Thursday, June 02, 2011

Closing Order of Case 002 against Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith

In preparation for the start of trial hearings beginning on 27 June 2011 of Case 002 against the surviving Khmer Rouge senior leaders Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary and Ieng Thirith, KI Media is starting a new series in posting installations of the public document of the Closing Order of Case 002.  The Closing Order of the Co-Investigating Judges forms the basic document from which all the parties (Co-Prosecutors, Co-Lead Lawyers for all civil parties, Defense Lawyers) will be making their arguments before the Trial Chamber judges (one Cambodian President, 2 Cambodian Judges, 2 UN judges).  Up until now, the hearings involving these four surviving senior Khmer Rouge leaders have been in the Pre-Trial Chamber over issues of pre-trial detention and jurisdictional issues.  Beginning in June 2011, the Trial Chamber will hear the substantive arguments over the criminal charges (e.g. genocide, crimes against humanity, penal code of 1956).  Available in Khmer and French.  Contact the ECCC for a free copy.

C. CPK CENTRE MILITARY ORGANS

Military Committee of the Central Committee

116.           The Military Committee,353 or High-Level Military Committee,354 was a CPK Central Committee organ set up since at least 1970 and the existence of which was reaffirmed at the Fourth Party Congress.355 In line with the original functions of the CPK's armed forces, combining security with purely military tasks, the Military Committee has also been described as the "Security Committee"356 or "Military and Security Committee".357 Also attached to the Central Committee were assistants with military responsibilities.358
120. The Military Committee acted as an organ of the Party Centre and thus ensured control of the RAK by the Party Centre.359 The Central Committee and Military Committee sometimes met in joint session to decide on military matters,360 effecting a unified strategic command over the armed forces.361
121. Ieng Sary claims that the Military and Security Committee was comprised of Pol Pot, Nuon Chea and Son Sen.362 Other members of the Military Committee included Sao Phim and Ta Mok,363 although they may have had less formal responsibility.364 Witnesses also name Vorn Vet365 and Ke Pork as members of the Military Committee.366 After 17 April 1975, Pol Pot continued to chair the Military Committee.367 Although Nuon Chea recognized that such an organ existed during the CPK era, he denies being a part of it.368 Several witnesses however, including Ieng Sary, mention him as a member of the Committee.369
122.           The Military and Security Committee decided on military and security matters, including "killing", "operation of S-21", "other secret locations", "secret agents", and "general matters". Ieng Sary states that this committee reported to the Standing Committee after receiving reports from the zones and that he personally heard reports on security.370
123.           Apparently in connection with their positions on the Military Committee,371 Pol Pot, Nuon Chea and Son Sen were in overall charge of S-21 and the security policy in general.372 Son Sen frequently met and coordinated with the other members of the Standing Committee, ensuring that the CPK leadership had constant knowledge and control over RAK activities.373
General Staff
124. The central body of the RAK was the General Staff. During a CPK Standing Committee meeting on 9 October 1975, Son Sen was designated as "Responsible for General Staff and Security"374 while Pol Pot was assigned the general responsibility over the military.375 Son Sen subsequently headed the General Staff; reports were submitted to him, and he issued orders.376
125. The General Staff was assigned with the command and administration of the armed forces. It centrally coordinated various tasks such as the setting up of divisions, organization matters, intelligence, military installations, policy, logistics, weapons, ammunitions, food supplies, uniforms, transport, and medicine,377 and issued movement orders to the divisions.378 The General Staff also removed secretaries and other cadre at Centre divisions,379 while appointments to leading positions in the Centre divisions were made in the name of the Central Committee or by Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary and Son Sen.380 To implement the party's line and policy the General Staff organized study sessions for selected cadre,381 as well as regular meetings of the leaders of Centre Divisions and Independent Regiments for reporting and issuing orders on various matters.382

