Sunday, March 18, 2012

Why we threw Sihanouk out - By Yem Sambaur, Cambodian Justice Minister


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Why we threw Sihanouk out
by Yem Sambaur, Cambodian Justice Minister

Cartoon by Sacrava (on the web at http://sacrava.blogspot.com)
To give a general view of the problem being set actually in my country, to the distinguished delegates present, 1 am going with your permission to set forth successively:

Firstly, what was the Vietcong-North Vietnamese forces implantation in Cambodia at the beginning of March 1970, that means before the characterized aggression of my country by those forces.

Secondly, what was the chronology of the recent political events which preceded, then followed that aggression perpetrated by the Vietcong-North Vietnamese forces.

Thirdly, what is the present record of damage caused in Cambodia by that aggression.

Lastly, what were the means used by the Cambodian Government with a view to avoiding the crisis provoked by the Republic of North Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, and then when the crisis exploded, with a view to solving it by means of safeguarding my country's neutrality.


I must therefore draw up for you first a picture of the Vietcong-North Vietnamese implantation in Cambodia at the beginning of March 1970.

A. It must be immediately stated that a definite occupation of a substantial part of the Khmer territory by the forces involved was ascertained.

Everyone remembers the clarifications given by President Nixon during his televised speech to the American people on last Thursday, April 30. He indicated in particular on a map the situation of various Vietcong bases on Cambodian territory; we can unfortunately confirm that it is only too true that such bases had already existed for a long time.

We are able to give precise facts about that. At the beginning of March 1970, the areas of Khmer territories estimated at 3500 square kilometres were occupied by the Vietcong-North Vietnamese forces. It was not only the areas nearby the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border which were concerned but also the areas situated in the very centre of the national territory, in particular, around the Great Lake. The areas occupied were summed up roughly by provinces as follows: Rattanakiri, Mondulkiri, Kratie, Kompong Cham, Svay Rieng, Prey Veng, Kandal, Takeo, and Kampot.

This occupation was often complete, which means that the territories involved completely escaped from the Cambodian Administration: Cambodian deputies came and publicly reported at the National Assembly tribune that in some parts of their electoral districts, a safe-conduct pass delivered by the Vietcong-North Vietnamese of the area was necessary to have right of way. As to our militarymen who wanted to enter the invaded areas, they were too often attacked in deadly ambushes. On this point, I bring to your notice that General Lon Nol himself came under the Vietcong fire in 1969 when he was on an inspection tour in the north-east of Cambodia.

B. Hanoi and NLF forces practiced numerous activities of military and paramilitary types on the portions of Cambodia they occupied.

The border areas occupied by the Vietcong-North Vietnamese were fitted up by them with a view to support their warfare effort in South Vietnam.

First, there is the fact that some of these areas were used as refuge areas when the pressure of American-South Vietnamese forces compelled the Vietcong-North Vietnamese to run away.

Afterwards, it must be mentioned that these areas were equipped to provide the regular units and the Vietnam with powerful logistic support. The Cambodian territory had thus been used to set up especially:
  • Small arsenals and arms and ammunition factories;
  • Repair-shops;
  • Warehouses for the storage of supplies needed for the troops engaged in South Vietnam;
  • Instructing and training centres for the soldiers.
Last of all, various hospitals had been set up in the border areas to cure the wounded and further in real resting-places had been installed for the Vietcong-North Vietnamese fighters, especially in the Great Lake areas.

It must also be emphasized that the various military implantations in the border areas included powerful defensive systems adapted to oppose any eventual actions either from the Cambodian military forces or the American-South Vietnamese forces. Strongly fortified, disposing of important tunnel systems to hide fighters and equipment, these bases were conceived as resistance zones against military attacks as refuges for the Vietcong-North Vietnamese forces fighting in South Vietnam. The operations recently engaged in by the Americans and South Vietnamese have moreover clearly shown the power of these entrenched camps.

C. In the areas that they did not occupy, the Vietcong-North Vietnamese has carefully set up Communist cells in the population, in particular in the towns.

In the effective occupation of some portions of the Khmer territory constitutes an undeniable spectacular fact, the creation of important Vietcong-North Vietnamese intelligence systems in towns and countrysides, of a large part of the country, arises as an infringement, doubtlessly more discreet, but at least as serious.

Especially in Phnom Penh where an important Vietnamese colony lives, our security services knew very well that there existed a strong Vietcong-North Vietnamese organization, the "5th column" ready to go into action against us as soon as the Hanoi and the NLF leaders considered it desirable. It has been demonstrated that a similar organization was in existence in almost the whole East, the Centre, the South urban centres of the country, as well as the rubber plantations and the large industrial companies.

