Showing posts with label John A. Hall. Show all posts
Showing posts with label John A. Hall. Show all posts

Wednesday, July 28, 2010

Tribunal Problems Loom

JULY 27, 2010
JOHN A. HALL
The Wall Street Journal


Duch's case was easy. The next round of prosecutions could raise challenges to the court's legitimacy

The Khmer Rouge Tribunal in Cambodia, which began operations in 2006, has finally rendered its first verdict. Kaing Guek Eav, known as Duch, was found guilty Monday of crimes against humanity and other serious offenses; his lawyer says he will appeal. Duch was commandant of the infamous Tuol Sleng torture facility in Phnom Penh in the late 1970s, where over 12,000 victims of the Khmer Rouge were imprisoned, tortured and executed.

This first verdict is of considerable historic and symbolic importance. Cambodians have waited over 30 years for an honest public accounting, a sense of justice served, and some measure of closure. But it is important to keep the Duch verdict in perspective. There is a reason his was the first case to be prosecuted: It was the most straightforward factually and legally, with a defendant who was willing to admit his responsibility and presented little in the way of a defense. He testified extensively and frequently apologized to the victims and their families. Only in the final days of the trial did he change tactics and request to be freed.

The next defendants will not be so cooperative. Four senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge currently face similar charges pertaining to offenses under international and Cambodian law, including genocide, crimes against humanity and homicide, with their trials expected to begin early next year: Nuon Chea, the movement's ideologue; head of state Khieu Samphan; foreign minister Ieng Sary; and his wife, the social affairs minister Ieng Thirith. Unlike Duch, these defendants have mounted an aggressive defense. Their defense teams have raised challenges as to the court's jurisdiction, the fairness of the proceedings, the scope of the court's obligation to translate documents, and the effect of the secrecy of the investigative stage on the rights of the charged persons.

That is entirely their right, and indeed any verdict—whether a conviction or acquittal—will be perceived as most credible if it comes after the defense has had every opportunity to present its best case in court. But by the same token, this means the tribunal itself must be able to withstand any challenges the defendants might make to its own legitimacy. On this score, there is serious cause for concern.

The tribunal has been plagued by allegations raised by nongovernmental organizations of corruption and mismanagement involving senior Cambodian officials, including an alleged kickback scheme in which jobs at the court were exchanged for cash. The officials have denied the allegations.

The defense teams have demanded that the court investigate the corruption allegations. The court has refused to do so, stating that it lacks the jurisdiction to investigate facts outside the mandated judicial investigations and suggesting that the negative effects of corruption are speculative, casting a cloud over the perceived trustworthiness of the proceedings.

Even more seriously, the Cambodian government's actions have threatened the court's independence, striking at the heart of judicial legitimacy. The prime minister has publicly expressed his opposition to additional prosecutions, warning of a return to civil war. The Cambodian co-prosecutor subsequently refused to cooperate in the naming of additional suspects, though she did not dispute the sufficiency of the evidence against them. When the court issued summonses for six senior government officials to testify, Cambodian officials quickly said no. Yet compliance with court summonses is mandatory under Rule 60(3) of the law establishing the tribunal, and no privilege applies to government officials. The international judge chose not to press the point by not asking the judicial police to compel the witnesses to appear.

The U.N., donors and international officials have been reluctant to criticize the court or address issues of political interference directly for fear of undermining fundraising efforts. This head-in-the-sand approach cannot work indefinitely, and the real risk exists that the pattern of quiet pandering to the bad behavior of senior Cambodian officials will undermine the legitimacy of the entire proceeding. And unlike Duch, no one should think that the defense teams for the next four defendants will go quietly into the night.

It remains unclear whether this tribunal will be able to meet the challenges that the next cases will bring. Will it overcome its systemic flaws, stave off the heavy-handed political interference of the Cambodian government, maintain adequate funding and donor support, and transparently address the problems that have plagued it? Can it demonstrate its ability to fulfill its mandate and consistently meet international standards in a credible, transparent and timely manner? It would be a great disservice if the Duch verdict turns out to be the high watermark of this tribunal.

