17 Oct 1990
The Nation (Thailand)
M.H. Lao calls for the restoration of monarchy and an open-ended commitment of the United Nations in Cambodia.
The Cambodians themselves and the architects of a future peaceful settlement of the conflict in Cambodia may have to look harder at the realities of Cambodian society and to take them into account if they are to have an effective and efficient administration of the country by the United Nations and a lasting peace they, are working for.
Compared with almost all countries in the world, Cambodia does, not seem to have any strong pillars or institutions to support and sustain its society. The brutal Marxist revolution and foreign aggression before and after that revolution have broken that society to its very foundations. Cambodia's social, cultural, and above all moral and ethical values have largely been destroyed. War propaganda and political indoctrination have worked against proclaimed efforts to rebuild that society. Hate has been institutionalized in the form of Day of National Hatred (May 20) inside Cambodia. Vengeance has been exhorted among the young, especially among the Khmer Rouge orphans who have been recruited into the Vietnamese-trained army.
Nowadays one can almost be certain that there are hardly any national institutions that can control large sections of the population or around which large sections of the population are bound together. Some talk of the "rebirth" of Buddhism in Cambodia. But the state and status of this religion are almost nothing compared with those before 1970. Even then Buddhism had greatly lost its influence over Cambodian society. The Phnom Penh regime and its administrative machinery have been in a parlous state all along. They have lately been very divided and are seen to be very corrupt. The communist party which controls the regime and the administrative machinery from top to bottom is dislike and commands no trust from the people. The Phnom Penh army, however much support it has got from the Vietnamese troops, is very weak and has no will to fight.
In the liberated zones, the resistance forces have not been able to inspire complete trust in them on the part of the population and to establish stronger institutions and administrative machinery.
In this situation the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) provided for in the Big Five's peace plan would have to do a lot to be able to bring those bits and pieces of Cambodian society together. To be able to satisfactorily complete this task, which is crucial to a lasting' peace, would take much longer time than the proposed two years.
The Cambodians who wish to uphold the supreme interests of their nation and the international community, which has shown so much concern for the Cambodian people should strive to promote Cambodia's remaining national institutions which still command popular respect and support. One of, such institutions is the Monarchy.
Many including surviving members of Cambodia's royal family feel that the Monarchy is completely discredited and destroyed. This may be so for the elite but to the ordinary people, after experiencing the consequences of, many non-monarchical forms of government, the Monarchy is still seen as the least bad.
There is now the question of who could and would occupy the throne. Again most educated Cambodians, including this family for various reasons, But to the ordinary people and especially to the older generation Prince Norodom Sihanouk is the most popular.
How to reconcile these different attitudes prevailing in Cambodian society? Prince Sihanouk himself has already agreed to a parliamentary regime. With external help, a deal could be struck to consolidate the foundations of a constitutional monarchy while UNTAC is governing Cambodia.
It would make a great impact on the Cambodian people if Prince Sihanouk could be crowned again on the 50th anniversary of his first coronation, that is, in April 1991. A big celebration of this Golden Jubilee would contribute; tremendously to the unity of these people. With a people now psychologically and socially more united around its King and with his cooperation, UNTAC's task in the administration, would be easier and more effective.
UNTAC: A dangerous deadline
All parties concerned over the conflict-in Cambodia have agreed to an enhanced role of the UN in the administration of Cambodia in the transitional period leading to the election and setting up of a national government of Cambodia. All have also agreed to the setting up of UNTAC for this purpose.
All the big pieces of the jigsaw puzzle seem to be in place, at least on paper. However, as to the nitty-gritty of the actual implementation of the final agreements on ending the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and the actual administration of Cambodia by UNTAC, many thorny issues are yet to be addressed. Nevertheless, thus far, there has been some sort of consensus on a few important points of this administration:
It is likely that both communist parties, when under irresistable pressure, would simply go along with the Perm Five's transitional arrangements, make the most of them, behave before the elections and try to win them. They would just lie low and hide their fangs under UNTAC’s rule. It is very likely that the outcome of these elections would be unfavourable to at least one of these rival parties. The losing party would not be happy and would not hesitate to seize the opportunity offered by social disorganization and political instability to come back to power.