D. Finally, the Vietcong-North Vietnamese forces made use of the Cambodian territory to assure the supplies of their troops fighting in South Vietnam.

It can be considered that during the recent years, the largest part of these supplies came through Cambodia.

This was carried out in particular by means of transit: weapons, ammunitions, medicine, merchandise bought by the Vietcong reached ports and airports of Cambodia, under various names, and were later dispatched to the Vietcong-North Vietnamese bases. This trading which contravened formally our official position of neutral nation, had been especially authorized by Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

If these transit operations were not directly prejudicial to our economy, it was not so for the Vietcong direct purchases in our country. A very important part of rice, fish, and other foodstuffs supplies necessary to the Vietcong-North Vietnamese troops, came indeed from Cambodia.
  • A substantial proportion of these purchases were done through smuggling despite the commercial agreements concluded between the parties, which constituted a heavy loss in interested duties to our public finances.
  • The payments by the Vietcong for the products they bought from our peasants and the traders, were often made disregarding our regulations in monetary matters and of the commercial agreements in force; those payments should have been made in foreign exchange for it was a matter of products designed for abroad, but they were frequently made in riels, and when there was a payment in foreign exchange, usually in US dollars, it was often to the profit of an intermediary or other and not to that of our National Bank; we have thus often been done out of large sums of foreign exchange.
  • The purchases of smuggled goods were of course made outside any control of the administrative authorities, which caused serious rebuffs: so, although we suffered from a serious lack of rice during the second half of 1969 following the bad results of the 1968-1969 rice campaign due to an unsatisfactory rainfall, considerable Vietcong interference exactly until now have created serious difficulties in the supply of rice to the consumers centred in the country, and even nearly provoked a real crisis of our supplying of this product.
I am stopping here this brief outline of Vietcong-North Vietnamese forces implantation in Cambodia before the characterized aggression of these forces. Of course, the members of our delegation, especially my military colleagues are at the disposal of every member of the Conference wishing to obtain more detailed information about one or the other point that I have raised.

In conclusion, it must therefore be noted that:
  • The Vietcong-North Vietnamese had purely and simply "annexed" important parts of our territory.
  • In the other parts of our territory, they had established intelligence systems ready to intervene at any moment in eventual operations against the Cambodian forces and population.
  • They organized their supplies from Cambodia in contempt of our laws and regulations, and in disregard of our interests.
Owing to Prince Norodom Sihanouk's complicity, the Vietcong-North Vietnamese hence behaved in our place more and more as in a conquered country, which became each day more intolerable to our military, religious men, youth, and people. The tension grew among the Cambodians and had to soon bring about an explosion of wrath which every impartial observer in good faith with bona fides will judge understandable.

I will now tell you the chronology of the recent political events preceding and following the Vietcong-North Vietnamese aggression against Cambodia.

I would like, first of all, to inform you that General Lon Nol's Government did not think it would be necessary to run to extreme solutions in trying to solve the problem of the Vietcong trespassing on Khmer territory and on our national sovereignty, allowed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

Instituted by our National Assembly on August 14, 1969, our Government was given the title of "Salvation Government" by Prince Norodom Sihanouk himself. In fact, the economic situation in Cambodia had become very precarious following the aberrant economic policy of our ex-leader and the main thing expected of General Lon Nol and his Ministers was that they correct this dangerous situation.

We concentrated all our efforts on the forming and putting into practice suitable reforms in order to get the country out of the deadlock impasse in which it found itself.

General Lon Nol, having defined the type and ways of applying these reforms, felt that he could leave his cabinet to apply his directions and he could thus take advantage of the respite. He then had to go abroad for a delicate sickness treatment, from which he had suffered for a long time.

Thus he left for France on October 30, 1969. He so little dreamed of undertaking any exceptional action that he only returned to Cambodia on February 18, 1970. It must also be emphasized that he was waiting due authorization from Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who was also in France, before returning to Phnon Penh.

On his return, the "invading" attitude of the Vietcong-North Vietnamese with regard to Cambodia could but worsen, probably because of the difficulties accrued in their war in South Vietnam. The situation became extremely grave and the Government of General Lon Nol waited for angry reactions from our countrymen.

