Showing posts with label Democratic Kampuchea. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Democratic Kampuchea. Show all posts

Thursday, March 29, 2012

ឌុច៖ នួន ជា ជា​អ្នក​បញ្ជា​ឲ្យ​សម្លាប់​មនុស្ស​នៅ​ទួល​ស្លែង - Duch: Nuon Chea ordered the killings in Tuol Sleng


សវនាការ​របស់​សាលាក្ដី​ខ្មែរក្រហម នៅ​ថ្ងៃ​ទី ២៨ មីនា ឆ្នាំ ២០១២ អង្គ​ជំនុំជម្រះ​នៅ​បន្ត​សួរ​ដេញដោល​សាក្សី ឌុច នៅ​ឡើយ​ទេ។

2012-03-29
ដោយ ឡេង ម៉ាលី
Radio Free Asia

សាក្សី កាំង ហ្កេក​អ៊ាវ ហៅ ឌុច បាន​ប្រាប់​អង្គ​ជំនុំជម្រះ​ថា ជន​ជាប់​ចោទ នួន ជា បាន​បញ្ជា​ឱ្យ​សម្លាប់​អ្នកទោស​ទួល​ស្លែង​ទាំង​អស់​នៅ​ថ្ងៃ​ចុង​ក្រោយ​នៃ​របប​កម្ពុជា​ប្រជាធិបតេយ្យ

សាក្សី ឌុច បញ្ជាក់​ដូច្នេះ គឺ​នៅ​ពេល​ឆ្លើយ​តប​នឹង​សំណួរ​របស់​សហ​ព្រះរាជអាជ្ញា ដែល​បាន​សួរ ឌុច ថា តើ​មន្ទីរ ស២១ ឬ​គុក​ទួល​ស្លែង​បិទ​ទ្វារ​នៅ​ពេល​ណា៖ «ស-២១ បើ​និយាយ​ពី​បិទ​ទ្វារ​ពិបាក​និយាយ​ណាស់។ បើ​និយាយ​អំពីបញ្ជា​បង នួន ឱ្យ​កម្ទេច​មនុស្ស​ឱ្យ​អស់ គឺ​ប្រហែល​នៅ​ថ្ងៃ ៣ ខែ​មករា ឆ្នាំ ១៩៧៩។ ម៉ោង ១១ រថក្រោះ​វៀតណាម​មក​ដល់​មុខ​ផ្ទះ​ខ្ញុំ។ ម៉ោង ៣ យើង​ខ្ញុំ​ចេញ​ពី ស-២១ ទៅ​សាលា​សន្សំ​កុសល។ អត់​មាន​បិទ​ទ្វា​ទេ គឺ​រត់​ចេញ​តែ​ម្ដង។ មេ​រត់​ចោល​បាត់»។

របាយការណ៍​ពី​មន្ទីរ ស-២១ ឬ​គុក​ទួល​ស្លែង ដែល​សហ​ព្រះរាជ​អាជ្ញា​លើក​ឡើង បាន​បង្ហាញ​អំពី​អ្នក​ទោស​ជាង ១ ម៉ឺន ២ ពាន់​នាក់ ត្រូវ​បាន​គេ​ឃុំ​ខ្លួន ធ្វើ​ទារុណកម្ម និង​សម្លាប់​ចោល បន្ទាប់​ពី​យក​ចម្លើយ​រួច។

សាក្សី ឌុច បាន​បន្ត​ថា បញ្ជី​ឈ្មោះ​អ្នក​ទោស​ជាង ១ ម៉ឺន​នាក់​នោះ គឺ​ចាប់​តាំង​ពី​ខែ​មេសា ឆ្នាំ ១៩៧៥ ដល់​ឆ្នាំ ១៩៧៩។

Monday, February 20, 2012

Wouldn't justice require that King Sihanouk explains himself in court about his association with the Khmer Rouge regime?

Then-Prince Sihanouk with his Khmer Rouge comrades


Justice requires precision rather than confusion


Monday, 20 February 2012
Prince Sisowath Thomico
The Phnom Penh Post

Dear Editor,

Justice and history both demand precision. Precision regarding the events, the dates and the contexts, as well as precision with respect to the involvement of individuals in those events.

Instead, an article in The Phnom Penh Post on February 16 titled “Blueprint for forced labour” is nothing but all about confusion.

Consequently, for the sake of justice and history, it is necessary to restore the facts in their historical context.

The article states: “. . . a translated version of the document appeared to implicate now-King Father Norodom Sihanouk in ordering the executions of two prominent Khmer Rouge leaders, Hu Nim and Hou Yuon, in 1977.”

There are two major inaccuracies in that sentence.

Sunday, February 19, 2012

Pol Pot discussed his relationship with Vietnam: RFA interview

Pol Pot

Click the control below to listen to the interview:

Complete translation of the DK Minute regarding Sihanouk's Resignation


[Unofficial translation by Bunsou Sour; edited by Prof. David Chandler]

MINUTE OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE THE FRONT
11 March 1976

PARTICIPANTS: COMRADE SECRETARY GENERAL [Pol Pot]
COMRADE DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL [Noun Chea]
COMRADE VORN [Vorn Vet]
COMRADE KHIEU [Son Sen]
COMRADE HEM [Khieu Samphan]
COMRADE DOEUN
COMRADE TUM
COMRADE TOUCH

AGENDA: SIHANOUK'S RESIGNATION FROM HIS POST

I.             Report on the Resignation of Sihanouk

Comrade HEM reported to the Standing Committee on the resignation of Sihanouk. Sihanouk has sent two letters written in French:

·        The first letter conveys his resignation and explains the important reason for which he is resigning. In particular, he emphasizes his various health problems, which do not allow him to continue his work.
·        The second letter is a statement addressed to the people of Democratic Kampuchea informing them that he wishes to resign from his post before the 20th March 1976. During his meeting respectively with the Ambassadors of Mauritania and Senegal,  Sihanouk has also indicated that he categorically resigns. But during his meeting with the Chinese Economic Delegation he grumbled about his illnesses...

II. Angkar's Opinion

1. Reason for his Resignation.

There are two: in the long term and in the short term.

A. In the Long Term: it is the difference of "classes", the difference between the grass roots of the Revolution and his own person and family. He cannot live with us. If in the past he was able to remain with us, it was simply because of his strategy. As we no longer go along with his strategy, he can onlyremain provisionally with us. It is not the first time that Sihanouk has resigned. He did that in 1971 already.

B. In the Short Term: It is a strategic difference together with the grass roots difference. An example was the case when we dispatched our Ambassadors abroad without consulting him. The incident has no importance but he would have thought that we no longer have any need for him. Thus the wrangle over position continues. But the situation has evolved more thoroughly than before. Outside the country, Sihanouk can work with us. While inside the country he feels completely lost without any future. He is very frustrated. He lacks work, he is bored and the environment that surrounds him, in particular his wife who cries constantly, pushes him to the point that he cannot endure any longer. In the case that he decides to remain with us, that cannot last either, at the most l or 2 years. As he wishes to leave, his leaving now is the best.

