Closing Order of Case 002 against Senior KR Leaders Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith

In light of the HISTORIC (!) start of MOST COMPLEX (sic!) trial hearings beginning on 27 June 2011 and again ANOTHER HISTORIC (!) START of this same MOST COMPLEX (sic!) on 21 Nov. 2011 of Case 002 against the surviving Khmer Rouge senior leaders Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary and Ieng Thirith, KI Media is posting installations of the public document of the Closing Order of Case 002 (Indictment).  The Closing Order of the Co-Investigating Judges forms the basic document from which all the parties (Co-Prosecutors, Co-Lead Lawyers for all civil parties, Defense Lawyers) will be making their arguments before the Trial Chamber judges (one Cambodian President, 2 Cambodian Judges, 2 UN judges).  Up until now, the hearings involving these four surviving senior Khmer Rouge leaders have been in the Pre-Trial Chamber over issues of pre-trial detention and jurisdictional issues.  Beginning in June November 2011, the Trial Chamber will hear the substantive (sic!) arguments over the criminal charges (genocide, crimes against humanity, penal code of 1956, etc., only the Phase I Movement in April 1975).  Available in Khmer, English and French. Contact the ECCC for a free copy. 

 

CLOSING ORDER

of Co-Investigating Judges You Bunleng and Marcel Lemonde

15 September 2010

IX. ROLES OF THE CHARGED PERSONS

A. NUON CHEA

 Participation in the Common Purpose

 

Knowledge of and Involvement in the Arrest of "Enemies"

927.            Nuon Chea knew and played an important role in the arrest of enemies in particular within the rank of the CPK and thus at every level of the hierarchy.

928.           With the secrecy surrounding the CPK Centre, Duch could only be certain of the hierarchy directly above him but did not know all the details of the decision making process for arrests. He states he only became aware of the 30 March 1976 Central Committee Decision through his access to the Case File.³⁸⁸⁶ Nevertheless, through his experience at S-21 and with the knowledge he had at the time, Duch was able to observe that the framework contained in this Central Committee decision regarding the "right to smash inside and outside the ranks" was implemented in practice.³⁸⁸⁷

929.            Duch understands that zone committees had the authority to arrest "mid level cadre" although not higher ranking ones and that they had to report in particular to Nuon Chea.³⁸⁸⁸ This is corroborated by the case of San Eap alias Khon and Saey alias Phang, two such cadres of New North Zone Sector 103 who seem to have been arrested on the initiative of the Zone Secretary Se. He then sent their confessions to the CPK Centre and they appear to have been annotated by Nuon Chea.³⁸⁸⁹

931. Numerous telegrams from the zones, autonomous sectors and Centre divisions copied to Nuon Chea report on the situation of internal and external enemies and actions taken against them.³⁸⁹⁰ These telegrams state, "We are continuing to purge the remaining group continuously" and "some have been removed, isolated and cleaned" or contain expressions such as: "sweep clean and screen them constantly";³⁸⁹³ "internal traitors have been swept clean";³⁸⁹⁴ "sweep out the underground enemy";³⁸⁹⁵ "searching the enemy";³⁸⁹⁶ "find more enemy apparatuses";³⁸⁹¹ and "smash all kind of enemies" ³⁸⁹⁸ [REDACTED] authenticated some of these telegrams and stated that "Uncle Nuon" on the "cc:" line refers to Nuon Chea and means that the telegram was required to be given to him.³⁸⁹⁹ Former Sector 105 Secretary and Military Commander, [REDACTED], was asked about some of the telegrams he wrote that have survived. These telegrams reported on the situation of internal and external enemies, arrests that were made, and people implicated in confessions.³⁹⁰⁰ He explains that when he addressed the telegram to "Respected Brother M-870" it meant the "Centre Committee" including Nuon Chea. Asked if he received answers, he states that telegrams were always answered with instructions from either Pol Pot or Nuon Chea.³⁹⁰¹ [REDACTED], who worked at K-1, clarified that when a telegram or a letter arrived at Pang's office, [REDACTED] was in charge of taking telegrams or letters to Pol Pot. After Pol Pot read them [REDACTED] would take them all to Nuon Chea. In return, Nuon Chea wrote letters to Pol Pot every day or two.³⁹⁰²

 

932. Concerning the arrest of people in the administrative units, including some high CPK cadres in the zones, and CPK cadres in ministries and other Centre offices, Duch believes that this was decided by someone above Son Sen. He states "It may be Pol Pot or Nuon Chea who made that decision. And then it came down to Son Sen".³⁹⁰³ For arrests in the military units, Duch observed that these decisions could be made by Son Sen as he was Chief of the General Staff.³⁹⁰⁴ He nevertheless also states that Pol Pot and Nuon Chea played a role in the decision making process. Duch states, "Which forces deserved to be screened first and which forces were to be last was a direction designated by the Standing Committee. Speaking precisely, Pol Pot was the person who designated this. The procedure was that Nuon Chea and Son Sen were the people who made the calculations" ³⁹⁰⁵

933. Duch repeatedly mentions Son Sen, Nuon Chea and Pol Pot as the ones who made the decisions, separately or together, to arrest people. Duch understands that Pol Pot was involved in the decision making process and explains that, although he was not directly aware of the details, he noticed that Nuon Chea could not always make decisions alone and "sometimes he had to raise it with Pol Pot"³⁹⁰⁶ He believes that when the decision to arrest was taken by Pol Pot, Nuon Chea was responsible for ensuring its proper implementation.³⁹⁰⁷ Nevertheless, Duch explains that Nuon Chea did have some discretion in the decision to arrest people who were implicated in confessions, as he decided on certain arrests during their meetings, notably for the arrest of members of S-21 personnel.³⁹⁰⁸ Duch also states that Nuon Chea had the discretion to decide what should or should not appear in the confessions, including the ability to remove some names of those implicated, which he notably did when Khieu Samphan's name appeared.³⁹⁰⁹

934. Based on his experience at S-21, Duch understands that there were two ways to arrest people. First, a unit could report to the superior and make a proposal for arrests.³⁹¹⁰ This is corroborated by the fact that the confession of San Eap alias Khon from the Phnom Penh Branch of the Sector 103 Commerce Committee was sent from the New North Zone Secretary to "Comrade 870" on 17 April 1978. In the accompanying letter, Kang Chap alias Se wrote that he was sending this confession, along with one other, to be examined by the committee in order to find a network of internal "traitors".³⁹¹¹ Duch believes that the annotation "19/04/1978follow up" on the cover page was written by Nuon Chea.³⁹¹²

935. Second, Duch believes that when a person or group of people were potential candidates for arrest, Nuon Chea would contact the relevant unit to get further information, and a joint decision on arrest would be made.³⁹¹³ Therefore, he understands that S-21 confessions would be circulated by Nuon Chea and/or Pol Pot to the relevant zones, centre offices and ministries.³⁹¹⁴ Annotations on the confessions show that some of the S-21 confessions were transmitted to the relevant units.³⁹¹⁵ Duch identified Nuon Chea's handwriting on some of these confessions.³⁹¹⁶ Son Sen operated a similar decision-making process for the arrest of people in the military units.³⁹¹⁷