Ties with Laos, Cambodia of strategic importance to India: President Patil

2010-09-09
ANI

President Pratibha Devisngh Patil, who is currently undertaking a ten-day official visit to Laos and Cambodia, today said that relations with both South Asian countries is of strategic importance to India.

"I believe India, Laos and Cambodia have much to gain by cooperating with each other in combating extremism and terrorism. I would like to add that both Laos and Cambodia have given us unconditional support for our candidature for permanent membership of the UN Security Council," she told mediapersons onboard Air India One while enroute to Laotian capital Vientiene.

"Our relationship with Laos and Cambodia are of strategic importance as well. I look forward to an exchange of views with Laos and Cambodia on how we can promote greater stability and security in the region," she said.

"My visit to Laos and Cambodia - two important countries in South East Asia, will reaffirm our pursuit of a closer and enduring partnership with the countries of the ASEAN region, as part of our Look East policy," President Patil said.

"As Country Coordinator for India from 2003 to 2006 in ASEAN, Laos played a proactive and supportive role for enhancing India's profile in the region. Currently, Cambodia is the coordinator on the ASEAN side on India-ASEAN relations, and we recall that it was under its Chairmanship of ASEAN, that India attained Summit level partnership. I expect to discuss our growing engagement with ASEAN countries as we move towards the next India-ASEAN and East Asia Summits in Vietnam in October," she added.

President Patil will be in Laos from September 9 to 13 and will then visit Cambodia from September 13 to 18.

She is visiting Laos on the invitation of the President of Laos, Choummaly Sayasone, who paid a state visit to India in August 2008.

Apart from visiting Laotian capital Vientiane, President Patil and the delegation will also travel to Luang Prabang.

The visit of President Patil to Laos is meant to reaffirm India's commitment to further strengthen and consolidate bilateral relations, and enhance economic engagement and assistance in socio- economic development.

The President will also have discussions with President Choummaly Sayasone and Prime Minister Bouasone Bouphavanh in Vientiane, apart from official talks between the two sides

After Laos, President Patil will travel to Cambodia from September 13 - 18 at the invitation of King of Cambodia Norodom Sihamoni.

China’s Naval Expansion in the Indian Ocean and India-China Rivalry

Harsh V. Pant
The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus

After dramatically increasing its military expenditure over the last several years, in 2010 China has raised it by only 7.5 percent, marking the first time in nearly 21 years that the rate of increase has fallen below double digits.1 While there are a number of factors behind this, the Chinese government has used this to announce its pacific intent, underlining that it has always tried to limit military spending and set defence spending at a reasonable level. China’s foreign policy thinkers and political establishment have long sought to convince the world that Beijing’s rise is meant to be a peaceful one, that China has no expansionist intentions, that it will be a different kind of great power.

Of course, the very nature of power makes this largely a charade, but more surprising is that western liberals have tended to take these assertions at face value. There is an entire industry in the West that would have us believe that China is actually a different kind of a great power and that if the west could simply give China a stake in the established order, Beijing’s rise would not create any complications.

Now, one of China’s most prominent policy intellectuals is advocating for the creation of overseas bases. Shen Dingli, a professor at Fudan University in Shanghai, asserts that “it is wrong for us [China] to believe that we have no right to set up bases abroad.” He argues that it is not terrorism or piracy that’s the real threat to China. It’s the ability of other states to block China’s trade routes that poses the greatest threat. To prevent this from happening, China, Shen asserts, needs not only a blue-water navy but also “overseas military bases to cut the supply costs.”2

Of course, Shen also wraps this up in the widely accepted world peace diplomacy, asserting that the establishment of such military bases overseas would promote regional and global stability. It is a familiar diplomatic wrapping that other superpowers should easily recognize.

