Preah Vihear: From Conflict to Development

Poorly equipped Cambodian soldiers along the border?

Monday, June 27, 2011
Op-Ed by MP

The news that the Thai delegation had decided to walk out on the World Heritage Convention in protest against the latter’s decision to advance Cambodia’s management plan for consideration does not come as a shock to any informed observers. All the signals from the Thai camp leading to this announcement last Saturday night in Paris appeared to convey an air of optimism that the UN body would cave in to Thailand’s obstructive pressure and lobby to derail Cambodia’s management proposal. The signals, misleading as they usually are, had been communicated with the Thai public in mind. Having manufactured or resurrected the row that had been put to bed since 1962, the challenge for this Thai administration has been how to ‘sell’ this unwholesome piece of its business and its largely incoherent strategy over this venture to an increasingly uneasy, sceptical Thai public in this critical period leading up to the forthcoming general election.

Politicians and diplomats the world over are not normally held in high esteem by their educated, thoughtful public. With the exception of an honourable few, this breed of men are a species of their own. However, at least on the issue of Preah Vihear, it is nevertheless, possible to surmise with a high level of confidence which camp has been telling the truth and which has been telling lies.

So we ask: what makes Bangkok different from Phnom Penh on this conflict? Well, not a great deal in most respects. Thailand may be the second largest economy in the region or enjoys a higher GDP as compared to many of its neighbours’ economic status, but its democratic credentials are largely open to question. Even the decision to end Thai participation at the UNESCO convention last Saturday evening is being questioned by some quarters in Thailand for having been made without parliamentary consultation or seal of approval. What really distinguishes between the two camps is the legal basis governing the actual case itself which is final and not amenable to interpretation. The Thais may argue that the ICJ has no right to adjudicate disputed boundary line between two countries, yet that is precisely what the Court did in 1962 when it declared that the Temple stood within Cambodian sovereignty, and that the boundary line in the immediate area (proximate to the Temple grounds) as drawn up by French geographers and subsequently accepted by Thailand’s central authorities over a period of several years (implying compliance or agreement) is to be upheld by the Court in place and irrespective of any reference to the watershed line raised by the Thai camp at the time.

So whereas Bangkok has this insurmountable legal mountain to climb (they have always been confident their expensively assembled legal team is capable of reducing a mountain to a hill and vice versa!) Phnom Penh has a simpler, defensive task to perform. The latter has no need to distort facts; to tell lies before their own people or to mislead the rest of the world. Nor will it be in their interest to do so. Why deceive anyone when the merit of the case is overwhelmingly in your favour?

While it may be premature to make assumptions about the likely outcomes of this case (being lodged with both UNESCO and the ICJ) it would be a perversion of truth and a travesty of justice if any of Bangkok’s demands is accommodated. Since the day the Temple became inscribed as a world heritage site, Bangkok has done everything possible to sow doubt into the minds of interested third parties as regards the management plan’s merit or even the very act of having this temple listed in this manner; an arrangement that does not foresee future Thai participation or involvement in any shape or form. This, it points out, is a sacrilegious violation of its own peculiar notion of sovereignty. Never mind that a previous Thai government approved of the inscription application proposal. Like a child in a sweet shop being dragged away from what it desires, this Thai government is opting to give vent to its childish instinct and frustration by throwing a tantrum and making as much a scene as it possibly can. If the child has no sense of shame or embarrassment, he/she certainly has nothing to lose!

Even some of the Phnom Penh regime’s severest critics would acknowledge its patient handling of the Temple issue in contrast to the corresponding aggressive behaviour of its Thai counterpart. This patience as such has partly been born of Cambodia’s inability to leverage the crisis initiated by Thailand, or more precisely by her military muscle and aggression. Since the integration of what was left of KR and other opposing armed Cambodian factions into the unified national military command, the general trend and expectation among Cambodian policy-makers had been to scale down the size of the country’s armed forces in order to reduce the costs of military expenses, and divert much needed resources into other fields. Unfortunately, this plan has since 2008 been turned on its head by the Preah Vihear crisis: the Thais appeared to have other ideas. The conflict itself, provided it remains localised and non-internationalised, would provide Thai political factions with a useful distraction and a sideshow, but for the Cambodian regime it is much more of a burden and potential slippery slope to political oblivion. This is why it would be unfair to suggest it had helped to initiate this situation.

The failure to equip Cambodia’s military to meet external threats of this kind until Thai troops had advanced across large patches of Cambodian territory would appear to indicate that the Cambodian regime had neglected one of its central obligations: i.e. national security vis a vis neighbouring states. The importance that a modern progressive state attaches to the internal affairs or domestic situation of another state is of vital long term strategic relevance and significance. Beside reports prepared by country embassies and other governmental agencies, a whole variety of sources of advance intelligence of this sort can also be extracted from within civil society, academia, historians, anthropologists, reporters, mass media etc. By failing to heed their warnings or restricting their right to freedom of expression in fear of their expanding ‘interference’ in politics and perceived governmental spheres, a regime or state is electing to put itself in a position of grave disadvantage and isolation.

Post-conflict Preah Vihear:

When will such a time be, I know not! However, once the legal wrangling has been put an end to, it is time for the Cambodian government to:

1. Demarcate the boundary within the Temple areas with tall barbed wire fences to prevent unwanted incidents from taking place such as armed clashes due to troops straying into each other’s territory, or any other unauthorised entries into the bespoken locations;
2. Build a small museum dedicated to the Temple and have a replica of the Temple in its peak condition erected to provide visitors with a glimpse of its original magnificence and stature. There should, of course, be a brief but factual chronology of the Temple’s history, beginning with its inception in the year its construction was started, dates of its completion and any subsequent restoration works done under various Khmer kings. Periods of its occupation by Siamese and Thai authorities should also be included in the chronology, including the settlement at the ICJ, and the current recurrence of the conflict with Thailand since 2008.
3. Screen entry from the Thai side of the border to the Temple site. Local Thai citizens as well as other Thais of Khmer descend should be granted free access to the Temple complex, both for tourism purposes as well as for business related activities. The rest of Thai citizens should be charged a nominal entrance fee for visiting the Temple from either side of the border. Other international tourists and visitors should be charged a higher entrance fee (but not too high!). Income derived from the gate receipt should be ploughed back towards meeting the Temple’s conservation costs.
4. The benefit of giving free access to local Thai citizens is two-fold: a) to help foster economic activities and momentum in the area by not restricting cross-border access to locals and traders whose well-being and livelihood will have a corresponding economic effect on the other side of the border where trade is inextricable linked and co-dependent; b) Cambodia will stand to gain valuable support from local population who see no sense in supporting ultra-nationalistic activities as witnessed by recent PAD activists’ violent protests in Sisaket in recent years and by the opposition of local residents to these actions who feared the inevitable damaging consequences upon their trade and livelihood. The small nominal entrance fee for other Thai citizens will be a gesture of goodwill towards the Thai people in general who may have a certain emotional attachment towards the site which came into being when their ancestors were still subjects of the Khmer Empire. They will also have an opportunity to explore the museum and learn about their actual national origins; about successive Thai governments’ attempt to illegally seize the Temple or the surrounding areas under the banner of national sovereignty.
5. The theme of the Museum should centre upon education and universal values that inspire a common bond and a sentiment of shared history and culture rather than accentuated national vanity.
6. Persuade the Chinese government or Chinese companies to invest in the region’s tourism infrastructure such as accommodation and transport systems. This will discourage future Thai military from taking reckless actions against the Temple and its surrounding locations.

It is time to pave the way for lasting peace for both nations and for their future generations to co-exist in mutual harmony and prosperity.

Thank you.