Villagers to police logging in Prey Lang [-Incompetence of Hun Xen's regime's cops?]

Monday, 19 March 2012
Chhay Channyda
The Phnom Penh Post

More than 600 villagers from four provinces and civil society organisation officials would em­bark on the largest community crackdown yet on the “anarchic logging” of Prey Lang forest in Kampong Thom, representatives said yesterday.

Undeterred by authorities’ reprimands of their previous “jungle justice”, representatives said the crackdown would begin today and continue until the end of the month.

“We are going into the forest because villagers see activities of tremendous illegal logging everyday,” Chhim Savuth, public forum co-ordinator for the Cambodian Centre for Human Rights, said.

"Hun Xen's upside down policy" - Op-Ed by Chhay Khemarak

Yuon are no better than Khmer, but our leaders are dumb - Opinion by Uon Sim

Yuon are no better than Khmer, but our leaders are dumb

"Who is responsible for the Koh Pich tragedy?": Incompetence of the authority, the police and the hospital

Survivors of Monday's stampede lie on a bed at Preah Kossamak Hospital in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Wednesday, Nov. 24, 2010. Thousands of people stampeded during a festival in the Cambodian capital late Monday, leaving over three hundred dead and scores injured in what Prime Minister Hun Sen called the country's biggest tragedy since the 1970s reign of terror by the Khmer Rouge. (Photo: AP)

Hello VOA Program with interview of the eyewitnesses

“It is clear, too, that Phnom Penh was unprepared for any large-scale disaster”: AHRC

People visited the site of the bridge stampede in Phnom Penh on Thursday, paying their respect by offering flowers and prayers and burning incense. (Justin Mott for The New York Times)

Mourners offered prayers for the victims of the bridge stampede in Phnom Penh on Thursday. (Justin Mott for The New York Times)

Questions Remain in Cambodia Crush

November 25, 2010
By SETH MYDANS
The New York Times

“While the exact cause of the stampede last night remains unclear, with contradictory reports indicating it may have been instigated by either crowd antics or poor construction of the bridge to Koh Pich island, the failure of the state to control the crowd and limit the damage from the stampede is clear,” the report said.

“It is clear, too, that Phnom Penh was unprepared for any large-scale disaster,” the report said. “Responses by police and military were lacking and may even have contributed to the stampede while hospitals were overwhelmed. Emergency and medical personnel resorted to piling bodies together, covering them with mats or sheets.”

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia — More than two days after hundreds of people died in a huge, tightly jammed crowd on the last night of a water festival, both the cause and the death toll remained unclear on Thursday.

Most of the victims were caught in a crush on a small bridge. Rather than being trampled, the victims suffocated or were crushed to death by a dense, immobile crowd in which some people were trapped for hours.

Various officials gave different counts of the death toll, which may not include victims who drowned or were taken from the scene.

On Wednesday, the government said at least 350 people had died and 400 were injured. But among other tallies on Thursday, the Phnom Penh Post newspaper, citing government sources, said the death toll had climbed to 456.

As grief and shock turned to demands for explanations, questions grew on Thursday over the cause of the crush, over the response by the police and over the city’s readiness to handle an influx of as many as 3 million people for the festival.

A preliminary government investigation reported that the mostly rural holiday-goers panicked when the suspension bridge began to sway slightly under the weight of the crowd.

This conformed with a report by a military police investigator, Sawannara Chendamirie, who said on the morning after the disaster that survivors told him there had been shouts that the bridge was collapsing.

There have been reports, beginning immediately after the disaster, that some people were electrocuted, possibly by strings of lights on the fretwork of the bridge. Some reports said the police fired water hoses at the crowd that might have contributed to this.But doctors at Calmette Hospital, the city’s main hospital, said they had seen no sign of electrocution among either the injured or the dead. They said this absence of evidence did not rule out the possibility, but they said most of the injured had suffered from the squeezing of the packed crowd. Some patients at the hospital said they had been unable to breathe and had passed out.

