Showing posts with label Autocratic regimes. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Autocratic regimes. Show all posts
Thursday, January 27, 2011
Sunday, August 22, 2010
Rwanda: A parallel to Cambodia's current political conditions
Efficiency versus freedom
Rwanda and other aid darlings
The West should not be silent when efficient leaders, such as Rwanda’s, squash the opposition
Aug 5th 2010
The Economist
THE differences between tiny Rwanda and the rest of Africa are immediately palpable even to the most casual visitor. The discarded plastic bottles and bags that pollute almost every other country on the continent are nowhere to be seen: the government has banned them. The tarred roads are usually in good shape; speed limits are actually enforced, by smart traffic police who fill out paperwork in exchange for a statutory fine rather than shaking you down for a bribe. Transparency International, an anti-corruption watchdog, rates Rwanda as one of the more honest countries in Africa. The World Bank says it is the fastest-improving as a place to do business. Hotels in the capital, Kigali, brim with Westerners attending conferences. Paul Kagame (above), the president who has overseen all this, is a darling of the aid-giving world. Western governments and prominent religious leaders have hailed him as the sort of man in whom to put their faith—and money.
Considering that Rwanda witnessed one of the most appalling waves of barbarity in history just 16 years ago, when around 800,000 people were hacked to death in three months, the efficiency is extraordinary. So much has gone admirably right in terms of development. But a lot is going depressingly wrong in politics. Mr Kagame has become more ruthless and authoritarian. In the run-up to the election on August 9th the opposition has suffered grievously. So where should the balance between development and freedom lie? Can democracy be shoved aside in the battle against poverty? And what should outsiders do to tilt the balance back?
The dilemma is not exclusive to Rwanda. The West has long sought leaders, such as Mr Kagame, who can be relied on to spend aid money well. Ethiopia’s Meles Zenawi, Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni and even, for a time, Nigeria’s Olusegun Obasanjo have been singled out for favoured treatment. Their countries have been graced with aid cash, debt forgiveness and political support. The West’s selective generosity has been prompted by various motives: guilt over past colonial wrongs; genuine altruism; and domestic self-interest that enabled left-of-centre parties to display their moral credentials abroad while reluctantly accepting the triumph of capitalism at home.
In Rwanda this has been taken to an extreme. Western guilt, which Mr Kagame has cleverly exploited, has been deeply felt. In 1994 the United States, the UN and Europe stood idly by as the genocide exploded. Since he took over a decade ago, Mr Kagame has happily presented himself as a development model for the whole continent, looking to Singapore rather than neighbouring Congo, a country far richer in resources whose people remain sunk in poverty as politicians feud and loot. In an effort to foster a sense of national unity and purpose, Mr Kagame has tried to abolish ethnic division between the Tutsi minority (to which he belongs) and the Hutu majority, whose members committed the genocide, by legislating their names out of the lexicon. Anyone challenging his “one Rwanda” policy, where Tutsis and Hutus no longer exist, can be jailed for “divisionism”.
The run-up to the election has been particularly ugly. The charge of divisionism has been used to swat criticism. Critical newspapers have been closed down, a reporter from one of them shot dead outside his home. Victoire Ingabire, head of an opposition party that has been barred from registering for the poll, has been charged with genocide denial and put under house arrest. Another opposition leader has been accused of terrorism. And the deputy head of a third party has been killed. The government denies involvement in all this and no solid evidence contradicts it (see article). But newspapers favouring Mr Kagame now describe his critics as “cockroaches” and “traitors”, the same insults that Hutu extremists used to egg on the massacre of Tutsis and moderate Hutus in 1994.
It mustn’t be either/or
Messrs Kagame, Meles and Museveni have all improved their countries’ lot. But election time invariably shows up the flaws in their model. All three leaders are growing more autocratic the longer they cling to office. The West has invested too much, financially and emotionally, in a select handful of charismatic aid darlings. Too often the aid lobbies have cheered them on, loth to acknowledge the flaws in people they need to prove that aid works. Too seldom has anybody promoted the more boring business of helping to build and reform institutions.
Withdrawing aid would be a blunt tool and, at any rate in the short run, would hamper the battle against poverty. But in the longer run, material development will suffer if authoritarian habits turn into tyranny. Those in the West who rightly praise Mr Kagame for his achievements in development must also loudly lambast him for his loathsome and needless tendency to intolerance.
