By Khmer Democrat, Phnom Penh
ECCC Cases 003 and 004 Series
Is civil party applicant Ms. Theary C. Seng correct in saying that Meas Muth and Sou Met are in Case 003 and Im Chaem and two other district chiefs are in Case 004? See ECCC Timeline by Theary C. Seng. Are Cambodian scholar Steve Heder and international lawyer Brian Tittemore correct in naming Meas Muth and Sou Met as senior leaders to be prosecuted? See http://www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/khmerrouge.pdf?rd=1. This series will provide in full the section on Meas Muth and Sou Met from the report Seven Candidates for Prosecution: Accountability for the Crimes of the Khmer Rouge.
According to DC-Cam’s holdings of the minutes of meetings of Central Committee military units as well as various messages between Son Sen and those units, in 1976 and 1977 Sou Met regularly and Meah Mut occasionally attended General Staff meetings, where they spoke, listened to reports by colleagues, and witnessed pronouncements by Son Sen.
These minutes implicate Sou Met and Meah Mut’s knowledge of arrests of civilians and CPK cadre as revealed to them by Son Sen and by division and regimental cadre who attended these gatherings (almost all of whom are now dead), as well as their knowledge of various "smashings" and "sweepings," including of purge victims to whom the especially damning label of "super-traitors" was applied.
The following detailed accounts of several of those meetings reveal Sou Met and Meah Mut’s close involvement in and knowledge of the Party’s arrest, interrogation and execution policies, and also reveal pertinent details of those polices as articulated by Chairman of the General Staff Son Sen.
On May 16, 1976, Sou Met attended a meeting of leading cadre of Central Committee divisions at which other secretaries reported on arrests their units had carried out -- arrests which, as indicated in Part III, were widely understood within the Communist Party to inevitably result in interrogation and death. Pin, the Secretary of Division 703 (later purged), informed those present of the arrest of "two skinny, long-haired persons...at the Central Market" in Phnom Penh, while Sâm Huoy alias Meah Tal (later purged), the Secretary of Division 180 (290), reported that it had arrested "four enemies" -- "two CIAs" and "two soldiers." On August 30, 1976, Sou Met attended another General Staff meeting, which had as its first agenda item an "examination of enemy situations and measures." Opening the meeting, Son Sen reported that, four days earlier, there had been "enemy unrest at Ang Prouch, on the border between Kandal Steung district" of Sector 25 and the neighboring Sector 33, both in the Southwest Zone. Those involved in the unrest had "raised a white banner with the slogan 'Long Live Buddhism' [and] 'Long Live the White Khmer Front of Liberation from Rice by the Can'." This pro-Buddhist, anti-Communist, anti-communal movement had been "getting ready for major unrest," but it had "already been sorted out by the grassroots" political administration through the arrest of more than 160 people. Moreover, Son Sen explained, the "responses" of these individuals during interrogation revealed that there was "a nexus between this situation and our army," because the detainees had implicated Chan Charkei alias Nôv Mean, the former Secretary of Central Committee Division 170, which was based on the outskirts of Phnom Penh, as "their leader." Charkei had been removed as Division 170 Secretary and made a Vice Chairman of the General Staff on March 15, 1976 and was subsequently arrested on May 19, 1976.
As purported evidence that an "enemy ... leadership apparatus" was behind rural unrest and problems in the army, Son Sen pointed to the fact some Division 170 combatants had recently "deserted" and fled to East Zone Sector 20, and that there had also been "agitation to steal" in certain military units. Son Sen advised Sou Met and other senior military cadre present that they should "examine and keep track of no-good elements" in their divisions, and "organize for them to be administered separately," that is, cull them out of existing units and concentrate them some place apart. At the meeting, Sou Met reported that one of his men had deserted, while another had recently "hung himself to death." Other leading cadre recounted their units' recent arrests. Son Sen concluded at this meeting that it was "apparent that the enemy has commenced activities, and these are activities endowed with a leadership network because the news is the same and the slogans are the same." He warned:
Sou Met attended another meeting of division leading cadre on September 16, 1976, where he listened to more reports of arrests and received more advice from Son Sen, and thereby gained further knowledge of the Party’s policies targeting suspected “enemies.” At this meeting, Son Sen expounded on what he referred to as "the enemy activities in the American imperialism and their lackeys department." In an apparent reference to the results of the interrogation at S-21 of Cambodians who had been allowed to come back to Cambodia from the United States and other places since April 1975, he declared that "according to the responses of those returning from abroad who we sent to do production and who fled, they say they fled in order to report to the CIA in South Viet Nam." Their "responses" had supposedly also revealed a French and United States imperialist plan to attack Cambodian islands in the Gulf of Siam.