The police came under criticism for a failure of crowd management and for an inadequate and incompetent response to the disaster. One officer said only half the officially reported number of police were actually deployed. Badly injured survivors reported being dumped into vehicles together with the dead.

The government did quickly mobilize help for relatives of victims, many of whom traveled from distant provinces to claim the dead. Tables were set up near a makeshift morgue to confirm identities. Military trucks offered transportation home for coffins and family members. The morgue was all but cleared within a day, although some people wandered the hospital grounds holding snapshots of missing relatives.

The Hong Kong-based Asian Human Rights Commission issued a report that documented the questions and criticisms.

“While the exact cause of the stampede last night remains unclear, with contradictory reports indicating it may have been instigated by either crowd antics or poor construction of the bridge to Koh Pich island, the failure of the state to control the crowd and limit the damage from the stampede is clear,” the report said.

“It is clear, too, that Phnom Penh was unprepared for any large-scale disaster,” the report said. “Responses by police and military were lacking and may even have contributed to the stampede while hospitals were overwhelmed. Emergency and medical personnel resorted to piling bodies together, covering them with mats or sheets.”

On the Koh Pich Tragedy and the "Do Little Administration"

Thursday, November 25, 2010
Opinion by Khmer Singapore posted on KI-Media

People who have lost their love ones can weep, cry, screem, yelling, pull hairs out, or walk up to Chroychangvar japanese built bridge to commit suicide.

However, the fact of this matter is the rotten culture of gross negligence and incompetence of the authority which undeniably and evidently is there to stay for a long haul. So Cambodian people, brace yourselves to live with these shortsighted laggers to make your lives more dramatic.

We all know that this huge incident involving hundreds of people death or even thousands does not happen only in Cambodia, and One can legitimate make argument about this fact.

However, the point is that when you pull the string of fatal events (small or big): 6 Singaporean youths drowned in boat race several years ago and put together; incapable of managing even tiny road trafffic, then you wonder why this tragedy of such magnitude can easily happen under their nose.

There is nothing we can do when life was lost but the question remains unanswer and perhaps it never will.

Building Stupa serves only a symbol of memory and relatively and culturally to commemorate to the death. It plays well to the belief of some, but it does not solve the big messy fundamental issue that this Government falls asleep in their own swift grip.

Cambodian people now and in the future desire and demand to have more compentent, much smarter organizers and forward looking officials in this Do Little Administration.

O Iron Fist, Where Art Thou?

(Photo: Sovannara, RFI)

The influence of Cambodia’s Strongman’s order

10 April 2010
By Pen Bona
Radio France Internationale
Translated from Khmer by Socheata
Click here to read the article in Khmer

The raid campaign led against illegal logging is shaking the entire country since mid-March, this is another example of the strong influence of the powerful Hun Xen. Nothing is impossible when it comes to orders issued by Cambodia’s Stongman, even if these orders are very complicated. Nevertheless, Cambodia under the rule of Strongman Hun Xen is riddled with unsolvable problems still, why is that so?

No matter how small or large a problem is, under the weight of Hun Xen’s “Iron Fist”, there is nothing that is impossible. Take for example the complicated problem of illegal logging which lasted for ages and which could not be resolved in the past few decades, it turns out that this problem was smashed broken in the span of a few weeks only.

Even though nobody can claim that illegal logging has ended completely in Cambodia, the latest raids dramatically pushed businessmen and influential government officials involved in illegal logging into a corner. This is not the first time that Hun Xen issued his personal orders to resolve inactions or illegal matters with much efficiency.

One can still remember about the Iron Fist campaign led against corrupt justice officials which took place a few years ago. The campaign led to the demise of several justice officials, as well as to their punishments, or position changes. This does not even take into account his orders to end betting and gambling, to stop using military and police license plates, etc… etc…, i.e. Hun Xen’s orders always brought fruits immediately and they are extremely efficient.

