banning the erection of new structures, settling instead for a vaguer prohibition against "inhabiting . . . presently uninhabited" locations.

The main aim, as officials admitted privately, was to send a signal to the international community that the South China Sea was no longer a flashpoint, while clearing the way for closer economic relations between China and Asean. Sure enough, the major powers with an interest in freedom of navigation through such a strategic waterway sat quietly on the sidelines, as China-Asean trade and investment surged.

But on the ground, or more accurately in the water, the promise of self-restraint was ignored. While several claimants are guilty of reinforcing their positions in the Spratly Islands, it is China that has hardened its stance and begun to throw its weight around.

Tensions rose in the past three years as Beijing threatened international oil companies operating in the South China Sea. A modernized Chinese navy increased its presence, harassing ships of the U.S. and other navies, enforcing a unilateral fishing ban and arresting hundreds of Vietnamese fishermen.

Meanwhile, a joint China-Asean working group committed to exploring confidence-building measures, supposedly leading to a code of conduct, has all but stalled. It has met only three times, the latest time in Hanoi in April, with Beijing apparently not interested in going further.

Diplomats recall that Beijing adopted similar tactics after the Philippines signed a bilateral code of conduct with China in the wake of the Mischief Reef intrusion. Beijing's intransigence torpedoed those earlier attempts at confidence building, too.

China's harsh criticism, currently directed at the U.S., decries attempts to "internationalize" the South China Sea disputes. Beijing denies any coercion or threat to regional peace emanating from the overlapping claims, and warns against traditional superpower tactics designed to maintain dominance in a disputed area.

But Beijing must be acutely aware that when Mrs. Clinton raised the South China Sea issue at a regional security forum in Hanoi on July 23, other countries lined up behind her to voice concern. They included the Asean claimants—Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei—as well as Indonesia, the EU, Australia and Japan.

China committed a tactical error by describing the South China Sea as a "core interest" and alarming the other Asia-Pacific powers. By overreaching, it has drawn the U.S. irrevocably into the debate. Once the current fit of pique is over, Beijing is going to have to think about how to engage Asean in a more measured manner, or else risk pushing its neighbors into closer alliances with the U.S.

Mr. Wain, writer-in-residence at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, is a former editor of The Wall Street Journal Asia.