D. COMPOSITION OF THE RAK
            126. Article 19 of the Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea describes the three branches of the RAK - regular, regional, and guerrilla forces.383 All of the three categories were "under the absolute leadership monopoly of the Communist Party of Kampuchea".384 The Revolutionary Armed Forces included the "Regular Army of the Centre" and all local military units,385 which were all ultimately under the command of the Central Committee and its Military Committee.386 Similar to other state organs, the Revolutionary Army was described as "the pure dictatorial instrument of the Party".387
The Regular army
            127.  The "regular" army was composed of Divisions388 and Independent Regiments. Divisions were separated into Centre Divisions, reporting directly to the Centre,389 and Regional Divisions. In most cases, a division consisted of three regiments,390 each regiment of three battalions and each battalion of three companies.391
Centre Divisions
            128.  The Centre Divisions were commanded directly by the Centre, as were the Independent Regiments. They constituted the main military force of RAK and, as such, carried out the bulk of military operations against external enemies.
            129.  Centre Divisions were frequently re-designated, dissolved, or merged into each other during the CPK era. As of March 1977, the Centre forces included Divisions 801, 703, 310, 450, 170, 290, 502, 920 and 164, and Independent Regiments 152, 377 and 48 8.392
            130.  The RAK also established two combined field commands that each exercised command over several divisions. Both were established in the East Zone. The first of these field commands was located on Route 1 in Sector 23. It was commanded by Son Sen393 and comprised of Divisions 703, 340, 221, 460, and 805, 210, 230, 250 and 270.394 The second field command was located on Route 7, also in the East Zone. It included Division 207 (ex-Division 310), Division 603 (ex-Division 45 0),395 Division 2 8 0396 and Division 175,397 plus elements of Division 5 0 2398 and forces of the Central Zone (former North Zone).399 Originally, Route 7 field command was commanded by Sao Phim with Ke Pork as deputy; Sao Phim was replaced by Son Sen after the purge and suicide of Sao Phim.
            131.  Centre Divisions were severely purged, which lead to their subsequent re-designation or merging into other divisions. Notably Divisions 310, 450 and 920, were purged as part of the purges in the North Zone, from where these units originated. As a result of this purge process, Division 310 and Division 450 were re-designated Division 207400 and 603,401 respectively.
            132.  Reorganization of divisions also occurred due to the intensification of the armed conflict with Vietnam from late 1977,402 which was accompanied by the creation of a number of new Centre divisions formed out of an expansion and reorganization of units originating in the Southwest Zone. These included Divisions 340, 221, 440, 460, 210, 230, 250 and 270.403
Zone Armies
            133.  The second primary branch of RAK was the Zone Armies, usually organized as divisions.404 Despite being ultimately under the command of the Centre, they were integrated into the Zone administration.405 Their tasks were closely connected to their zone, including territorial defence as well as internal security. Zone armies of zones bordering Thailand and Vietnam were heavily involved in the fighting occurring at these borders.406 Below division level, districts also maintained local forces on battalion level.
Militia
            134.  The third pillar of the armed forces was the local militia, also referred to as the guerilla forces.
            135.  Militia troops lived among the people in the villages and performed duties related to local security.407 Among these duties were arrests408 and killings,409 but also more clearly military- related duties such as preparations for the defence of the villages and cooperatives.410 The militias directly reported to the village, subdistrict or district committees411 and were called on by the civil administration to perform security tasks. 412


3 comments:

Anonymous said...

EVIDENCE OF POLITICALLY-MOTIVATED EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS AND KILLINGS OF FUNCINPEC LOYALISTS.

LIST OF INSTANCES OF EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS during 1997 coup by PM Hun Sen. These people with their name list below were murdered by PM Hun Sen.

• Ho Sok, 45, Secretary of State at the Ministry of Interior and second ranking FUNCINPEC official in the Ministry of Interior.
• 2-3. Gen Chao Sambath, alias Ngov, Deputy-Chief of the Intelligence and Espionage Department, RCAF Supreme Command since 1993
• 4 and 5. Maj. Gen. Ly Seng Hong, Deputy-Chief of Staff, RCAF General Staff (second highest-ranking FUNCINPEC official in the RCAF General
• 6. Colonel Sok Vireak, Chief, Transmission Bureau, Army General Staff. A former KPNLF General Staff officer in charge of military training who joined Nhek Bun Chhay after the Paris Agreements. Status
• 7. Colonel Thlang Chang Sovannarith, Deputy Chief-of-Staff of the Fifth Military Region, RCAF General Staff
• 8. Colonel Hov Sambath, Deputy-chief of Military Training Bureau, RCAF General Staff
• 9. Lietenant Colonel Sao Sophal, 42, an officer of the First Bureau of the RCAF General Staff.
• 10. Navy First Lt. Thach Soeung, aged about 30, an ethnic Khmer from southern Vietnam, stationed at Dang Kaum Navy base on the eastern bank of the Tonle Sap.
• 11 to 14. Seng Phally, Lt. Col. Chao Keang, Chao Tea and Thong Vickika - security officers working under Gen. Chao Sambath.
• Seng Phally, alias Huot Phally, aged 25, single, a gendarme who worked as chief of the security team at the Pipoplok 2 Hotel/Casino
• Lt. Col. Chao Keang, aged about 25. He was an officer in the Research and Intelligence Bureau of Chao Sambath
• Chao Tea, 29, brother of Chao Keang, a security guard at the Regal Hotel/Casino. His body bore a bullet hole in the left side of the chest and in the right side of the stomach. He was also handcuffed and blindfolded
• Thong Vicchika, aged about 27-28, a body-guard of Chao Sambath and a security staff at the Regal Hotel/Casino.
• Dr. Seng Kim Ly, a military medical doctor
• Major Lak Ki, Head of Operations, Research and Intelligence, RCAF High Command
• Four unnamed body-guards of Nhek Bun Chhay were summarily executed after his office-cum-house in Somnang
• Major Lak Ki, Head of Operations, Research and Intelligence, RCAF High Command
• Pheap, a body-guard of Major Lak Ki, in his late twenties
• Dok Rany, 27, an officer and body-guard of Gen. Chao Sambath who worked at the Research and Intelligence Bureau
• Ros Huon, aged 23, Sopheap, aged 25, two alleged members of the Gendarmerie
• Dok Sokhun, alias Michael Senior, a Khmer-Canadian journalist who taught English at ACE Language School in Phnom Penh
• Major Aek Eng (CPP), Head of Administration of Phnom Penh Thmei police station