Nonetheless, the paradox is the fact if the prime minister has so much power like this, why a large number of problems are still cropping up again and again, and why are they all unsolvable? To try to answer this paradox, we will try to review a number of problems listed below:

First and foremost, we can see that, in general, connivance is the rule among officials working under Hun Xen. It is true that Hun Xen has power and that he wants to solve all problems immediately, but if the officials working under him are all in connivance for their personal gains, then they can hide everything behind Hun Xen’s eyes, and therefore, none of the problems can be solved.

Furthermore, the lower level of the administration and all levels of the police force, such as the police administration or those who act as the eyes and ears of the government, do not seem to fulfill their daily role properly at all. For example, at the local levels, illegal activities are taking place all the time, but the authorities did not take any measure against them at all. There are three possible explanations for this inaction: (1) the authority is incompetent to take care of illegal actions; (2) for personal gains, the authorities are the one who let illegality fester; and (3) those who commit illegal actions or act as the backers of illegal actions are powerful government officials, this forces the authorities to close their eyes and ears to these illegal activities.

Under these conditions, Hun Xen’s “Iron Fist” orders are necessary to rid of inactions or illegal actions because it is only through such orders that the authorities are forced to fulfill their role properly. However, the problem that remains is that: one cannot always wait for Hun Xen to issue his orders to resolve all the problems that take place.

The best solution that guarantees the permanence of the fight against illegal actions is a strict and uniform application of the law by the authorities. Under that condition, the PM’s orders are still necessary but they would be reserved for major problems only. In this case, small issues do not have to wait for an order from the prime minister in order for them to be resolved.

CBC: Behind the Preah Vihear Temple Affair

CFC/CBC 28 05 08 A

CAMBODIA’S BORDER COMMITTEE

Communiqué

BEHIND THE PREAH VIHEAR TEMPLE AFFAIR

Le texte en français se trouve en dessous du texte en anglais

With the agreement of Phnom Penh, UNESCO just endorsed Thailand’s argument that there is no defined border between Cambodia and Thailand in front of Preah Vihear, and that only the temple can be listed as a World Heritage Site. This first disavowal of the 1962 decision by The Hague International Court of Justice is a major victory for Bangkok. According to UNESCO’s criteria, such listing brings no benefit to Cambodia. Quite to the contrary, it dangerously weakens the statute of Preah Vihear. But, once again, Hun Sen had to yield to Thailand’s military, economic and financial threats and offers.

While claiming to recognize The Hague International Court of Justice decision regarding the ownership of the ancient temple by Cambodia, nevertheless, Bangkok opposed Phnom Penh’s demand to list the temple as a UNESCO World Heritage Site, without a joint “association” with Thailand. The public reasons provided by Thailand are confusing: the temple would belong to Cambodia, but not the Preah Vihear Mount on top of which the temple is built on, and the surrounding areas; as well as the “legitimate” rights by Thailand to benefit from this temple – from tourism (following a Khmer-Thai agreement date 27 July 1998), as well as from international aid for the restoration and maintenance of this temple. Some on Thailand side even claim that the border just cut across in front of the staircase leading to the temple, this is of course contrary to the International Court of Justice decision (see 1:2,000 scale map included in the court decision). At the same time, Thai troops were sent along the northern border of Cambodia to occupy portions of Cambodia’s territories and to chase away Cambodian residents, meanwhile the public sentiment is boiling up in Bangkok.

More serious contentions arose when Bangkok’s civilian and military officials let it be known that they globally reject the border delineation conducted by France (and then-Siam) one century earlier, and that the Preah Vihear case is nothing but an example of the imprecision of these delineations, both on land and on the seas. To support their claims, and based on “a treaty concluded with Phnom Penh in 2000,” Thailand, on its own, decided to rectify the “erroneous borderline set by France” by annexing over the Ta Mean temple and its surrounding areas, located in the Khmer province of Oddar Meanchey, before summoning the Cambodian and French ambassadors in Thailand to officially inform them of this Franco-Khmer “error” in this location in March 2008.