Aug 5th 2010
The Economist
THE differences between tiny Rwanda and the rest of Africa are immediately palpable even to the most casual visitor. The discarded plastic bottles and bags that pollute almost every other country on the continent are nowhere to be seen: the government has banned them. The tarred roads are usually in good shape; speed limits are actually enforced, by smart traffic police who fill out paperwork in exchange for a statutory fine rather than shaking you down for a bribe. Transparency International, an anti-corruption watchdog, rates Rwanda as one of the more honest countries in Africa. The World Bank says it is the fastest-improving as a place to do business. Hotels in the capital, Kigali, brim with Westerners attending conferences. Paul Kagame (above), the president who has overseen all this, is a darling of the aid-giving world. Western governments and prominent religious leaders have hailed him as the sort of man in whom to put their faith—and money.
Considering that Rwanda witnessed one of the most appalling waves of barbarity in history just 16 years ago, when around 800,000 people were hacked to death in three months, the efficiency is extraordinary. So much has gone admirably right in terms of development. But a lot is going depressingly wrong in politics. Mr Kagame has become more ruthless and authoritarian. In the run-up to the election on August 9th the opposition has suffered grievously. So where should the balance between development and freedom lie? Can democracy be shoved aside in the battle against poverty? And what should outsiders do to tilt the balance back?
The dilemma is not exclusive to Rwanda. The West has long sought leaders, such as Mr Kagame, who can be relied on to spend aid money well. Ethiopia’s Meles Zenawi, Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni and even, for a time, Nigeria’s Olusegun Obasanjo have been singled out for favoured treatment. Their countries have been graced with aid cash, debt forgiveness and political support. The West’s selective generosity has been prompted by various motives: guilt over past colonial wrongs; genuine altruism; and domestic self-interest that enabled left-of-centre parties to display their moral credentials abroad while reluctantly accepting the triumph of capitalism at home.
In Rwanda this has been taken to an extreme. Western guilt, which Mr Kagame has cleverly exploited, has been deeply felt. In 1994 the United States, the UN and Europe stood idly by as the genocide exploded. Since he took over a decade ago, Mr Kagame has happily presented himself as a development model for the whole continent, looking to Singapore rather than neighbouring Congo, a country far richer in resources whose people remain sunk in poverty as politicians feud and loot. In an effort to foster a sense of national unity and purpose, Mr Kagame has tried to abolish ethnic division between the Tutsi minority (to which he belongs) and the Hutu majority, whose members committed the genocide, by legislating their names out of the lexicon. Anyone challenging his “one Rwanda” policy, where Tutsis and Hutus no longer exist, can be jailed for “divisionism”.
The run-up to the election has been particularly ugly. The charge of divisionism has been used to swat criticism. Critical newspapers have been closed down, a reporter from one of them shot dead outside his home. Victoire Ingabire, head of an opposition party that has been barred from registering for the poll, has been charged with genocide denial and put under house arrest. Another opposition leader has been accused of terrorism. And the deputy head of a third party has been killed. The government denies involvement in all this and no solid evidence contradicts it (see article). But newspapers favouring Mr Kagame now describe his critics as “cockroaches” and “traitors”, the same insults that Hutu extremists used to egg on the massacre of Tutsis and moderate Hutus in 1994.
It mustn’t be either/or
Messrs Kagame, Meles and Museveni have all improved their countries’ lot. But election time invariably shows up the flaws in their model. All three leaders are growing more autocratic the longer they cling to office. The West has invested too much, financially and emotionally, in a select handful of charismatic aid darlings. Too often the aid lobbies have cheered them on, loth to acknowledge the flaws in people they need to prove that aid works. Too seldom has anybody promoted the more boring business of helping to build and reform institutions.
Withdrawing aid would be a blunt tool and, at any rate in the short run, would hamper the battle against poverty. But in the longer run, material development will suffer if authoritarian habits turn into tyranny. Those in the West who rightly praise Mr Kagame for his achievements in development must also loudly lambast him for his loathsome and needless tendency to intolerance.
