Closing Order of Case 002 against Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith

In preparation for the start of trial hearings beginning on 27 June 2011 of Case 002 against the surviving Khmer Rouge senior leaders Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary and Ieng Thirith, KI Media is starting a new series in posting installations of the public document of the Closing Order of Case 002.  The Closing Order of the Co-Investigating Judges forms the basic document from which all the parties (Co-Prosecutors, Co-Lead Lawyers for all civil parties, Defense Lawyers) will be making their arguments before the Trial Chamber judges (one Cambodian President, 2 Cambodian Judges, 2 UN judges).  Up until now, the hearings involving these four surviving senior Khmer Rouge leaders have been in the Pre-Trial Chamber over issues of pre-trial detention and jurisdictional issues.  Beginning in June 2011, the Trial Chamber will hear the substantive arguments over the criminal charges (e.g. genocide, crimes against humanity, penal code of 1956).  Available in Khmer and French.  Contact the ECCC for a free copy.

CLOSING ORDER

of Co-Investigating Judges You Bunleng and Marcel Lemonde, 15 September 2010

Dates & Participation

181.    This policy was primarily carried out by members of the military and security forces (Santebal) of the CPK.⁵⁸⁷ It evolved before and throughout the regime. By the 1970s, security centres and execution sites had been established in "liberated" zones and were reeducating bad-elements and killing enemies.⁵⁸⁸ This policy was widely disseminated from 1971 and songs encouraging the "smashing" of people were used as a tool of implemention.⁵⁸⁹

182.   In July 1975, at a RAK gathering, the "Chairman of the High-Level Military Committee of the Party" declared that the Revolutionary Army had to defend the country against "internal enemies" and continue "smashings".⁵⁹⁰ During various other RAK meetings, the methods to be employed against bad elements were discussed.⁵⁹¹

183.   The Standing Committee addressed this policy during a series of meetings held between

                                                                                                         

August 1975 and August 1976, including methods of surveillance, the situation of specific individuals such as Sihanouk or cadres identified as potential "traitors,"⁵⁹⁴ and the situation of national defence⁵⁹⁵ and enemies.⁵⁹⁶

184.   Two Party documents, both dating from September 1975, discuss those whom the CPK suspected of engaging in activities against the State, both inside and outside Cambodia, and in some cases they propose an appropriate sanction.⁵⁹⁷ For example, it was decided that intellectuals living abroad would be reeducated through labour upon their return to the country. ⁵⁹⁸

186. On 30 March 1976, the Central Committee reported the following, regarding the power to decide on "smashing within and outside the ranks": "If in the base framework, to be decided by the Zone Standing Committee. Surrounding the Centre Office, to be decided by the Central Office Committee. Independent Sectors, to be decided by the Standing Committee. The Centre Military, to be decided by the General Staff'. ⁵⁹⁹ In the following months, internal CPK documents required heightened "revolutionary vigilance" with a view to "ensuring that the enemy is unable to bore from within " the Party and the army.⁶⁰⁰ In practice, some sectors subordinated to zones made the decisions to "smash"⁶⁰¹ or oversaw decisions to "smash" at the district level.⁶⁰² Elsewhere, it appears that districts made such decisions on their own authority.⁶⁰³ In addition, the Central Committee delegated this authority to at least some cooperatives. Some cooperatives retained the power to smash as evidenced by witness statements,⁶⁰⁴ official media reports,⁶⁰⁵ and telegrams.⁶⁰⁶ At the same time, authorities at some cooperatives nominated prisoners to district security offices for execution, as was the case in Tram Kok district, as set out in the section of the Closing Order relating to the Factual Findings of Crimes for Tram Kok Cooperatives and the Kraing Ta Chan security centre.

187. The People's Representative Assembly articulated this policy in meetings held from 11 to 13 April 1976, at which it approved the need to "raise revolutionary vigilance to a high level at all times".⁶⁰⁷

188. At a Council of Ministers meeting on 22 April 1976,⁶⁰⁸ Pol Pot stated that the policies of the CPK had to be correctly implemented in every sector and ministry, emphasizing that "only when we fulfil our duties ... the enemy will respect us and be apprehensive about us" ⁶⁰⁹ In particular, talking about the dangers of the imperialists and the CIA, he stated that "no matter how well we do things, if the imperialists are alive, if their CIA is alive, if their reactionary groups are not yet eliminated from the face of the world, they will continue opposing the revolution, opposing us opposing any progressive both overtly and clandestinely" .⁶¹⁰ He also insisted on the importance of "revolutionary vigilance" against "every form of enemy activity" and on the reeducation of the masses "in every ministry and office and in the Army, in the cooperatives, the unions, etc". ⁶¹¹ On 31 May 1976, Pol Pot reported to the Council of Ministers that difficulties were being encountered at the eastern border, from a "military group and a small number of students that the contemptible assigned to be CIA network" ⁶¹²

189. This policy was also discussed in four ad hoc CPK meetings held in 1976: two on propaganda, one regarding base work, and one addressing health and social affairs.⁶¹³ Surviving minutes of meetings on propaganda dated March 1976 insist on the importance of radio broadcasting "to prevent the enemy from attacking us," or to ensure "reeducation and training on the constitution".⁶¹⁴ In the second meeting on propaganda held in June 1976, a series of precise instructions regarding these matters were issued in the name of the Standing Committee, including the need to "have more revolutionary vigilance especially the enemies burrowing within"⁶¹⁵ The enemy situation at the base was also discussed at the third meeting dated March 1976, where the need for a "dictatorship of our proletariat class ... to prevent the enemy from seizing the opportunity [to attack]" was discussed.⁶¹⁶ In the fourth meeting, in June 1976, political and consciousness work, and the need for further indoctrination was discussed with the Ministry of Social Affairs.⁶¹⁷

190. In June 1978, the Party's line towards enemies and bad elements appears to have altered, when a Central Committee directive was issued entitled "Guidance of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea on the Party's Policy towards Misled Persons who have joined the CIA, served as Yuon agents or joined the KGB and Opposed the Party, Revolution, People and Democratic Kampuchea".⁶¹⁸ This directive appears to prescribe reeducation for those who allegedly joined the CIA, KGB and Vietnamese before July 1978, and orders the Party and the general population to eliminate networks that continued to oppose the Party.⁶¹⁹ One witness states that this June 1978 directive gave authority to the CPK Central Committee for implementing "smashing" which had previously been delegated outside the CPK centre by the 30 March 1976 directive.⁶²⁰ The June 1978 directive was disseminated in an issue of Revolutionary Flag⁶²¹ Another issue of Revolutionary Flag dating from July 1978, further declares that the former delineation between "full-rights" people, "candidates" and "depositees" within cooperatives had been abolished.⁶²² The July 1978 issue of Revolutionary Flag itself also urged Party members to "continue constantly to powerfully impel further forward the mass movement to sweep cleanly away the concealed enemies" ⁶²² In September 1978, Pol Pot disseminated this new policy at a large assembly which gathered Party cadre from the whole country.⁶²⁴ However, Duch gave evidence that this purported change in the CPK policy was only a deception designed to calm the population.⁶²⁵