Thailand's Withering Democracy Leading to Political Impasse

03 Dec 2010
Fabio Scarpello
World Politics Review

The withering of Thailand's democracy is closing potential avenues for political resolution of the country's ongoing crisis and may lead toward widespread violence, and possibly even an armed revolt.

The latest episode in this ongoing, self-destructive process was the Constitutional Court's decision on Nov. 29 to dismiss a case against the ruling Democrat Party -- which had been accused of electoral fraud -- on a technicality. In ruling that the case was not brought within the prescribed time period, the court declined to consider the merits or the opinion of the prosecutor. The party risked being dissolved in the event of a conviction.

The ruling is problematic, but not surprising. The Thai legal system has a history of siding with the party in power. In many respects, this latest ruling recalls one that cleared former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra on charges of asset concealment in 2001. At the time, the freshly elected Thaksin was acquitted despite convincing evidence that he and his wife had hid huge amount of his Shin Corporation shares with nominees' accounts.

This week's ruling nonetheless highlights and reaffirms the country's ongoing reverse-democratization.

Thailand has never been a liberal democracy, characterized by the rule of law and deep popular participation in the political process. But after the fall of the dictatorial regime in 1992, Bangkok made considerable progress in moving from authoritarianism toward a functioning democracy, with the progressive and inclusive 1997 constitution making Thailand a beacon of democracy for the region. Although the various regimes that followed were hybrid democracies, neither authoritarian nor truly liberal democratic, the trend was toward a more participatory democracy.

Thaksin's rise inverted that process, and current Premier Abhisit Vejjajiva is arguably even less-democratic. The two share responsibility for the country's spiraling regression.

According to the Freedom House 2010 report, Thailand can no longer even be considered an electoral democracy. The U.S. watchdog, like many others, deemed the December 2007 election neither free nor fair and noted that Abhisit has avoided going to the polls to gain a democratic mandate since assuming power. He still governs with the mandate accorded by parliament in a vote heavily influenced by the military in 2008. By then, the military had already substituted the 1997 constitution with one that erased most of its democratic advances. In addition, Abhisit is seen as progressively losing his grip on power, while the military is increasingly open about asserting its own will. Thailand may not be a dictatorship yet, but it is very close to becoming one.

Bangkok has been under an emergency decree since early this year. The military monitors all political activities. Web sites are blocked. Community radio stations, cable television channels and publications leaning toward or supporting the opposition are either shut down, blocked or constrained. Legal recourse for arrested opposition members is nonexistent.

In such a context, an independent judiciary could have provided a mitigating outlet for the political conflict. But as an expert on constitutional process at Bangkok's Chulalongkorn University told World Politics Review, "Since the time of the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) dissolution, the Constitutional Court has lost all credibility."

The TRT was the first Thaksin-affiliated political party. It was dissolved in May 2007 by the Constitutional Court for violating electoral laws during the 2006 legislative elections. In addition, 111 TRT senior members, including Thaksin, were banned from participating in politics for five years. Thaksin's second political vehicle, the People's Power Party, was also dissolved by the Constitutional Court in December 2008.

Without an independent judiciary, and with little prospect of either an early election or genuine political, social and economic reform, it appears likely that political instability will remain and probably get worse.

Far from healing the differences, in fact, Bangkok's political-military response has led to a metamorphosis in the opposition, making it now more difficult to root out. The recent, apparent calm should be read as a gathering of dark clouds, rather than a slow return to normality.

The anti-government front has become fragmented but is still very active. The pro-Thaksin Puea Thai Party remains the largest party in parliament and arguably the most popular in the country. It is likely that it would win a general election, if one were held today.

However, the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) -- the opposition umbrella organization, also known as the Red Shirts -- is no longer merely a pro-Thaksin front. Its various factions, which include those interested in progressive political reforms as well as former communists, may have different objectives, but they are united in their dislike of the current regime. This makes the movement a formidable force, unlikely to be subdued even in the long term.

Following the arrest of most of the UDD leaders, the movement has also become more grassroots-driven, reinventing itself as a vanguard for multilayered grievances. Large-scale protests have been abandoned in favor of locally organized, small-scale events, which take place several times every week nationwide, giving people the opportunity to vent their frustrations.

The ongoing government crackdown may also lead to the emergence of an underground, violent faction of the movement. Over the past few months, there have been a series of small explosions across Bangkok and some provincial capitals. The military and the Red Shirts have blamed each other for the attacks, but the possibility of a new, politically motivated, armed insurgency cannot be ruled out. During the April-May demonstrations in Bangkok, the Red Shirt camp was guarded by the so-called Ronin Warriors, men with paramilitary training, estimated by security sources to number around 400-500. Most have returned home, although it is possible -- even likely -- that some may have decided to continue their struggle. Their links to supporters in the political and business establishment would facilitate access to funds, weapons, and trained recruits.

To avoid falling into the trap of endless social unrest and a potential civil war, the conservative elite -- comprised of the military, the bureaucracy, the monarchy, and parts of the political establishment -- would need to reverse the current trend and move the country back toward a more democratic, participatory system. This implies a genuine political reform that takes into consideration the aspirations of the rural masses via a better distribution of wealth and political power.

Unfortunately, there are no signs of this happening.

Fabio Scarpello is the Southeast Asia correspondent for the Italian news agency Adnkronos International. He is based in Denpasar, Indonesia.