As China emerges as a major global power, it will expand its military footprint across the globe, much like that other great power, the US, whose bases surround China. The rapid expansion of China’s naval capabilities and broader military profile is a classic manifestation of its great power status. China’s new naval strategy of “far sea defense” is aimed at giving Beijing the ability to project its power in key oceanic areas, including and most significantly the Indian Ocean.3

China’s expansionist behaviour has, in fact, long been evident. China has been acquiring naval facilities along the crucial choke-points in the Indian Ocean not only to serve its economic interests but also to enhance its strategic presence in the region. China realizes that its maritime strength will give it the strategic leverage it needs to emerge as the regional hegemon and a potential superpower. China’s growing dependence on maritime space and resources is reflected in the Chinese aspiration to expand its influence and to ultimately dominate the strategic environment of the Indian Ocean region. China’s growing reliance on bases across the Indian Ocean region is a response to its perceived vulnerability, given the logistical constraints that it faces due to the distance of the Indian Ocean waters from its own territory. Yet, China is consolidating power over the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean with an eye on India, something that emerges clearly in a secret memorandum issued fifteen years ago by the Director of the General Logistic Department of the PLA: “We can no longer accept the Indian Ocean as only an ocean of the Indians…We are taking armed conflicts in the region into account.”4

China’s growing naval presence in and around the Indian Ocean region, beginning in areas such as China’s Hainan Island in the South China Sea, is troubling for India. China deployed its Jin class submarines in 2008 at a submarine base near Sanya in the southern tip of Hainan, raising alarm in India as the base is merely 1200 nautical miles from the Malacca Strait and is its closest access point to the Indian Ocean. The base also has an underground facility that can hide the movement of submarines, making them difficult to detect.5 The concentration of strategic naval forces at Sanya could propel China towards a consolidation of its control over the surrounding Indian Ocean region. The presence of access tunnels on the mouth of the deep water base is particularly troubling for India as it will have strategic implications in the Indian Ocean region, allowing China to interdict shipping at the three crucial chokepoints in the Indian Ocean – Bab el Mandeb, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Strait of Malacca. Of particular note is what has been termed China’s “string of pearls” strategy that has significantly expanded China’s strategic depth in India’s backyard.6

This “string of pearls” strategy of bases and diplomatic ties includes the Gwadar port in Pakistan, naval bases in Burma, electronic intelligence gathering facilities on islands in the Bay of Bengal, funding construction of a canal across the Kra Isthmus in Thailand, a military agreement with Cambodia and building up of forces in the South China Sea.7 These “pearls” are to help build strategic ties with several countries along the sea lanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea in order to protect China’s energy interests and security objectives. Some of the claims are exaggerated, as has been the case with the purported Chinese naval presence in Burma. The Indian government, for example, had to concede in 2005 that reports of China turning the Coco Islands in Burma into a naval base were incorrect and that there were indeed no naval bases in Burma.

Still, the Chinese thrust into the Indian Ocean is gradually becoming more pronounced. The Chinese may not have a naval base in Burma but they are involved in upgrading of infrastructure in the Coco Islands and may be providing some limited technical assistance to Burma.

With almost 80 percent of China’s oil passing through the Strait of Malacca, given its reluctance to rely on US naval power for unhindered access to energy, it has moved to build up its naval power at choke points along the sea routes from the Persian Gulf to the South China Sea.

China is courting other states in South Asia by building container ports in Bangladesh at Chittagong and in Sri Lanka at Hambantota. Consolidating its access to the Indian Ocean, China has signed an agreement with Sri Lanka to finance the development of the Hambantota Development Zone at the southern tip of Sri Lanka, which includes a container port, a bunker system and an oil refinery. China’s activities at Marao in the Maldives have also generated apprehension in New Delhi.

China’s involvement in the construction of the deep-sea port of Gwadar on the Southwest coast of Pakistan has attracted a lot of attention due to its strategic location, about 70 kilometres from the Iranian border and 400 kilometers east of the Strait of Hormuz, a major oil supply route. It has been suggested that it will provide China with a “listening post” from where it can “monitor US naval activity in the Persian Gulf, Indian activity in the Arabian Sea, and future US-Indian maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean.”8 Though Pakistan’s naval capabilities alone pose no challenge to India, the combinations of Chinese and Pakistani naval forces can indeed be formidable for India to counter.