Friday, February 10, 2012

ELIZABETH BECKER Exhibition - A reporter’s dangerous guided tour through Democratic Kampuchea

All Photos: Elizabeth Becker





Thursday, February 09, 2012
By Celine Ngi
LePetitJournal.com
Translated from French by Luc Sâr

In 1978, Elizabeth Becker was one of the few Western journalists to be invited for a two-week “guided” tour of Democratic Kampuchea. From her stay under close surveillance, she brought back pictures and interviews which will be exhibited at the Bophana Center between February 9 and 29.

It has been almost one week to the day since the announcement of the life sentence against Kaing Guek Eav, aka Duch, that this exhibition opens this Thursday, February 9, at the Bophana Center. It is devoted to the work of Elizabeth Becker, a photographer and journalist who was a former correspondent of The Washington Post and The New York Times. She is also the author of the book “When the War Over” which traced back the history of the Khmer Rouge revolution in Cambodia.

In 1978, when the country was closed to the world, Elizabeth Becker was one of the few journalists to be invited for a two week stay in Democratic Kampuchea. From her dangerous tour under close surveillance, she brought out interviews and photos which will be shown for the first time in Cambodia at the Bophana Center from tonight until 29 February. She will be present at the inauguration to discuss about her work and about her documents – a work which she describes as “terrifying.”

“Everything was planned in advance”

Thursday, February 09, 2012

Hearing of Evidence in Case 002 | February 8, 2012


Hearing of Evidence in Case 002 | February 8, 2012 - Part 1 from Cambodia Tribunal Monitor on Vimeo.


Hearing of Evidence in Case 002 | February 8, 2012 - Part 2 from Cambodia Tribunal Monitor on Vimeo.

Nuon Chea Describes Chinese Aid to Khmer Rouge

Nuon Chea in court (Photo: The Phnom Penh Post)
Wednesday, 08 February 2012
Kong Sothanarith, VOA Khmer | Phnom Penh
“There was the aid of technicians, but no assistants to politics.”
Jailed Khmer Rouge leader Nuon Chea told the UN-backed tribunal on Wednesday that China had provided munitions, food and clothes to the Khmer Rouge, but he denied any influence from Beijing over the regime’s policies.

The aid came “without conditions” and was not expected to be reimbursed, he said under questioning from a court prosecutor.

“There was the aid of technicians, but no assistants to politics,” he said.

Saturday, December 24, 2011

KR report of Vietnamese encroachments into Cambodia in Chantrea district, Svay Rieng province

KI-Media Note: It is interesting to note that the regions where the KR reported about Vietnamese encroachments into Cambodia are both located more or less in the same area where Cambodian villagers have recently complained about Vietnamese encroachments on their rice fields, and where opposition leader Sam Rainsy and the villagers pulled out border stakes planted in the middle of rice fields belonging to Cambodian villagers.

Who's who in the letter:

The Permanent Committee of Zone 23 Report to the Permanent Regional Committee of the Eastern Region 23/2/1976 [Democratic Kampuchea] regarding Vietnamese moving boundary markers into Cambodia.

(S.M., Samakmit) Comrade Keo An was the Lekha Dambon 23, the Secretary of Zone 23 of Phumipheak Bo, the Eastern Region. The report was meant to go to Sao phim, the Secretary of the Eastern Region, Lekha phumipheak Bo.

Comrade Soa Phim (a member of the Standing Committee/Politburo) committed suicide in May 1978 (he was to be arrested and brought to Phnom Penh S. 21 prison; surrounded by the taop machem (the special forces of the Phumipheak pises/Phnom Penh, Phim committed suicide ). Soon after Keo An was purged. Comrade Hun Sen (mitr Nal) fled to Vietnam.

Regards Bora Touch
------------
Unofficial translation from Khmer by KI-Media
Eastern Region
Zone 23

Report
Secretary of Zone 23

To beloved Secretary of Eastern Region

Subject: Regarding Vietnam moving border posts into Cambodian territories.

We received the report from the Chantrea district committee indicating that on 16 February 1976, Vietnam sneaked and moved the Kampuchea-Vietnam border post into Chantrea district at two locations:
  1. Near Daun Tey Khang Keut (East Daun Tey) village, Samrong commune, Chantrea district, they moved the border by 500 meters [into Cambodian territories].
  2. Near Ta Lok Chong Khang Keut (East Ta Lok) village, Bavet commune, Chantrea district, they moved the border by 500 meters [into Cambodian territories].
I am reporting the facts above so that the Secretary of the Region be apprised of this information.

Wishing good health and great victories,

20 February 1976

Secretary of Zone 23
Comrade Keo An

Friday, November 25, 2011

Vietnam denies that it is the cause of the genocide in Cambodia - វៀតណាម​បដិសេធ​ថា​ខ្លួន​ជា​អ្នក​ដើមចម​កាប់​សម្លាប់​ពលរដ្ឋ​ខ្មែរ

លោក​នួន ​ជា ​បាន​និយាយ​ថា​កត្តា​ដែល​​វៀតណាម​ មាន​មហិច្ឆតា​គ្រប់គ្រង​ត្រួតត្រា​កម្ពុជា ​និង​​ឡាវ ​ដោយសារ​តែ​វៀតណាម​ មាន​គំនិត​ជាតិ​ធំ ​ឬ​ហៅ​ថា​លទ្ធិ​ជាតិ​និយម ​ដែល​លទ្ធិ​នេះ ​ត្រូវ​បាន​អនុវត្ត​ទៅលើ​ប្រទេស​តូចៗ ​ប្រជាជន​តិច​ ទន់​ខ្សោយ​ និង​មើល​ងាយ​មើល​ថោក​ប្រទេស​តូចតាច។ (រូបថត៖ AP)

ថ្ងៃពុធ, 23 ខែវិច្ឆិកា 2011
ដោយ ហេង រស្មី វីអូអេ ខ្មែរ | ភ្នំពេញ
«កត្តា​វៀតណាម​គឺ​ជា​បច្ច័យ​មួយ​សំខាន់ ​ដែល​បង្ក​ឲ្យ​មាន​ការច្របូក​ច្របល់​នៅ​ក្នុង​ប្រទេស​កម្ពុជា​ប្រជាធិបតេយ្យ ​ពី​ឆ្នាំ​១៩៧៥​ ដល់​ខែ​មេសា ​ឆ្នាំ​១៩៧៩»។ - "The Vietnam factor was a major contributor that created havoc in Democratic Kampuchea between 1975 to April 2979" - Nuon Chea
ក្នុង​វ័យ​៧៥​ឆ្នាំ​អតីត​បង​ធំ​ទី​ពីរ​ នួន ​ជា ​និង​ជា​ប្រធាន​រដ្ឋសភា​នៅ​ក្នុង​របប​កម្ពុជា​ប្រជាធិបតេយ្យ​បាន​ធ្វើ​ការចោទ​ប្រកាន់​ចំៗ​ថា​គឺ​ប្រទេស​វៀតណាម​ដែល​នាំ​ទៅ​ដល់​ការសម្លាប់​អាយុ​ជីវិត​មនុស្ស​អស់​ជាង​​១,៧​លាន​នាក់​ដោយសារ​តែ​ការកាប់​សម្លាប់ ​ការធ្វើ​ទារុណកម្ម ​ការបង្អត់​អាហារ​ និង​ដោយសារ​ជំងឺ។