Its cadres including army officers who are used to having power and riches by the use of this power and who cannot find other satisfactory employment because of its shortage or of their lack of skills and knowledge would then organize themselves and resort to their old ways once UNTAC is out of Cambodia, History in the region has shown that the communists are very patient and can wait for a very long time. Two years away is simply tomorrow for them. The ineffective role and, at the end, the departure from Cambodia in the late 1960s of the International Control Commission that eventually led to the final collapse of Cambodia should be a strong reminder.
As has been well known already' very few former colonies have experienced political and social stability let alone, economic prosperity in the aftermath of the colonial rule. Cambodia itself experienced continued political instability after the departure of the French until it finally collapsed when the Vietnam war was extended to its territory. But then it had at least social and, until the early 1960s, economic stability thanks to its strong institutions such as its Monarchy, its religion and its vast land compared with a small population. But now Cambodia is in a much worse condition than it was in the aftermath of French rule. The probability of a dangerous political, social and economic instability and of the ensuing struggle for power is very high.
The international community which has been so generous to the Cambodian people should reconsider the deadline of UNTAC and make its commitment to looking after these people an open-ended one. The costs of this open-ended commitment may not be necessarily higher as it would force at least the present generation of communists to abandon right from the beginning all hopes of regaining power by their old ways and to learn, as lately in Eastern Europe and Mongolia, a democratic' way to power.
Once all abandon these hopes and the Monarchy restored UNTAC will have more cooperation from them and an environment far more conducive to its effective administration and could start to gradually phase out its costly staff earlier than planned until at the end it would simply need a skeletal staff of technical advisors to assist the Cambodian authorities.
M.H. Lao is director of the Institute of Public Administration of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front.
The Cambodians themselves and the architects of a future peaceful settlement of the conflict in Cambodia may have to look harder at the realities of Cambodian society and to take them into account if they are to have an effective and efficient administration of the country by the United Nations and a lasting peace they, are working for.
Compared with almost all countries in the world, Cambodia does, not seem to have any strong pillars or institutions to support and sustain its society. The brutal Marxist revolution and foreign aggression before and after that revolution have broken that society to its very foundations. Cambodia's social, cultural, and above all moral and ethical values have largely been destroyed. War propaganda and political indoctrination have worked against proclaimed efforts to rebuild that society. Hate has been institutionalized in the form of Day of National Hatred (May 20) inside Cambodia. Vengeance has been exhorted among the young, especially among the Khmer Rouge orphans who have been recruited into the Vietnamese-trained army.
Nowadays one can almost be certain that there are hardly any national institutions that can control large sections of the population or around which large sections of the population are bound together. Some talk of the "rebirth" of Buddhism in Cambodia. But the state and status of this religion are almost nothing compared with those before 1970. Even then Buddhism had greatly lost its influence over Cambodian society. The Phnom Penh regime and its administrative machinery have been in a parlous state all along. They have lately been very divided and are seen to be very corrupt. The communist party which controls the regime and the administrative machinery from top to bottom is dislike and commands no trust from the people. The Phnom Penh army, however much support it has got from the Vietnamese troops, is very weak and has no will to fight.
In the liberated zones, the resistance forces have not been able to inspire complete trust in them on the part of the population and to establish stronger institutions and administrative machinery.
In this situation the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) provided for in the Big Five's peace plan would have to do a lot to be able to bring those bits and pieces of Cambodian society together. To be able to satisfactorily complete this task, which is crucial to a lasting' peace, would take much longer time than the proposed two years.
The Cambodians who wish to uphold the supreme interests of their nation and the international community, which has shown so much concern for the Cambodian people should strive to promote Cambodia's remaining national institutions which still command popular respect and support. One of, such institutions is the Monarchy.