Wednesday, April 28, 2010
Cambodian lessons for South Korea
Apr 29, 2010
By Donald Kirk
Asia Times Online (Hong Kong)
By Donald Kirk
Asia Times Online (Hong Kong)
SAIGON - North Korea's apparent torpedoing of a South Korean navy ship and getting away from the scene of the crime with no more than recriminations and oratorical flourishes ringing in the ears of the perpetrators demonstrates a reality from which there is no escape. The North still has thousands of artillery pieces within range of metropolitan Seoul and the nearby port of Incheon as well as missiles with the range to reach anywhere in the South, and nobody in South Korea really wants to challenge that kind of threat.
South Korea is doing so well economically and living standards are so high that the idea of seeking anything other than rhetorical revenge for the sinking of the Cheonan with a loss of 46 lives on March 26 appears almost unthinkable. Certainly South Korea would get no support for such a venture from its American ally, bogged down in wars in the Middle East and attempting to force South Korean generals reluctantly to believe they should take full command of all forces in the South in the event of a second Korean war.
While South Korea's economy grows at a pace ahead of that of the rest of the industrial world, South Korean military people worry over what they see as the North's alarming new strategy. That is, to chip away at the South Koreans with attacks such as that on the hapless navy corvette in the West or Yellow Sea - and maybe bold quick hits on Seoul and Incheon.
The point, according to JoongAng Ilbo, one of South Korea's major newspapers, would eventually be to occupy a portion of metropolitan Seoul and then to negotiate a ceasefire. The paper quoted a military intelligence source as saying North Korea had strengthened its mechanized forces near the line with South Korea. At the same time, North Korea is bolstering naval forces on its southwest coast and threatening new attacks on South Korean vessels along the Northern Limit Line below which the South bans all North Korean boats.
While reluctant to do anything that might provoke armed conflict with North Korea, US and South Korean analysts wonder how long the North can carry on with such impunity. They see no let-up in the harshness of life for the vast majority of North Koreans - and ask whether any system can endure forever while the economy deteriorates, citizens gain slightly more knowledge of the outside world via illicit cell phones and short-range radios and ailing Dear Leader Kim Jong-il smoothes the way for transition of power to his youngest son.
For precedent, it's tempting to turn to the case of Cambodia after the victory of the Khmer Rouge in April 1975.
The Dear Leader's rule may not be cruelest the world has seen since the defeat of Adolf Hitler's Germany in 1945 or the death of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in 1953. That distinction probably belongs to Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge, who ruled from the once tranquil capital of Phnom Penh until December 1978 when Vietnamese communist troops drove them out. About two million people are estimated to have died at the hands of the Khmer Rouge from starvation, executions, torture and disease.
Although comparisons may seem far-fetched, the suffering under the Khmer Rouge is reminiscent of that endured for many more years in North Korea.
Today, however, Phnom Penh is bustling, alive with shops selling an incredible range of exotic silk, statuary, silver objects and souvenirs. Restaurants offer any kind of menu. The streets are swarming with traffic as motor scooters dart in and out and larger vehicles carry people and commercial products. Motorcycles pulling what look like small old-fashioned carriages offer taxi services. Internet cafes thrive in every market place. Casinos and nightclubs lure those in search of higher-priced fun, and the National Museum and Royal Palace offer lush and rich glimpses into Khmer civilization and heritage going back 2,000 years.
So what lesson is there in the transformation of Cambodia from a frightening dictatorship into a hustling if not exactly democratic society? Cambodia's present system, in which Hun Sen has ruled as prime minister with the backing of Vietnam almost constantly for 25 years, is obviously not ideal. Many of the country's 15 million people continue to suffer economically.
And it's fair to assume that torture and killing go on, although not on a mass scale. In an imperfect world, however, Cambodia gives every appearance of having recovered its erstwhile reputation as an "oasis of peace". That was how then prince Norodom Sihanouk - who before and after ruled as king - described Cambodia when it was navigating a treacherous course of neutrality as American and South Vietnamese forces fought the North Vietnamese until the US-backed regime fell in Vietnam two weeks after the defeat of that in Cambodia in 1975.
Incredibly, Sihanouk has survived, so much so that in his old age he endures as a kind of king emeritus above the tawdry power politics that periodically shakes up the elite of the capital six years after his eldest son, Norodom Sihamoni, was crowned as his successor.