ថ្លែង​ប្រាប់​សាលាក្តី​ខ្មែរក្រហម​ កាលពី​ថ្ងៃ​អង្គារ​ម្សិលម៉ិញ​នេះ ​អស់​រយៈពេល​ជាង​មួយ​ម៉ោង​ លោក​នួន ​ជា ​បាន​វាយ​ប្រហារ​ប្រទេស​វៀតណាម​ស្ទើរតែ​មិន​ដាច់​ពាក្យ ​ដោយ​លោក​បាន​ចោទ​ប្រកាន់​ថា​ ប្រទេស​វៀតណាម​ មាន​បំណង​លេប​ទឹកដី ​ឈ្លានពាន ​និង​បំបាត់​ពូជសាសន៍​កម្ពុជា។

និយាយ​មួយៗ ​តែ​សំឡេង​ច្បាស់​លោក​នួន ​ជា ​បាន​និយាយ​ថា​កត្តា​ដែល​ប្រទេស​វៀតណាម​ មាន​មហិច្ឆតា​គ្រប់គ្រង​ត្រួតត្រា​ប្រទេស​កម្ពុជា ​និង​ប្រទេស​ឡាវ ​ដោយសារ​តែ​វៀតណាម​ មាន​គំនិត​ជាតិ​ធំ ​ឬ​ហៅ​ថា​លទ្ធិ​ជាតិ​និយម ​ដែល​លទ្ធិ​នេះ ​ត្រូវ​បាន​អនុវត្ត​ទៅលើ​ប្រទេស​តូចៗ ​ប្រជាជន​តិច​ ទន់​ខ្សោយ​ និង​មើល​ងាយ​មើល​ថោក​ប្រទេស​តូចតាច។


«វៀតណាម​ប្រកាន់​យក​នូវ​លទ្ធិ​ឈ្លានពាន ​វាតទី​លេប​ទឹកដី​បំបាត់​ពូជសាសន៍។​ វៀតណាម​លោភ​លន់​អំណាច ​និង​ផលប្រយោជន៍ ​ខាង​សេដ្ឋកិច្ច​ ឬ​ហៅថា​ផលប្រយោជន៍​និយម​ឬ​អំណាច​និយម។ ចាប់​តាំង​ជា​សហព័ន្ធ​ឥណ្ឌូចិន ​ដោយ​នៅ​ក្រោម​ការត្រួតត្រា​របស់​ប្រទេស​វៀតណាម​ តាម​រូបភាព​មិត្តភាព​ពិសេស​ និង​គំនិត​ធ្វើ​រាមច្បង​នៅ​ក្នុង​ប្រទេស​អាស៊ាន ​ក៏​វៀតណាម​នៅ​មាន​មហិច្ឆតា​នេះ​ដែរ»

ដោយ​បាន​ធ្វើការ​រៀបរាប់​យ៉ាង​វែង ​ទាំង​ការ​បង្កើត​បក្សកុម្មុយនីស្ត​ឥណ្ឌូចិន ​នៅ​ក្នុង​ឆ្នាំ​១៩៥១​ រហូត​ដល់​របប​ខ្មែរក្រហម​ លោក​នួន​ ជា ​ក៏​បាន​ទាញ​យក​ទឡ្ហីករណ៍​ជាក់ស្តែង​មួយ​ នៅ​ក្នុង​ពេល​បច្ចុប្បន្ន​នេះ ​បន្ទាប់​ពី​ប្រទេស​វៀតណាម ​បាន​បង្កើត​សមាគម​របស់​ខ្លួន​ចំនួន​២៤​ខេត្ត​ក្រុង​ នៅ​ក្នុង​ប្រទេស​កម្ពុជា។ ​លោក​នួន​ ជា ​បាន​បញ្ជាក់​ថា ​ការបង្កើត​សមាគម​នេះ​ មាន​សាខា​ដឹកនាំ​ធ្វើ​សកម្មភាព​នយោបាយ ​សេដ្ឋកិច្ច ​យោធា ​និង​មនោគមវិជ្ជា​ នៅ​តាម​ខេត្ត​ ដែល​នេះ​គឺ​ជា​យុទ្ធវិធី​ពស់​ថ្លាន់​ រឹត​កូន​ឈ្លូស​ឲ្យ​ទន់​ឆ្អឹង ​រួច​ហើយ​លេប​តែ​ម្តង

Tuesday, April 27, 2010

Remembering 'Year Zero' when Beijing-backed regime rammed socialism through

Monday, April 26, 2010
John Metzler
Special to World Tribune (Washington, USA)


UNITED NATIONS — Thirty-five years ago this week, the guns fell silent in Cambodia. The capital city Phnom Penh was captured by the Khmer Rouge communists and the war was finally over. Then an unfathomable reign of terror commenced pulling Cambodia into yet lower levels of the Indochinese inferno. Now a generation later, an UN-backed tribunal is trying key Khmer Rouge leaders “accused of mass killings and other crimes during the country’s genocide.”

During the rule of the Beijing-backed Pol Pot regime between 1975-1979, nearly two million Cambodians were killed by their own people in the name of communist utopianism. The Year Zero as it was called, was to forcibly transform Cambodia into a socialist state, which rivaled the radicalism even of Mao’s Cultural Revolution in Mainland China.

Neighboring Vietnam’s invasion of its old ethnic rival, Cambodia and the instillation of a puppet regime in 1979, interrupted the sanguinary rule of Democratic Kampuchea. Despite the illegality of the invasion and the dubious legitimacy of the rulers, (many of them former Khmer Rouge defectors), from a human rights perspective, and for the average Cambodian, the situation improved.

Yet Democratic Kampuchea was still the UN-recognized representative holding the seat of Cambodia. An annual political General Assembly debate brought together representatives of the Pol Pot regime, genuine nationalists, and the mercurial if bizarre Prince Sihanouk. The People’s Republic of China backed the Khmer Rouge, the U.S. Administration of Jimmy Carter had just recognized Beijing and thus was playing the China Card, and most developing countries opposed Hanoi’s invasion too. Thus there existed the political clout to produce resounding majorities contemning Vietnam’s illegal occupation of Cambodia.

In light of the condemnations of Vietnam, it almost became an afterthought that the Khmer Rouge had presided over the infamous Killing Fields, an indisputable genocide which tore the once gentle heart from this Indochina land, making the very name Cambodia synonymous with forced starvation, torture and death.