Referring to "the infiltration links" of the previously arrested former Secretary of Division 170, Chan Chakrei alias Nôv Mean, Son Sen declared that "the Chakrei links are a major infiltration network that is in contact both with American imperialism and the revisionists" of the Soviet Union and Viet Nam, and that Chakrei’s links had been "making contacts" within the Revolutionary Army "to win over those having contradictions over status and rank and those dissatisfied with our revolutionary regime." Son Sen indicated that this was because "Soviet, Vietnamese and CIA links were all connected to Chakrei," and claimed that "current agitation actions" within the armed forces demonstrated the existence of links to the CIA among "those with an incorrect revolutionary stance." All of this information proved that the army had been lax in allowing deserters and other undesirable elements who had been purged from the army during the 1970-1975 war to re-enter it after 1975, along with "newcomers who had never fought at all" and "even evacuees from Phnom Penh." Son Sen therefore called on leading cadre "to follow up troop biographies clearly and conscientiously, especially of those we have enrolled recently," apparently in order to weed out such elements by means that were not specified. Again, such directions appear to have exposed Division Secretaries like Sou Met and Meah Mut to the Party’s “purge” policies and the methods by which they were carried out.
Both Sou Met and Meah Mut also attended a General Staff meeting convened on September 19, 1976, at which S-21 was represented by its number three cadre, Huy. They and other participants in this meeting heard another exposition on the situation from Son Sen, who called for continuing concern "about the activities of the enemies inside the country and inside our ranks," all of which were "CIA activities." He emphasized that, although attacks by enemy networks "burrowing from within the grassroots and our army" had "been basically defeated" because the most important of these networks had now been "attacked and smashed," it remained
In particular, Son Sen told leading military cadre that they must "have an absolute standpoint about purging counter-revolutionary elements; don't be half-baked." Meah Mut and Sou Met also listened to reports of arrests from other leading division cadre. This included Division 310 Secretary Sbauv Him alias Euan (later purged), who reported that "a number of traitors" had been "discovered" in the division through what Euan described as "the concrete situation" and as a result of "responses from the outside," possibly a reference to "confessions" extracted at S-21.
In his own report at this meeting, Meah Mut echoed elements of CPK purge policies, lamenting that there had been "powerful changes" for the worse with regard to "enemy situations" in September.
First, he said, "thefts of everything have emerged."
Second, somebody was "whipping up the word that there are tigers" about in Division 164's areas of operation.
Third, "seven combatants from the motor pool set up a liberal unit of organization with their own commissar, commander and person in charge of logistics."
Fourth, "combatants and cadre who have been hospitalized walk around freely."
Finally, "some cadre" were misleading "their subordinates by saying the Organization has summoned them to a meeting, and then go motorcycle riding for fun." At the same meeting, Sou Met reported an "enemy situation" involving the discovery by Division 502 of a carbine in a place where a political study session was to be convened. This discovery had led him to "surmise ... that the enemy intended to kill our cadre while they were studying." He also reported that "no-good elements" in the Northwest Zone army who had been guarding an airfield near Batdambang town had been purged by the "grassroots" there.
Furthermore, he lamented that, while most of his own cadre and combatants were "good and active in building socialism,” some individuals were "still kicking back and insubordinate." In particular, one company cadre who had been assigned "to guard enemy women" had been accused of "being mixed up in problems of morality," that is sexual impropriety. Arrests by Sou Met’s Division 502 were reported at a September 30, 1976 meeting of the General Staff presided over by one of its members, Siet Chhæ alias Tum (later purged).
Under the agenda item "enemy situations," the minutes record that Sou Met's unit had been "able to arrest 15" combatants who had "deserted in September" and were now confined as "elements with tendencies and who are liberal." On October 9, 1976, Sou Met's deputy, Nhem San (later executed), sent a report to the General Staff on a new enemy situation that had resulted in Division 502's arrest two days previously of one Ov Pring,4who had "responded" during interrogation that he "had conducted activities in Boeng Thom subdistrict, District 52, Sector 33, with the intention of conducting a demonstration on 12 October 1976 to oppose the listed in the report.
Meah Mut and Sou Met then attended an October 9, 1976 meeting of division cadre convened by Son Sen. They heard Division 450 Secretary Suong (later purged) speak of problems with "cadre whose parents have been swept out" before listening to reports by their deputies Deum (later purged) and San. Deum reported four recent arrests by Mut’s Division 164, and San similarly referred to "some arrests on the 502 front.” He also reported that Division 502 suffered from "desertion to the grassroots," contacts with bandits and complaints by cadre.