The survival of the throne, however, represents a grand compromise in which momentous changes had to occur before Cambodia could begin to reach its current level of peace and prosperity. The Pol Pot regime had to fall, and the men around him, those responsible for forms of torture matched and exceeded only by the security apparatus of Kim Jong-il, had to flee, be killed or captured, to disappear forever. The lesson here may not be lost on South Koreans or their American ally.
There is, however, another irony here: that communist Vietnam, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, united between North and South Vietnam, drove out the Khmer Rouge. How was it that the forces of a communist country, against which the Americans and South Vietnamese, supported by two divisions of South Koreans, had fought for a generation, could have accomplished such a stunning success for the everlasting benefit of the Cambodian people?
The answer in part is that Vietnam, after the communist victory in 1975, was never a terrible dictatorship on the scale of North Korea. As Vietnam's leadership went through its own tortuous policy shifts, market capitalism began to flourish. Vietnamese gained a level of cultural and economic freedom that had not appeared possible in 1975. Moreover, Ho Chi Minh, who led Vietnam's communist regime until his death in 1969, never gained a reputation for pervasive cruelty over his own people even as he ruthlessly suppressed opponents.
Vastly different though the societies and cultures of Cambodia and North Korea undoubtedly are, the conclusion seems clear. There can be no real compromise with the Kim Jong-il regime. The history of regimes such as that in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge is they do not willingly yield, do not suddenly adopt humanitarian policies and do not give up the props of their rule, notably their weapons. It's wishful thinking to expect North Korea to shift its policies or honor any agreement on much of anything, including its nuclear weapons program. It took an upheaval to bring about relief from suffering in Cambodia, and it will take another to reform North Korea.
Donald Kirk, based in Seoul, covered the wars in Vietnam and Cambodia for newspapers and magazine, writing two books about them. He has also written three books on Korea, most recently Korea Betrayed: Kim Dae Jung and Sunshine.
South Korea is doing so well economically and living standards are so high that the idea of seeking anything other than rhetorical revenge for the sinking of the Cheonan with a loss of 46 lives on March 26 appears almost unthinkable. Certainly South Korea would get no support for such a venture from its American ally, bogged down in wars in the Middle East and attempting to force South Korean generals reluctantly to believe they should take full command of all forces in the South in the event of a second Korean war.
While South Korea's economy grows at a pace ahead of that of the rest of the industrial world, South Korean military people worry over what they see as the North's alarming new strategy. That is, to chip away at the South Koreans with attacks such as that on the hapless navy corvette in the West or Yellow Sea - and maybe bold quick hits on Seoul and Incheon.
The point, according to JoongAng Ilbo, one of South Korea's major newspapers, would eventually be to occupy a portion of metropolitan Seoul and then to negotiate a ceasefire. The paper quoted a military intelligence source as saying North Korea had strengthened its mechanized forces near the line with South Korea. At the same time, North Korea is bolstering naval forces on its southwest coast and threatening new attacks on South Korean vessels along the Northern Limit Line below which the South bans all North Korean boats.
While reluctant to do anything that might provoke armed conflict with North Korea, US and South Korean analysts wonder how long the North can carry on with such impunity. They see no let-up in the harshness of life for the vast majority of North Koreans - and ask whether any system can endure forever while the economy deteriorates, citizens gain slightly more knowledge of the outside world via illicit cell phones and short-range radios and ailing Dear Leader Kim Jong-il smoothes the way for transition of power to his youngest son.
For precedent, it's tempting to turn to the case of Cambodia after the victory of the Khmer Rouge in April 1975.
The Dear Leader's rule may not be cruelest the world has seen since the defeat of Adolf Hitler's Germany in 1945 or the death of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in 1953. That distinction probably belongs to Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge, who ruled from the once tranquil capital of Phnom Penh until December 1978 when Vietnamese communist troops drove them out. About two million people are estimated to have died at the hands of the Khmer Rouge from starvation, executions, torture and disease.
Although comparisons may seem far-fetched, the suffering under the Khmer Rouge is reminiscent of that endured for many more years in North Korea.