The first grave signs of popular discontent appeared on March 8, 1970 at Svay Rieng, a frontier town situated in the immediate proximity to the combat zones in South Vietnam in the sector known as the "Parrot's Beak". On Thursday, demonstrators attacked persons accused of belonging to the Vietcong, with sidearms. Finally, the explosion of rage of the Cambodian people arose in different parts of the country. It was expressed most violently in Phnom Penh on March 11, 1970: in the morning, large groups of demonstrators, including a large number of young people, shouted their indignation in the streets of our capital and demanded the immediate retreat of Vietcong-North Vietnamese forces from our national territory. Carried away by its anger, the crowd, in spite of the efforts of our police to hold them back, ended up attacking the buildings housing the diplomatic missions of the Popular Republic of North Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, which suffered considerable damage. Our Government had to apologize for these regrettable incidents and to promise to pay for the damage.

In the evening of March 11, 1970 a new demonstration by the students of our school of Law and Economic Sciences brought a motion to our National Assembly, condemning Vietcong dealings in Cambodia. On this occasion, the Assembly opened a debate on the people's demonstrations, to which the deputies gave their approval.

Being informed of these events, our ex-Head of State, who was still in France, put the blame for these troubles on the National Assembly, on the Army, and on the Government. He accused us of dark dealings against him, going so far as to speak of extreme Right Wing maneuverings hostile to his person.

I give you formal assurance that everything was put in motion by us in order to avoid a political crisis between Prince Norodom Sihanouk and our Government. Many telegrams carrying very detailed explanations of the passage of events were sent by General Lon Nol to our ex-Head of State without the latter having changed his preconceived ideas: one telegram on March 11, 1970, another on March 12, two others on March 13, another on March 15, and the two last on March 17.

It was even decided, on Friday, March 13, to send two emissaries to Prince Norodom Sihanouk to explain him the situation. I was to be the first one of these emissaries, and as Vice-President of the Council of Ministers, I would have represented the Government. The second emissary was to be Prince Norodom Kantol, Director-General of the Services of the Royal Palace, who would have been the special Representative of Her Majesty Queen Kossomak, Prince Sihanouk's mother. He still refused this excellent opportunity to be informed of the exact situation. He even announced that, on his return to Cambodia, he would act with the greatest severity in dealing with those deputies, members of the Government and the military, revealed to be opposed to his policy vis-a-vis the Vietcong and North Vietnamese. As the said deputies, members of the Government and the military had a clear conscience on the question of the occupation of Khmer territory by Vietcong-North Vietnamese forces, and acted in the national interest, the egotistical, despotic, and anti-nationalistic spirit of our ex-Head of State made a political conflict, unavoidable.

This conflict had its outcome on Wednesday, March 18, 1970: on this day, at 13:00, the Parliament, uniting the National Assembly and the Council of the Kingdom in a full session, unanimously decided to withdraw confidence in Prince Norodom Sihanouk who was thus stripped, by strictest constitutional law, of his functions as Head of State. He was immediately replaced in this post, provisionally, by H.E. Cheng Heng, President of the National Assembly as stipulated in our Constitution.

With the departure from the political scene of he who gave the Vietcong-North Vietnamese the authorization to install themselves on our land, we hoped that, shortly, a peaceful solution could be found with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and with the Provisional Government of South Vietnam to achieve the withdrawal of foreign troops stationed on our territory.

Unfortunately, something, which I must say in all good faith we have never even thought of, happened to complicate the situation seriously: Prince Norodom Sihanouk who had announced many times that he did not cling to power, committed the unpardonable crime of asking our enemy to help him to regain his power which the representatives of the Khmer people had withdrawn from him unanimously.

Our ex-leader was in Moscow, about to leave for Peking, when the news of his legal removal reached him. Soon after his arrival in the capital of the People's Republic of China, the radio of that country broadcast messages from Prince Sihanouk, who refused to recognize the unanimous vote of our Parliament with absurd arguments, even grotesque if one thinks that they were expressed in all unconsciousness in a Communist State: one hears in fact that our ex-Head of State was "sacred, inviolable, and elected for life," which certainly did not figure in our Constitution of May 6, 1947. In these messages, members of Parliament, members of the Government and our Army were also greatly insulted and threatened.

Prince Norodom Sihanouk continued to act in a profoundly dishonourable way: on March 23, 1970, which history will remember as a "day of shame" for his heir to a long line of Khmer kings, he called on our people to revolt against the legal power, and above all he asked the North Vietnamese-Vietcong, Pathet Lao, and other so-called popular forces to attack our territory. Really we could never have imagined that our ex-Head of State could think of asking foreigners to carry the war into our country solely to regain absolute power, an initiative which is so far as we know, unique in recent world history of fallen dictators. One must add that this initiative appeared more bewildering for Prince Norodom Sihanouk's demand was addressed to partisans of an ideology which he himself had always declared he would fight as nationalist and which he had effectively fought by secretly assassinating several "Khmers Rouges" and imprisoning many other compatriots which he qualified as "pro-Chinese."