Finally, he reported that "more than 80 elements with political tendencies" had "already been removed" from the Division. Also notable during this meeting was Son Sen's presentation on how the "duty of defending the country" had been carried out with regard to a "certain number of traitors in the Party whom we have been able to arrest." He promised to inform those present of the "measures" taken in this connection "and a number of experiences we have deduced with
regard to the task of defending the country."
Son Sen also declared that "we have basically smashed the leadership links" of this suspected traitorous network. Using an established code word to describe those who were condemned to death, he said these leadership links "were big historical super-traitors to the nation and Party." Those who had been "basically smashed" included such "CIAs on the inside," along with "the major traitorous forces belonging to them." He warned, however, that "their henchmen still exist." Thus, he instructed:
Son Sen therefore urged those present to indoctrinate subordinate cadre and combatants in their units "so that they understand the state of contradictions arising from the enemies burrowing from within and from the enemies' tricks."
Division 164's Deum was the first to declare that he "would like to be in unity with the Organization's presentation," adding: "before, I had suspected some and not suspected some because all these individuals held important leadership posts. I have now therefore heightened vigilance even more."
After listening to more such statements by leading cadre from other units, Meah Mut spoke up to applaud the measures Son Sen said had been taken and to vow that he would clean up Division. Mut declared:
Division 502 Secretary Met spoke out in similar terms, declaring:
Son Sen then asserted in his summing up that it was "imperative to purge no-good elements absolutely in the sense of an absolute class struggle."
Thus, after hearing in unambiguous terms Son Sen’s account of the CPK’s policy of exterminating suspected traitors within the Party, Sou Met and Meah Mut expressed their wholehearted support for these initiatives and pledged to continue to carry them into effect.
Significantly, Sou Met was also at a meeting of division cadre convened by Son Sen on March 1, 1977, the agenda of which included not only "internal enemy situations" but also "purging elements in units of organization to make them clean." Met declared that it was now "obvious that number of elements" from Division 502 who had been "previously arrested really are enemy elements," and revealed that "more than 50 no-goods" from the unit had "been sent to S-21." Although throughout these meetings Son Sen never explicitly said that those arrested for treason had been or would be executed, his constant use of the term "smashed" and his reference to at least the purported ringleaders as "super-traitors" seemed to leave no doubt. His delineation of a category of "absolute purge" for dangerous elements, to be dealt with by means more than repeated re-education, also pointed toward execution, albeit less clearly.
As in other meetings, Sou Met heard reports of arrests and purges in other Divisions, as well as another summing up from Son Sen, who stressed that things were worse than the Party had thought in late 1976. In particular, Son Sen indicated that, although in late 1976 the Party had "eliminated" the "treasonous networks" of East Zone Sector 24 Secretary Chhouk and Northwest Zone Secretary Ya, it had since "discovered another treasonous network," which had now also been "basically eliminated" - another "enormously great victory."
Son Sen also claimed that all of this information yet again showed that both "the CIA and the revisionists are one and are similarly opposed to a correct revolution." Continuing threats to the Revolution meant that, while it was "imperative to continue with further political and ideological education, ... mere education is not enough: it is imperative to continue further with absolute purges." Thus, "the imperative measure vis-à-vis the troops is to purge absolutely the no-good elements."
The minutes of General Staff meetings attended by Sou Met and Meah Mut therefore illustrate their close involvement in and knowledge of the Party’s arrest, interrogation and execution policies. The minutes also reveal pertinent details of those polices as articulated by Son Sen, including in particular regular and persistent directions by Son Sen to leaders in the Party hierarchy, including Sou Met and Meah Mut, to identify, arrest and ultimately execute suspected traitors.
Sou Met and Meah Mut
a) Evidentiary Analysis
ii. Minutes of General Staff Meetings
According to DC-Cam’s holdings of the minutes of meetings of Central Committee military units as well as various messages between Son Sen and those units, in 1976 and 1977 Sou Met regularly and Meah Mut occasionally attended General Staff meetings, where they spoke, listened to reports by colleagues, and witnessed pronouncements by Son Sen.
These minutes implicate Sou Met and Meah Mut’s knowledge of arrests of civilians and CPK cadre as revealed to them by Son Sen and by division and regimental cadre who attended these gatherings (almost all of whom are now dead), as well as their knowledge of various "smashings" and "sweepings," including of purge victims to whom the especially damning label of "super-traitors" was applied.