Given massive international political pressures, Vietnam withdrew from Cambodia and allowed a UN peacekeeping and political process with led to free and fair elections in the early 1990’s. Not surprisingly the old Kingdom of Cambodia was reestablished. By 2003 the UN and Cambodia agreed to a joint judicial Tribunal, tasked with trying leading Khmer Rouge figures. The Tribunal is composed of both Cambodian and foreign judges.

Recently the UN’s Chief Legal Counsel, Patricia O’Brien, visited the Phnom Penh-based Tribunal, officially called the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, (ECCC). After holding discussions with Cambodian officials, she stressed the continuing importance of the Tribunal, but called on donor countries to provide funding to support the ongoing judicial process.

The ECCC budget for 2010 stands at $45 million and is paid by both the Cambodian government and foreign donors. The Tribunal provides a full and proper legal frame- work with Trial and Appeals Chambers.

A trial of the notorious leader Kiang Guek Eav also known as “Duch” has finished and he is awaiting sentence. He was charged with crimes of torture and premeditated murder at the infamous S-21 camp. There will be at least a few more trials before the Tribunal winds down its mandate in 2015.

According to a statement, “The ECCC has confirmed its ability to conduct complex international criminal trials to international standards.” Yet the obvious question arises; with so many of the perpetuators of the Khmer Rouge genocide still alive, and many living openly in Cambodia, why is the Tribunal’s mandate so narrow?

Clearly there are large numbers in Cambodian society who are willing to turn the page on the past, or who more likely, fear returning to that past. Confronting the living ghosts of the Pol Pot regime raises fears and a specter of a Cambodia which existed before probably most of the current population was even born. The fragile peace, fractious democracy, and fluctuating economic development have moved forward but could quickly wilt in the hot-light of recriminations or perhaps worse. Revenge for the crimes of the genocidal regime is not the issue, but justice should be the indisputable goal.
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John J. Metzler is a U.N. correspondent covering diplomatic and defense issues. He writes weekly for WorldTribune.com.

Monday, October 26, 2009

The King Father and the Democratic Kampuchea

September 30, 2009
By Julio A. Jeldres*
Originally Posted at CamboSastra.org


I was recently asked to comment on a paper entitled “The Scope of the Authority of the Extraordinary Chambers to obtain the testimony of High-Level Cambodian Government Officials and King Father Sihanouk” by Ms. Anne Heindel, Legal Advisor of DCCAM.[1]

The paper is a legal commentary on a legal document. As I am not a jurist I cannot comment on its argument, but as a history researcher, I would like to offer, with due diffidence, the following comments:

1) It should be pointed out, at the outset, that the whole premise about the desirability and feasibility of the ECCC obtaining the testimony of His Majesty the King Father in Ms Heindel’s paper is based on articles published in the local Cambodian press and, more in particular, on the request of the Nuon Chea defence team who are seeking an opportunity to question the King Father, and have said that:

“It’s hard to imagine a more uniquely situated individual to shed light on the events of Democratic Kampuchea.” They have highlighted the retired King’s brief role as head of state of the DK regime, his presence in Cambodia during much of the Khmer Rouge period, and the information he may have been privy to due to his “unparalleled access to its senior leaders and hierarchy.” Moreover, “Sihanouk is singularly capable of providing information relevant to the [prosecutors] allegations relating to the DK authority structure’.”

2) Having had the opportunity recently to study the Nuon Chea Defence Team (NCDT) submission to the ECCC, I fear that the NCDT have not done their primary research before asking the ECCC to call for the testimony of the King Father and other government officials.[2]
This is most regrettable particularly as so much money is being spent on the workings of the ECCC, with some of that money surely a proper, accurate research could have been undertaken, before launching their application with the tribunal. But, in fact, their research is based on the work by Western scholars and journalists and on His Majesty’s book “War and Hope; The Case for Cambodia”, which they claim was published in 1978, when in fact was published in 1979 (for the French edition) and in 1980 (for the English translation) after His Majesty was freed from the Khmer Rouge.[3]

3) I notice, with particular regret that the NCDT made no attempt to consult His Majesty’s book dealing with the period 1976-79 when he was a prisoner of the Angkar (“Prisonnier des Khmers Rouges”), published by Hachette in France in 1986, in which His Majesty described his daily life at the Khemarin Palace and his infrequent contacts with Khieu Samphan, who was the only “leader” authorized by the Khmer Rouge leadership to have contact with the King Father.

While I can well understand that the principal preoccupation of the NCDT is to find exculpatory evidence for their client, a little more diligence would have brought to their attention the following facts:

A) Norodom Sihanouk was Head of State of the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia (GRUNC) which was established in exile in Peking on 5 May 1970. Assessments of Sihanouk’s position since he assumed his role as President of the National United Front of Kampuchea (FUNK) and of GRUNC have tended to confuse his titular role with a policy-making role in these organizations. This was not the case. The Politburo of the FUNK, whose members were Sihanouk-loyalists, left-leaning intellectuals and a few communists living in exile in Peking, was responsible for policy making while the King Father was responsible for the diplomatic activities of FUNK and GRUNC as a man of international standing.

B)
After the fall of Phnom Penh on 17 April 1975, His Majesty remained in Peking, where the late Queen Mother Kossamak Sisowath was seriously ill. The Queen passed away on 27 April 1975[4] and her funeral was held in Peking in the days that followed. Here it should be pointed out that after 17 April 1975, all policy making decisions were taken away from the Politburo of the FUNK and made by the in-country Khmer Rouge Politburo.

The King Father remained in mourning in Peking until 19 May 1975[5], when he accepted an invitation from President Kim Il Sung of North Korea to visit that country. During the time he was in North Korea the King Father received messages from the Khmer Rouge leadership, through the late nominal Prime Minister of GRUNC, Samdech Penn Nouth, which suggested that the King Father could not return yet to Cambodia because there were problems with the telecommunications and the landing strip at Pochentong airport.[6]

During this time, a message from Khieu Samphan to the King Father also informed him that following a meeting on 25 July 1975 of the Council of Ministers in Cambodia, it had been decided to reshuffle the GRUNC with the addition of two Deputy Prime Ministers: Ieng Sary became Second Deputy Prime Minister in Charge of Foreign Affairs and Son Sen became Third Deputy Prime Minister in Charge of National Defence. Interestingly, the said message also confirmed that the GRUNC’s Foreign Minister, Sarin Chhak, remained in his post, thus Cambodia became one of the few countries in the world to have two Foreign Ministers.[7]

On 15 August 1975, a delegation of FUNK-GRUNC from Cambodia, led by Khieu Samphan and Ieng Sary arrived in Peking for an official visit to China[8].

