At the Threshold of History: Lessons from Egyptian Revolution of 2011

Tahrir Square Rally 2011

Freedom Park Rally 2013

“I have witnessed the tremendous energy of the masses. On this foundation it is possible to accomplish any task whatsoever.

The people, and the people alone, are the motive force in the making of world history.”

         Mao Zedong

by School of Vice

The decision to stage protest rallies in stages or instalments by the CNRP leadership can be viewed at best as a serious lack of foresight and a grave tactical error. The CNRP won resoundingly in most major cities in the country, including the capital. This is partly because there is a much better room for non-state channelled information to transmit itself among densely populated centres like Phnom Penh and Kampong Cham, as well as outlying regions surrounding these major conurbations such as Kandal province at large where the opposition have seen their strongest electoral support and victories. It was only right that the CNRP leaders travelled to places to convey their gratitude to their supporters and people who voted for the party. However, the ruling party’s subsequent refusal to heed the opposition’s call to form an ‘independent’ body to look into alleged electoral irregularities in the days and weeks after the election provided the CNRP with a most potent weapon and a point of reference by which to rally the population and with which to strike a decisive blow against the incumbent regime which after all has been in power for far too long and by all means irregular imaginable. The CNRP leadership [or at least one of its thinkers with any political instinct and acumen] should have read the obvious signs and writings that the public have put up on the walls, and more importantly respond constructively and positively to their demand for immediate and unconditional change.

It is at these urban centres where opposition grassroots support is strongest, particularly, in the capital, the seat of power, that demonstrations should be held indefinitely. 

All humans tremble before imminent danger; the arrogance of dictators and of unaccounted power stems from the certainty and knowledge that the existing status quo is beyond challenge and thus unthreatened. One of the key to maintaining this order is the spectre or the threat of terror and violence, which as embodied in the armed personnel and the military in general has the capacity to intimidate and instil fear into the ranks of the entire populace; a psychological factor or prowess that is vastly disproportionate to its actual physical strength and size. This is why throughout history a few thousand armed men have invariably been able to intimidate and terrorise unarmed populations of hundreds of thousands or even in the millions.  However, even these armed forces would be no match for the avalanche of deeply unhappy, discontented civilians coming at them in their vast numbers and marching in solidarity and resolute in spirit and morale. Whatever the differences in the respective circumstances of the Egyptians and the Tunisians as compared with those facing the Cambodian context and experience, the common denominators are hardly vastly different: absence of a democratic governance and representation breeding in turn a general climate of abuses and impunity on the part of an organised minority in relations to the rest of the ill nourished population. Fortunately, even these types of regimes have a finite lifespan, or are predestined to die of their own volition and accord at some stage owing to their own internal dynamics and the nature of unaccounted practices that lend themselves to moral and social excesses. 

When we look at these dynamics and currents inherent in any authoritarian regime the world over it is not hard to see the causes that led to its rise and those that led to its often violent fall. We can also see that all other factors such as geo-political pressures or considerations [in Cambodia’s case, this refer to external foreign stake holders such as Vietnam and China] are effective emanations of, or subsidiary to, having that core of ‘home-grown’ [or in the CPP’s case, externally imposed] unaccounted seat of power in the first instance. By the same arrangement a group or sections of the population are empowered to extort and abuse with impunity the rest of the society, these groups can also be bribed and used by foreign stake-holders [i.e. China, Thailand, Vietnam et al] to advance their own external designs and agendas. After decades of giving the Chinese the green light to usurp Myanmar’s natural riches, even the generals of that country are now coming to their senses and are responding to the call to overhaul some of the most destructive Chinese projects at work in their country. By way of contrast, will we ever see an end to those 99 years leases [ELCs] that unspeakably compromise Cambodia’s dignity and sovereignty, and further compound her precarious chance of making it to the end of the 21^st century as an entity and nation under the current CPP leadership? If one’s heart and head concur that the answer is a definitive ‘No’ then the debate and negotiation are well over, and the action by the people themselves must commence without further ado. And now that the people have ‘woken up’, please don’t ask them to sleep again; not until they will have accomplished what their hearts and souls cry out loudly for. 

Follow and obey the Will of the people: is that not what democrats are there for?

 

In some parts of the world’s rural communities, particularly in Africa, farmers, fed up with the havoc caused to their farms and crops by marauding elephants, have come up with an ingenious defence mechanism to the problem by building, not tall fences of barbed wire or electric fences, but bee hives at close intervals to ward off the offenders – and yes, it works! But more vitally and economically for the farmers, it works around the clock saving them both time and expense in the process, enabling them to devote these precious resources to more creative pursuits such as the odd afternoon nap and a proper night’s sleep after a hard day’s work. This arrangement of course assumes the idea of economic reciprocation – the farmers have built the refuge comfortable enough for the bees to put down their tents, and respect their long term presence in the given location. In this simple formulae each party, in effect, only has the obligation to look after its own narrow self-interest(s) to ensure both parties reap more or less equal outcomes or benefits simultaneously. This is a well known guerrilla practice which the CPP and its Vietminh mentors have put to use in Indochina [and Cambodia since the 1950s] with undoubted success. 