Today, however, Phnom Penh is bustling, alive with shops selling an incredible range of exotic silk, statuary, silver objects and souvenirs. Restaurants offer any kind of menu. The streets are swarming with traffic as motor scooters dart in and out and larger vehicles carry people and commercial products. Motorcycles pulling what look like small old-fashioned carriages offer taxi services. Internet cafes thrive in every market place. Casinos and nightclubs lure those in search of higher-priced fun, and the National Museum and Royal Palace offer lush and rich glimpses into Khmer civilization and heritage going back 2,000 years.
So what lesson is there in the transformation of Cambodia from a frightening dictatorship into a hustling if not exactly democratic society? Cambodia's present system, in which Hun Sen has ruled as prime minister with the backing of Vietnam almost constantly for 25 years, is obviously not ideal. Many of the country's 15 million people continue to suffer economically.
And it's fair to assume that torture and killing go on, although not on a mass scale. In an imperfect world, however, Cambodia gives every appearance of having recovered its erstwhile reputation as an "oasis of peace". That was how then prince Norodom Sihanouk - who before and after ruled as king - described Cambodia when it was navigating a treacherous course of neutrality as American and South Vietnamese forces fought the North Vietnamese until the US-backed regime fell in Vietnam two weeks after the defeat of that in Cambodia in 1975.
Incredibly, Sihanouk has survived, so much so that in his old age he endures as a kind of king emeritus above the tawdry power politics that periodically shakes up the elite of the capital six years after his eldest son, Norodom Sihamoni, was crowned as his successor.
The survival of the throne, however, represents a grand compromise in which momentous changes had to occur before Cambodia could begin to reach its current level of peace and prosperity. The Pol Pot regime had to fall, and the men around him, those responsible for forms of torture matched and exceeded only by the security apparatus of Kim Jong-il, had to flee, be killed or captured, to disappear forever. The lesson here may not be lost on South Koreans or their American ally.
There is, however, another irony here: that communist Vietnam, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, united between North and South Vietnam, drove out the Khmer Rouge. How was it that the forces of a communist country, against which the Americans and South Vietnamese, supported by two divisions of South Koreans, had fought for a generation, could have accomplished such a stunning success for the everlasting benefit of the Cambodian people?
The answer in part is that Vietnam, after the communist victory in 1975, was never a terrible dictatorship on the scale of North Korea. As Vietnam's leadership went through its own tortuous policy shifts, market capitalism began to flourish. Vietnamese gained a level of cultural and economic freedom that had not appeared possible in 1975. Moreover, Ho Chi Minh, who led Vietnam's communist regime until his death in 1969, never gained a reputation for pervasive cruelty over his own people even as he ruthlessly suppressed opponents.
Vastly different though the societies and cultures of Cambodia and North Korea undoubtedly are, the conclusion seems clear. There can be no real compromise with the Kim Jong-il regime. The history of regimes such as that in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge is they do not willingly yield, do not suddenly adopt humanitarian policies and do not give up the props of their rule, notably their weapons. It's wishful thinking to expect North Korea to shift its policies or honor any agreement on much of anything, including its nuclear weapons program. It took an upheaval to bring about relief from suffering in Cambodia, and it will take another to reform North Korea.
Donald Kirk, based in Seoul, covered the wars in Vietnam and Cambodia for newspapers and magazine, writing two books about them. He has also written three books on Korea, most recently Korea Betrayed: Kim Dae Jung and Sunshine.
Thursday, November 06, 2008
Meetings of the autocratic regimes in the communist capital of Hanoi
CLMV Ministerial Meeting opens in Hanoi
HANOI, Nov. 6 (Xinhua) -- The Ministerial Meeting of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV) opened in Hanoi on Thursday, with the participation of foreign ministers from the four countries.
They include Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Hor Namhong, Lao Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Thongloun Sisoulith, Myanmar Foreign Minister U Nyan Win and Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Gia Khiem.
The ministers will talk about regional cooperation during the meeting, according to the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry.
The CLMV mechanism was formed in 2004. The seven key cooperation areas among CLMV include trade and investment, agriculture, industry and energy, transport, information technology, tourism and human resource development.
The ministerial meeting is held as a preparation for the 4th CLMV Summit, which is scheduled to open later on Thursday.
They include Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Hor Namhong, Lao Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Thongloun Sisoulith, Myanmar Foreign Minister U Nyan Win and Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Gia Khiem.
The ministers will talk about regional cooperation during the meeting, according to the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry.
