Tuesday, September 20, 2011

Wikileaks: Statement on Thailand regional issues which also includes Thai's perspective on the Cambodian-Thai border conflict

Cable 10BANGKOK186, A/S SHAPIRO VISIT: DISCUSSIONS OF REGIONAL ISSUES

Reference ID: 10BANGKOK186
Created: 2010-01-23 10:42
Released: 2011-08-30 01:44
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Origin: Embassy Bangkok

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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM MARR MASS TH CH CB
SUBJECT: A/S SHAPIRO VISIT: DISCUSSIONS OF REGIONAL ISSUES,
THE RISE OF CHINA, AND ASEAN

Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Summary. During a January 13-15 visit, Assistant
Secretary for Political-Military Affairs Andrew Shapiro
discussed a range of regional issues during meetings with
senior Thai officials. The rise of China was viewed benignly
by Thai officials, who stressed that Beijing was more
interested in supporting trade and economic development in
the ASEAN region than in attending to security issues.
Heightened tensions with Cambodia were universally
characterized as a political issue rather than a security
threat, and DPM Suthep Thaugsuban said that he expected that
relations with Cambodia would improve this year. The Vice
Foreign Minister stressed that Prime Minister Abhisit
Vejjajiva would not visit Burma until a meeting with Aung San
Suu Kyi was permitted, and that the PM firmly supported the
release of all political prisoners. Ministry of Defense
Permanent Secretary Apichart Penkitti underscored to A/S
Shapiro Thailand's desire for the U.S. to join the ASEAN
Defense Ministers Meeting Plus arrangement.


¶2. (C) Assistant Secretary Shapiro stressed to a wide range
of Thai interlocutors the Obama Administration's commitment
to engagement in Southeast Asia and in Thailand in
particular. With the rise of China of interest to the entire
international community, the U.S. wanted close relations with
Southeast Asia in order to insure that Beijing utilized its
growing role in a way that supported regional security. End
summary.


¶3. (C) Comment. A/S Shapiro's visit highlighted to the RTG
U.S. interest in engaging on regional and strategic issues,
particularly in advance of the U.S.-Thai Strategic Dialogue.
We were struck by the Thai interest in economic issues, even
in their discussions with the A/S for Political/Military
affairs. Reflecting that orientation, Thai views on China
were surprising in that there was a universal lack of concern
over whether China's rise could potentially disrupt regional
security. Of course, this lack of worry also likely is the
product of Thailand lacking a territorial dispute with
Beijing. That said, Thai officials continue to encourage the
U.S. to participate in ADMM Plus, a grouping that could
otherwise likely be dominated by China. End comment.

CHINA'S RISE: A NATURAL EVENT, FOCUSED ON ECONOMICS
--------------------------------------------- ------

¶4. (C) During a January 15 meeting, Deputy Prime Minister
Suthep Thaugsuban told A/S Shapiro and the Ambassador that he
believed that U.S. policy had in recent years moved towards
restricting imports. In contrast to the U.S. approach,
Beijing was working to improve trade with Southeast Asia and
to promote economic development in ASEAN. In particular,
China had promised ASEAN large amounts of financial
assistance for transportation and development projects and
had become a leading investor in the region. Suthep
recommended that the U.S. look for ways to improve economic
relations while also supporting regional security.

¶5. (C) A/S Shapiro asked about Thailand's view of China's
increasing international role during a January 14 meeting
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Panich Vikitsreth. Panich
said the RTG wanted to continue to work closely with the
U.S., but had no option but to develop closer relations with
China as well. According to Panich, China's interests in
Southeast Asia were primarily economic. Foreign investment
in Thailand had in the past been predominantly Japanese, but
China had recently become one of the largest foreign
investors in Thailand, Panich said. That said, the RTG was
watching with caution Chinese engagement in Burma.

¶6. (C) During a January 14 meeting, Ministry of Defense
Permanent Secretary General Apichart Penkitti told A/S
Shapiro and the Ambassador that the rise of China was not a
concern because the Chinese were focused on good relations
with ASEAN and on promoting economic development in the
region. In regard to bilateral relations with Beijing,
Apichart said it was natural for the Thai-Chinese
relationship to progress. That said, the PLA had pressed
Thailand to initiate large scale bilateral exercises, but the

BANGKOK 00000186 002 OF 003


Thai military had insisted that exercises should be limited
to Special Forces training, such as the ones held in 2007 and
2008, as well as the commencement of an annual naval and
marine exercise this year.

¶7. (C) Assistant Secretary Shapiro January 15 asked Royal
Thai Armed Forces Chief of Defense Forces General Songkitti
Jaggabatra for his views of the rise of China and its
influence in the region. A/S Shapiro said that while the
U.S. wanted to work closely with China, as evidenced by the
U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the USG wanted to
strengthen relationships in Asia in order to maintain
stability in the event that China's rise proceeded in a way
that could compromise regional security. General Songkitti
commented that due to its size and history, it was normal for
China to gain a more influential role in Asia. With Laos and
Cambodia heavily influenced by China, it was important for
Thailand to develop good relations with Beijing as well in
order to insure against being sidelined in the region.
Songkitti said that Thai relations with the U.S. were much
stronger than those with China -- due to historically strong
economic and educational bonds -- but that the RTG would
pursue closer relations
with Beijing as Thailand could not escape its geographic
reality.

