Closing Order of Case 002 against Senior KR Leaders Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith

In light of the HISTORIC (!) start of MOST COMPLEX (sic!) trial hearings beginning on 27 June 2011 and again ANOTHER HISTORIC (!) START of this same MOST COMPLEX (sic!) on 21 Nov. 2011 of Case 002 against the surviving Khmer Rouge senior leaders Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary and Ieng Thirith, KI Media is posting installations of the public document of the Closing Order of Case 002 (Indictment).  The Closing Order of the Co-Investigating Judges forms the basic document from which all the parties (Co-Prosecutors, Co-Lead Lawyers for all civil parties, Defense Lawyers) will be making their arguments before the Trial Chamber judges (one Cambodian President, 2 Cambodian Judges, 2 UN judges).  Up until now, the hearings involving these four surviving senior Khmer Rouge leaders have been in the Pre-Trial Chamber over issues of pre-trial detention and jurisdictional issues.  Beginning in June November 2011, the Trial Chamber will hear the substantive (sic!) arguments over the criminal charges (genocide, crimes against humanity, penal code of 1956, etc., only the Phase I Movement in April 1975).  Available in Khmer, English and French. Contact the ECCC for a free copy. 

 

CLOSING ORDER

of Co-Investigating Judges You Bunleng and Marcel Lemonde

15 September 2010

 

IX. ROLES OF THE CHARGED PERSONS

 

A. NUON CHEA

 

 Participation in the Common Purpose

 

 

Role in the Purge of the East Zone

937.            Nuon Chea played a key role in the decision making process leading to the arrest of the "enemies inside the rank" of both CPK cadres and RAK members who were from or associated with the East Zone, as well as the implementation of this decision.

938.            It appears that Nuon Chea played a role in the early days of the East Zone purge notably in the arrest of Sector 24 Secretary Suos Nov alias Chouk.³⁹²⁸

939. [REDACTED] recalls that the first time he heard about the plan for troops transferred from the Southwest to participate in a purge of alleged Vietnamese collaboraters in the East Zone was during a meeting at Zone Secretary Ta Mok's house in Takeo in 1977. They were also told at this meeting that they would be fighting the Vietnamese.³⁹²⁹ Together with 2400-2500 military personnel detached from the Southwest, [REDACTED] was sent to Phnom Penh where he had a meeting with Son Sen, under whose command they were now placed,³⁹³⁰ in order to prepare the execution of this mission.³⁹³¹ Son Sen reiterated that this included purging the East Zone cadres and troops on the battlefield where they were to be sent, and although Pol Pot and Nuon Chea were present, they did not add anything at that time.³⁹³² After this event [REDACTED] was deployed to Svay Rieng (Sector 23) in the southern part of the East Zone.³⁹³³ [REDACTED] recollects that half a month later, in early 1978, he participated in a meeting in Phnom Penh for High Military Commanders at the Military Headquarters. He states that during this meeting "Pol Pot spoke about the plan to purge; then Nuon Chea agreed with what Pol Pot said. Nuon Chea and Pol Pot supplied detailed information on the plans to arrest and remove the cadres from the East Zone. He said that all of them had cooperated with Vietnam and that they would be arrested by our cadre from the southwest zone".³⁹³⁴ He adds that Nuon Chea spoke about "purging embedded enemies boring holes inside, enemies that were the arms and the legs of the Yuon. Nuon Chea ordered the arrests, meaning the purge. In that era the term 'purge' meant to arrest and kill".³⁹³⁵ Despite [REDACTED]'s assertion that other former Southwest Zone commanders were present at this meeting, they deny meeting Nuon Chea during the CPK regime.³⁹³⁶

940. [REDACTED] states that decisions about the East Zone purges were made by the Standing Committee, with Son Sen acting on the orders of Pol Pot, Nuon Chea and Ta Mok.³⁹³⁷ Witness [REDACTED], who worked with Son Sen for the General Staff at the Communication and Logistics Office first in Svay Rieng and later on Route 7 in the northern part of the East Zone, corroborates this, stating that the decision to purge the East Zone was made by and carried out under the control of the CPK Centre. He states that Son Sen often "personally went to report to the Central Committee, and in few cases he used the secret telephone at Svay Rieng and Suong frontlines. I understood that the decision to arrest the implicated cadres was not made by him alone, it had to be approved by the Central Committee as well".³⁹³⁸ He adds that, as far as he understood, only Pol Pot could order the purge in the East Zone.³⁹³⁹ The S-21 confession of an east zone RAK member annotated by Nuon Chea in late March 197 8,³⁹⁴⁰ shows that Nuon Chea was kept appraised of the arrest of CPK cadres and RAK members in the East Zone in 1978 and followed these developments closely.

941. In June 1978, Sao Phim, the East Zone Secretary and a member of the Central Committee, commited suicide.³⁹⁴¹ Duch explains that the purge of Sao Phim was decided by the Standing Committee and that Son Sen called him from the East Zone battlefield to inform him that an agreement had been reached.³⁹⁴² Sao Phim had a long-standing and close relationship with Ponhea Krek District, and in particular "Bos" village around 10 kilometres due west of Steung Tauch. This was known to the CPK leadership, including Nuon Chea,³⁹⁴³ and villagers from Bos village were executed after the suicide of Sao Phim.³⁹⁴⁴ Further, a witness recalls that the people of Bos village who were later sent to Steung Tauch for execution were told that they were going to Suong in order to meet with Nuon Chea.³⁹⁴⁵

942. Former B-1 cadre, [REDACTED], says that in September 1978, Nuon Chea participated in a meeting on the drafting of the Black Paper which described the foreign policy between Vietnam and Cambodia. He adds that during that meeting Pol Pot was the one who talked most and "Nuon Chea was more an observer than an active participant".³⁹⁴⁶ The Black Paper contained sections on the alleged Vietnamese strategy to create "enemy networks" inside the ranks of the CPK and states that the Vietnamese secretly penetrated into Cambodia and held meetings in the East Zone between February and May 1978. The paper states that "the agents infiltrated and [were] organized for a long time by Vietnam ... in order to carry out the plan of Coup d'Etat" but that the plan had been defeated by the CPK.³⁹⁴⁷