The following detailed accounts of several of those meetings reveal Sou Met and Meah Mut’s close involvement in and knowledge of the Party’s arrest, interrogation and execution policies, and also reveal pertinent details of those polices as articulated by Chairman of the General Staff Son Sen.
On May 16, 1976, Sou Met attended a meeting of leading cadre of Central Committee divisions at which other secretaries reported on arrests their units had carried out -- arrests which, as indicated in Part III, were widely understood within the Communist Party to inevitably result in interrogation and death. Pin, the Secretary of Division 703 (later purged), informed those present of the arrest of "two skinny, long-haired persons...at the Central Market" in Phnom Penh, while Sâm Huoy alias Meah Tal (later purged), the Secretary of Division 180 (290), reported that it had arrested "four enemies" -- "two CIAs" and "two soldiers." On August 30, 1976, Sou Met attended another General Staff meeting, which had as its first agenda item an "examination of enemy situations and measures." Opening the meeting, Son Sen reported that, four days earlier, there had been "enemy unrest at Ang Prouch, on the border between Kandal Steung district" of Sector 25 and the neighboring Sector 33, both in the Southwest Zone. Those involved in the unrest had "raised a white banner with the slogan 'Long Live Buddhism' [and] 'Long Live the White Khmer Front of Liberation from Rice by the Can'." This pro-Buddhist, anti-Communist, anti-communal movement had been "getting ready for major unrest," but it had "already been sorted out by the grassroots" political administration through the arrest of more than 160 people. Moreover, Son Sen explained, the "responses" of these individuals during interrogation revealed that there was "a nexus between this situation and our army," because the detainees had implicated Chan Charkei alias Nôv Mean, the former Secretary of Central Committee Division 170, which was based on the outskirts of Phnom Penh, as "their leader." Charkei had been removed as Division 170 Secretary and made a Vice Chairman of the General Staff on March 15, 1976 and was subsequently arrested on May 19, 1976.
As purported evidence that an "enemy ... leadership apparatus" was behind rural unrest and problems in the army, Son Sen pointed to the fact some Division 170 combatants had recently "deserted" and fled to East Zone Sector 20, and that there had also been "agitation to steal" in certain military units. Son Sen advised Sou Met and other senior military cadre present that they should "examine and keep track of no-good elements" in their divisions, and "organize for them to be administered separately," that is, cull them out of existing units and concentrate them some place apart. At the meeting, Sou Met reported that one of his men had deserted, while another had recently "hung himself to death." Other leading cadre recounted their units' recent arrests. Son Sen concluded at this meeting that it was "apparent that the enemy has commenced activities, and these are activities endowed with a leadership network because the news is the same and the slogans are the same." He warned:
The enemy would like to take the opportunity to gather up no-good elements, the statusand rank-conscious, those whose families we have swept out, those whom we have removed from their positions, and those who have not internalized the revolutionary movement and can't keep up with the rest, and, at the same time, the new people who don't yet understand things, whom we are putting in difficulty and temporarily lack food: the CIA enemy is finding opportunities to gather them all up to attack us.
Sou Met attended another meeting of division leading cadre on September 16, 1976, where he listened to more reports of arrests and received more advice from Son Sen, and thereby gained further knowledge of the Party’s policies targeting suspected “enemies.” At this meeting, Son Sen expounded on what he referred to as "the enemy activities in the American imperialism and their lackeys department." In an apparent reference to the results of the interrogation at S-21 of Cambodians who had been allowed to come back to Cambodia from the United States and other places since April 1975, he declared that "according to the responses of those returning from abroad who we sent to do production and who fled, they say they fled in order to report to the CIA in South Viet Nam." Their "responses" had supposedly also revealed a French and United States imperialist plan to attack Cambodian islands in the Gulf of Siam.
Referring to "the infiltration links" of the previously arrested former Secretary of Division 170, Chan Chakrei alias Nôv Mean, Son Sen declared that "the Chakrei links are a major infiltration network that is in contact both with American imperialism and the revisionists" of the Soviet Union and Viet Nam, and that Chakrei’s links had been "making contacts" within the Revolutionary Army "to win over those having contradictions over status and rank and those dissatisfied with our revolutionary regime." Son Sen indicated that this was because "Soviet, Vietnamese and CIA links were all connected to Chakrei," and claimed that "current agitation actions" within the armed forces demonstrated the existence of links to the CIA among "those with an incorrect revolutionary stance." All of this information proved that the army had been lax in allowing deserters and other undesirable elements who had been purged from the army during the 1970-1975 war to re-enter it after 1975, along with "newcomers who had never fought at all" and "even evacuees from Phnom Penh." Son Sen therefore called on leading cadre "to follow up troop biographies clearly and conscientiously, especially of those we have enrolled recently," apparently in order to weed out such elements by means that were not specified. Again, such directions appear to have exposed Division Secretaries like Sou Met and Meah Mut to the Party’s “purge” policies and the methods by which they were carried out.
