[Thai] Military interference hinders a settlement of border issues

March 2, 2011
By Pavin Chachavalpongpun
The Nation

some Thai soldiers deployed along the border complained of Abhisit's seemingly hopeless approach toward Cambodia, and that they decided to fire artillery into the Preah Vihear Temple to demonstrate their frustration as much as their bravery

For now, there will be no more armed clashes along the Thai-Cambodian border.

Asean, led by its current chair, Indonesia, can be proud of its achievement in bringing the grouping's two stubborn members to the negotiating table. Asean's mediation efforts are commendable. But they may be inadequate in the search for a long-lasting solution to this persistent thorn in Thai-Cambodian relations.

Already, Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva has confirmed that the Thai Army will not withdraw any troops from the border, even though Indonesia is in the process of sending a team of observers to the disputed area. Abhisit's firm position is likely to see a similar firm response from his Cambodian counterpart, Prime Minister Hun Sen.

That suggests the situation will remain fragile. It will also remain highly dangerous if Thailand continues to produce an incoherent policy vis-a-vis Cambodia.

Analysts have been unable to figure out why armed clashes broke out on February 6, just a few hours after the two countries' armies agreed on a temporary ceasefire. There are so many possibilities, which have led to so much speculation.

But one thing is quite certain: There is likely to be a collision involving the policies endorsed by the Thai Foreign Ministry and the Army. The two agencies have apparently adopted two different approaches.

There is nothing new about the above situation. In the past, as Thailand was concerned with the threat posed by ethnic insurgents operating in Burma, the military often expressed its impatience with the Foreign Ministry's "spongy" approach. Similarly, as the Foreign Ministry became more interested in trading with Burma during the Thaksin Shinawatra administration, the military, particularly those units stationed in the north, were more concerned about the flow of illegal drugs, weapons and refugees from Burma into Thailand.

In the context of the Thai-Cambodian conflict, it is evident that the Foreign Ministry's diplomatic approach failed miserably in preventing the armed clashes. Its failure was understandable: Cambodia was more than willing to reject anything proposed by the yellow-shirt member turned foreign minister Kasit Piromya. There is a lack of trust between Hun Sen and Kasit.

Since the coup of 2006 the military has invaded politics and resumed a dominant role in the foreign policy domain. The military has taken new initiatives, particularly in redefining the faces of enemies, reinventing new threats to national security and reinvigorating its own power through the defence budget augmentation. For these purposes, the Thai Army has nominated Cambodia as Thailand's most worrying external threat.

With this prevalent perception of the situation, the Thai military has shown little interest in promoting a working relationship with Cambodia. The devious campaign by the Thai Patriots' Network, the nationalist faction in the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), is particularly crucial here. The PAD faction has encouraged the Thai public to give consent to a military option in dealing with the border issue. Undoubtedly the PAD's encouragement has helped deepen the military's position in the political realm and in the country's aggressive policy toward Cambodia.

While the Foreign Ministry has tried hard to keep the channels of communication open with Cambodia, these attempts are frequently incapacitated by the military and non-state actors, such as the PAD, the Thai Patriot Networks and the Santi Asoke sect. Together they have transformed Cambodia into national enemy number one.

Painting Cambodia in this way has further complicated the work of the Foreign Ministry. Today, the military continues to assert the right to pursue its own foreign policy while invoking the trump card of national security.

A military-influenced foreign policy can be exceedingly treacherous. By nature, the military has been taught to make war, not peace, and to accumulate arms, not friends. The term "diplomacy" has never been in the Thai military's dictionary. It is doubtful if the majority of Thai soldiers really understand the content and structure of international politics. Most importantly, in the case of Thai-Cambodian relations, which have been shaped by distorted memories of the past, the question of whether they actually comprehend the devastating effects on the bilateral ties caused by fabricated history remains critical.

It was reported that some Thai soldiers deployed along the border complained of Abhisit's seemingly hopeless approach toward Cambodia, and that they decided to fire artillery into the Preah Vihear Temple to demonstrate their frustration as much as their bravery. To a great extent, the PAD has been successful in stirring up a sense of nationalism. Some Thai generals truly believe they are indeed fighting against a national enemy. In other words, for them, a war with Cambodia would be legitimate.

At this point in time, the only role left for the Foreign Ministry to play is to fix problems created by the military and the irresponsible nationalist elements in the PAD. Making enemies is easy. But to rebuild trust can take decades.

The Foreign Ministry has been put in an awkward position: With the Thai military on its shoulder, it is unable to promote a serious dialogue with Cambodia, or to reassure Cambodia of Thailand's sincerity so long as Kasit is still in charge.

Pavin Chachavalpongpun, a former diplomat, is a visiting lecturer at the Department of Political Science at the National University of Singapore.