Closing Order of Case 002 against Senior KR Leaders Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith

In light of the start of trial hearings beginning on 27 June 2011 of Case 002 against the surviving Khmer Rouge senior leaders Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary and Ieng Thirith, KI Media is posting installations of the public document of the Closing Order of Case 002.  The Closing Order of the Co-Investigating Judges forms thebasic document from which all the parties (Co-Prosecutors, Co-Lead Lawyers for all civil parties, Defense Lawyers) will be making their arguments before the Trial Chamber judges (one Cambodian President, 2 Cambodian Judges, 2 UN judges).  Up until now, the hearings involving these four surviving senior Khmer Rouge leaders have been in the Pre-Trial Chamber over issues of pre-trial detention and jurisdictional issues.  Beginning in June 2011, the Trial Chamber will hear the substantive arguments over the criminal charges (e.g. genocide, crimes against humanity, penal code of 1956).  Available in Khmer and French. Contact the ECCC for a free copy. 

 

CLOSING ORDER

of Co-Investigating Judges You Bunleng and Marcel Lemonde

15 September 2010

S-21

 

Arrest and transfer to S-21

            For the arrest and transfer of CPK cadres and RAK members from autonomous regions or zones, two methods were used. In some cases, S-21 personnel would go to the zones and make arrests, or collect prisoners arrested by the zone units, and then return to Phnom Penh.¹⁸⁷⁴ In other cases, CPK cadres and RAK members were summoned to Phnom Penh by Office 870 and in particular by Nuon Chea (officially for a meeting), and they disappeared, never to be seen again.¹⁸⁷⁵ In the vast majority of cases, cadres passed through K-7 before being taken to S-21 by members of units under S-71.¹⁸⁷⁶ For the Phnom Penh units, and particularly ministries and units of the Centre, it appears that beyond those cases where arrests were carried out by S-21, members of S-71 units were also responsible for the arrests.¹⁸⁷⁷ In some instances, they also passed through K-7.¹⁸⁷⁸ Sometimes, the ministries were charged with transporting prisoners from their own departments to S-21.¹⁸⁷⁹ Duch confirms that as a rule, "S-21 [did not] have the right to arrest people", adding that, in most cases, he was simply informed of an arrest by the higher echelon so that he could organize the reception of

the prisoners.¹⁸⁸⁰ Apart from cases in which S-21 made arrests as described below, Duch was notified that prisoners were due to arrive through lists, which were prepared and sent by Son Sen, Nuon Chea or Ken alias Lin.¹⁸⁸¹

            S-21 personnel themselves sometimes made arrests.¹⁸⁸² According to Him Huy, where S-21 made arrests outside its premises, but within Phnom Penh, there were two possible scenarios: either his unit made the arrest, or, if the arrest had already been made, his unit was only responsible for the transfer of the prisoners to S-21.¹⁸⁸³ Him Huy states that he was dispatched from Phnom Penh on several occasions to bring prisoners to S-21, and in each of these cases, Duch gave him a list of the people to be arrested.¹⁸⁸⁴ Duch states that whenever necessary, a special S-21 unit left Phnom Penh bearing an order issued by the Central Committee and a special pass signed by Son Sen, authorising it to bring prisoners back to S-21. However, he adds that this system was subsequently discontinued.¹⁸⁸⁵ Furthermore, Duch explains that he was sometimes consulted and was involved in the planning of arrests, particularly when it involved arresting a large number of people within one unit, or when the persons to be arrested were prominent members of the Party.¹⁸⁸⁶ Lastly, the arrests of some important persons, such as Koy Thuon and Pang, took place in Duch's house.¹⁸⁸⁷

            Duch indicates that when the decision to make an arrest was made, secrecy and trickery were mandatory in order to avoid leaks, and prevent any attempts to resist, especially when a large number of people had to be arrested in the same location.¹⁸⁸⁸ In such cases, according to Duch, he asked Hor to speak to the head of the unit and urged him to "calm the staff' and make sure that he was methodical in making the arrests.¹⁸⁸⁹

Arrest of Vietnamese civilians and soldiers

            The Arrest of Vietnamese civilians and soldiers generally took place in the main conflict zone (along the border with Vietnam) or nearby.¹⁸⁹⁰ Former military commander [REDACTED]

says: "all of the Vietnamese soldiers who were captured along the border near Svay Rieng and Prey Veng Provinces were sent to Phnom Penh. Initially, they were sent to Ren At the decision headquarters, and he decided what was to be done with them ... I think this group was sent to Duch at S-21, but I am not certain, because at that time we seemed to be in a dark world; many things happened that we did not know about, and movement was extremely strict".¹⁸⁹¹

            It appears that at least some, if not all,¹⁸⁹² of the Vietnamese civilians and soldiers arrested in the main conflict zone were detained at S-21. Duch explains that he was only informed of their arrival in the same way that he was informed of the arrival of the other prisoners, namely by way of lists,¹⁸⁹³ and that S-21 was never required to organise the transportation of the Vietnamese from the theatre of operations.¹⁸⁹⁴ This claim is contradicted by Him Huy, who states that on two occasions, in 1977 and 1978, Duch sent him to the battlefront in Svay Rieng to escort Vietnamese soldiers to S-21¹⁸⁹⁵ Furthermore,     states that he was sent

to work on the border in 1977 and saw S-21 personnel transporting Vietnamese prisoners of war in S-21 trucks from the theatre of operations.¹⁸⁹⁶

Arrests of S-21 personnel

            S-21 personnel were also arrested and either sent to S-24 for reeducation,¹⁸⁹⁷ or imprisoned in S-21.¹⁸⁹⁸ Cadres could be sent to S-24 for minor offences, especially when someone they knew was detained at S-21.¹⁸⁹⁹ For more serious offences, such as allowing a prisoner's escape, death or suicide before interrogation,¹⁹⁰⁰ the person responsible was considered as a traitor to the revolution, and was arrested.¹⁹⁰¹ However, some witnesses suggest that the majority of S-21 staff members who were arrested, specifically those from Division 703, had not actually committed a serious offence.¹⁹⁰²

            A former guard states that only Duch could order the arrest of S-21 personnel.¹⁹⁰³ However, Duch maintains that "The S-21 Committee was competent for the first form of purge (sending a staff member to S-24). Conversely, Son Sen, and later Nuon Chea, were competent for the second form of purge (imprisoning a staff member in S-21)".¹⁹⁰⁴