January 25, 2010By Michael Vatikiotis
Asia Security (Mac Arthur Foundation)It doesn’t take long for a visitor to the Cambodian capital Phnom Penh to hear about the country’s problems with Thailand. Almost anyone you speak to has a view, mainly centered on Thailand’s alleged provocative actions over a disputed boundary that intersects a 12th century Buddhist temple.
The dispute was formally resolved more than forty years ago when the International Court of Justice awarded sovereignty of the Preah Vihear temple to Cambodia. The dispute erupted again two years ago when Cambodia applied to UNESCO to have the temple declared a world heritage site. Thailand initially supported the bid. But opposition politicians in Bangkok’s highly polarized political climate protested that the temple’s world heritage status would mean encroaching on Thai territory, forcing the Thai government to withdraw support for Cambodia’s UNESCO bid. This led in 2008 to an escalation of military tensions along the border and the outbreak of some fighting, quickly quelled by local commanders.
What has happened since is an example of how bilateral disputes can easily escalate into conflict and a wake-up call for ASEAN in terms of the need for a more formal conflict management mechanism. Another armed clash between Thai and Cambodian forces along the border in the third week of January underscored the fragile security situation in the area.
As is commonly the case in the region, both countries agreed at first to keep the dispute strictly a bilateral affair. Boundary disputes between Indonesia and Malaysia and Singapore and Malaysia have followed the same route – although in the case of the Sipadan and Ligitan dispute in Borneo waters between Indonesia and Malaysia and the more recent Pedra Branca island dispute between Singapore and Malaysia, the parties sought international arbitration.
In the case of Preah Vihear, international arbitration has already settled the question of sovereignty, and the issue was only resurrected on the Thai side as part of a bitter political quarrel between forces for and against ousted Thai Premier Thaksin Shinawatra. In the process, whatever goodwill there was between Thailand and Cambodia, which have a long history of mutual dislike and suspicion, evaporated towards the end of 2009 after Cambodia accused Thailand of betraying a promise and raising the Preah Vihear issue in multilateral fora.
Thailand, for its part, felt stabbed in the back after Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen appointed the fugitive Thaksin Shinawatra as one of his economic advisors, which led to an escalated level of diplomatic tension and the recalling of each country’s ambassador. A deep sense of recrimination and bitterness now prevails; Cambodia has accused Thailand of espionage amid leaked Thai official documents that talk of preparations for war. Thailand accuses Cambodia of harbouring fugitives from Thai law and acting as a sanctuary for those who plot violent demonstrations aimed at bringing down the government.
Thaksin has in fact made frequent visits to Phnom Penh, where he has met with supporters unhindered. Now, some officials in the Cambodian capital provocatively say that only a general election in Thailand will help restore relations. Meanwhile, both sides of the border have been reinforced with heavily armed troops. Cambodia has acquired new equipment, including ground to air missiles, built new roads, sowed fresh mine fields and deployed thousands of troops in newly built villages.
None of this sits very well with the image of ASEAN as an effective bulwark against intra-regional conflict. Here are two neighbouring countries that have taken their animosity to levels of political and military brinkmanship never seen in the region.
The question is whether ASEAN can and should intervene, and then how? The first obstacle to doing so is that ASEAN Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan is himself a Thai, and Cambodian officials openly express their suspicion of his role advising the Thai government on the matter of Preah Vihear and the subsequent fallout. Surin himself strongly denies any role in influencing or shaping current Thai foreign policy. But even with Surin’s natural reluctance to get involved, no one else has come forward to assume a quiet diplomatic role in defusing tensions, which is a pity.
This seems all the more astonishing since the dispute has had a somewhat disrupting impact on high-level ASEAN meetings in the past few months, with Cambodia accusing Thailand as the ASEAN Chair of not properly following diplomatic protocol at summit meetings. Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono did meet separately with the Thai and Cambodian Prime Ministers on the fringes of the APEC meeting in Singapore last November, but this rather public attempt at mediation appears to have had no effect on levels of acrimony in the two capitals.
A more effective approach would be for a credible neutral envoy, given a mandate by ASEAN Foreign Ministers, to embark on some quiet diplomacy. This might involve shuttling between meetings in Bangkok and Phnom Penh aimed at finding areas where confidence and trust building can begin the long process of repairing relations.
In this respect, it would be beneficial if Cambodia stopped commenting on internal Thai political affairs, and Thailand in turn stopped raising the Preah Vihear issue in international fora. Neither of these measures would result in a loss of dignity for either party, and would set the stage for a resumption of bilateral dialogue through designated official channels.
