How much is a seat at the UNSC? - Foreign Aid and Bribery at the UN

Dear All,

This may be of interest to the discussions on UNSC bid.

It's no coincidence that Cambodia bids for UNSC post now while big powers are jostling for influence and given the Cambodia's relations with all of them.

Conclusions from a working paper on benefits of UNSC posts (from google search) in the document attached.

V. Conclusion

Thus far, we have argued that non-permanent members of the U.N. Security Council receive extra foreign aid from the United States and the United Nations, especially during years when the attention focused on the council is greatest. Our results suggest that council membership itself, and not simply some omitted variable, drives the aid increases. On average, the typical developing country serving on the council can anticipate an additional $16 million from the United States and $1 million from the United Nations. During important years, these numbers rise to $45 million from the United States and $8 million from the United Nations.

Finally, the U.N. finding may actually be further evidence of U.S. influence: UNICEF, an organization over which the United States has historically had great control, seems to be driving the increase in U.N. aid.

Ideally, a study of vote-buying in the United Nations would test for the ability of Security Council aid to influence actual voting. Unfortunately, this is difficult for two reasons. First, we cannot observe the counter-factual: how the country would have voted in the absence of vote-buying activity. Second, votes themselves are strategic. Agenda setters typically know, before putting a resolution up for a vote, the preferences of each member. Perhaps this is why most Security Council resolutions are passed unanimously, and why failed resolutions are rare—recall that the 2003 resolution to authorize the invasion of Iraq never actually came to a vote. Due to these identification problems, we believe that actual outlays of aid are the most trustworthy way to measure the presence of vote-buying in the Security Council. By providing extra aid to non-permanent members of the council, especially during years when council votes are especially important, agenda setters have implicitly revealed their faith in the Security Council’s relevance in world affairs.

V.

http://www.box.com/s/xczloo8zq670nhza8em1