Recent suggestions emanating from Beijing that China is contemplating setting up military bases overseas to counter American influence and exert pressure on India have been interpreted in certain sections in New Delhi as a veiled reference to China’s interest in securing a permanent military presence in Pakistan. Although it might not be politically feasible for the Pakistani government to openly allow China to set up a military base, New Delhi fears that Islamabad might allow Beijing use of its military facilities without any public announcement.9

It is possible to explain the construction of these ports and facilities by China on purely economic and commercial grounds, but regional and global powers like the US, Japan and India inevitably view the sum total of China’s diplomatic and military efforts in the Indian Ocean as projecting power vis-à-vis competing rivals. Moreover, most of Chinese naval facilities in the Indian Ocean are dual use in nature and no serious strategy can discount their future military use.

Whatever China’s vision, together with its expansive military budget and accelerated global search for energy and other natural resources, it has built up all aspects of its maritime economy and created one of the world’s largest merchant fleets with a port, transport, and ship-building infrastructure to match.10 Certainly, the Indian Ocean could play an important role in Chinese efforts to establish a position as a leading maritime power in the region. And this is resulting in Sino-Indian competition for influence in the Indian Ocean and beyond. Despite significant improvement in Sino-Indian ties since the late 1990s, the relationship remains competitive and China has succeeded in containing India within the confines of South Asia by building close ties with India’s key neighbours, in particular with Pakistan.11

The notion that China aspires to naval domination of the Indian Ocean remains a bit far-fetched. However, China certainly wishes to play a greater role in the region, to protect and advance its interests, especially Chinese commercial interests, as well as to counter India. But given the immense geographical advantages that Indian enjoys in the Indian Ocean, China will have great difficulty in rivalling India in the Indian Ocean. Even the task of sea lines of communication (SLOC) protection remains challenging for the PLA Navy as of now. Still, the steps that China is taking to protect and enhance its interests in the Indian Ocean region are generating apprehensions in Indian strategic circles, thereby engendering a classic security dilemma between the two Asian giants. And it is India’s fears and perceptions of China’s growing naval prowess in the Indian Ocean that is driving Indian naval posture. Tensions are inherent in such an evolving strategic relationship as was underlined in an incident in January 2009 when an Indian Kilo class submarine and Chinese warships, on their way to the Gulf of Aden to patrol the pirate-infested waters, reportedly engaged in rounds of manoeuvring as eacg tried to test for weaknesses in the others’ sonar system. The Chinese media reported that its warships forced the Indian submarine to the surface, which was strongly denied by the Indian Navy.12 Unless managed carefully, the potential for such incidents turning serious in the future remains high, especially as Sino-Indian naval competition is likely to intensify with the Indian and Chinese navies operating far from their shores.

For its part, China is merely following in the footsteps of other major global powers, which have established military bases abroad to secure their interests. There is only one kind of great power, and one kind of great power tradition. China will not be any different; power is necessarily expansionist.

The sooner the world acknowledges this, the better it will be for global stability.

Harsh V. Pant, is Lecturer of Department of Defence Studies at King's College London. He holds a doctorate degree from the University of Notre Dame. His research interests include nuclear proliferation, and Asia-Pacific security issues. He wrote this article for The Asia-Pacific Journal.

Recommended citation: Harsh V. Pant, "China’s Naval Expansion in the Indian Ocean and India-China Rivalry," The Asia-Pacific Journal, 18-4-10, May 3, 2010.

Notes

1 “China plans to slow expansion of defense spending in 2010,” Washington Post, March 5, 2010.

2 Shen Dingli, “Don’t shun the idea of setting up military bases overseas,” January 28, 2010, available here.

3 Edward Wong, “Chinese Military Seeks to Extend Its Naval Power,” New York Times, April 23, 2010.

4 Youssef Bodansky, “The PRC Surge for the Strait of Malacca and Spratly Confronts India and the US,” Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, Washington, DC, September 30, 1995, pp. 6-13.