I must specify here that this demand of March 23, 1970 will have had at least one happy outcome for Cambodia: it has achieved the quasi-unanimity of Khmers behind the Government. If there were still some hesitators after the legal deposing of our ex-Head of State on March 18, they became extremely rare after the crime of high treason represented by this invitation sent to our enemy to come and invade our country.

Certainly the Vietcong-North Vietnamese could with difficulty resist the temptation to overrun Cambodia completely when they had been invited to do so.

This offer was the more alluring for them because they had a false idea of the prestige of Prince Norodom Sihanouk among his people: they were apparently convinced that the demand of the latter would be welcomed with enthusiasm by the masses and that our country would thus be entirely occupied, quickly and without any risk. The reality was quite otherwise … However that might be immediately after the demand on March 23, one noticed the first Vietcong-North Vietnamese attacks on March 26, in the south. These were the first enemy actions. After March 27, it was a great scale offensive launched against Kompong Cham and the rubber plantations of this province. Then came the classic escalade. I will show later what is the actual balance of prejudice in Cambodia caused by this aggression which has transformed clandestine occupation of our territory into a hot war.

I would also like to emphasize several other dates which have marked the political evolution of this crisis.

Pursuing his hostile actions against his country, Prince Norodom Sihanouk attended a "Summit Conference of the Indo-Chinese People" on the 25th and 26th of April, which was held near Canton under the aegis of H. E. Chou En-Lai. It was decided during this conference to create a "United Front of Indo-Chinese peoples" whose aggressive intentions against Cambodia were not hidden. More recently, our ex-Head of State announced the creation of a "National Front of Kampuchea," then of a "Liberation Government," curiously composed of several Khmers previously exiled by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, were mentioned alongside the "Khmers Rouges" who disappeared since 1967, a time when they would have been assassinated by order of our ex-Head of State. This assassination was moreover officially announced three years ago by Peking Radio.

In any case, this so-called Government has not the least legal base. Each one must know in fact that Prince Norodom Sihanouk is no more than a simple citizen having no power to represent Cambodia in any form, and on the other hand that he must answer to the tribunals of his country for crimes of forfeiture and high treason.

I would like to draw your attention to the negotiations which began on April 28, 1970 with the representatives of the Republic of South Vietnam in order to sort out in a humanitarian manner the exodus of the important Vietnamese colony living in Cambodia. The international Press has written incorrect articles about the inhuman treatment which the Cambodians have inflicted on the Vietnamese in our country. Certainly there have been a few innocent victims killed in the heat of battle. There might have been some regrettable incidents but unfortunately understandable due to the anger of our military often taken in the back of inhabitants, men and women, young and old, who were supposed to be peaceful: these are military customs too often used by the Vietcong.

But, all in all, we try scrupulously to prevent any excess and any extortion against foreigners living in our country. I will not insist on this subject: the truth is being known little by little and international opinion begins to have some ideas of the exact relations between the Khmers and the Vietnamese. I would only emphasize that the delegates of the South Vietnamese Government have recognized that we are doing what we can to protect their countrymen in a measure compatible with the necessity to unmask the numerous Vietcong-North Vietnamese agents within the Vietnamese colony living in Cambodia.

The last remarkable date that I would like to bring to your attention is Thursday April 30, 1970, the date of the televised President Nixon's speech to the American people in which he announced the intervention of American-South Vietnamese forces in Cambodian territory. Certainly we would have preferred to be able to push back the Vietcong-North Vietnamese aggressors on our own, but we recognize that we have been relieved by the help brought to us by the Americans, and our South Vietnamese neighbours. We were badly prepared for the war, while the Vietcong-North Vietnamese had a long experience of daily combat. Also their forces were greatly superior to ours. We are thus grateful for this American-South Vietnamese intervention, but we desire that this intervention should be provisionary and limited to as short a time as possible. We thus hope to occupy anew ourselves all the zones of intervention by the Americans and South Vietnamese. Our most important objective is still to preserve our neutrality and to defend by ourselves our frontiers and our territorial integrity.

I must now give you the present breakdown of damage caused in Cambodia by the Vietcong-North Vietnamese aggressors.