The CLMV mechanism was formed in 2004. The seven key cooperation areas among CLMV include trade and investment, agriculture, industry and energy, transport, information technology, tourism and human resource development.
The ministerial meeting is held as a preparation for the 4th CLMV Summit, which is scheduled to open later on Thursday.
CLMV Summit: A summit of 4 autocratic regimes
Backgrounder: Cambodia-Laos-Myanmar-Vietnam (CLMV) Summit
HANOI, Nov. 6 (Xinhua) -- The 4th Summit of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV) will open on Thursday in Hanoi, Vietnam.
The CLMV Summit is an annual event. The first CLMV Summit was held in November 2004 in Vientiane, Laos, with the adoption of the Vientiane Declaration on enhancing economic cooperation and integration among CLMV countries.
According to the Vientiane Declaration, the seven areas of cooperation among CLMV countries are as follows: trade and investment, agriculture, industry and energy, transport, information technology, tourism and human resource development.
The Declaration showed strong commitment of CLMV countries to strengthen and enhance cooperation among CLMV countries and promote CLMV integration into cooperation frameworks under the Mekong sub-region, ASEAN and the whole region.
The Declaration also called for international assistance for CLMV countries to narrow the development gap between them and other regional countries.
Each year, the CLMV Senior Officials' Meeting and Ministerial Meeting are held prior to the CLMV Summit.
The CLMV Summit is an annual event. The first CLMV Summit was held in November 2004 in Vientiane, Laos, with the adoption of the Vientiane Declaration on enhancing economic cooperation and integration among CLMV countries.
According to the Vientiane Declaration, the seven areas of cooperation among CLMV countries are as follows: trade and investment, agriculture, industry and energy, transport, information technology, tourism and human resource development.
The Declaration showed strong commitment of CLMV countries to strengthen and enhance cooperation among CLMV countries and promote CLMV integration into cooperation frameworks under the Mekong sub-region, ASEAN and the whole region.
The Declaration also called for international assistance for CLMV countries to narrow the development gap between them and other regional countries.
Each year, the CLMV Senior Officials' Meeting and Ministerial Meeting are held prior to the CLMV Summit.
Wednesday, November 21, 2007
Southeast Asian Pact Exposes Rifts
November 21, 2007
By WAYNE ARNOLD
The New York Times (USA)
By WAYNE ARNOLD
The New York Times (USA)
SINGAPORE, Nov. 20 — Southeast Asian leaders signed a charter here on Tuesday that was drafted as a watershed document to bind the region together in a European-style economic community, but the pact has instead exposed the sharp divisions over one of its members, Myanmar.
The Asean charter establishes the group as a legal entity, creating permanent representation for members at its secretariat in Jakarta, Indonesia, and committing heads of state to meetings twice a year. It includes a blueprint for economic reforms intended to create a European-style trading bloc by 2015, with free movement of goods, services, investment and skilled labor. The document also sets timelines for the elimination of nontariff barriers and other trade restrictions.
But the president of the Philippines has warned that her country may not ratify the document if Myanmar does not institute democratic changes and release the long-detained opposition leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
The blueprint also falls short of establishing the customs union many businesses in the region have been hoping for. And it includes a provision that allows members to opt out of economic commitments if other members agree.
“The charter they ended up with is very diluted, to a point where it doesn’t make any new ground,” said Thitinan Pongsudhirak, director of the Institute of Security and International Studies in Bangkok. “What we have is the codification of existing norms.”
It is increasingly clear that Myanmar is a liability to regional status. On Monday, the United States trade representative, Susan C. Schwab, warned that the situation in Myanmar was holding up progress toward a free trade agreement between the United States and Asean. And President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo of the Philippines warned that unless Myanmar committed itself to democratic reforms and released Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi, her country’s Congress was unlikely to ratify the charter, essentially vetoing it.
Pointing to Asean’s track record of lofty targets and pedestrian achievements, economists and analysts have voiced skepticism about the group’s ability to follow Europe’s lead given the widely divergent levels of economic development among its 10 members — with rich Singapore at one end of the spectrum and impoverished Laos at the other.
“The disparities are still quite big,” said Chua Hak Bin, an economist at Citigroup in Singapore. “Don’t even talk about a single currency. It’s so far away.”
The squabbling over Myanmar only underscored the disparate levels of political maturity and development that exist between Asean’s older and newer members.
