Thailand Military Change of Guard – A New Era of Cooperation or Increasing Hostility

"Facing with these looming volatilities, it would be prudent for the Royal Government of Cambodia to remain cautious and adopt the “don’t provoke, don’t fear” policy vis-à-vis Thailand."

Friday, July 23, 2010
Op-Ed by Davan Long

For military observers and analysts, it is no surprised that this year Thailand democrat-led coalition government is in an unusual hurry to complete its annual military reshuffling, and that the Royal Government of Cambodia is closely watching this event due to its real potential to further severe the already-tense bilateral relationship between the two countries.

Usually each year in August/September, the commanders of Thai armed forces submit their reshuffle lists, which recommend the promotions and appointments of senior officers to key positions, to the Defence Minister through the defence permanent secretary. The Prime Minister and his cabinet will then review and finalize the list before sending it to the Privy Council for royal endorsement.

In a hasty move, Defence Minister General Prawit Wongsuwon has instructed that this year’s military reshuffle lists be submitted to the defence permanent secretary, General Apichart Penkitti, no later than July 20. With this new deadline, Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva would be able to forward the final list for royal blessing by the end of August, a month ahead of the usual schedule.

One plausible hypothesis for such a rush is that the Constitution Court, as requested by the Election Commission, may dissolve PM Abhisit Vejjajiva’s political party for allegedly violating Political Party Act in 2005 by receiving a 258 million bath donation through a third party, as well as for allegedly misusing 29 million baths of political development fund. PM Abhisit Vejjajiva is also facing possible impeachment proceedings over a string of other allegations under investigation by the National Anti-Corruption Agency.

Another possible hypothesis is that knowing that his government may not survive the pending allegations, PM Abhisit Vejjajiva may attempt to boost his much-needed credibility by unilaterally calling an early election. Whatever the scenario is, the ultimate goal of his government is to ensure that it can complete the military reshuffle before the next general election. In fact, that was arguably the main reason why he refused to call general election immediately as demanded during the red-shirt protests, instead offering to hold it in November 2010.

The outcome of this year military reshuffle will shape Thai political landscape for years to come, and Prime Minster Abhisit Vejjajiva is clearly determined to get anti-Thaksin, ultra-royalist army generals into dominating military positions. In case his party does not emerge as the winner in the next elections, those army generals can decisively exert influences over the formation of the coalition governments. That was precisely what Generals Prawit, Anupong and Prayuth did to “persuade” other parties to leave the pro-Thaksin Puea Thai party to form the coalition government with the Democratic Party. Indeed, one could further argue that without the continued backing from the military, PM Abhisit Vejjajiva’s coalition government would have succumbed to the red-shirt protests.

The most anticipated outcome in this year military reshuffling is the compulsory retirement of General Anupong Poachinda who has been the army Commander-in-Chief since 2007, and the appointment of his deputy, General Prayuth Chan-ocha, a known favorite of the Royal Palace, as a successor. If his promotion is confirmed, General Prayuth Chan-ocha could essentially remain in the army’s top job till 2014, at which time he will reach the mandatory retirement age of 60.

Graduates from Pre-Cadet Class 12, General Prayuth Chan-ocha is a long time close friend and protégé of General Anupong Poachinda. He previously held the positions of Commander of the First Army Region, and Army Chief-of-Staff before getting promoted to his current position. Like General Anupong, General Prayuth has also commanded the high profile Queen’s Guard Second Division.

Together with General Anupong, General Prayuth played key role in the 2006 putsch that ousted Thaksin in 2006, and later at the peak of army internal rift, the alliance between Prawit (pre-Cadet Class 6), Anupong (Pre-Cadet Class 10) and Prayuth, known as “Eastern Tigers” pack, was seen as a stabilizing force for the irreconcilable differences between military factions.

Ironically, the Anupong-Prayuth fraternity appeared to take a different turn during the red-shirt protests as the latter inserted his hawkish influences at the Center of Resolution for Emergency Situation (CRES). There was unconfirmed rumor that General Prayuth was contemplating “half coup” to remove General Anupong while keeping Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva coalition government intact. General Prayuth categorically denied the allegation. However, in a country like Thailand, which had gone through eighteen military coups since becoming a Constitutional Monarchy in 1932, any rumor of military coup, no matter how improbable it was, could not be entirely dismissed. On that note, it is arguable that if General Prayuth does become the Army Commander-in-Chief, it is likely because of his close tie with the 90 years-old retired General Prem Tinsulanonda, presently President of the Privy Council, as well as his good working relationship with Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva.

