Closing Order of Case 002 against Senior KR Leaders Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith

In light of the HISTORIC (!) start of MOST COMPLEX (sic!) trial hearings beginning on 27 June 2011 and again ANOTHER HISTORIC (!) START of this same MOST COMPLEX (sic!) on 21 Nov. 2011 of Case 002 against the surviving Khmer Rouge senior leaders Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary and Ieng Thirith, KI Media is posting installations of the public document of the Closing Order of Case 002 (Indictment).  The Closing Order (or INDICTMENT) of the Co-Investigating Judges forms the basic document from which all the parties (Co-Prosecutors, Co-Lead Lawyers for all civil parties, Defense Lawyers) will be making their arguments before the Trial Chamber judges (one Cambodian President, 2 Cambodian Judges, 2 UN judges).  Up until now, the hearings involving these four surviving senior Khmer Rouge leaders have been in the Pre-Trial Chamber over issues of pre-trial detention and jurisdictional issues.  Beginning in June 2011, the Trial Chamber will hear the substantive (sic!) arguments over the criminal charges (e.g. genocide, crimes against humanity, penal code of 1956 - sic!).  Available in Khmer, English and French. Contact the ECCC for a free copy. 

 

CLOSING ORDER

of Co-Investigating Judges You Bunleng and Marcel Lemonde

15 September 2010

IX. ROLES OF THE CHARGED PERSONS

A. NUON CHEA 

Role in the CPK Security Apparatus

Member of the Military Committee of the Central Committee

859.           Nuon Chea was a member of the Military Committee of the Central Committee. His membership of the committee is confirmed by Ieng Sary,³⁶⁹³ [REDACTED],³⁶⁹⁴ and the speech he gave on the occasion of the ninth anniversary of the RAK in the name of the Military Committee of the CPK.³⁶⁹⁵ Duch explains that Nuon Chea was part of this committee, although it is unclear whether he had knowledge of this at the time or if his understanding has evolved with his access to the Case File.³⁶⁹⁶ In any case, Duch was aware at the time that Nuon Chea was responsible for security and military affairs.³⁶⁹⁷ Nuon Chea has recognized that the Committee existed during the CPK regime and that its role was national defence and purging internal enemies, but he has firmly denied that he was a member of it.³⁶⁹⁸

860.            Other evidence in the Case File supports the fact that Nuon Chea was responsible for security affairs. With respect to security, Duch states that "Pol Pot decided on Security work but Nuon Chea was his representative ".³⁶⁹⁹ A telegram operator in Autonomous Sector 105 explains "My typewritten documents regarding Security matters were sent to Nuon Chea". He adds, "Nuon Chea regularly instructed on security matters".³⁷⁰⁰ Other witnesses corroborate the responsibilities held by Nuon Chea in this area.³⁷⁰¹ In an interview with a journalist, Nuon Chea stated that Son Sen was responsible for the Ministry of Defense. He further stated that he did not have the capacity to interfere or issue orders on internal security, an area for which the Military Committee was responsible.³⁷⁰²

861.           Regarding military matters, the central body of the RAK was the General Staff led by Son Sen, with Pol Pot having general responsibility for the military. Nevertheless, as Deputy Secretary of the Central Committee and member of the Military Committee of the Central Committee, Nuon Chea actively participated in military affairs together with Pol Pot and Son Sen. During an interview, Duch states "Everything had to pass through Nuon Chea even if it was in scope of the military".³⁷⁰³ It appears that Nuon Chea participated in the military planning of the attack on Phnom Penh in April 1975.³⁷⁰⁴ Furthermore, numerous witnesses confirm that Nuon Chea exercised some responsibility for military matters during the CPK regime³⁷⁰⁵ including the political training of RAK members³⁷⁰⁶ and the appointment of military cadres.³⁷⁰⁷ Finally, a telephone operator for Son Sen explains that there was no telegram communication between Son Sen and Nuon Chea "because they generally met and worked together every day". Conversely, he states Nuon Chea never came to the General Staff where Son Sen regularly met with the divisions.³⁷⁰⁸ This is corroborated by the fact that none of the minutes of meetings between the General Staff, Central Divisions, and Independent Regiments mention Nuon Chea's attendance.³⁷⁰⁹

862.           Although foreign policy was not Nuon Chea's primary responsibility, he did exercise some functions with regards to international security matters. As a full-rights member of the CPK Standing Committee, Nuon Chea participated in the decision-making process regarding policies and strategies related to Cambodian borders and the situation with Vietnam.³⁷¹⁰ He provided opinions and precise instructions on these matters.³⁷¹¹ Nuon Chea negotiated with the Vietnamese authorities³⁷¹² and participated in the drafting of the Black Paper concerning the foreign policy of Vietnam.³⁷¹³ Nuon Chea was copied to the vast majority of surviving telegrams concerning the situation on the battlefields and at the border with Vietnam, and movement of troops, military attacks and casualties were frequently discussed.³⁷¹⁴ Some of the telegrams ask for instructions or materials from the CPK Centre or acknowledge having followed an instruction, or received materials.³⁷¹⁵ There is also evidence that Nuon Chea had the authority to send instructions to lower echelons on matters of international security and that he did so by telegram, or by letter on some occasions.³⁷¹⁶

S-21 Security Centre and S-24 Worksite (Prey Sar)

863.           In interviews conducted after the CPK regime, Nuon Chea explains that he did not know about S-21 before 1979 and that any documents implicating him must have been fabricated. He adds that Duch was working for the Ministry of Defence and Internal Security and that Son Sen was the one accountable for that Ministry.³⁷¹⁷ Nevertheless there is strong evidence that Nuon Chea was in charge of the S-21 security centre and its associated worksite S-24 (Prey Sar)³⁷¹⁸ from the time of their establishment until 6 January 1979.

864.           At S-21, between 15 August 1975 and 15 August 1977 first In Lorn alias Nat and then

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subsequently Duch had Son Sen as direct superior. Duch understood that Son Sen's authority was derived from his position as member of the CPK Centre Military Committee,³⁷²¹ member of the CPK Standing Committee,³⁷²² and as Chairman of the General Staff.³⁷²³ Even if Duch did not have direct contact with Nuon Chea during this period, he understood from his conversations with Son Sen that Nuon Chea, as the Deputy Secretary and the second in the Party hierarchy, was in overall charge of S-21 as Son Sen's superviser.³⁷²⁴ Duch states "Son Sen [had] Nuon Chea as his superior, the latter being under Pol Pot's authority" ²¹²⁵ It is not always clear to what extent Duch's knowledge and understanding of the hierarchical structure above him developed with his access to the Case File,³⁷²⁶ but it is is clear that at the relevant time Duch was aware that Nuon Chea was Son Sen's superior with respect to S-

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879. On 15 August 1977, when Son Sen left Phnom Penh to be closer to the front lines in the conflict with Vietnam and Nuon Chea summoned Duch to his office at the Buddhist Institute.³⁷²⁸ From this point on, Duch understood he had to report to Nuon Chea, who became his direct supervisor.³⁷²⁹ Duch states that Nuon Chea told him "the Chairman at S-21 was not me, Duch, but he, Nuon Chea, was Chairman".³⁷³⁰ Although reporting directly to Nuon Chea, Duch maintained communication with Son Sen who would contact him once or twice a month by phone. Although Duch no longer sent confessions to Son Sen directly, Son Sen still participated in monitoring S-21 activities and, according to Duch, considered himself to be Duch's supervisor.³⁷³¹

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