Read the extract below about the revolution in Egypt [and the famous Tahrir Square rally elsewhere if one can] and one may come to recognise the strategic importance of timing and maximising a mass popular protest, or even a relatively non-violent protest as such. Of course, at this point in time the Cambodian people have little choice but to be ‘non-violent’, because for one thing, the instruments and arsenals of physical violence are firmly in the hands of the ruling CPP regime. Yet, that reality may change as the protest itself goes on, but not one which stops after three days and then starts again...?

I will discuss the subject of “violence” and or ‘non-violence’ at a later time, if necessary, as an option and instrument for affecting and forcing momentous socio-political change – and Cambodia is in dire need of such a change – and consider whether there are alternative rationales to conventional perceptions and understandings of this emotive subject.    

      

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The Egyptian Revolution of 2011 - Revolution of 25 of January - took place following a popular uprising that began on 25 January 2011. It was a diverse movement of demonstrations, marches, plaza occupations, riots, non-violent civil resistance, acts of civil disobedience and labor strikes. Millions of protesters from a variety of socio-economic and religious backgrounds demanded the overthrow of the regime of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. There were also important Islamic, liberal, anti-capitalist, nationalist, and feminist currents of the revolution. Violent clashes between security forces and protesters resulted in at least 846 people killed and 6,000 injured.[21][22] Protesters also burned upwards of 90 police stations, though international media and politicians attempted to minimize that aspect of the revolt.[23] Protests took place in Cairo, Alexandria, and in other cities in Egypt, following the Tunisian revolution that resulted in the overthrow of the long-time Tunisian president.

Grievances of Egyptian protesters were focused on legal and political issues[24] including police brutality, state of emergency laws,[1] lack of free elections and freedom of speech, corruption,[2] and economic issues including high unemployment, food price inflation[3] and low wages.[1][3] The primary demands from protesters were the end of the Hosni Mubarak regime, the end of emergency law, freedom, justice, a responsive non-military government and a say in the management of Egypt's resources.[25] Strikes by labour unions added to the pressure on government officials.[26]

During the uprising the capital city of Cairo was described as "a war zone"[27] and the port city of Suez saw frequent violent clashes. The protesters defied the government imposed curfew and the police and military did not enforce it. The presence of Egypt's Central Security Forces police, loyal to Mubarak, was gradually replaced by large restrained military troops. In the absence of police, there was looting by gangs that opposition sources said were instigated by plainclothes police officers. In response, watch groups were organised by civilians to protect neighbourhoods.[28][29][30][31][32]

International reactions have varied with most Western states saying peaceful protests should continue but also expressing concern for the stability of the country and the region. The Egyptian revolution, along with Tunisian events, has influenced demonstrations in other Arab countries including Yemen, Bahrain, Jordan, Syria and Libya.

Mubarak dissolved his government and appointed former head of the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate Omar Suleiman as Vice-President in an attempt to quell dissent. Mubarak asked aviation minister and former chief of Egypt's Air Force, Ahmed Shafik, to form a new government. Mohamed ElBaradei became a major figure of the opposition, with all major opposition groups supporting his role as a negotiator for some form of transitional unity government.[33] In response to mounting pressure, Mubarak announced he had not intended to seek re-election in September.[34]

On 11 February 2011, Vice President Omar Suleiman announced that Mubarak would be stepping down as president and turning power over to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and Mubarak resigned from office.[35] The military junta, headed by effective head of state Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, announced on 13 February that the constitution would be suspended, both houses of parliament dissolved, and that the military would rule for six months until elections could be held. The prior cabinet, including Prime Minister Ahmed Shafik, would continue to serve as a caretaker government until a new one is formed.[36] Shafik resigned on 3 March, a day before major protests to get him to step down were planned; he was replaced by Essam Sharaf, the former transport minister.[37] On 24 May, Mubarak was ordered to stand trial on charges of premeditated murder of peaceful protestors and, if convicted, could face the death penalty.[12]

On 2 June 2012, Mubarak was found guilty of complicity in the murders of the protestors and sentenced to life imprisonment, but this sentence was later overturned on appeal.[38] Numerous protesters upset that others tried with Mubarak, including his two sons, had been acquitted, took to the streets.[39] On 19 June, protesters, many belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood, protested in Cairo's Tahrir Square, angry that the SCAF had taken some of the powers that had formerly belonged to the President. Protesters also accused the SCAF of launching a coup. On 24 June, the State Election Commission announced that Islamist Mohammed Morsi had won the presidential election. On 30 June, Morsi was inaugurated as the 5th President of Egypt.

On 3 July 2013 Mohammed Morsi was deposed by a coup d'état led by ministry of defense Gen Abdel Fattah El-Sisi after mass opposition protests on 30 June 2013 . Massive popular demonstrations against military rule are continuing despite brutality of security forces who use live ammunition to suppress demonstrations [40].

Wikipedia