Asean’s newer members, poor and ruled by autocratic governments — Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam — empathize with Myanmar’s ruling junta and oppose efforts to press it to tolerate political dissent. Analysts said these countries feared that any stronger action by Asean on Myanmar might set an unwelcome precedent.
These three nations helped Myanmar block plans by Singapore to have the United Nations special envoy to Myanmar, Ibrahim Gambari, deliver a briefing on Wednesday to a meeting that includes leaders from Asean, China, Japan, South Korea and India. (Mr. Gambari instead held private talks with Asean leaders late Tuesday, although China’s prime minister, Wen Jiabao, reportedly declined to meet with him.)
But Asean’s original members, more developed and relatively more democratic — Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines among them — now see Myanmar as a diplomatic embarrassment that needs to be handled through careful pressure and persuasion. All of Asean’s members agree that sanctions like those imposed by the United States and Europe would serve only to isolate Myanmar further and reduce what little leverage they have over the junta.
The charter resolves to create an Asean human rights body but has no provisions for enforcing compliance with any human rights standard.
“They’re more into rhetoric than real action,” said Sinapan Samydorai, president of the Think Center, a nongovernmental organization in Singapore. “They can talk about human rights, but they can’t enforce it.”
The Asean charter establishes the group as a legal entity, creating permanent representation for members at its secretariat in Jakarta, Indonesia, and committing heads of state to meetings twice a year. It includes a blueprint for economic reforms intended to create a European-style trading bloc by 2015, with free movement of goods, services, investment and skilled labor. The document also sets timelines for the elimination of nontariff barriers and other trade restrictions.
But the president of the Philippines has warned that her country may not ratify the document if Myanmar does not institute democratic changes and release the long-detained opposition leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
The blueprint also falls short of establishing the customs union many businesses in the region have been hoping for. And it includes a provision that allows members to opt out of economic commitments if other members agree.
“The charter they ended up with is very diluted, to a point where it doesn’t make any new ground,” said Thitinan Pongsudhirak, director of the Institute of Security and International Studies in Bangkok. “What we have is the codification of existing norms.”
It is increasingly clear that Myanmar is a liability to regional status. On Monday, the United States trade representative, Susan C. Schwab, warned that the situation in Myanmar was holding up progress toward a free trade agreement between the United States and Asean. And President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo of the Philippines warned that unless Myanmar committed itself to democratic reforms and released Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi, her country’s Congress was unlikely to ratify the charter, essentially vetoing it.
Pointing to Asean’s track record of lofty targets and pedestrian achievements, economists and analysts have voiced skepticism about the group’s ability to follow Europe’s lead given the widely divergent levels of economic development among its 10 members — with rich Singapore at one end of the spectrum and impoverished Laos at the other.
“The disparities are still quite big,” said Chua Hak Bin, an economist at Citigroup in Singapore. “Don’t even talk about a single currency. It’s so far away.”
The squabbling over Myanmar only underscored the disparate levels of political maturity and development that exist between Asean’s older and newer members.
Asean’s newer members, poor and ruled by autocratic governments — Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam — empathize with Myanmar’s ruling junta and oppose efforts to press it to tolerate political dissent. Analysts said these countries feared that any stronger action by Asean on Myanmar might set an unwelcome precedent.
These three nations helped Myanmar block plans by Singapore to have the United Nations special envoy to Myanmar, Ibrahim Gambari, deliver a briefing on Wednesday to a meeting that includes leaders from Asean, China, Japan, South Korea and India. (Mr. Gambari instead held private talks with Asean leaders late Tuesday, although China’s prime minister, Wen Jiabao, reportedly declined to meet with him.)
But Asean’s original members, more developed and relatively more democratic — Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines among them — now see Myanmar as a diplomatic embarrassment that needs to be handled through careful pressure and persuasion. All of Asean’s members agree that sanctions like those imposed by the United States and Europe would serve only to isolate Myanmar further and reduce what little leverage they have over the junta.
The charter resolves to create an Asean human rights body but has no provisions for enforcing compliance with any human rights standard.
“They’re more into rhetoric than real action,” said Sinapan Samydorai, president of the Think Center, a nongovernmental organization in Singapore. “They can talk about human rights, but they can’t enforce it.”
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