Many including surviving members of Cambodia's royal family feel that the Monarchy is completely discredited and destroyed. This may be so for the elite but to the ordinary people, after experiencing the consequences of, many non-monarchical forms of government, the Monarchy is still seen as the least bad.
There is now the question of who could and would occupy the throne. Again most educated Cambodians, including this family for various reasons, But to the ordinary people and especially to the older generation Prince Norodom Sihanouk is the most popular.
How to reconcile these different attitudes prevailing in Cambodian society? Prince Sihanouk himself has already agreed to a parliamentary regime. With external help, a deal could be struck to consolidate the foundations of a constitutional monarchy while UNTAC is governing Cambodia.
It would make a great impact on the Cambodian people if Prince Sihanouk could be crowned again on the 50th anniversary of his first coronation, that is, in April 1991. A big celebration of this Golden Jubilee would contribute; tremendously to the unity of these people. With a people now psychologically and socially more united around its King and with his cooperation, UNTAC's task in the administration, would be easier and more effective.
UNTAC: A dangerous deadline
All parties concerned over the conflict-in Cambodia have agreed to an enhanced role of the UN in the administration of Cambodia in the transitional period leading to the election and setting up of a national government of Cambodia. All have also agreed to the setting up of UNTAC for this purpose.
All the big pieces of the jigsaw puzzle seem to be in place, at least on paper. However, as to the nitty-gritty of the actual implementation of the final agreements on ending the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and the actual administration of Cambodia by UNTAC, many thorny issues are yet to be addressed. Nevertheless, thus far, there has been some sort of consensus on a few important points of this administration:
- UNTAC will administer Cambodia over a period of two years;
- It will run five key ministries (interior, defence, finance, foreign affairs and information) and have 10,000 peace-keepers and 10,000 civilian staff;
- The financial burden on the UN, that is, on the international community, will be between three and five billion US dollars.
It is likely that both communist parties, when under irresistable pressure, would simply go along with the Perm Five's transitional arrangements, make the most of them, behave before the elections and try to win them. They would just lie low and hide their fangs under UNTAC’s rule. It is very likely that the outcome of these elections would be unfavourable to at least one of these rival parties. The losing party would not be happy and would not hesitate to seize the opportunity offered by social disorganization and political instability to come back to power.
Its cadres including army officers who are used to having power and riches by the use of this power and who cannot find other satisfactory employment because of its shortage or of their lack of skills and knowledge would then organize themselves and resort to their old ways once UNTAC is out of Cambodia, History in the region has shown that the communists are very patient and can wait for a very long time. Two years away is simply tomorrow for them. The ineffective role and, at the end, the departure from Cambodia in the late 1960s of the International Control Commission that eventually led to the final collapse of Cambodia should be a strong reminder.
As has been well known already' very few former colonies have experienced political and social stability let alone, economic prosperity in the aftermath of the colonial rule. Cambodia itself experienced continued political instability after the departure of the French until it finally collapsed when the Vietnam war was extended to its territory. But then it had at least social and, until the early 1960s, economic stability thanks to its strong institutions such as its Monarchy, its religion and its vast land compared with a small population. But now Cambodia is in a much worse condition than it was in the aftermath of French rule. The probability of a dangerous political, social and economic instability and of the ensuing struggle for power is very high.
The international community which has been so generous to the Cambodian people should reconsider the deadline of UNTAC and make its commitment to looking after these people an open-ended one. The costs of this open-ended commitment may not be necessarily higher as it would force at least the present generation of communists to abandon right from the beginning all hopes of regaining power by their old ways and to learn, as lately in Eastern Europe and Mongolia, a democratic' way to power.
Once all abandon these hopes and the Monarchy restored UNTAC will have more cooperation from them and an environment far more conducive to its effective administration and could start to gradually phase out its costly staff earlier than planned until at the end it would simply need a skeletal staff of technical advisors to assist the Cambodian authorities.
M.H. Lao is director of the Institute of Public Administration of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front.