While in Peking, Khieu Samphan and Ieng Sary visited Zhou Enlai at his hospital. The Chinese leader told them:

“Norodom Sihanouk must be protected. He is the Head of State. He must remain your common rallying point. You must unite, bring together all those you can, to build up a neutral, independent Cambodia.” [9]

The Chinese leader then proceeded to warn his Cambodian visitors about their future Socialist policies for Cambodia in the following terms:

“Socialism is not an easy road to walk. China is now walking along that road, and it is a very long road, with many obstacles” [10]

On 19 August 1975[11], the FUNK-GRUNC delegation led, this time, by Samdech Penn Nouth and composed of Khieu Samphan and Madame Ieng Sary (Ieng Sary, Sarin Chhak and other GRUNC officials having left from Peking to attend a meeting of Non-aligned countries in South America), travelled to North Korea for a state visit, during this visit to North Korea, Khieu Samphan extended an invitation to the King Father to pay a visit to Cambodia. The King Father returned to Peking from North Korea on 23 August 1975.[12]

The conditions posed by the Khmer Rouge for the return of Sihanouk to Cambodia were that Sihanouk and Samdech Penn Nouth could only be accompanied by their respective spouses.[13] He was not allowed to take any member of his personal secretariat and secretarial staff would be provided to him in Phnom Penh by the Khmer Rouge leadership. Members of the Royal Family and of the Cabinet of the Head of State could return to Cambodia later on and upon their return they would be lodged not in the capital but in the provinces, just as the members of the Royal Family who had remained in Cambodia have been asked to do, in order to familiarize themselves with the new living conditions of the country. Prince Sisowath Monireth, maternal uncle of the King Father, was said to be living in the region of Kompong Cham. One person who was granted permission to accompany Sihanouk on his September 1975 trip to Cambodia was the former Director of Royal Protocol and then GRUNC Ambassador to China, Ker Meas. But when the former King returned to Cambodia on 31 December 1975, he had been taken away never to be seen alive again.[14]

Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, at the time seriously ill with cancer, received the FUNK-GRUNC delegation on 26 August 1975 at his hospital and he pointed out that any division between Sihanoukists and Khmer Rouges would be extremely dangerous for Cambodia, as such division would open the door to interference in the internal affairs of the country by foreigners.[15] The ailing Chinese Premier insisted “that unity and peace would preserve the country together”. Zhou Enlai further added:

“It is pure and very dangerous utopia to try to reach fundamental Communism in just one step. It is necessary to advance, with a lot of prudence, towards such supreme goal. Firstly, it is necessary to try to achieve Socialism and that is already a very difficult enterprise. In any case, when one wishes to be a good Communist, the priority must be the well-being of the People. If one makes the People unhappy, one must conclude that one has failed in the process of an honourable Communisation of his country”.[16]

On 27 August 1975[17], Chairman Mao Zedong received the King Father and the FUNK-GRUNC delegation. On that opportunity Chairman Mao addressed the King Father in the following terms:

“Prince Sihanouk, the Kampuchean people loves you very much and owes you a lot. Please remain as their Head of State. I know well. My dear Prince, that there is a misunderstanding between you and your Cambodian Communist comrades, but do not forget that the grounds of understanding between you and them are more numerous than those that cause your misunderstanding”. Please, remain always together”.[18]

The King Father then proceeded to visit re-unified Vietnam, accompanied by Khieu Samphan and Madame Ieng Sary, for the celebration of their first National Day, on 2nd September 1975.

While in Hanoi, Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong suggested to Norodom Sihanouk that the “brothers and comrades in arms” from North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia should have a joint dinner together[19]. In a clear indication of what the Khmer Rouge had in mind for their so-called “Head of State”, Khieu Samphan intervened and said to Pham Van Dong:

“We, Kampucheans accept a bipartite dinner between you, North Vietnamese, the host country, and our delegation”.[20]

Upon their return to the State Guest House, where the FUNC-GRUNC delegation was lodged, Khieu Samphan told Sihanouk that

“We must never fall in the trap prepared by these Viets who wish to dominate and swallow up our Kampuchea by incorporating it in their Indochinese Federation. We must remain very vigilant. This projected quadripartite dinner was a dangerous trap! We must not fall into it”.[21]

The (first) exile in Peking of the King Father was ceremoniously farewelled by a banquet presided by Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping, who had assumed governmental duties replacing the very ill Zhou Enlai, on 6 September 1975. At the banquet Deng reiterated Chinese support for Sihanouk describing him as an “outstanding patriot of Cambodia” and as an “old and close friend of the Chinese people”.[22]

The King Father returned to Cambodia from 9 to 28 September 1975.

C) During that period he resided at the Khemarin Palace but had no contact at all with the Cambodian people. The day after his arrival from Peking, Sihanouk presided over a Council of Ministers meeting but was reportedly not allowed to speak. He and his small retinue were confined to the Royal Palace during their stay and were only allowed outside on accompanied visits. His principal “liaison officer” for the Khmer Rouge was Khieu Samphan, who took him on a boat trip on the Mekong River.

The King Father then proceeded to China for the National Day and then to New York for the United Nations General Assembly. He spoke at the UNGA on 6 October 1975, and then proceeded to Paris, where he met President Giscard D’Estaing on 9 October 1975, according to French officials the meeting was “strictly for old times’ sake and nothing substantive was expected to result from it”.[23] He then travelled via Peking to Pyong Yang (North Korea) where he attended the 30th Anniversary of the Korean Workers Party, as the personal guest of President Kim Il Sung.

Upon his return from North Korea to Peking, around mid-October 1975 Sihanouk undertook a long trip of Arab, African and European countries which had recognized GRUNC from 1970 to 1975. Just prior to the trip of the GRUNC Head of State to these countries, Ieng Sary, as newly appointed Deputy Prime Minister in Charge of Foreign Affairs ordered all the Cambodian (GRUNC) Ambassadors back to Phnom Penh. Ambassador Chea San, who was accredited to Romania, protested arguing that it would be incorrect not only towards Sihanouk, but also towards President Nicolae Ceaucescu of Romania to withdraw the Ambassador of GRUNC from Bucharest, the Romanian capital, on the eve of the arrival of the Cambodian Head of State. Ieng Sary rejected the protest of Ambassador Chea San, asserting that that the “internal affairs of the new Kampuchea were more important than the visit of Sihanouk to friendly countries”. Finally, thanks to the intervention of GRUNC Prime Minister, Samdech Penn Nouth with Ieng Sary, the Cambodian (GRUNC) Ambassadors posted to the countries which Sihanouk was to visit were authorised to remain in those countries until the completion of the state visits.[24] I should add here that most of the GRUNC Ambassadors, with the exception of Ambassadors Chem Snguon and Hor Namhong, were executed by the Khmer Rouge once they returned to Cambodia in late December 1975.