5 Manu Pubby, “China’s new n-submarine base sets off alarm bells,” Indian Express, May 3, 2008.

6 The term “string of pearls” was first used in a report titled “Energy Futures in Asia” that was commissioned by the US Department of Defense’s Office of net Assessment from defense contractor, Booz-Allen-Hamilton. For details, see David Walgreen, “China in the Indian Ocean Region: Lessons in PRC Grand Strategy,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 25, No. 2 (January 2006). Also, see Jae-Hyung Lee, “China’s Expanding Maritime Ambitions in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 24, No. 3 (June 2007), pp. 553-4.

7 For a detailed explication of the security ramifications of the Chinese “string of pearls” strategy, see Gurpreet Khurana, “China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications,” Strategic Analysis, Vol. 32, No. 1 (January 2008), pp. 1-22.

8 Ziad Haider, “Oil Fuels Beijing’s new Power Game,” Yale Global Online, March 11, 2005, available here.

9 Saibal Dasgupta, “China mulls setting up military base in Pakistan,” Times of India, January 28, 2010.

10 Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (London: Frank Cass, 2004), p. 102, concludes from this that the Chinese government appears “to have a very clear vision of the future importance of the sea and a sense of the strategic leadership needed to develop maritime interest.”

11 Harsh V. Pant, “India in the Asia-Pacific: Rising Ambitions with an Eye on China,” Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 14 (1), May 2007, pp. 54-71.

12 Manu Pubby, “Indian submarine, Chinese warship test each other in pirate waters,” Indian Express, February 5, 2009.

Why we should heed [Indian] navy chief's warning on China

August 26, 2009
Harsh V Pant
rediff.com

Outgoing Chief of Naval Staff and Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Admiral Sureesh Mehta, drew a lot of criticism recently when he suggested that India neither has the 'capability nor the intention' to match China's military strength 'force for force.'

But he was merely stating the obvious ground reality given that China's GDP is more than thrice that of India and India's annual defence expenditure is less than half of China's. Much of the criticism was unwarranted as Admiral Mehta was probably trying to wake the Indian political class out of its slumber by forcing it to think more clearly about the implications of China's rise for India.

His was a warning about China which is rapidly moving towards the consolidation of its national power and if India does not move proactively it will find it almost impossible to catch up with China.

Towards this end, he suggested that India not only has to achieve higher rates of economic growth but it also needs to build ties with other major global powers and undertake significant reforms in the defence sector.

These steps are necessary as it is clear that if India has to protect its national interests, it will have to challenge China's growing might in its vicinity.

One should look at the euphoria in India surrounding the launch of INS Arihant in this context. Though that euphoria is not entirely unwarranted as decades of investment, India finally has the ability to indigenously build and operate a nuclear-powered submarine, a feat accomplished by only five other countries, it should not blind India to the fact that it has miles to go before it can catch up with China, which has made some significant advances in the waters surrounding India.

Just a few months back China's growing naval capability was on full display when it paraded its nuclear powered submarines for the first time as part of the celebrations to mark the 60th anniversary of the People's Liberation Army.

Gone is the reticence of the yore when China was not ready to even admit that it had such capabilities. Chinese commanders are now openly talking about the need for nuclear submarines to safeguard the nation's interests and the Chinese navy, once the weakest of the three services, is now the focus of attention of the military modernisation programme that is being pursued with utmost seriousness.

China's navy is now considered the third-largest in the world behind only the US and Russia and superior to the Indian Navy in both qualitative and quantitative terms. China's navy has traditionally been a coastal force and China has had a continental outlook to security. But with a rise in its economic might since the 1980s, Chinese interests have expanded and have acquired a maritime orientation with an intent to project power into the Indian Ocean.