On the Cambodian side, Hun Sen did not protest against the Thai annexation of the Ta Mean temple. For the Preah Vihear temple, Hun Sen let the affair drags on since 2000 – coincidentally, it is the very same year he signed the Memorandum of Understanding with Bangkok to implicitly recognize the existence of the border overlap, the so-called border “white zones.” Next, in 2007, he decided to include an “insignificant” 4.6-square-kilometer area around the Preah Vihear temple in his request to list the temple on UNESCO’s World Heritage Site, and this led to Thailand’s extreme rage. However, there should not be any “white zone” in this area: the decision by The Hague International Court of Justice dated 15 June 1962 clearly indicated a preliminary agreement between the two parties on a border delineation between Thailand and Cambodia in this location, prior to the decision of the ownership of the temple and the surrounding areas to Cambodia, including the mountain bearing the same name. Furthermore, legally and according to International practice, the attribution of a historical building to a country is always undertaken with a surrounding area measuring 2 to at least 5 kilometers to the border delineation, in order to allow this country to proceed to its maintenance, protection and defense of the building involved. Therefore, the borderline in front of Preah Vihear should not cut across “just in front of the staircase.” Furthermore, in a 10-kilometer area surrounding Preah Vihear, there is no other historical building from that era there, on one side of the Dangrek Mountain chain and the other. Therefore, there is nothing to negotiate about anymore. As we stated, all that is needed is to refer to the map included in the decision handed down in Annex I by The Hague International Court of Justice, and to build the corresponding demarcation posts. However, Hun Sen and his cohorts preferred to allow this “white zone” to remain. Why?

Thailand knows that it is difficult for them to take back the Preah Vihear temple directly, but, they demanded and obtained, with the existence of this “white zone” at the foothill of the temple, the right to the “joint administration” of the temple itself. Most likely, Thailand did this as a principle matter because neither Thailand nor Cambodia will benefit much from material aid from UNESCO, nor from tourism in this location. In effect, Noppadon Pattama, Thailand Foreign Minister and a former business lawyer, proposed to subordinate the “joint administration” of Preah Vihear issue to that of the overlapping maritime zone, a maritime “white zone” extending over some 26,000-square-kilometer, located in front of the Khmer Koh Kong Island, subjected to common oil exploration between the two countries. Recently, according to Thailand’s news media, former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, a great friend and client of Noppadon Pattama and also a great friend of Hun Sen, agreed with the latter for “a concession of Cambodian oil and gas exploration in exchange for a solution on Preah Vihear that will favor Phnom Penh.” In any case, Hun Sen was very happy to see that Thaksin, his great friend, had in mind “development projects for the Island of Koh Kong – with the construction of a second casino.” With the showing off of enormous sums of monies to be shared among “friends,” souvenirs from the Preah Vihear legal cases and the border issues between Cambodia and Thailand are conveniently forgotten, and only the “joint administration of the white zones” – which completely belonged to Cambodia prior to 1979 – is retained.

Of course, Thailand is also aware of Hun Sen’s weaknesses and those of his CPP in this issue of “white zones”: Hanoi’s domination of the Phnom Penh regime and Hanoi’s annexations of Cambodian land and maritime territories, precisely under the very same pretext of imprecision in the border delineation undertaken by France. Furthermore, on 11 August 1997, Hanoi signed with Bangkok a new delineation of their maritime border, by assigning themselves a bonus of about 30,000-square-kilometer of Cambodian maritime territories, including the entire Cambodia-Thailand “overlapping zone.” During that time, Hun Sen vaguely protested, but Thailand knew that he will never dare protest the legal problem in this zone because he is linked to the “Historical Waters” Agreement dated 07 July 1982 which he concluded with Hanoi. As for the joint administration of the “white zones,” it is nothing more than a “legal” hostage-taking of Khmer territories by Thailand, with the help of Hun Sen’s formal recognition of the existence of these zones, and thus providing Thailand the rights to these Khmer territories and their progressive occupation – since they are stronger, in terms of material means – while awaiting for Thailand’s complete annexation of these zones. The precedence can be clearly seen through the results of the joint Cambodia-Vietnam administration of the “Historical Waters” and other “joint development zones” in Cambodia’s South and East.