I do not think this is the moment to give you a too detailed list. Therefore I will not recite the endless list of operations which resemble each other more or less and which would be of limited interest to the distinguished members of this Conference. So I will content myself with a few characteristic achievements to give you an overall idea of the forces of Vietcong aggression. I thus excuse myself in advance for the brevity of this part of my exposé, but as I just mentioned, the military members of the Cambodian delegation are at the disposal of any member of the Conference who would like to have a more detailed information on the military operations of which I am going to give you a brief resume.

Until the beginning of March 1970, the occupation of a substantial part of our territory could not have been maintained without giving rise to numerous incidents. These remained relatively limited since, until March 18, 1970, the Command of the National Khmer Armed Forces had only considered as serious with the Vietcong some 122 incidents which caused the following losses: 54 killed, 98 wounded, and 25 missing.

This changed abruptly after Prince Norodom Sihanouk's call for foreign intervention. From the time of our ex-Head of State's removal until May 5 1970, our military authorities raised 471 cases of incidents provoked by Vietcong-North Vietnamese forces. These incidents caused death or disappearance of 4078 Cambodians, losses which are divided as follows among the principal provinces which are victims of foreign agression:
  • Kompong Cham: 755 killed or missing
  • Svay Rieng: 1277 killed or missing
  • Kandal: 785 killed or missing
  • Takeo: 536 killed or missing
  • Kratie and Mondulkiri: 425 killed or missing
  • Kampot : 300 killed or missing
To this sad account must be added 825 wounded and an enormous loss of buildings, material, and equipment notably more than 800 buildings burnt, 40 bridges destroyed, 13 military posts and provincial guardhouses destroyed, 28 other posts temporarily occupied, etc...

Certainly, we have reacted with all the energy we are capable of in spite of all weakness of our means. Our military have accounted for more than 8000 of the enemy killed in combat, which supposes a very high rate of loss on the side of the Vietcong-North Vietnamese because of the well-known habit of these forces of carrying away dead and wounded to disguise the gaps left in their ranks.

I think it's better to stop this enumeration here, although it could go on much longer. But I would like to end this sad account by drawing your attention to the numerous losses of human life among our peaceful civilian population. I am speaking now of the frequent grave exaggerations made by the international Press concerning the brutality of which the Vietnamese population are said to have been victims. We also, alas could list the undeniable atrocities suffered by our countrymen.

On this subject I would like to emphasize the systematic nature of the actions carried out by the Vietcong with a view to terrorizing the people whom they wish to subjugate.

They threaten our officials with death, and shamelessly, they do not hesitate in carrying out their sinister threats. We have recently received information about killing of this sort at Mimot, Chhlong, etc, and we await with distress the confirmation of this terrible news.

Worse, in contempt of the most basic elements of international moral behaviour, Vietcong kill our doctors and their assistants: in the most recent case of this nature, one of our health officers, very well-liked for his kindness and his professional integrity, was savagely put down while he was looking after both Khmer and Vietcong wounded, without discrimination, at Neak Luong. Last Monday, on May 11, a large crowd, full of both grief and anger, were present at the incineration of his mortal remains.

Trampling under foot the accepted practices of all civilized countries, the Vietcong burn our infirmaries, our schools . . . The height of their impudence in this field was reached two weeks ago when Vietcong and North Vietnamese troops attacked the Takeo-Kampot University. The students, organized into self-defense groups, resisted as long as they could, but faced with these experienced fighters, they had to withdraw and leave the barbarians to invade the University campus which they looted and destroyed all the equipment. What a splendid victory for the so-called Popular Army.

I would also like to ask you to read carefully the communiqués about the occupation of towns and villages by the Vietcong: you will see that, when the Cambodian troops come to drive them out, the foreign invaders very often take refuge in schools, pagodas, and churches, where they fire out at our troops. Here is another excellent example of the moral principles by which the fighting units of Hanoi and of the South Vietnam Liberation Front are motivated.

Allow me now to pay solemn homage to two brave deputies of our National Assembly, representing the province of Kompong Cham, who were assassinated on March 27, 1970 while they were trying to calm a demonstration incited by the Vietcong. It was a most abominable crime, as their bodies were terribly mutilated, something which no Khmer would agree to, particularity because of their religious convictions. May the "Tevodas" grant that the martyrdom of those brave Parliamentarians will help Cambodia quickly to achieve peace which she desires.