China is investing far greater resources in the modernisation of its armed forces in general and its navy in particular than India seems either willing to undertake or capable of sustaining at present.

China's increasingly sophisticated submarine fleet could eventually be one of the world's largest and with a rapid accretion in its capabilities, including submarines, ballistic missiles and GPS-blocking technology, some are suggesting that China will increasingly have the capacity to challenge America.

Senior Chinese officials have indicated that China would be ready to build an aircraft carrier by the end of the decade as it is seen as being indispensable to protecting Chinese interests in the oceans. Such an intent to develop carrier capability marks a shift away from devoting the bulk of PLA's modernisation drive to the goal of capturing Taiwan.

With a rise in China's economic and political prowess, there has also been a commensurate growth in its profile in the Indian Ocean region. China is acquiring naval bases along the crucial choke-points in the Indian Ocean not only to serve its economic interests but also to enhance its strategic presence in the region.

China realises that its maritime strength will give it the strategic leverage that it needs to emerge as the regional hegemon and a potential superpower and there is enough evidence to suggest that China is comprehensively building up its maritime power in all dimensions.

It is China's growing dependence on maritime space and resources that is reflected in the Chinese aspiration to expand its influence and to ultimately dominate the strategic environment of the Indian Ocean region. China's growing reliance on bases across the Indian Ocean region is a response to its perceived vulnerability, given the logistical constraints that it faces due to the distance of the Indian Ocean waters from its own area of operation.

Yet, China is consolidating power over the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean with an eye on India, something that comes out clearly in a secret memorandum issued by the director of the general logistic department of the PLA: 'We can no longer accept the Indian Ocean as only an ocean of the Indians... We are taking armed conflicts in the region into account.'

China has deployed its Jin class submarines at a submarine base near Sanya in the southern tip of Hainan island in the South China Sea, raising alarm in India as the base is merely 1,200 nautical miles from the Malacca Strait and will be its closest access point to the Indian Ocean. The base also has an underground facility that can hide the movement of submarines, making them difficult to detect.

The concentration of strategic naval forces at Sanya will further propel China towards a consolidation of its control over the surrounding Indian Ocean region. The presence of access tunnels on the mouth of the deep water base is particularly troubling for India as it will have strategic implications in the Indian Ocean region, allowing China to interdict shipping at the three crucial chokepoints in the Indian Ocean.

As the ability of China's navy to project power in the Indian Ocean region grows, India is likely to feel even more vulnerable despite enjoying distinct geographical advantages in the region.

China's growing naval presence in and around the Indian Ocean region is troubling for India as it restricts India's freedom to manoeuvre in the region. Of particular note is what has been termed as China's 'string of pearls' strategy that has significantly expanded China's strategic depth in India's backyard.

This 'string of pearls' strategy of bases and diplomatic ties include the Gwadar port in Pakistan, naval bases in Myanmar, electronic intelligence gathering facilities on islands in the Bay of Bengal, funding construction of a canal across the Kra Isthmus in Thailand, a military agreement with Cambodia and building up of forces in the South China Sea.

Given that almost 80 per cent of China's oil passes through the Strait of Malacca, it is reluctant to rely on US naval power for unhindered access to energy and so has decided to build up its naval power at 'choke points' along the sea routes from the Persian Gulf to the South China Sea.

China is also courting other states in South Asia by building container ports in Bangladesh at Chittagong and in Sri Lanka at Hambantota as well as helping to build a naval base at Marao in the Maldives.

Given the immense geographical advantages that Indian enjoys in the Indian Ocean, China will have great difficulty in exerting as much sway in the Indian Ocean as India can. But all the steps that China will take to protect and enhance its interests in the Indian Ocean region will generate apprehensions in India about her real intentions, thereby engendering a classic security dilemma between the two Asian giants.

Tensions are inherent in such an evolving strategic relationship as was underlined in an incident earlier this year when an Indian Kilo class submarine and Chinese warships, on their way to the Gulf of Aden to patrol the pirate-infested waters, reportedly engaged in rounds of manoeuvring as they tried to test for weaknesses in others' sonar system.