Anonymous said...

• At least four, and possibly up to 22 persons described as FUNCINPEC soldiers executed and cremated in Pich Nil on 9, 10 and 11 July 1997 by Military Region 3 soldiers. Status: Confirmed executions in at least 4 cases
• 34 to 36 (and possibly 45). On 17 July, at about noon time, the body of a soldier was witnessed floating near the bank of the Tone Bassac near the Watt Chum Leap, in the village of the same name, Rokakpong commune, Saang district, Kandal province. The body was headless and both hands were tied up behind the back with a kramma. It was dressed in dark olive military uniform
• 37 and 38. Two unidentified men, blindfolded and with their hands tied behind the back. Status: Confirmed executions
• Pheap, aged 33, a bodyguard of the First Prime Minister. Status: Confirmed execution.
• Sok Vanthorn, 21 and Sou Sal, two villagers from Ampeov village, Kompong Speu province. Status: Confirmed execution.
• Brig. Gen. Chea Rittichutt, a founding member of the Moulinaka movement and the Governor of Kep-Bokor
• Navy officer Meas Sarou, Deputy-director, First Bureau, Navy, based in Chrouy Changvar, and one of his body-guards, and a third person, a woman named Luch.
• Ung Sim, Second Deputy Governor, Kompong Speu province - missing since his arrest, reportedly near Pich Nil by CPP soldiers on 7 or 8 July 1997.
• Col. Sam Sarath, Deputy Chief-of-Staff, Third Military Region
• Put Som Ang, male, aged 42, a KNP activisit in Siem Reap province, and Sam Sophan, 38, an activist in Takeo province
• Major So Lay Sak and Major Chin Vannak, officers working in the Logisitics department of the RCAF General Staff
• Som Taing, Deputy Chief, Inspection Office, Provincial Governor's Office, Kompong Speu
• Chum Sarith, Chief, Criminal Bureau, Provincial Police, Sihanoukville
Forty-six bodies were brought in and dumped at the crematorium of a Phnom Penh pagoda between 5 and 9 July
In the case of Ho Sok (executed on 7 July, brought to Watt Lanka on 8 July); of Seng Phally, Chao Keang, Chao Tea and Thong Viccheka (executed on 5-6 July and brought by the police to Wat Unalom on the morning of 7 July - see cases number 13-16 above) and in the case of a fifth corpse which was brought to the same pagoda on the same morning, but which could not be identified, the police ordered that cremation of the bodies be conducted without question and without proper cremation permit.
Between 9 and 11 July, according to a variety of reliable corroborating accounts, the bodies of 4 and probably up to 22 soldiers were alleged to have been executed in Pich Nil and burned
Plus many and many more names with lose count that order and executed by Hun Sen and CPP.

Anonymous said...

Thia ECCC or Khmer Rouge Trials has failed long ago because of the following:

1. This ECCC in not independent.

2. Political interference from Hun Sen.

3. Everything this ECCC has done for over 3 years since 2007 has been very secretive and not fully informed the public (the victims ).

4. Big scandal of corruption to obstruct the court process ( ECCC ) of Case 002.

5. Detaining suspects beyond detaining time (over 3 years ) to avoid fully public hearing of Case 002.

If Case 002 undergo public hearing there will be many other countries involved one of them is Yuon Hanoi who formed Khmer People's Revolutionary Party and later on Known as CPP.

So the real killers of Khmer innocent people are still at large that to say CPP and yuon Hanoi the mastermind of killing field between 1975-1979 in Cambodia.

To back up my above comment all these answers are in Indochina Federation formed by late Ho Chi Minh in 1930.

We are the victims of killing field between 1975-1979 must know the real Khmer history at least between 1930-2011 so we know when and how yuon Hanoi formed CPP.

So this ECCC is 100% a failure to find justice for 1.7 million of Khmer victims.

So Case 002 will face a lot obstacles , not fully public hearing.