Since 1979, Hun Sen and his CPP created with Hanoi numerous and inextricable problems affecting Cambodia’s borders. Currently, any change to the border delineation in front of Preah Vihear will affect the 1962 decision provided by The Hague International Court of Justice, as well as the 1904 and 1907 Franco-Siamese Treaties which the court decision was based on. Thailand’s diplomatic and economic activism and the noise it brought to the news media largely surpass the real issue of listing the Preah Vihear temple with UNESCO. However, it allows the opportunity for Thailand to implant the alleged idea of “imprecision and errors committed by France” in the delineation of land and maritime border lines between Siam (Thailand) and Cambodia. When the time comes, Thailand can use this as a pretext for dramatic changes in these borders, as the Vietnamese just did on their side. This is an opportunity for Thailand to put pressure on the weak Hun Sen regime to accept Bangkok’s political (in addition to economical) tutelage, in an attempt to “balance” Hanoi’s tutelage. With that, Cambodia will no longer have any border, nor will she have a safe territory.

Done in Paris, 28 May 2008

Dy Kareth
Vice President,
Cambodia’s Border Committee in France and Worldwide
-------

LE COMITÉ DES FRONTIÈRES DU CAMBODGE
Communiqué

DERRIERE LE TEMPLE PREAH VIHEAR

L’Unesco, avec l’accord de Phnom-Penh, vient d’endosser l’argument thaï, selon lequel il n’y a pas de frontière définie entre le Cambodge et la Thailande devant Preah Vihear, et seul le temple peut être inscrit sur la liste du Patrimoine mondial. C’est une grande victoire de Bangkok avec ce premier désaveu de la décision de 1962 de la Cour internationale de justice de La Haye. Selon les critères de l’Unesco, une telle inscription n’a aucun intérêt pour le Cambodge. Au contraire, elle affaiblit dangereusement le statut de Preah Vihear. Mais, Hun Sen a dû céder une fois de plus aux menaces et propositions thaïes - militaires, économiques et pécuniaires.

Bangkok, tout en disant reconnaître l’arrêt de la Cour de La Haye sur l’appartenance au Cambodge de l’ancien temple, s’est opposée à la demande de Phnom-Penh de le faire inscrire sur la liste du Patrimoine mondial de l’Unesco, sans que la Thaïlande y soit « associée ». Les raisons évoquées publiquement sont confuses : le temple appartiendrait au Cambodge, mais pas le mont Preah Vihear – sur lequel est bâti le temple - et ses environs, et des droits « légitimes » thaïs sur les bénéfices tirés de ce temple – provenant du tourisme (suite à un accord khméro-thaï du 27/07/1998) comme de l’aide internationale pour sa restauration et son entretien. Des Thaïs ont même prétendu que la frontière passe juste devant l’escalier montant vers le temple, ce qui est contraire à la décision de la Cour (Voir carte de 1 :2000e annexée à la décision). En même temps, des troupes thaïes sont envoyées à la frontière du nord du Cambodge occuper des portions de territoires khmers et en chasser les habitants, pendant que les esprits s’échauffent dangereusement à Bangkok.

