Seeking Balance in Cambodia

November 2, 2010
Posted by Catharin Dalpino
Asia Security Initiative

In a town hall meeting with young Cambodians on Monday, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton lost little time zeroing in on Cambodia’s relations with China. “Look for balance,” she counseled when asked to comment on Cambodia’s international relations. She did not need to mention that China is Cambodia’s largest external donor; a source of new infrastructure; and a military partner. Clinton granted that there are reasons for Phnom Penh to maintain good relations with Beijing, but also urged that Cambodia raise certain issues with China, such as the downriver effects of Chinese dams built on the Mekong River. From there the questions quickly moved to an issue that Cambodia has with the United States: Phnom Penh’s debt of $400 million outstanding from the Lon Nol period in the early 1970’s, the disposition of which is still under discussion. Clinton assured the audience that Washington wants to resolve the matter but did not offer a specific solution. The juxtaposition of these two questions and answers demonstrates, on the one hand, that China has transcended its Cold War history with Cambodia and, on the other, that US-Cambodia relations still suffer from some degree of time warp.

In Western analysis, Cambodia often emerges as the poster child for China’s “charm offensive” in Southeast Asia, an example of a small, weak state on the verge of absorption by a large and predatory neighbor to the north. But Sophie Richardson offers an alternative interpretation in her book China, Cambodia, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Columbia University Press), published this year. She delves into the origins of the PRC’s Five Principles of foreign policy- peaceful coexistence, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, nonaggression, non-interference, and the assumption of equality - forged by the Communist Party of China in the early 1940’s and abandoned during the Cold War in favor of revolutionary intervention.

Although Richardson is careful to point out that Beijing endeavors to apply the Five Principles across the board (and the world), there was no greater need for them than in Southeast Asia, where China had been particularly active in supporting communist insurgency in the 1950’s and 1960’s. And within Southeast Asia, no better test case than Cambodia, where Beijing’s history of support for the Khmer Rouge could well have poisoned relations with Phnom Penh in the post-UNTAC period. Richardson draws out the nuances in Chinese policy toward Cambodia. Beijing’s opposition to the Khmer Rouge Tribunal may not have been based on fear that a tribunal would uncover unsavory details about Chinese complicity in Khmer Rouge crimes, as is commonly assumed in the West, but rather in concern that a tribunal could destabilize Cambodia’s fragile political stability. In this and other examples Richardson acknowledges the risk in analysis of this kind: that attempting to understand the mindset and motivations of Chinese foreign policy may be seen as tantamount to apologizing for it in some quarters. However, she also points out serious drawbacks to the Five Principles policy, not least being that it has prevented Beijing from intervening in numerous instances in which a foreign government has committed systematic and gross human rights abuse against its own people. A persistent and vocal advocate with Human Rights/Asia in Washington, Richardson presumably is all too aware of such cases.

Richardson also offers a brief chapter on Chinese-US relations. In Beijing’s view, US foreign policy is the antithesis of the Five Principles, and Richardson holds out little hope that the two countries will narrow the gap in this regard. However, Cambodia illustrates the success of the Chinese approach at this point: Beijing’s unconditional aid gives it an advantage over the West - the United States, European Union and the major IFI’s - which is inclined to tie assistance to a number of demands, such as greater control over corruption. To be sure, US relations with Cambodia have improved noticeably in recent years and enjoyed several watersheds, from the introduction of the Peace Corps in 2007 to the first post-1975 joint military exercises this year. But if, as Clinton suggests, Phnom Penh needs more balance in its foreign relations, it may behoove Washington to increase its efforts in Cambodia to help even out the scales.

---------

The Asia Security Initiative blog hosts a discussion of current events and security challenges in the Asia-Pacific, drawing from the policy research of the Asia Security Initiative network. Anchored by six expert bloggers, the blog also includes contributions from leading Asia Security Initiative-supported experts.