[Thailand:] Key element missing in 'coup plot' - a good excuse

February 4, 2011
By Tulsathit Taptim
The Nation

Words of wisdom have it that you can never discard the possibility of a military coup in Thailand. So is Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva safe?

The current coup rumours were based on what was perceived by some as a political impasse. According to the "deadlock" school of thought, Abhisit, because of his disastrous handling of the Thai-Cambodian territorial conflict, has come as far as he could, and although he has repeatedly promised an early election, that wouldn't help. Under present political circumstances, the only alternative to Abhisit is a Pheu Thai-led government, which would be too close to Thaksin Shinawatra for comfort.

In other words, if both the Democrats and Pheu Thai are bad for Thailand, there's going to be only one option left. The question, therefore, is how practical or plausible that "option" is. The answer is: "Not much."

A coup now would be illogical. In a democracy, no coup is logical, you may argue, but a coup now would be even "more illogical" than any others given the looming election. Men in uniform could roll out tanks to expel politicians who are allegedly corrupt, abusive and intolerable and who refuse to go away. But in Abhisit's case, what can the military say when a prime minister is promising an early election every other day? Can they really tell him, "We know you are giving it back to the people, but we want you to leave at gunpoint, anyway"?

The 2006 coup was very different. Thaksin called a new election from an omnipresent position. He knew he was unbeatable election-wise and so did his opponents. Abhisit will call a new ballot from a shaky position, so nobody would be able to accuse him of trying to give himself with a fake new "mandate".

Of course, if Abhisit lets it drag on past April, the "illogical" argument may lose weight. But again, a coup as the country edges towards an election requires a very good script to answer both domestic and international critics.

Now, to the issue of who could do it. Most eyes have been on Army chief Prayuth Chan-ocha. If soft-spoken, diplomatic soldiers like Anupong Paochinda could do it, how can we trust an aggressive, sometimes belligerent character like Prayuth, who, additionally, is a well-connected guy with favourable ties with people who matter in various sectors?

But Prayuth has chosen to be diplomatic on the Cambodian affair. In fact, on the matter of the controversial Cambodian monastic sanctuary built on a disputed area at the border, he sounded more cautious and polite towards Cambodia than the Thai Foreign Ministry. If he launched a coup against Abhisit, the conventional "explanation" to the Thai public couldn't include accusations that the government was "weak" when it came to national sovereignty. That would leave Prayuth with little to utilise as a pretext.

Then there's the issue of "motivation". Most coups in the past happened because perceived or proclaimed serious threats against the country's beloved institution, and politicians in power were implicated in such threats, if not directly deemed to be those threats themselves. Whatever people criticise Abhisit for, he can hardly be accused of being disloyal.

Another conventional motivating factor is perceived threats against the military establishment. Abhisit has been respectable in this regard, never trying to politicise the military. Critics will argue he has just been the military's "good boy", which, however, raises the question why a "good boy" would have to be booted out.

This leaves "corruption" as the only viable pretext. This excuse, however, requires assets seizure, a court trial and all. For any ambitious general out there wanting to explore this avenue, all he needs to do is look back and see how difficult it was even against one Thaksin Shinawatra.