Plus grave encore, des officiels civils et militaires de Bangkok ont fait comprendre qu’ils rejettent globalement les tracés des frontières faits par la France (et le Siam) il y a un siècle, et que le cas de Preah Vihear n’est qu’un exemple parmi d’autres du problème de l’imprécision de ces tracés, aussi bien sur terre qu’en mer. Pour appuyer leurs dires, et en se basant sur « un traité avec Phnom-Penh en 2000 », les Thaïs ont rectifié eux-mêmes en 2004 la « ligne de frontière erronée laissée par la France », en annexant de force le temple Ta Mean et ses environs, de la province khmère d’Oddar Mean Chey, avant de convoquer les ambassadeurs khmer et français, en mars 2008, pour leur signifier officiellement de l’« erreur » franco-khmère à cet endroit.

Du côté khmer, Hun Sen n’a pas protesté contre l’annexion thaïe du temple Ta Mean. Sur Preah Vihear, il a laissé traîner l’affaire depuis 2000, année où, curieusement, il a signé un Memorandum of understanding avec Bangkok, reconnaissant implicitement l’existence de zones de chevauchement territorial, des « zones blanches » aux frontières. Puis, en 2007, il a décidé d’inclure un espace insignifiant de 4,6 Km² autour du temple Preah Vihear dans sa demande d’inscription du temple sur la liste de l’Unesco, ce qui a soulevé la grosse colère des Thaïs. Or, il ne devait pas avoir de « zone blanche » à cet endroit : l’arrêt de la Cour de La Haye du 15 juin 1962 a bien indiqué un accord préalable entre les parties d’un tracé de frontière entre la Thaïlande et le Cambodge à cet endroit, avant de décider l’appartenance du temple et de ses environs, dont le mont du même nom, au Cambodge. Et, en droit et dans la pratique internationale, l’attribution d’un bâtiment historique à un pays se fait toujours avec un espace environnant de deux à au moins cinq kilomètres avant la délimitation de la frontière, pour permettre à ce pays de procéder à l’entretien, à la protection et à la défense dudit bâtiment. La ligne frontalière devant Preah Vihear ne saurait donc passer « juste devant son escalier ». D’ailleurs, dans un rayon de 10 Km autour de Preah Vihear, il n’y a aucun autre bâtiment historique de ces époques, en deçà de la chaîne du Dangrèk comme au-delà. Il n’y avait donc rien à négocier encore. Il suffisait, nous l’avons dit, de se référer à la carte retenue par la décision de la Cour de La Haye dans son Annexe I et d’y implanter les bornes de démarcation correspondantes. Mais Hun Sen et les siens ont préféré laisser subsister cette « zone blanche ». Pourquoi ?

Les Thaïs savent qu’il leur est difficile de reprendre directement le temple Preah Vihear, mais ont réclamé et obtenu, avec l’existence de cette «zone blanche» au pied du temple, le droit à l’«administration conjointe» du temple lui-même. Pour le principe, sans doute, car ni les Thaïs ni les Khmers n’auront vraiment pas grande chose à bénéficier de l’aide matérielle de l’Unesco, ni du tourisme à cet endroit. Effectivement, le ministre thaï des Affaires étrangères, Noppadon Pattama (un ex-avocat d’affaires), a proposé de subordonner le problème d’«administration conjointe» de Preah Vihear à la résolution de celui de la zone de chevauchement maritime, une « zone blanche » en mer de quelque 26 000 Km², située en face de l’île khmère Koh Kong et promise à l’exploitation d’hydrocarbures sous-marines. Récemment, selon la presse thaïe, l’ancien Premier Ministre Thaksin Shinawatra, un grand ami et client de Noppadon Pattama et également de Hun Sen, se serait entendu avec ce dernier pour « une concession d’exploitation du pétrole et du gaz cambodgiens, en échange d’une solution sur Preah Vihear favorable à Phnom-Penh ». En tout cas, Hun Sen est très content que son grand ami Thaksin ait « des projets de développement – avec la construction d’un 2e casino - pour l’île Koh Kong ». Avec cette agitation d’énormes quantités de dollars à se partager entre « amis », l’on effacerait donc petit à petit le souvenir des questions juridiques de Preah Vihear et des frontières khméro-thaïes, pour ne retenir que celles des « gestions communes des zones blanches » – qui étaient totalement khmères avant 1979.