It now remains for me to inform you of these efforts made by the Cambodian Government in order to avoid the crisis provoked by the North Vietnamese Democractic Republic, then, when the crisis was reached, to resolve it by methods which would safeguard the neutrality of my country.

Today, for the first time, the Cambodian Government is going to make real the many advances, undertaken since 1969, to try to arrange that the Vietcong-North Vietnamese forces leave our territory and that they respect our national sovereignty. In spite of the authorization given by Prince Norodom Sihanouk to the Vietcong to use our territory, for a long time, serious warnings of the impossibility for the Khmers to tolerate such trespasses have been sent to the Hanoi and to the NLF authorities. These warnings were given by various people in the Cambodian Government notably by General Lon Nol.

The first requests addressed specifically to the Vietcong to respect our sovereignty were made during the official visit of President Huynh Tan Phat to Cambodia, between June 30 and July 5. During the visit of this important member of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, a special mention was made of the problem of the abusive occupation of Khmer territory, but without the slightest concrete result, although the question was brought up later at the ambassadorial level.

General Lon Nol was able to take up this discussion strongly again with the Heads of the Governments concerned whom he had the opportunity to meet in Peking during an official visit to the People's Republic of China as President of the Council of Ministers of the Cambodian Government, from September 27 to October 3, 1969, to celebrate China's National Day. On this occasion, General Lon Nol was able to have discussion:
  • three times with President Chou En-Lai particularly on September 29, from 18:00 to 20:00, at the People's Palace.
  • twice with President Nguyen Huu Tho, on September 30, from 17:30 to 18:15, and then on October 1, from 17:00 to 17:30.
The main theme, and in some conversations the sole subject of these various discussions was the necessity of the Vietcong and North Vietnamese forces to respect the various aspects of Cambodia's national sovereignty. General Lon Nol continually returned to the charge in order to obtain firm undertakings from those to whom he was speaking that they would restore his country's legal territorial rights. He particularly emphasized the fact that our soldiers were regularly being killed as a result of actions by the foreign army of the Vietcong and North Vietnamese, and that therefore our army could no longer understand how the North Vietnamese Democratic Republic and the Provisional Government continued to declare themselves our friends. He clearly warned that his Government would be able to do nothing when their fellow-countrymen became sick and tired of the situation and rose against the unwarrantable foreign interference.

There was no lack of promises made. Prime Minister Pham Van Dong said that everything would be done so that the incidents mentioned would not happen again. President Nguyen Huu Tho said that strong and precise instructions had already been given to their troops to respect Cambodian sovereignty, and then he said that these instructions would be repeated. The discussion with Mr. Nguyen Huu Tho was particularly stern, General Lon Nol having emphasized that the Cambodian were "living on their nerves" and could not tolerate much longer of not being able to go about in areas of their own country without the risk of being shot at, sometimes fatally (an experience which the General himself had). President Chou En-Lai, finally, said that he thought it was right that the Vietcong forces in transit through Cambodia should respect our laws and should be unarmed during their stay in our country.

During these conversations, it was decided to set up a control system which would clarify the situation and which would be put an end to the incident which caused it. In fact, meetings took place in Phnom Penh at the ambassadorial level to apply this decision, and military missions of inspection in the frontier region s were jointly organised. General Sak Sutsakhan represented us on these missions. We can only say that the apparent goodwill of these undertakings made in Peking at the end of September 1969 was completely fictitious. In fact, no concrete progress was made, and, on the contrary, as I told you in the second part of this statement, the situation only got worse.

Here, I must give a few details, as Prince Norodom Sihanouk could be tempted to contest the truth of the revelations which I just made to you on behalf of the Government of Cambodia: the exact content of the conversations in question was reported to our ex-Head of State who was thus aware of the nature of the warnings given to the Vietcong-North Vietnamese forces in spite of the protection which he was giving them. Prince Norodom Sihanouk made no comment on General Lon Nol's efforts. My Government is thinking of publishing, if it seems advisable, a document giving an account of these Peking talks in September-October 1969, and proving the ex-Head of State's passive attitude with regard to them.

Cambodia had once again to prove her desire to come to a peaceful solution before the crisis provoked by the Vietcong-North Vietnamese. I have already showed you how, after the demonstrations on May 11 in Phnom Penh had brought about material damage to the buildings of the diplomatic representations of Hanoi and the Liberation Front, we immediately sent our apologies to the Governments concerned and offered to pay for the damages.