Both Sou Met and Meah Mut also attended a General Staff meeting convened on September 19, 1976, at which S-21 was represented by its number three cadre, Huy. They and other participants in this meeting heard another exposition on the situation from Son Sen, who called for continuing concern "about the activities of the enemies inside the country and inside our ranks," all of which were "CIA activities." He emphasized that, although attacks by enemy networks "burrowing from within the grassroots and our army" had "been basically defeated" because the most important of these networks had now been "attacked and smashed," it remained
imperative to have the perspective that the enemies are not all gone; they are continuing further with their activities of attacking us. Therefore, do not be optimistic in a nonrevolutionary way.
In particular, Son Sen told leading military cadre that they must "have an absolute standpoint about purging counter-revolutionary elements; don't be half-baked." Meah Mut and Sou Met also listened to reports of arrests from other leading division cadre. This included Division 310 Secretary Sbauv Him alias Euan (later purged), who reported that "a number of traitors" had been "discovered" in the division through what Euan described as "the concrete situation" and as a result of "responses from the outside," possibly a reference to "confessions" extracted at S-21.
In his own report at this meeting, Meah Mut echoed elements of CPK purge policies, lamenting that there had been "powerful changes" for the worse with regard to "enemy situations" in September.
First, he said, "thefts of everything have emerged."
Second, somebody was "whipping up the word that there are tigers" about in Division 164's areas of operation.
Third, "seven combatants from the motor pool set up a liberal unit of organization with their own commissar, commander and person in charge of logistics."
Fourth, "combatants and cadre who have been hospitalized walk around freely."
Finally, "some cadre" were misleading "their subordinates by saying the Organization has summoned them to a meeting, and then go motorcycle riding for fun." At the same meeting, Sou Met reported an "enemy situation" involving the discovery by Division 502 of a carbine in a place where a political study session was to be convened. This discovery had led him to "surmise ... that the enemy intended to kill our cadre while they were studying." He also reported that "no-good elements" in the Northwest Zone army who had been guarding an airfield near Batdambang town had been purged by the "grassroots" there.
Furthermore, he lamented that, while most of his own cadre and combatants were "good and active in building socialism,” some individuals were "still kicking back and insubordinate." In particular, one company cadre who had been assigned "to guard enemy women" had been accused of "being mixed up in problems of morality," that is sexual impropriety. Arrests by Sou Met’s Division 502 were reported at a September 30, 1976 meeting of the General Staff presided over by one of its members, Siet Chhæ alias Tum (later purged).
Under the agenda item "enemy situations," the minutes record that Sou Met's unit had been "able to arrest 15" combatants who had "deserted in September" and were now confined as "elements with tendencies and who are liberal." On October 9, 1976, Sou Met's deputy, Nhem San (later executed), sent a report to the General Staff on a new enemy situation that had resulted in Division 502's arrest two days previously of one Ov Pring,4who had "responded" during interrogation that he "had conducted activities in Boeng Thom subdistrict, District 52, Sector 33, with the intention of conducting a demonstration on 12 October 1976 to oppose the listed in the report.
Meah Mut and Sou Met then attended an October 9, 1976 meeting of division cadre convened by Son Sen. They heard Division 450 Secretary Suong (later purged) speak of problems with "cadre whose parents have been swept out" before listening to reports by their deputies Deum (later purged) and San. Deum reported four recent arrests by Mut’s Division 164, and San similarly referred to "some arrests on the 502 front.” He also reported that Division 502 suffered from "desertion to the grassroots," contacts with bandits and complaints by cadre.
Finally, he reported that "more than 80 elements with political tendencies" had "already been removed" from the Division. Also notable during this meeting was Son Sen's presentation on how the "duty of defending the country" had been carried out with regard to a "certain number of traitors in the Party whom we have been able to arrest." He promised to inform those present of the "measures" taken in this connection "and a number of experiences we have deduced with
regard to the task of defending the country."