During the red-shirt protests in April and May this year, General Prayuth was seen as not only adamantly anti-Thaksin but also a hardliner who advocated tough military actions against the red-shirts, in stark contrast to General Anupong who publicly favored political over military solution and refused to take harsh military actions against the protesters.

If General Prayuth does get promoted to the army top job, the democrat-led coalition government, which seems to neither trust nor have control over the police, will enjoy the much-needed unreserved backing from the military to crack down hard on the pro-Thaksin movement. However, tough military actions can backfire the government as it will likely drive the pro-Thaksin movement into deeper and possibly better organized underground movement.

It is too soon to state that having General Prayuth at the helm of the army will provide greater stability for Thailand ongoing socio-political unrest. The rapid and meteoric rise of General Prayuth and his clique (Pre-Cadet Class 12) has been widely perceived as at the expense of more professional soldiers belonging to different cliques or serving in less royally decorated units. Top generals and commanders who feel their careers were sidelined or wrecked by Pre-Cadet Class 12 are prone to become watermelon soldiers (green outside, red inside), a popular expression for referring to the soldiers who sympathize with the red-shirt protesters. A number of these disfranchised generals, some of whom have undying loyalty to Thaksin, may secretly support the red-shirts leaders currently in hiding or actively working underground. In fact some government officials strongly suspect that the black-clad militants who fought along side the red-shirt protesters were soldiers from rival units.

The appointment of General Prayuth as army chief is likely to further complicate the already strained relationship between Cambodia and Thailand. It would not be a surprise if some speculations have already been circulated in the current Thai coalition government and military leadership that the red-shirts could use Cambodia soil as a training camp to mount anti-government activities. Such speculations could easily lead to serious, though false, accusations. There is also a concern that the new army chief may force the Preah Vihear issue with Cambodia to defuse the domestic political unrest and internal rivalry between army factions.

Facing with these looming volatilities, it would be prudent for the Royal Government of Cambodia to remain cautious and adopt the “don’t provoke, don’t fear” policy vis-à-vis Thailand.

Open Letter to PM Hun Sen

Monday, November 09, 2009

Dear PM Hun Sen,

With the recent nomination of Mr. Thaksin Shiwanatra, Cambodia and Thailand are now headed to a whole different battle – a diplomatic battle to win over public opinion at both national and international levels. Many Khmers, including myself, view the nomination as a brilliant strategy by your government in every aspect.

As anticipated, Thailand PM Abhisit’s government has staged a number of PR campaigns to falsely accuse your government of interfering or meddling with Thailand internal politics, while it is clearly the same government that exports Thailand internal conflicts to Cambodia in the first place.

To counter such unjust accusation, and to prove our sincere and honest intention to Thai people and other nationals in the region, I felt compelled to draft the following communiqué based on my understanding of the RGC’s policy for your consideration, and eventual or possible release to the Press as you see fit.

Yours truly,

Davan Long
--------------------

(---Proposed text by Davan Long for PM Hun Sen Press Conference ---)

The Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) would like to welcome the nomination of Mr. Thaksin Shinawatra, by His Royal Highness King Sihamony, to the prestigious and influential position of State Economic Adviser (SEA). On behalf of the RGC, I would like to thank Mr. Thaksin Shinawatra for accepting the nomination.

With the recommendations of the SEA, Mr. Shinawatra, and inline with the RGC’s long term economic and foreign policies, I take this opportunity to announce a series of measures to immediately create a framework that will not only enhance the cooperation and harmony between Cambodia and Thailand, but further fulfill RGC’s responsibility and commitment toward ASEAN stability and prosperity.

Effective immediately, I order:

1) The Ministry of Defence to unilaterally initiate the first phase of troop reduction at the border. At the end of this multi-phases initiative, only a minimum number of troops will remain stationed at the border to prevent drug trafficking and other illegal cross border activities.

2) The Ministry of Interior to step up its resources and efforts to protect Thai investment assets and business community in Cambodia soil;

3) The Ministry of Finance to introduce some fiscal incentives to encourage and facilitate Thai business investment in Cambodia.

With the aforementioned initiatives and others to be announced in the near future, the RGC wants to send a clear message to Bangkok that the nomination of Mr. Shinawatra is in no way intended to be detrimental or harmful to the interests of both nations. Furthermore, the RGC intends to demonstrate its genuine and transparent foreign policy based on mutual benefits and respect to the Thai public, as well as its firm commitments to the peaceful and collaborative relationship with all nations within ASEAN framework.