Evidemment, les Thaïs sont conscients aussi des faiblesses de Hun Sen et son PPC dans le problème de ces « zones blanches » : la domination de Hanoi sur le régime de Phnom-Penh et ses annexions de territoires terrestres et maritimes cambodgiens, sous le prétexte, précisément, de l’imprécision des tracés de frontière laissés par la France. De plus, le 11 août 1997, Hanoi a signé avec Bangkok une nouvelle délimitation de leur frontière maritime, avec en prime la permission à cette dernière de s’enrichir d’environ 30 000 Km² du domaine maritime khmer, comprenant la totalité de l’actuelle « zone de chevauchement » khméro-thaïe. Sur le coup, Hun Sen a vaguement protesté, mais les Thaïs savent qu’il n’osera jamais soulever le problème juridique de cette zone, car il est lié à celui de l’Accord sur les « Eaux historiques » du 7 juillet 1982 que Hun Sen lui-même a signé avec Hanoi. Quant aux gestions communes khméro-thaïes des « zones blanches », elles seront ni plus ni moins des prises en otages « légales » de territoires khmers par les Thaïs, grâce à la reconnaissance formelle de Hun Sen de l’existence de ces zones, donc des droits des Thaïs sur les territoires khmers et leur occupation progressive, puisqu’ils sont matériellement les plus forts, en attendant de pouvoir les annexer complètement. L’on connaît déjà les résultats des gestions conjointes khméro-viêtnamiennes des «Eaux historiques» et d’autres « zones de développement commun » au sud et à l’est du Cambodge.

Hun Sen et son PPC ont créé avec Hanoi, depuis 1979, d’innombrables et inextricables problèmes touchant les frontières du Cambodge. Aujourd’hui, toute modification de la délimitation de la frontière devant Preah Vihear remettra en cause la décision de la Cour de La Haye de 1962, ainsi que les traités franco-siamois de 1904 et de 1907 sur lesquels s’est basée la Cour. L’activisme diplomatico-économique et le tapage médiatique actuels des Thaïs dépassent largement l’enjeu réel de l’inscription du temple à l’Unesco. Mais ils leur donnent l’occasion d’ameuter l’opinion sur « les imprécisions et les erreurs de la France » dans les tracés des lignes de frontières terrestre et maritime entre le Siam (la Thaïlande) et le Cambodge. Ils pourront, le moment venu, s’en servir comme prétexte à des révisions dramatiques de ces frontières, comme l’ont déjà fait les Viêtnamiens de leur côté. C’est donc une occasion thaïe de presser un faible Gouvernement Hun Sen d’accepter une certaine tutelle politique (en plus de l’économique) de Bangkok, pour tenter de faire «équilibre» avec celle de Hanoi. Le Cambodge n’aura plus alors de frontière, ni de territoire sûr.

Paris, le 28 mai 2008
P. Le Comité des Frontières du Cambodge
en France et dans le Monde,

Dy Kareth
Vice-Président

Opposition: Hun Sen should be blamed

Thursday, July 5, 2007
Everyday.com.kh
Translated from Khmer by Socheata

In a rebuke to Prime Minister Hun Sen’s blasting on Nhim Vannda and Pol Saroeun, as well as on high ranking RCAF officers, on their inability to find the plane crash last week, an opposition party official said that Hun Sen should blame himself first before blaming his government officials. SRP MP Son Chhay said that Hun Sen should blame himself first because he is the one who nominated these government officials. The Cambodia Daily quoted Son Chhay as saying: “We should blame the prime minister because he is responsible for the nomination of the government cabinet … It reflects on himself.” Son Chhay added that some senior RCAF officers are incompetent because they bought their positions.