Just before leaving Peking, on 30 December 1975, Chinese Acting Primer Minister, Deng Xiaoping hosted a farewell banquet for the King Father. During a conversation prior to the banquet, the Chinese leader informed Sihanouk that “his government would soon establish diplomatic relations with Thailand”. Sihanouk felt completely disconcerted as the Khmer Rouge had “not thought it worthwhile to inform me of their forthcoming ‘wedding’ with Bangkok, leaving to China the job”.[25]

C) During January 1976, Sihanouk was allowed to perform some of his diplomatic duties as “Head of State”. He received the Ambassadors of Sweden and Zambia in Peking who presented to him their credentials as non-resident Ambassadors to Cambodia. He was also allowed to receive visits from the Ambassadors of Albania, China, North Korea, Vietnam and Yugoslavia; and the Charge d’affaires of Cuba in Phnom Penh. He was also allowed to see diplomats from Afghanistan, Palestine, Romania, Egypt, Mauritania, Senegal and Tunisia, who had been invited by the Khmer Rouge leadership to visit Cambodia. One of his last visitors was the Chinese Minister for Foreign Trade, Li Kiang.[26]

Days after his return to Cambodia, on 5 January 1976, Cambodia announced to the world that a new Constitution had been promulgated and that the country was now to be known as “Democratic Kampuchea”; that a new flag (Red with an Angkor symbol in yellow) and a new National Anthem (“April 17, the Great Victory”) were also announced. Sihanouk whom, as “Head of State”, should have been consulted was not and a so-called “National Congress” had been held while he was on his diplomatic mission abroad.[27]

In February 1976, the “Angkar” decided that Sihanouk should do a “tour of the Great Lake”. This meant a journey by train from Phnom Penh to Battambang, then by car to Sisophon and Siemreap-Angkor, returning from Siemreap to Phnom Penh with a stop at Kompong Thom.[28]

Soon afterwards, the King Father heard a broadcast by Radio Democratic Kampuchea announcing that the new Democratic Kampuchean Ambassador to Laos had presented his credentials to Prince Souphanouvong, President of the Lao Democratic People’s Republic. Sihanouk did not recall ever having signed credentials accrediting an Ambassador to Laos. He, therefore, asked Samdech Penn Nouth, whom was allowed to visit the King Father, whether he had attended the Council of Ministers formalizing the appointment of the new Ambassador to Laos only to be told by Samdech Penn Nouth that he had himself learn the news while listening to Radio Democratic Kampuchea!

Here, I feel I should present the testimony of Dr. Dhimiter Thimi Stamo, the former Albanian Ambassador to Democratic Kampuchea. Albania had been a strong supporter of the Sihanouk led GRUNC and in December 1975 had sent Dr Stamo to establish the Albanian Embassy in Phnom Penh:

“As soon as I arrived in Phnom Penh (on 2 December 1975), I informed the protocol that I had a letter of credence addressed to Samdech Norodom Sihanouk by the Albanian Head of State. I was told to wait until an appropriate moment. It was not until the March 1976 elections that I was given some idea that I would be presenting my credentials but by then there had been a change of Head of State and it was necessary to prepare new letters of credence which arrived from Tirana on 30 April 1976. I again informed the protocol and was told it was not necessary. When I insisted, I was told to wait. It was not until the 11 June 1976 that I was able to present my credentials to Khieu Samphan, accompanied by Ieng Sary, that is six months after my arrival in Phnom Penh!” [29]

The King Father requested permission to travel to China for a medical check up but was told that Dr. Thiounn Thoeunn was perfectly capable of taking care of his medical worries.[30]

The Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy of Romania in Peking, Mr. Lefter, who visited Cambodia in late January 1976, upon his return to Peking, told US diplomats that he had had a three hour private conversation with Sihanouk, he described the prince as being very sad and feeling that he had been dealt a double blow, first by the Lon Nol coup and second by the Khmer Rouge. According to the Romanian diplomat “Sihanouk had lost weight, was despondent and feared for his life”.[31]

An Egyptian diplomat in China, Ambassador Medhat Tawfik Ibrahim Tawfik, who knew Sihanouk since 1958 and was at the time the Deputy Chief of Mission of the Egyptian Embassy in China, visited Cambodia in early March 1976, commented to the US Liaison Office in Peking that Sihanouk “was a Head of State who had nothing to do with the day to day business of government.”[32]

Both diplomats felt that Samdech Sihanouk did not enjoy much power or influence and that he owed his life to the influence of China with the Khmer Rouge, and to the interest other foreign Heads of State showed in his well-being.[33] However, with the passing away of Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, who had strongly supported Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge stopped treating the King Father with consideration. Chinese author, Han Suyin, has observed “

“As long as Zhou Enlai was alive, Sihanouk was fairly treated by the Khmer Rouge”[34]

Norodom Sihanouk submitted his resignation in early March 1976[35]. Almost immediately he was placed under house arrest. He was only allowed to leave the Royal Palace when the Khmer Rouge organized for him a couple of visits to the countryside but all contact with the Cambodian people was forbidden, even with his own children, grand-children and other members of the Royal Family. He was not allowed to receive letters and his only means of communication with the outside world was his small transistor radio.

President Mao Zedong of China died in September 1976, the King Father was not allowed to visit the Chinese Embassy to sign the condolences book and therefore Sihanouk wrote a message and asked his Khmer Rouge jailers to forward it to Peking. But upon his return to Peking in January 1979, some of the King Father’s Chinese friends expressed being disappointed by the fact he had not shown any sympathy on the President’s death, it was then that Sihanouk realised that his message never reached the Chinese capital.[36]

In 1977, another of the King Father’s closest friends, President Tito of the then Yugoslavia, let it be known that he was only willing to receive a visiting Khmer Rouge delegation led by Ieng Sary, after he was given assurances that his Ambassador in Phnom Penh would have access to Sihanouk.[37]

The last documented attempt by a foreign dignitary to check on the well-being of the King Father was made by the widow of the late Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, Madame Deng Yingchao, who was dispatched on a mission to Cambodia in early January 1978. She requested on several opportunities a meeting with Sihanouk but was denied the same and was only allowed to see Sihanouk accompanied by the Queen Mother driving pass Madame Deng Yingchao’s residence in Phnom Penh, thus confirming to the senior Chinese visitor that the King Father was still alive.[38]

During the whole period the King Father spent in Cambodia, he only met Pol Pot once, just prior to the King Father’s departure for China in January 1979. I have found no record or reference to the King Father ever meeting Nuon Chea, thus it is hard to understand the claim by the Nuon Chea Defence Team that the King Father had “unparalleled access to the senior Khmer Rouge leadership” and even more hard to imagine how could His Majesty provide any further information or light on the events of Democratic Kampuchea when he was a prisoner of the regime.
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*Ambassador Julio A. Jeldres is an Adjunct Research Fellow at the Asia Institute of Monash University, a former Senior Private Secretary to His Majesty the King Father and currently his Official Biographer.