Son Sen also declared that "we have basically smashed the leadership links" of this suspected traitorous network. Using an established code word to describe those who were condemned to death, he said these leadership links "were big historical super-traitors to the nation and Party." Those who had been "basically smashed" included such "CIAs on the inside," along with "the major traitorous forces belonging to them." He warned, however, that "their henchmen still exist." Thus, he instructed:
In terms of our perspective and standpoint, we must further heighten our spirit of revolutionary vigilance. ... It is therefore imperative to have lofty revolutionary vigilance and ensure defence of the Party and the army.
Concretely operationalizing revolutionary vigilance means having a firm grip on our units of organization, ensuring that the enemy is unable to burrow from within, and doing whatever needs to be done to make our army clean. Both the American imperialist-CIA side and the Yuon-Soviet-revision side have their plans for burrowing from within to create a new Party to oppose us.
Son Sen therefore urged those present to indoctrinate subordinate cadre and combatants in their units "so that they understand the state of contradictions arising from the enemies burrowing from within and from the enemies' tricks."
Division 164's Deum was the first to declare that he "would like to be in unity with the Organization's presentation," adding: "before, I had suspected some and not suspected some because all these individuals held important leadership posts. I have now therefore heightened vigilance even more."
After listening to more such statements by leading cadre from other units, Meah Mut spoke up to applaud the measures Son Sen said had been taken and to vow that he would clean up Division. Mut declared:
I would like to say about concern with the activities of the traitors within the Party, that this has been a great victory for our Party. This lesson has strengthened to another degree the standpoint of revolutionary vigilance.
We have been indoctrinated with the Party's standpoint that a correct standpoint analyzes these enemies as being American imperialists and revisionists with plans to ttack our revolution.
As for the problem of the grasp on the unit of organization, cadre and combatants, it is not yet firm. No-good elements or enemies are still camouflaged and infiltrated in the rank-and-file. The most important factor is the grasp of the everyday ideology of the Core Organizations.
It is imperative to make arrangements to take measures so as to seize the initiative in advance. On this I would like to be in total agreement and unity with the Party. Do whatever needs to be done not to allow the situation to get out of hand .... and not to let them strengthen or expand themselves in the least.
As for the problem of the grasp on the unit of organization, cadre and combatants, it is not yet firm. No-good elements or enemies are still camouflaged and infiltrated in the rank-and-file. The most important factor is the grasp of the everyday ideology of the Core Organizations.
It is imperative to make arrangements to take measures so as to seize the initiative in advance. On this I would like to be in total agreement and unity with the Party. Do whatever needs to be done not to allow the situation to get out of hand .... and not to let them strengthen or expand themselves in the least.
Division 502 Secretary Met spoke out in similar terms, declaring:
After the Party revealed the upper traitorous links belonging to American imperialism and the revisionists, I was happy and had more faith in the Party. This experience proves that our Party has a solid grip on things and a stance of constant vigilance. If there are contradictions, it grasps them clearly, and this is a victory for our Party.
With regard to this problem, it can be stipulated that the enemies have been basically eliminated, but it is imperative to take further measures to prevent this from happening a second, a third and a fourth and so on again time.
The enemy will not be able to do anything to us so long as our military is politically hard and clean. It is imperative to strengthen the Party politically, ideologically and organizationally. It is imperative to dare absolutely to conduct purges.
With regard to this problem, it can be stipulated that the enemies have been basically eliminated, but it is imperative to take further measures to prevent this from happening a second, a third and a fourth and so on again time.
The enemy will not be able to do anything to us so long as our military is politically hard and clean. It is imperative to strengthen the Party politically, ideologically and organizationally. It is imperative to dare absolutely to conduct purges.
Son Sen then asserted in his summing up that it was "imperative to purge no-good elements absolutely in the sense of an absolute class struggle."
Thus, after hearing in unambiguous terms Son Sen’s account of the CPK’s policy of exterminating suspected traitors within the Party, Sou Met and Meah Mut expressed their wholehearted support for these initiatives and pledged to continue to carry them into effect.
Significantly, Sou Met was also at a meeting of division cadre convened by Son Sen on March 1, 1977, the agenda of which included not only "internal enemy situations" but also "purging elements in units of organization to make them clean." Met declared that it was now "obvious that number of elements" from Division 502 who had been "previously arrested really are enemy elements," and revealed that "more than 50 no-goods" from the unit had "been sent to S-21." Although throughout these meetings Son Sen never explicitly said that those arrested for treason had been or would be executed, his constant use of the term "smashed" and his reference to at least the purported ringleaders as "super-traitors" seemed to leave no doubt. His delineation of a category of "absolute purge" for dangerous elements, to be dealt with by means more than repeated re-education, also pointed toward execution, albeit less clearly.
