November 28, 2011
Kavi Chongkittavorn
The Nation
The East Asia Summit in Bali ended two weeks ago but the political ripples continue. The long-term implications will be with the region for decades to come. Kudos to Asean and the chair for its success in bringing the US and China for discussions on its own turf. Deep down, the grouping hopes they will balance each other out at the Asean-led forum. Will they?
A frequently asked question is whether Asean has the long-term capacity to handle the world's two most powerful players according to its own simple set of rules and norms, mainly the non-interference principle and non-use of force. Asean can be very confident and at times forgets that the US and China have their own norms. At this juncture, these dialogue partners are presenting themselves, one way or another, as regional and international norm setters. It was only from 2003 onward that they began to acknowledge the existing practices in the region, especially those established by Asean in the past four decades, but nobody can be certain of the sustainability of this trend if there is a full-blown US-China rivalry.
When the super powers' self-interested norms and values collide in the future, what will the grouping's exit strategies be? As the Bali meeting demonstrated, the US and China differ greatly in their approaches to conflict resolution and prevention in the region. They bring with them perceptions and historical baggage to deal with. Take for instance, the South China Sea quagmire; their respective positions are now polarising Asean, not only between the non-claimants and claimants but among other members as well. For decades, the conflict was confined to the direct parties. Now it has been internationalised under the auspices of Asean. Obviously, there will be unexpected consequences.
President Barack Obama's charm offensive has caused a stir in all Asean capitals, and fed immediately into the US domestic scene — focusing on hotly contested US policy on China — where any endeavour to demonstrate proactive gestures towards friends and allies are highlighted. Asean played along with the US pre-positioning this time around, knowing full well that the current focus on China's assertiveness will not last forever.
Although Obama's mild manners won the day, the increased US presence in Darwin, Australia, which will begin to host a 2,500-strong troop rotation, has caused uneasiness in Indonesia and to a certain extent
in Malaysia. The US president also
surprised Asean leaders as he made comments twice on maritime security and the South China Sea after other EAS leaders mentioned the topic.
He made the second intervention toward the end of a 90-minute session involving all the leaders, followed by China.
Since China was last to speak at the EAS, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao dutifully had to reply to all the points brought up. He was visibly upset during the EAS discussion, but he remained composed. He addressed and reiterated China's position that this sensitive issue should not be raised in the forum as it has been addressed elsewhere by conflicting partners since 2002. The EAS participants were not in the mood. As a leader-led strategic forum, no issue should be off the agenda. In raising the issue, Washington even quoted the first EAS chair statement in 2005 issued in Kuala Lumpur that the EAS is for strategic discussions on key issues affecting the region and the evolving regional architecture.
Now that the US is in the arena along with other gigantic players, the future of Asean will depend on how it utilises its strengths and improves embedded weaknesses. It is interesting to note that while Obama reiterated the central role played by Asean in the emerging Trans Pacific Partnership, at the working level the US and other Western dialogue partners are doing the opposite. They are undermining the very essence of Asean as the gatekeeper. After long hours of wrangling, the Western EAS members refused to allow the grouping to use the term "Asean centrality" in the joint statement of EAS. As a non-Asean member, China has been one of the strongest supporters of Asean centrality.
In the weeks and months to come, the future of China's participation in the EAS will be directly linked to Asean's perceived role. At this point, Beijing does not feel as comfortable as it did at the previous five meetings. At the latest expanded EAS in Bali, China was singled out. Despite the lack of much-needed progress as demanded by Asean, until recently China and Asean have been able to maintain stability in the South China Sea.
To mitigate further internationalisation of the conflict, senior officials from China and Asean are scheduled to meet in Taiyuan, in China's Shanxi province, early next year to work out details of the proposed codes of conduct in the troubled maritime area - a far cry from previous years when China said that it would do so when the conditions were right. The proposed Taiyuan meeting would be a game-changing platform because China seeks to restore the grouping's confidence over its peaceful rise. In March 1995, the common Asean position on the South China Sea over Mischief Reef increased its bargain power against China, which resulted in the signing of the 2002 Declaration of Conduct among conflicting parties with the language credited to a unified Asean.
However, this solidarity, which lasted for about seven years, has now been weakened due to the lack of tangible progress on the joint cooperation. Further rubbing salt into the wound, the growing intolerance of Asean claimants coupled with China's assertiveness have accelerated power plays over the disputes. Beijing faulted Manila for inviting the US and other Western countries into the fray. Presently, the Philippine-China ties are at their lowest ebb, although there have been exchanges of high-level visits and billions of dollars of Chinese investment pledges. If this China-bashing continues well into the next EAS, it will further heighten the division among the EAS members, in particular within Asean.
Interestingly, US power projection in Asia comes at a time when its economic performance is in decline. Asean understands this situation very well. China will continue to enjoy economic growth and will certainly become the world's biggest economy in the next two decades or so, as numerous economists predicted. But China's military power will continue to be secondary to US military power. Asean wants to have its cake and eat it too.
Therefore, Asean has to watch its step. Both China and the US have strong assets in the region. More than we would like to admit, their relations are inclusive. China is an old civilisation and is located here: that is why it claims history and geography to be on its side. While the US is 12 time zones away, Washington bases its legitimate interests in the body of international norms and practices. Like it or not, Asean-brokered events will be used for occasional diplomatic manoeuvring by the US and China, with additional military deployments and posturing becoming the new normal for "intersessional" activities, to borrow a term from the Asean Regional Forum.
One caveat is in order. Asean must be careful not to allow itself to be used to rationalise actions taken by these powers, or to legitimise what they consider "fait accomplis".
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