Cambodia-Thailand border dispute: Observer that desperately seeks trust

Mon, 05/30/2011
Bambang Hartadi Nugroho, Jakarta
The Jakarta Post

The Cambodia-Thailand territorial dispute and violent conflict has remained a widely discussed topic, not only during the recent ASEAN summit, but also at the ASEAN Civil Society Conference (ACSC)/ASEAN Peoples’ Forum (APF).

The growing concern is due to the fact that the quarrel between the two neighboring countries has marred the image of the organization and may destabilize the region, not to mention its impacts on civilians who live near the disputed area.

As reported, the discussion of this issue during the summit was not an easy process. Both parties disagreed over many alternatives of peaceful settlement offered by members of the group.

Yet in the end they finally agreed that Indonesia as the chair of ASEAN would play a role as an observer and mediator.

Without any intention to underestimate the effort and role that the Indonesian government, in particular the Foreign Ministry, has played so far, we have to realize that there will be many limits for Indonesia to carry out its job.

Those obstacles arise due to the nature of observer’s role itself and the fact that Indonesia is the only one playing the role. In the end, these limitations may also determine the success or failure of this process.

To begin with, in a spectrum line which represents the role, authority and equipment of peacekeeping efforts, an observer is located at the far left of the line, with peacekeeping missions in the middle and peace enforcement forces at the far right.

As the role of peacekeeping operation is to maintain a cease-fire by creating a buffer zone between both conflicting sides and peace enforcement to compel disputants to a cease-fire, an observer has neither the role nor authority.

Its role is purely to observe and report the situation without any intention to create a buffer zone. This is also due to the fact that an observer mission usually has no military equipment whatsoever that can be used to defend itself, let alone force both sides to stop fighting.

Moreover, unlike peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions whose members are mostly military personnel, an observer mission at most times consists of civilians.

Even one person can act as an observer because there is not really much to do in this role.

Such characteristics will by default become the flaws of any observer mission, including in the case of Cambodia-Thailand. While Indonesia’s observer team was not established, let alone present, it barely could do anything when the skirmish between troops erupted last April.

Beside its lack of capacity to urge both sides to lay down arms, the observer’s mandate would not permit it to do so either. Another limit is the lack of consent from both Cambodia and Thailand in Indonesia’s mediation role.

The initial stance of both sides in resolving the conflict demonstrated a hesitance toward the adoption of a regional mechanism.

Cambodia, at first, bypassed its co-members of ASEAN and called for attention from the UN Security Council to intervene.

Thailand, on the contrary, was very eager to resort to bilateral negotiation. Those initial preferences reflected the parties’ lack of trust in the middleman. In a business of resolving conflicts, trust from the mediated parties is vital. A lack of trust, therefore, will be a major complication toward the peace process.

In this case, the lack of confidence in Indonesia might be a result of the perception that the country was a dominant actor in the region but its ability to manage domestic conflicts was in doubt.

For the parties to trust a third party, they first must be sure on its neutrality. Being neutral does not only mean favoritism on one side, but also freedom of interest.

Naturally, a third party will always be suspected of hiding vested interests. Such suspicion will loom larger when the third party is a “big power”, assuming that it would have more interest in the conflict.

It explains why in most cases around the world where a third party was involved, be that as an observer, peacekeeper, or peace enforcer, major powers such as the US seldom took part.

In the context of the Preah Vihear conflict, Indonesia’s stature as the “regional big power” can weigh in negatively towards its acceptance by Cambodia and Thailand.

Although Indonesia clearly has no particular interest in the disputed territory, it is understandable that the parties may suspect Indonesia is looking for a bigger political leverage within the organization by, for instance, working in favor of one side.

Additionally, Indonesia’s initiative may also be perceived as a breach of sovereignty and a violation of the ASEAN sacrosanct principle of non-interference. Doubts over the Indonesian government’s ability to solve domestic conflicts may also be the root of this trust deficiency.

Although Indonesia managed to resolve major conflicts such as the Aceh rebellion, recent developments at the national level indicate a decline in the government’s ability or will to address conflicts such as separatism in Papua.

With those problems at hand and the ambition to maximize its role as the current ASEAN chair, what Indonesia should do is look beyond the Cambodia-Thailand conflict.

That is to say that instead of focusing only to resolve this conflict, Indonesia must seek to design a proposal for a dispute settlement body. The idea to set up the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation is a positive move. However, the institute needs more authority in resolving conflicts instead of issuing recommendations.

For example, it gets to decide which dispute settlement mechanism is to be applied in certain cases, including, when needed, whether observers or a peacekeeping mission are necessary to be sent.

Furthermore, to ensure its impartiality, the institute has to consist of neutral representatives from all ASEAN countries; for instance, academics, prominents of the civil society movements and former diplomats whose experience has been proven but no longer have direct ties with their respective governments.

Intervention in the form of sending peace missions to end the violence and maintain cease-fire is essential because only in that way both sides can start peace talks.

And last but not least, such an intervention is pressing to protect civilians from falling victim to armed conflicts or being affected in any way directly or indirectly. That is, of course, if ASEAN really cares about its people.

The writer is an assistant lecturer in international relations at the University of Indonesia.