September 30, 2009
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[1] “The Scope of the Authority of the Extraordinary Chambers to Obtain the Testimony of High-Level Cambodian Government Officials and King Father Sihanouk”, Anne Heindel, Legal Advisor, Documentation Center of Cambodia, September 2009

[2] Seventh Request For Investigative Action, Nuon Chea Defence Team, 28 November 2008

[3] Norodom Sihanouk (translated by Mary Feeney) “War and Hope: The Case for Cambodia” Sidgwick & Jackson, London 1980

[4] See New York Times, April 28, 1975, page 29

[5] See New York Times, May 19, 1975, page 2

[6] Handwritten letter from Samdech Penn Nouth to HRH Princess Monique Sihanouk dated June 24, 1975. Copy from His Majesty’s Personal Archives in the author’s possession.

[7] Telegram from Khieu Samphan, Deputy Prime Minister of GRUNC and Commander in Chief of the People’s National Liberation Army of Kampuchea to Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, Head of State and President of FUNK, July 30, 1975 (submitted to NS on 5 August 1975). Copy from His Majesty’s Personal Archives in the author’s possession.

[8] USLO to State, Peking No. 1561, August 16, 1975, Record Group 59: General Records of the Department of State, NARA, College Park.

[9] See Han Suyin “Zhou Enlai and the making of modern China” Pimlico (Random House), London 1994, page 405

[10] Ibid

[11] New Zealand Embassy Peking to External Affairs Wellington, Telegram No.62 (Confidential), August 20, 1975.

[12] French Embassy Peking to Quay d’Orsay Paris, Telegram No. 1466-68 (Confidential), Peking August 25, 1975, Diplomatic Archives of France, Paris, Asie/Oceanie, Cambodge 1970-75

[13] Norodom Sihanouk, unpublished manuscript, “The Cup to the Dregs” Second Part, Chapter 1

[14] Unpublished manuscript “The Cup to the Dregs”, Second Part , Chapter 5

[15] French Embassy Peking to Quay d’Orsay Paris, Telegram No. 1477-81 (Secret) , Peking August 25, 1975, Diplomatic Archives of France, Paris, Asie/Oceanie Series, Cambodge 1970-75

[16] See “Text for History” by Norodom Sihanouk on his website, 30 June 2003 (My translation from French)

[17] Xinhua News Agency, Daily Bulletin in English, 28 August 1975

[18] “Text for History: op. cited.

[19] Unpublished manuscript “The Cup to the Dregs”, op cited, Second Part, Chapter 12

[20] Ibid, op cited

[21] Ibid. op. cited

[22] Speech by Deputy Premier Deng Xiaoping, 6 September 1975, copy in author’s possession.

[23] US Embassy in Paris to State Department, No. 26381 (Confidential), October 9, 1975, Record Group 59: General Records of the Department of State, NARA, College Park.

[24] Unpublished manuscript “The Cup to the Dregs”, op. cited, Second Part, Chapter 4

[25] Unpublished manuscript “The Cup to the Dregs”, Second Part , Chapter 2

[26] Unpublished manuscript “The Cup to the Dregs”, Second Part, Chapter 5

[27] Unpublished manuscript “The Cup to the Dregs”, Second Part, Chapter 6

[28] Ibid.

[29] See Dhimiter Thimi Stamo “Tre Anni con I Khmer Rosi” (Three Years with the Khmer Rouge), AFRICANA –Rivista di Studi Extraeuropei, Vol. VI 2000, page 22. My translation from Italian

[30] Unpublished manuscript “The Cup to the Dregs”, Second Part, Chapter 18

[31] USLO, Peking to State Department, March 18, 1976, copy from Indochina Archive, Berkeley.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid, op cited

[34] Han Suyin “Zhou Enlai”, op. cited page 405

[35] Documents concerning the request of Prince Norodom Sihanouk for retirement. This booklet circulated in April 1976 by the Khmer Rouge leadership comprises the original handwritten request by Norodom Sihanouk to retire in French language, a translation in English, as well as a Statement of the Government of “Democratic Kampuchea”, dated 4 April 1976, accepting the request in English and French. It is interesting that in the handwritten letter of Norodom Sihanouk the month March had been changed to April.

[36] Unpublished manuscript “The Cup to the Dregs”, Part 2, Chapter 19

[37] Author’s personal discussion with HM the King Father, Peking November 1996

[38] Norodom Sihanouk “Prisonnier des Khmers Rouges”, Hachette, Paris, 1986, pages 249-50. This episode was confirmed to the author in 1988 in Peking by a Chinese diplomat who served in the Chinese Embassy in Cambodia
.

Friday, August 31, 2007

Sihanouk's resignation from his post - A Minute of the KR Standing Committee

Standing Committee Minutes, March 11, 1976

Documentation Center of Cambodia Catalogue Number: D7562
[Unofficial translation by Bunsou Sour; edited by Prof. David Chandler]


MINUTE OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE
THE FRONT

11 March 1976
PARTICIPANTS: COMRADE SECRETARY GENERAL [Pol Pot]
COMRADE DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL [Noun Chea]
COMRADE VORN [Vorn Vet]
COMRADE KHIEU [Son Sen]
COMRADE HEM [Khieu Samphan]
COMRADE DOEUN
COMRADE TUM
COMRADE TOUCH

AGENDA: SIHANOUK'S RESIGNATION FROM HIS POST

I. Report on the Resignation of Sihanouk

Comrade HEM reported to the Standing Committee on the resignation of Sihanouk. Sihanouk has sent two letters written in French:

- The first letter conveys his resignation and explains the important reason for which he is resigning. In particular, he emphasizes his various health problems, which do not allow him to continue his work.

- The second letter is a statement addressed to the people of Democratic Kampuchea informing them that he wishes to resign from his post before the 20th March 1976.

During his meeting respectively with the Ambassadors of Mauritania and Senegal, Sihanouk has also indicated that he categorically resigns. But during his meeting with the Chinese Economic Delegation he grumbled about his illnesses...

II. Angkar's Opinion

1. Reason for his Resignation.

There are two: in the long term and in the short term.

A. In the Long Term: it is the difference of "classes", the difference between the grass roots of the Revolution and his own person and family. He cannot live with us. If in the past he was able to remain with us, it was simply because of his strategy. As we no longer go along with his strategy, he can onlyremain provisionally with us. It is not the first time that Sihanouk has resigned. He did that in 1971 already.

B. In the Short Term: It is a strategic difference together with the grass roots difference. An example was the case when we dispatched our Ambassadors abroad without consulting him. The incident has no importance but he would have thought that we no longer have any need for him. Thus the wrangle over position continues.

But the situation has evolved more thoroughly than before. Outside the country, Sihanouk can work with us. While inside the country he feels completely lost without any future. He is very frustrated. He lacks work, he is bored and the environment that surrounds him, in particular his wife who cries constantly, pushes him to the point that he cannot endure any longer. In the case that he decides to remain with us, that cannot last either, at the most l or 2 years. As he wishes to leave, his leaving now is the best.

2. POSITIVE and Negative aspects of his Resignation

A. Positive Aspects for our Revolution :

- All the people of Kampuchea will feel a huge surge of relief. The same applies to all our cadres and military. As far as the world is concerned, there won't be any problem.