As in other meetings, Sou Met heard reports of arrests and purges in other Divisions, as well as another summing up from Son Sen, who stressed that things were worse than the Party had thought in late 1976. In particular, Son Sen indicated that, although in late 1976 the Party had "eliminated" the "treasonous networks" of East Zone Sector 24 Secretary Chhouk and Northwest Zone Secretary Ya, it had since "discovered another treasonous network," which had now also been "basically eliminated" - another "enormously great victory."
Son Sen also claimed that all of this information yet again showed that both "the CIA and the revisionists are one and are similarly opposed to a correct revolution." Continuing threats to the Revolution meant that, while it was "imperative to continue with further political and ideological education, ... mere education is not enough: it is imperative to continue further with absolute purges." Thus, "the imperative measure vis-à-vis the troops is to purge absolutely the no-good elements."
The minutes of General Staff meetings attended by Sou Met and Meah Mut therefore illustrate their close involvement in and knowledge of the Party’s arrest, interrogation and execution policies. The minutes also reveal pertinent details of those polices as articulated by Son Sen, including in particular regular and persistent directions by Son Sen to leaders in the Party hierarchy, including Sou Met and Meah Mut, to identify, arrest and ultimately execute suspected traitors.
15 comments:
Anybody giving Khmer land to the Vietnamese must die now.
Khmer people is in a boiling point by land-grabbing, forced evictions and loss of land the Vietnamese.
All Khmer people must stand up and fight to protecting and saving your motherland CAMBODIA because nobody can help Khmer people now, all Khmer people must keep fighting and struggling by ourselves.
savecambodian.blogspot.com
មានវិទ្យុមួយដែលនិយាយភាសារខ្មែរបានចុះផ្សប់ផ្សាយថាខ្មែរនឹងសៀមខំដណ្តើមគ្នាកាន់កាប់ទីតាំង។វិទ្យុនេះនិយាយមិនមានភាពយុត្តិធម៍ចំពោះពលរដ្ធខ្មែរ
ទាល់តែសោះ។សូមពលរដ្ធខ្មែរទាំងក្នុងស្រុកនឹងក្រៅ
ស្រុកសូមនាំគ្នាថ្តោលទោសវិទ្យុនេះផង(អាស៊ីសេរី
Why don'tDr. Hun Sen bark more ? Is it he run out of shell ? Is it he no missiles as he said? Is it he scare ? Is it his son at his home sex with young teen girls? Is it his currupt regime no money to buy proper weapons to defend the nation ?
គិតទៅអាបក្សប្រឆាំងបើពួកវាគ្រាន់បើម្តេចមិនទៅ
ព្រួសដាក់អាសៀមដែលវាបានផ្លោងគ្រាប់រាបរយរាប់
ពាន់មកលើទឹកដីខ្មែរទៅ?ឬក៏ជាកញ្ជះអាសៀមទេដឹង?
His personality is if you are dared to do anything against me you shall be killed. He did so many times in Cambodia to kill off his criticizers.
When the first Cambodian-Thai conflict on the border, he spoke like the Thai were Khmer and forgot that they were combatants.
He look so fearsome. After a few conflicts he learned that his power can only be used with the innocents unarmed Khmer and no power over anyone else.
Through his ruling Cambodia is as weak as a weasel. You can treat Cambodian people like a dog can expect it to be strong.
Var Kim Hong does recognize that Cambodia, if compared to the colonial Service Geographique de l’Indochine scale map 1/100,000 and the 1985 delimitation treaty, will loses 9,000 hectares; and compared to U.S Army Mapping Service scale map 1/50,000 with the 1985 Treaty, would lose about 7,900 hectares to Vietnam. This statement was confirmed by Var Kim Hong to Mr. Touch Bora Esq through a telephone conversation on 30 August 2002 at 4:30 p.m. (Sydney time), which Mr. Touch Bora Esq wrote in his letter dated on 9 September 2002 sent to Sam Dach Ta Noroudom Sihanouk concerning over border affairs.
In fact, the loss is absolutely more than the 1000 square kilometers stated by MP Sam Rainsy in his statement, if we add the size of the historical water of 30000 square kilometers awarded to Vietnam under the 1982 Agreement which has been into affect and now already become under the full control of Vietnam. And this would not be the last if the equidistance principle be used to delimit the maritime boundary, Cambodia will lose an additional area of sea and seabed measuring at least 860 square nautical miles from the Brevie Line to the north, analyzed by Mr. Touch Bora Esq or another 10000 square kilometers confirmed by Mr. Sean Pengse, the President of the Cambodian Border Committee Worldwide, which exclusively include another Koh Poula Wai to Vietnam added to the previous lost islands- Koh Tral (Dao Phu Quoc) and Koh Poulo Panjang (Dao Thu Chu).