The Chinese media reported that its warships forced the Indian submarine to the surface which was strongly denied by the Indian Navy.

Unless managed carefully, the potential for such incidents turning serious in the future remains high, especially as Sino-Indian naval competition is likely to intensify with the Indian and Chinese navies operating far from their shores.

If Admiral Mehta's warning that India is long way off from catching up to China can generate the requisite debate in the Indian political establishment about the rise of China and its implications for Indian strategy, he would have done his bit for the nation.

Harsh V Pant teaches at King's College London and is presently a visiting professor at IIM-Bangalore.

China's "String of Pearls" strategy around India in tatters

May 11th, 2009
Frontier India World Affairs

The Chinese “String of Pearls” strategy around India appears to be have broken. By definition, the “String of Pearls” describes the manifestation of China’s rising geopolitical influence through efforts to increase access to ports and airfields, develop special diplomatic relationships, and modernize military forces that extend from the South China Sea through the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and on to the Arabian Gulf (USAF Lieutenant Colonel Christopher J. Pehrson, “string of Pearls: meeting the challenge of china’s rising Power across the asian littoral” July 2006, Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College).

Around India, the Chinese pearls include Myanmar, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles and Pakistan.

Currently there might be no comprehensive policy by the current Indian government to contain it, but, a mix of luck, some policy, some internal and external events seem to have worked in favour of India.

Myanmar (Burma): Sittwe Port, Coco Island, Burma Hianggyi, Khaukphyu, Mergui and Zadetkyi are the main names associated with Chinese interest in Myanmar. India shares a border of more than 1,600 kms with Myanmar. Myanmar also serves as a gateway to South East Asia and ASEAN and is supposed to be the Eastern Flank to the Bay of Bengal.

“Look East” policy by former Indian Prime minister, Father of Modern India, Hon. PV Narasimha Rao, had brought Myanmar in Indian sights. Subsequently, India had toned down its criticism of the junta, supplied Myanmar with military spares, joint action on rebels in each others borders and offered economic co-operation. Vice Senior General Maung Aye visited India from 2 to 6 April 2008. During his visit, The Kaladan Muti Model Transit Transport Project agreement was signed which saw India gaining access to Sittwe. India also signed Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement with Myanmar. India and Myanmar are engaged in various sectors like cross-border developmental projects, trade, IT, Telecommunication, hydrocarbon etc.

Myanmar does not lean towards China or India. It makes best of the competition between China and India which are competing for Myanmar’s resources.

Bangladesh: Bangladesh currently has an India friendly government and army. Before this Bangladesh had an anti-Indian government and Army. China had taken full advantage of it.

Nepal: China and India are currently locked under a tussle over Nepal. China can do little but has increased considerable influence with the Nepali Maoist. India is not expected to loose its clout in Nepal.

Sri Lanka: This is another area where China is trying to influence. Hambantota port is being developed by China and China is a supplier of military wares to Sri Lanka. Indian influence in Sri lanka is not expected to be lost.

Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles: china is trying, but, it is not successful in getting ports or bases in these countries due to Indian objections.

Pakistan: Pakistan is currently involved in counter insurgency in its own country and has a very heavy US influence. Pakistan proxy is not currently available to China due to US influence. Gwadar port, which was built with Chinese assistance is under the management of Singapore based company. Chinese have not been able to complete central Asia - Gwadar link due to US influence and Indian friendly government in Afghanistan.

There are two more countries that are within the Chinese String of Pearls strategy, i.e, Thailand and Cambodia. Thailand has a proximity with Indian Andaman and Nicobar Island. India needs to work on relations with Thailand. Cambodia is currently of less direct significance to India.

For china, the fight for dominance over these regions is not yet over as it needs to secure its energy and trade route with Middle East and Africa. India needs a strategy to keep these gains and discourage Chinese dominance within Indian Ocean.