(To be signed)
PM Hun Sen

Defending The Nation – Part II: The (Probable) Battle Plan

Thursday, November 06, 2008
Op-Ed by Davan Long

Dear Fellow Khmers,

The volatile political environment in Thailand continues to put pressure on the border issues, and Cambodia has a legitimate concern that Thai ultra nationalists may attempt to exploit such volatility to stage a major cross-border military offensive. After all, this is how the current border standoff got started in the first place.

Despite of recent public announcement by both Cambodia and Thailand on their commitment to peaceful solution on the border issues, the military situation on the ground remains tense. Both sides have troops entrenched in and on high alert a few hundred meters from each others. It is inherently dangerous. Accident poises to happen and any misunderstanding could ignite the gunfight.

In part I of Defending the Nation entitled Threat Assessment, National Defence Association (NDA) exposed Thai military structure, strength and arsenal. In this part, NDA will highlight its view or anticipation of a possible battle plan being drawn up by Thai generals, and recommends some counter measures.

It is unusual to openly discuss potential military plan or preparation in public place. Nonetheless, NDA is taking this unusual step in order to inform our population, soldiers, military planners and government of how it thinks the Preah Vihear Battle is likely to be fought by the Thai side should the war breaks out. NDA exercises utmost diligent in its writing and is well aware that this article can fall into the enemy hands. Rest assured that the information presented here has been carefully screened so that it will only benefit our nation. It will not put our troops in any harm way, and the enemy will not gain anything valuable out of this article.

Analyzing the current Thai political context, military structure, arsenal, training and war experience, there is a high degree of certainty that the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTA) will fight the Western-style battle with a two-phase-strategy. From the Thai perspective, this is not an invasion for occupying the whole country or for toppling the Cambodian government, but a quick and muscular military offensive specifically set out to humiliate, weaken and demoralize the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, and to ultimately occupy all disputed areas by forces.

To achieve the objective of the first phase, the RTA will likely mobilize a significant number of regular ground troops and call up on its air force to launch a swift offensive, expecting to defeat and inflict severe damages and casualties on Cambodian troops. Once it believes it has achieved that objective, the RTA will promptly redeploy its regular ground troops to mislead the international communities, while covertly sending in its paramilitary units (rangers) to establish military outposts on our soils, occupy our temples, and to assail or/and evict our local population from their villages.

Our best defense in such scenario is not to fight their battle but to make them fight our battle. By not fighting their battle, we have effectively deny them their firepower and air superiority. We must avoid concentrating our troops to resist their major offensive, but prepare to make tactical retreats and regroup for counter-offensives. What the Thai generals really want is for us to commit a large number of troops and materials to resist their direct assault so that they can use their firepower and logistical advantages to slaughter our troops.

Tactically, it is pointless to pay a heavy price in terms of troops and materials for defending a particular position or line along the border areas. Let the enemy troops move in, and then ambush them with coordinated counter-offensives based on pre-established plans to inflict heavy casualties on their ground troops.

Our troops must remain light and highly mobile, and be prepared to operate behind the enemy line. This is our major strength as most of our troops have the ultimate knowledge of the terrain and were grown up with the way-of-life in the jungle. To ensure that our troops can effectively operate behind the enemy line, we must hide critical supplies (non-perishable food, medicines and ammunitions) in sufficient quantities at key strategic locations.

Any major offensive by the RTA will certainly be supported by heavy artillery shelling and low-altitude air strikes. Similarly, any RTA rapid troop movement or reinforcement during our counter-attacks will be done through airlift (helicopters). It is urgent for the government to equip our troops with more portable shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles (SAM) to counter low-altitude air threat. A few well known portable SAMs are FIM-92 Stinger made by US, Igla-S made by Russia, QianWei-1 exported by China, and Anza-MKII produced by Pakistan. During the Soviet occupation war in the 1980s, the Afghan Mujahadeens had used the Stinger to destroy numerous Soviet helicopter gunships, and effectively changed the tide of the war in their favor.

Radio communications are one of the key elements for coordinated attacks, but it has inherent vulnerability that will be exploited by the enemy. We must increase awareness among our soldiers on modern warfare capabilities, especially in the areas of Electronic Support Measures (ESM) and Counter-Measures (ECM). The RTA has significantly invested in its Command, Control and Communications (C3) systems and is deploying such systems to disrupt or/and intercept our radio communications. Our soldiers must be trained how to react to mitigate the impact of enemy jamming and eavesdropping.