This is why sVar Kim Hong said in front of Students´s Movement for Democracy (SMD), and Sam Dach Ta Norodom Sihanouk on 22 Janaury 2000 during our audience with him concerning the border resolution with Vietnam that; “If we want peace, we must sacrifice our flesh to the tiger.” The truth is discovered now that, “Sacrifice the flesh to tiger actually means cutting our land to the Viet.” This word was clearly spoken out from his mouth and there were Sam Dach Ta as witness and 31 members.
We must condemn this Var Kim Hong for his role in helping the traitorous regime of Hun Sen.
Smart Khmer Girl Ms. Rattana Keo,
Koh Tral Island must not be forgotten
By Ms. Rattana Keo
Why do Koh Tral Island, known in Vietnam as Phu Quoc, a sea and land area covering proximately over 10,000 km2 [Note: the actual land size of Koh Tral itself is 574 square kilometres (222 sq miles)] have been lost to Vietnam by whose treaty? Why don’t Cambodia government be transparent and explain to Cambodia army at front line and the whole nation about this? Why don't they include this into education system? Why?
Cambodian armies are fighting at front line for 4.6 km2 on the Thai border and what's about over 10,000km2 of Cambodia to Vietnam. Nobody dare to talk about it! Why? Cambodian armies you are decide the fate of your nation, Cambodian army as well as Cambodian people must rethink about this again and again. Is it fair?
Koh Tral Island, the sea and land area of over 10,000 square kilometres have been lost to Vietnam by the 1979 to 1985 treaties. The Cambodian army at front line as well as all Cambodian people must rethink again about these issues. Are Cambodian army fighting to protect the Cambodia Nation or protecting a very small group that own big lands, big properties or only protecting a small group but disguising as protecting the Khmer nation?
The Cambodian army at front lines suffer under rain, wind, bullets, bombs, lack of foods, lack of nutrition and their families have no health care assistance, no securities after they died but a very small group eat well, sleep well, sleep in first class hotel with air conditioning system with message from young girls, have first class medical care from oversea medical treatments, they are billionaires, millionaires who sell out the country to be rich and make the Cambodian people suffer everyday.
Who signed the treaty 1979-1985 that resulted in the loss over 10,000 km2 of Cambodia??? Why they are not being transparent and brave enough to inform all Cambodians and Cambodian army at front line about these issues? Why don't they include Koh Tral (Koh Tral size is bigger than the whole Phom Phen and bigger than Singapore [Note: Singapore's present land size is 704 km2 (271.8 sq mi)]) with heap of great natural resources, in the Cambodian education system?
Look at Hun Sen's families, relatives and friends- they are billionaires, millionaires. Where did they get the money from when we all just got out of war with empty hands [in 1979]? Hun Sen always say in his speeches that Cambodia had just risen up from the ashes of war, just got up from Year Zero with empty hands and how come they are billionaires, millionaires but 90% of innocent Cambodian people are so poor and struggling with their livelihood every day?
Smart Khmer girl Ms. Rattana Keo,
FUCKING BLIND KHMER DUMB IDIOT!
គិតទៅ
អា HUN SEN បើវាគ្រាន់បើ
ម្តេចមិនទៅព្រួសដាក់អាសៀម
ដែលវាបានផ្លោងគ្រាប់រាបរយរាប់
ពាន់មកលើទឹកដីខ្មែរទៅ ?
ឬ វាជាកញ្ជះអាសៀមទេដឹង?
8:01 PM
You right. There is a big conflict on the border, and Hun Sen did not say a word about it because he is too busy fuck with Nguyen Tan Dung.
Hun Sen name means:
Hun = share, meanning the share of Vietnam in Cambodia soil
Sen = Give tresures too, meanning give all Cambodia tresures to Vietnam.
The name Hun Sen was given by Vietnam to remind "Hun Sen" about his role in Cambodia to Vietnam.
7:56Am you are motherfucker.
We've million of people why the fuck we choose the fucking dumb ass one to lead our country. Why da fuck people keep voted for this moron man to lead the country. Stops voted for them from now on this regime CPP doesn't working for Khmer nation they only cares about these money and power.
FUCKING BLIND KHMER DEMOCRAT IDIOT AKA KHMER DUMB ASS!
1:29am
FUCK YOU ASSHOLE, FATHERFUCKER!
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