¶8. (C) A/S Shapiro asked Songkitti about the planned
Thai-Chinese naval and marine exercise scheduled to be
initiated in 2010. Songkitti said the exercise was still in
the planning stage, but commented that it would be
small-scale due the Thai military's lacking budgetary
constraints. Songkitti explained that Thailand did not need
another large scale exercise because the annual multilateral
Cobra Gold exercise already met the need for such an event.
That said, the Thai military leaders believed that it was
necessary to develop relationships with their Chinese
counterparts.

¶9. (C) RTARF J3 LTG Suraphan Wongthai told A/S Shapiro that
Thailand had a natural desire for close relations with the
U.S. This was the result of U.S. efforts after World War II
to shield Bangkok from British and French demands for
reparations from Thailand, and shared experiences during
conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. That
said, in recent years the Thai military had found it more
difficult to maintain the relationship with the U.S.
military. Suraphan said this was because few junior officers
in the Thai military had the opportunity to attend
International Military Education and Training (IMET) courses
in the U.S. as funding levels had not yet reached pre-2006
levels. Also, the Thai military had found it increasingly
difficult to purchase U.S. weapons. In contrast, LTG
Suraphan said that China appeared eager to find ways to
interact with the Thai and were very willing to sell weapons
systems. A/S Shapiro told Suraphan that while budget
increases would be difficult, the Political-Military Bureau
would explore possibilities for increased IMET funding for
the Thai.

ABHISIT WAITING TO VISIT BURMA
------------------------------

¶10. (C) VFM Panich told A/S Shapiro that Prime Minister
Abhisit Vejjajiva considered Burma policy a top priority.
The PM wanted free and fair elections, and the release of
political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK).
Abhisit had also decided to hold off on visiting Burma until
he could meet ASSK. Nonetheless, Thailand was willing to
work closely with the U.S. as Thailand was a close dialogue
partner on Burma. During a January 15 lunch meeting with Dr.
Panitan Wattanayagorn, Deputy Secretary General for Prime
Minister Abhisit and Acting RTG Spokesman, Panitan confirmed
to A/S Shapiro that the Prime Minister would wait to visit
Burma until the regime permitted a meeting with ASSK. Burma
was a key issue for the RTG as the two nations' long border
led to significant narcotics trafficking and illegal labor
problems, Panitan said.

ASEAN AND ADMM PLUS
-------------------

BANGKOK 00000186 003 OF 003



¶11. (C) VFM Panich told A/S Shapiro that the Thai government
was proud of its accomplishments as ASEAN Chair, particularly
efforts to raise regional awareness of human rights and to
initiate ASEAN Connectivity. Dr. Sarasin, CP Group Executive
Vice President and a former high-ranking Thai diplomat, told
A/S Shapiro that he thought the RTG should re-examine its
policy in regards to ASEAN. With its foreign policy focused
on ASEAN, an organization dependent on consensus, Thailand
had in the past twenty years lost standing in the
international community. Sarasin commented that, as it took
much time to convince other ASEAN nations to take action,
Thailand often found itself unable to focus on important
international issues.

¶12. (C) Ministry of Defense Permanent Secretary Apichart told
A/S Shapiro and the Ambassador that ASEAN had not yet decided
on the composition of the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting
Plus (ADMM Plus) grouping. Apichart said the expanded
arrangement would include the ASEAN plus six nations or the
ASEAN plus eight nations. (Note: It is our understanding
that "plus six" would include Australia, China, India, Japan,
New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea and the "plus eight"
would include Russia and the U.S. as well. End note.)
Apichart told A/S Shapiro that the RTG wanted the U.S. to be
a part of ADMM Plus.

REGIONAL RELATIONS DEPEND ON CAMBODIA-THAKSIN
---------------------------------------------

¶13. (C) During their January 15 meeting, A/S Shapiro asked
DPM Suthep about the Thai government's views of regional and
strategic challenges. Suthep said that Cambodian Prime
Minister Hun Sen's relations with former Prime Minister
Thaksin Shinawatra would be a key factor in efforts to
improve the regional political environment. With Burma,
Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam strongly aligned, it was
important that Thailand improve relations with Phnom Penh.
The DPM said that he was confident that relations would
improve as Thaksin's challenge to the Thai government faded
over the coming year.

¶14. (C) VFM Panich told A/S Shapiro that Thai-Cambodian
relations along the border were fine, but the appointment of
Thaksin as an advisor to Hun Sen was unacceptable to the Thai
government. As such, Hun Sen's act had led to heightened
political tensions. While tensions were not as high as in
October and November of last year, the appointment continued
to be an obstacle to improving government to government
relations, Panich said.

¶15. (C) General Apichart emphasized to A/S Shapiro that the
tensions with Cambodia were entirely political, adding that
military relations along the border were good and the two
sides communicated often and had close cooperation. RTARF J3
LTG Suraphan laughed off recent reports that military
tensions had risen along the border and instead stressed the
greater concern posed by Burma purchasing more advanced,
long-range weapons.

¶16. (U) Assistant Secretary Shapiro cleared this cable.
JOHN

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