To avoid the repetition of such an incident, and taking into account the default of those with whom the talks in Peking at the end of September had been held, without it being desirable moreover to notify the embassies concerned that the Vietcong and North Vietnamese armed forces were asked to leave Khmer territory before dawn on March 15. But this request was matched with an invitation to negotiate.

We designated our delegation to take part in the negotiations on March 14 and in fact, a meeting was held on March 16 with the participation, not the ambassadors, but of the charges d'affaires of the North Vietnamese D.R. and PRG of the Republic of South Vietnam. A short time after this first meeting, our partners in the talks decided unilaterally to break off diplomatic relations and the proposed negotiation was therefore not carried on in spite of various attempts on our part that it be taken up again, the last one being made on March 25, 1970. In any case, we are aware of having done everything in what concerned us to find a peaceful solution to the dispute in question.

Some days later, the Vietcong and North Vietnamese forces started a systematic aggression and thus undertook the escalation of a hot war against us.

We nonetheless wanted to continue to seek a negotiated agreement and our first reaction was to make a strong request for the reactivation of the International Control Commission according to the Geneva Agreement of 1954. Here, it should be recalled that Prince Sihanouk took the initiative in asking for the dissolution of the ICC in Cambodia at the end of 1969 under various pretexts. In fact we know that he simply wanted to get rid of an embarrassing witness to the wide facilities for settlement on Khmer territory which he gave to the Vietcong and North Vietnamese forces, in spite of Cambodia's officially neutral position.

Our first appeal for the return of the ICC was made on March 22. On that day, in a communiqué, the Government asked the two chairmen of the Geneva Conference of 1954 "that the International Control Commission should come without delay to take up again their mission in Cambodia to help put a peaceful end to the occupation of the territory of Cambodia." Our Minister of Foreign Affairs made contact, to this end, with the Ambassadors of USSR and of Great Britain. At the same time he requested the co-chairman of the Geneva Conference of 1954 to rapidly inform and consult with the other members of the Conference about the situation brought about by the occupation of our territory by the Vietcong and North Vietnamese troops. Our Minister of Foreign Affairs reiterated this request on several occasions (the last note dated April 27) to the embassies of the USSR and Great Britain. We insisted that a decision be immediately taken to recommence the activities of the ICC in Cambodia.

As you know, in spite of several concrete attempts made by friendly countries to support our request and in spite of the numerous demonstrations of their approval of our position, there has been no follow-up as yet to our request for the return to Cambodia of the ICC as provided for under the Geneva Agreements of 1954.

We have also sent appeals to the United Nations in various forms requesting it to support us in our time of trial.

Our representative in New York gave details to the Security Council of the flagrant and more frequent attempts by the Vietcong and North Vietnamese troops of which the victims were both the Cambodian defence forces and posts, and civilian population. Moreover, we tried to obtain observers from the United Nations to assist us by their presence in search for a solution to the Khmer-Vietcong problem.

D. Thus we have increased our appeals of various kinds in the diplomatic world. We have met unceasingly with the heads of diplomatic missions accredited in Phnom Penh to explain to them our desire for peace and neutrality, and respect for our national sovereignty. Countries of all kinds of politics, socialist, western, or non-aligned, have thus been informed with very great care of our wish for an honorable agreement with the People's Republic of Hanoi and the PRG of the Republic of South Vietnam authorities.

Indeed we are aware that we have not neglected any effort to reach a peaceful solution to this Khmer-Vietcong crisis.

Ever since the legal removal of Prince Norodom Sihanouk on March 18, 1970 the elected bodies of Cambodia have taken constant care to proclaim that they remain faithful to that policy. On March 18, in a short speech at the moment of being called to take on provisionally the functions of Head of State, as provided for in our Constitution, H.E. Cheng Heng, the former Chairman of the National Assembly, declared, "I solemnly state, at this moment, that Cambodia will follow the same political line, that is to say, of independence, neutrality, and territorial intepity."

In a statement on the same day, General Lon Nol affirmed that "our country must always remain Khmer, genuinely neutral, and completely independent". On March 20, he said further in a statement: "We shall continue to have friendly relations and to co-operate with every country of the world without distinction of government or ideology and, let me be clear, without belonging to any military pact or ideological bloc."

On March 21, H.C. Cheng Heng, on taking the oath as Head of State of Cambodia, determined to "assure anew our friends that the independence, neutrality, and territorial integrity of Cambodia will be rigourously maintained."