- We can resolve the problem of the nomination in our State Organisation easily. And under these conditions we can work peacefully without any obstacles.

- Our work in External Affairs will thus be improved because henceforth we will make the decisions ourselves, we will express our position by ourselves. Without Sihanouk we are clean-cut.

B. Negative Aspects for our Revolution

- On the one hand, Vietnam attacks us and treats us as being too far to the left. Sihanouk has helped us, so why should we drop him? Vietnam will point out to others, saying something bad about us, but good about themselves. But it is a provisional problem only. If in the final analysis we remain very close to them, we shall certainly have no problem.

- On the other hand, the enemy is about to attack us, but we should let them be for say half a month. But even if Sihanouk had not resigned the enemy will always attacks us, their spies still exist. If the enemy does not cease attacking us, are we going to suffer? No, because they cannot isolate us.

3. MEASURES to be Taken: two directives

A. First directive: We don't reject him. We ask him to remain in the same position. If he wishes to remain with us, he could remain for 5 months, l or 3 years, as long he would like. If he cannot resist, it is not because of us, it is not our fault. In fact he won't be able to remain with us. He and his family can see very well that they won't have well-being We don't give him any choice, if he does not wish to remain, too bad for him.

Thus we must go and see him and ask him to excuse us for being unable to pay him visits as often as we would like, because we were very busy. We SHOULD acknowledge reception of his letter. That is why we come together to see him. The Situation of our country is very difficult, very poor, the country must face tremendous difficulties. We must resolve all the problems with national dignity. It is in this way that we can be truly independent. Our position, including that of the government, is of always recognizing his noble contribution, HIS deeds and efforts for the country, in particular in the international arena.

The [Khmer] Nation owes him its gratitude for his highly patriotic contribution, something which our Assembly has already noted in its resolutions. We respect a lot [our] collective decisions once they have been adopted. But we request that he remains with the people. The people will preserve his nationalist undertakings and we also will congratulate him and will do our utmost to implement the resolution of our extraordinary session of the National Assembly.

B. Second Directive: in the event that he insists on resigning. We thank him. In the recent past we fought together, shoulder to shoulder. We very much regret his resignation. We shall convoke a meeting of the Council of Ministers to take a decision. If he resigns we won't allow him to leave the country. His departure will render the situation complicated to China. The enemy does not cease to condemn and criticize us. If we refuse to allow him to leave, the enemy can criticize us at least for one month.

Certain reasonable attitudes of Sihanouk show a patriotic spirit, but his wife has no patriotic spirit at all. Consequently, if we are not clear in solving this problem, it is possible that unresolved questions will complicate our tasks later on. Thus we should go for the first solution and if that does not work, adopt the second one.

III. ANGKAR'S OPINION (meeting of 13 March 1976)

Comrade HEM made several reports to the Standing Committee on the Sihanouk problem. He has made a categorical decision to resign. He asks Angkar that it TAKE PITY ON him. HE lowers and humbles himself only requesting Angkar that it accepts his resignation. This resignation is not against us...

Comrade Secretary General pointed out that it is an important question to be decided by the Central Committee of the Party. But Comrade Secretary General has already prepared a number of ideas, which WERE supported by the Standing Committee:

1. To forbid Sihanouk from leaving the country is the first measure to be taken.

2. It is necessary to call a meeting of the Council of Ministers to submit to it reports on the matter, in order for the latter to make a decision and, then, to meet Sihanouk once again, with the presence of Penn NOUTH

It is necessary that arrangements be made to record the conversation with Sihanouk. It is necessary to speak to him in such a way for him to keep UP his hopes and allow the recording of his conversation. It is for our documentation.

3. To dispatch telegrams to the sons of Sihanouk asking them to return as soon as possible, pointing out that they must come for the New Year and the National Day celebration. We must solve this problem once and for all. We must also solve it for the interests of our revolution.

4. Is Our Decision TRUE TO Revolutionary Morality?

a. As the morality of the Revolution or the interests of the Revolution. The morality of the revolution must be based on the interests of the revolution. It is a gain for the revolution. To allow Sihanouk to leave is a loss for the Revolution. In reality, Sihanouk is a meek tiger, which only has its skin and bones left, without claws and the fangs. HIS beard has also been shaven. Thus all that remains is to wait for the day of his death. But if this old tiger is freed in the street, all the children would certainly be afraid of it. Certain old men that did not know this meek tiger would also be afraid.

b. Sihanouk participated with us in our Revolution despite his differences with us. That is the reason why our Party decided that Sihanouk should become President of Democratic Kampuchea. But Sihanouk refuses. Thus it is up to him, he can remain or not, it is his problem.

We consider him as a Senior Personality. We shall not kill him. But vis-a-vis the people and the Nation, Sihanouk must also be punished for his fault of having massacred the people.

Thus our decision is reasonably taken in every respect. We shall not change it. But if he continues to resist us, we shall take measures to liquidate him.

5. Direction of the Evolution of our Revolution:

Consequently, it is necessary to put an end to feudalism. We have reached this stage. The whole feudal regime has been destroyed and definitively dismantled by the Revolution. The Monarchy existing for over 2000 years has finally been dismantled. We do not have any other alternatives. Reactions will certainly take place, but we must follow the path of the Revolution in order to win.

6. Another Measure to be Taken:

Henceforth, Sihanouk shall not be allowed to meet foreign diplomats. We shall give them valid reasons to explain the situation.

Wednesday, August 29, 2007

Hun Sen retains a valuable lesson from Pol Pot: a rebellious Sihanouk would have been killed

King-Father (Top), Pol Pot (Bottom Left), and Hun Sen (Bottom Right)

Pol Pot Would Have Killed a Rebellious Sihanouk, Hun Sen Says

Chun Sakada, VOA Khmer
Original report from Phnom Penh
28 August 2007


Pol Pot and his cadre would have killed then-prince Norodom Sihanouk in the 1970s had the monarch pulled his support form the Khmer Rouge in the early days of the communist movement, Prime Minister Hun Sen said Tuesday.

His remarks followed arguments made last week by a small US-based advocacy group, the Cambodia Action Committee for Justice and Equity, which said Sihanouk's constitutional immunity in a tribunal should be stripped.

The government said in a statement Friday the former king's immunity was not in jeopardy, and Hun Sen's remarks Monday hammered the message home.

Citing a recorded conversation between of Pol Pot and other Khmer Rouge cadre, Hun Sen said the leaders of Democratic Kampuchea, the official name of the regime, discussed killing Sihanouk, the former prince who was ousted in a US-supported coup.

From Beijing, Sihanouk had made himself the nominal head of a coalition in exile that included the Khmer Rouge.

When he considered resigning from that post, Hun Sen said, Pol Pot and other leaders of the movement planned to lure him back to Cambodia to "solve" the problem "smoothly."

"Pol Pot's meaning of to 'solve it smoothly' is to kill," Hun Sen told onlookers at a pagoda inauguration. "If [Sihanouk] rebelled, he was finished."