Tuesday, May 31, 2011

Closing Order of Case 002 against Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith

In preparation for the start of trial hearings beginning on 27 June 2011 of Case 002 against the surviving Khmer Rouge senior leaders Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary and Ieng Thirith, KI Media is starting a new series in posting installations of the public document of the Closing Order of Case 002.  The Closing Order of the Co-Investigating Judges forms the basic document from which all the parties (Co-Prosecutors, Co-Lead Lawyers for all civil parties, Defense Lawyers) will be making their arguments before the Trial Chamber judges (one Cambodian President, 2 Cambodian Judges, 2 UN judges).  Up until now, the hearings involving these four surviving senior Khmer Rouge leaders have been in the Pre-Trial Chamber over issues of pre-trial detention and jurisdictional issues.  Beginning in June 2011, the Trial Chamber will hear the substantive arguments over the criminal charges (e.g. genocide, crimes against humanity, penal code of 1956).  Available in Khmer and French.  Contact the ECCC for a free copy.

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CLOSING ORDER
of Co-Investigating Judges You Bunleng and Marcel Lemonde, 15 September 2010
 
V. MILITARY STRUCTURE
A. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY OF KAMPUCHEA
113.           The Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea ("RAK") was a core institution within the CPK governed Democratic Kampuchea.337 CPK policy relied heavily on the implementation of is goals by forceful means, making the military an important part of its government apparatus. From the outset, the CPK considered that "for self-defense and self-liberation it is imperative to use violence, whether political violence or armed violence. It is imperative that the people be armed, that is, there must be an army ... in order to defend the people, to defend the revolution, and to go on the offensive to counter-attack the enemy".338
114.           The CPK asserted that its armed forces originated in "a Secret Defence Unit.339 By 1968 these forces had been upgraded into "armed guerrilla units".340 17 January 1968 marks the official launch of an armed struggle and the birth of the CPK "revolutionary army".341 According to the official line of the Party, by 1969 "the preconditions for an army were already there ...In some locations, in the major Zones, there were already companies, many units, platoons, squads, teams. Other locations had just platoons, squads, and teams. However, those forces were the ranks of a Revolutionary Army!".342 In March 1970, the latter was officially designated as the "Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed Forces" (CPNLAF).
115. The formal reorganization of the armed forces was proclaimed in July 1975, at a gathering that was officially described as an "important political conference of the CPK Centre for approximately 3,000 representatives of every unit of the Revolutionary Army, " which was addressed by "the comrade chairman of the High-Level Military Committee of the Party".343

RAK received expert assistance344 and military equipment345 from other countries, most prominently from China.
B. ROLE OF RAK
116.           The role of the RAK is defined in two central documents on the organization of Democratic Kampuchea. Article 19 of the Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea describes the two goals of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea (RAK): "defend the State power of the Kampuchean people ... and at the same time help to build a country ".346 According to Article 27 of the Communist Party of Kampuchea Statute, the RAK was responsible for both external and internal security, as well as generally participating in "building the country".347 This understanding of the RAK's role was repeated and reiterated in various CPK publications and Party committee meetings.348
117.           External security or national defence was the core task of the RAK, in particular in the context of the armed conflict with SRV and in relation to border disputes.349 Internal security comprised of the defence of the CPK rule against perceived enemies and spies within the armed forces, the Party and the country as a whole.




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