Statements such as these were thereafter often made in numerous circumstances by our responsible authorities. As President of the Cambodian Delegation to the 26th Session of ECAFE held from the 14th to the 27th of April in Bangkok my colleague here, H.E. Phlek Phoeun, Minister of Public Works in our Government, had the honor to make a first overseas statement by a member of Khmer Government since March 18, 1970. Permit me to repeat the last words that he pronounced on that occasion: "In Cambodia, the Head of State, H.C. Cheng Heng, the Parliament, the Government presided over by General Lon Nol, in association with his faithful and courageous collaborator, H.H. Sirik Matak, first Vice-President of the Council of Ministers, the Buddhist clergy, the youth now volunteering enthusiastically for service in our Army to repel aggression, indeed all the population, wish to preserve the friendship of all the sundry of the West, of the Socialists, and of the non-aligned. In one word they want to be neutral, this time genuinely neutral, and not as was the case with our ex-Head of State so-called neutral, hostile according to circumstances to the Thais, North Vietnamese or South Vietnamese or, more distantly, to our friends in the United States of America, in the Popular Republic of China, in Russia, etc.

"The bases of our policy of peace and strict neutrality are well known, and they seem to us in all good faith acceptable to all interested countries: we only ask that our independence, territorial integrity, and our present frontiers, are scrupulously respected. In return we are determined neither to belong to any block nor to participate in any military alliance.

"Do you not think that it is in the interest of all that Cambodia, which marks, near the mouth of the Mekong, a kind of frontier between two very different worlds by their racial origins, should be neutral? If we, the Khmers, desire this neutrality with all our heart, we think that logically it should also appeal to the great family of the nations of the world, for the neutrality of Cambodia imposed practically by history and geography, will certainly constitute by no means a negligible factor for peace in South-East Asia and even in the world."

My Government reiterates our statement which closed with the following urgent appeal directed at the representatives of the countries and international organizations attending that 26th Session of ECAFE: "As far as you can, please help Cambodia to remain neutral, genuinely neutral."

In this contest, we feel we must solemnly draw the attention of all the nations of the world to the fact that if the survival of a sovereign Cambodia is not guaranteed and the only formula which can guarantee this survival would appear to be neutrality, it now seems clear that it will be impossible to avoid many catastrophes: the war in South Vietnam will be intensified, Thailand will come to feel increasingly and daily the risk of Communist interference, South-East Asia will face increased insecurity, and finally perhaps the whole world will face an apocalyptic conflict.

To speak sincerely, I do not think that I am exaggerating: my colleagues in the present Khmer Government and I are almost all old political hands, and we know only too well how irrevocable conflicts begin. We are sure that Cambodia, obviously of little importance judged by its physical, demographic, and economic dimensions, nevertheless constitutes by reason of its geographical situation on the frontiers of races having played an important part for thousands of years in the history of the world, an irrefutable political test of the willingness of the peoples of the various blocs to live in peace.

But today, I have to give further details of the appeal which we made last month in Bangkok to various countries to help us to remain neutral: we need help to preserve this neutrality. We therefore beg friendly countries to give concrete support to our efforts to resist the assaults of the Vietcong and North Vietnamese forces. This help, for which we underline the urgent necessity, could be granted in different fields.

4 comments:

Anonymous said...

Bloggers spent too time to read
long article.
Please cut into 3 to 4 pieces
that make sense for bloggers.

សរសេរវែង និយាយច្រើនគេធុញ
សរសេរខ្លីពេក គំនិតសុញគេថប់។
អ្នកសំនេរភាគច្រើនពុំមានឱកាស
ច្រើននឹងអាន ដូច្នេះ គេមានក្ដីធុញចប់
ក្នុងចិត្ត។ សូមអ្នកសរសេរអត្ថបទ យល់ចិត្ត
អ្នកសំនេរឲ្យយោបល់។
យើងត្រូវយល់ចិត្តគ្នាទៅវិញទៅមក ដើម្បី
រកសេចក្ដីល្អទាំងអស់គ្នា។
សូមអរគុណ,

T from Ldn said...

Thank to KI Media for posting this Khmer historical document.

Anonymous said...

Mr. Yem Sambo was one of the cunning Cambodian elits in that time. He was part of the regime to fall.But this cunning man was clever enough to get away and point finger to his master.

Anonymous said...

សូមទោសអ្នកអានសំនេររបស់ខ្ញុំ 12:25PM;
អរគុណលោក KI.
ឃ្លាទី ៤ របស់ខ្ញុំ,"គេមានក្ដីធុញថប់"ទើបត្រូវ។
ខ្ញុំសរសេរខុស ខ្ញុំសូមទទួលកំហុស។