Orders should be issued to all combat units to maintain strict radio silence and to only talk over the radios when it is absolutely necessary. Every soldier must clearly understand that every time he talks over the radio (or cell phone), there is a great risk that the enemy will either intercept the message or/and pinpoint our tactical positions. Do not use plain language, use coded words or messages instead. Learn to recognize each other voice over the radios. Ask the caller to verbally authenticate to prevent the enemy impersonating our troops. Do not use the same passwords for each authentication. Do not blindly trust or rely on the radio built-in encryption features. They are likely to be known and already broken by the enemy.

Our troops have years of field experiences in fighting guerillas or insurgency battles. But facing the new threats, weapons and technology, they need to be trained to have adequate understanding of modern warfare tactics and capabilities. There are new generation of expatriate Khmers who have trained and served with Western armed forces. They are well verse with modern weaponry and special ops, and ready to counsel our troops at home. Together, we can blend our traditional and modern fighting skills and knowledge to yield a formidable fighting force.

NDA strongly advocates and hopes for a peaceful settlement on the border issues, but fears that such resolution is virtually unattainable as the current Thai negotiators unreasonably insist to negotiate on a map that their country has unilaterally drawn. Should a military confrontation become unavoidable, NDA is confident that our nation has the will, the strength and the necessary mean to defend itself unassisted. We will prevail in the present or future armed conflict, provided that we are all united, and remain utmost prudent in our strategy and preparations, not to overlook details that could be exploited by the enemy during the battles.

Yours truly,

Davan Long
NDA
davan.long@gmail.com

Defending The Nation – Part I: Threat Assessment

Friday, October 17, 2008
Comment by Davan Long

Dear Fellow Khmers,

As the prospect of full scale armed conflict with Thailand is looming, a number of concerned citizens have openly asked questions on our defense strategy and recommendations. Obviously, the best strategy is to live in peace with our neighbors, as long as they respect our territorial integrity. Unfortunately, this is not happening. Our border has been repeatedly encroached. Our bilateral negotiations have yielded no results and we are left with no other option but to defend our motherland vigorously by any mean including the military option.

Although we hope to be able to resolve the border issues peacefully at the international court, the situation on the ground clearly shows that large scale armed hostility is increasingly inevitable. Facing such threat, National Defense Association (NDA) has conducted some assessment on the Thai military structure and capability, and would like to communication this vital information to our fellow citizens, soldiers, military planners and government so that we are all aware of what we are up against, and that we can decide what specific counter measures we must take during the military confrontations.

As summarized in the attachment, the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTA) has a combined strength of roughly 301,000 regular plus 200,000 reserve, and an estimated annual budget (2009) of $4.08 billion dollar (US). The RTA consists of three service branches - Royal Thai Army with 190,000 soldiers; the Royal Thai Navy which has 68,000 men (sailors, marines and naval aviators); and the Royal Thai Air Force which consists of 43,000 airmen. Furthermore, there are around11,000 paramilitary known as rangers operating along border areas.

Thai military arsenal includes 315 aircrafts, 185 of which are fighters such as L-39, Alpha Jet, AU32, F5 and F16 fitted with advanced medium range air-to-air missiles; over 180 helicopters; 360 main battle tanks; 460 light tanks; 1150 armored personel carriers; 650 field artilleries [11.5 to 39.6Km range]; 240 anti aircraft artilleries; 1 aircraft carrier, 11 frigates; 7 corvettes; 9 amphibious landing ships; 110 patrol boats;

Thai defense is organized into four areas - Western and central provinces protected by 1st Army; North Eastern area under the command of the 2nd Army; North and Northwestern area under the command of the 3rd Army; and finally the Southern area protected by the 4th Army. Thai military current involvements include border dispute and drug smuggling surveillance along Burma border, border dispute with Cambodia, and controlling the Muslim revolts in the Southern provinces along Malaysia border.

Numerically, Thai military strength and budget are impressive. However according to several military experts, Thai soldiers lack combat experiences and are ill-prepared for battlefields. The bulk of their defense budget goes to the staff salary and only minimum amount is spent on training. Thai generals spend more times to exercise their influences in domestic politics than preparing the troop for combat readiness. This is largely due to the fact that Thai defense strategy from the cold war era relies on US to provide protection against external armed conflict and to resort to political solution to avert potential war.

NDA assessment is that Thai government is unlikely to commit huge materials and ground troops for a prolonged conflict with Cambodia. Thailand has nothing to gain from such conflict. However, she is testing our solidarity and determination to fight. If we don't response swiftly and decisively on the border incursions, Thais will continue to repeatedly violate our sovereignty.

In part II, NDA will provide some high level recommendations on the tactical manoeuvering in the battlefields.

Regards,

Davan Long,
NDA