Mr. Hall is an associate professor at Chapman University School of Law in Orange, Calif
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Wednesday, September 16, 2009

The Khmer Rouge Tribunal: A Failed Experiment in Hybrid Justice?

Colloquium with Dr. John Hall, Associate Professor, Chapman University School of Law

Wednesday, September 16, 2009
12:15 PM - 1:15 PM
Room 1327
UCLA School of Law
UCLA Campus
Los Angeles,

Professor Hall has written widely on human rights and international law and has carried out extensive human rights fieldwork in Cambodia (where his research centers on factory conditions, the bringing to justice of the Khmer Rouge, and human trafficking) and the Philippines (where he is currently involved working on behalf of 10,000 farmers facing forced relocation by land developers).

Sponsored by the UCLA Law International Human Rights Program.

Special Instructions
RSVP to humanrights@law.ucla.edu

For more information please contact
Barbara Gaerlan
Tel: 310-206-9163
cseas@international.ucla.edu
www.law.ucla.edu/home/index.asp?page=2935

Monday, March 02, 2009

Judging the Khmer Rouge Tribunal

March 2, 2009
by John A. Hall
Far Eastern Economic Review


Nobody would accuse the Khmer Rouge tribunal—the Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia (ECCC)—of moving with undue haste. Nevertheless, the court in Phnom Penh is on the verge of beginning a trial of one of its five defendants, that of Kaing Guek Eav, alias Duch, the former commander of an infamous torture facility.

Unfortunately there is little reason to rejoice. Despite years of ineffectual handwringing by the U.N., donors and monitors, the ECCC has failed to adequately address persistent accusations of corruption and political interference. The following four steps are the minimal prerequisites for the ECCC to regain a semblance of legitimacy before the trials officially start this month:

1) Limit opportunities for political interference in judicial decision making.

Fears about political influence in the ECCC’s work were heightened in December last year when Cambodian co-prosecutor, Chea Leang, would not agree to the investigation of additional suspects beyond the five named defendants. The reasons she provided to justify this position had nothing to do with the sufficiency of the evidence or the legal basis for additional investigations, but were political in nature and aligned with the long-held views of the Cambodian Prime Minister who has long wanted to limit the trials to his political enemies and resisted efforts which might see people in positions of power (or whose patrons are) brought before the court.

The Pre-Trial Chamber is set to resolve the dispute between the international and Cambodian co-prosecutors, and has an opportunity to visibly assert the court’s independence. Under the ECCC’s rules, this decision is set to be made in secret and it is unclear whether its decision would be made public. Judges need to change this rule, and ensure the court operates with total transparency on a question which will go a long way towards determining whether the court is seen as one which is credible and not simply a tool of the government, in the same way that domestic courts are often viewed. At a minimum, the ECCC must allow domestic and international monitors to witness this secret proceeding.

2) Create an independent investigation mechanism for accusations of wrongdoing.

In June 2008, Cambodian staff brought to the UN specific complaints of corruption. These complaints followed a call by watchdog NGO Open Society Justice Initiative for an investigation into allegations that ECCC Cambodian staff had to pay kickbacks in exchange for their jobs. In response to the U.N. report, which reportedly found merit in the complaints in its initial review, apparently asked the Cambodian government to investigate. However, with reports of retaliation against suspected whistleblowers—and a history in Cambodia of threats against those who challenge corrupt practices, a national investigation is unlikely to inspire confidence in local staff to come forward.

On February 23, a high-level U.N. delegation met with Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Sok An, and issued a joint statement that an agreement has been reached involving continuing parallel domestic and international mechanisms to investigate corruption. The statement was ambiguous and unclear as to specifics. In so far as it appears to rely on Cambodian staff being willing to report wrongdoing to ethics monitors appointed by the Cambodian tribunal management, the parallel structure would seem to chill rather than encourage such reports. The joint statement reeks of political compromise.

Preferable to parallel mechanisms would be an entirely independent procedure for investigating corruption at the ECCC—one that does not rely for its success on the honest participation of Cambodian officials. One solution is an auditing model, which has already been used in a limited fashion at the tribunal. An independent auditing company acceptable to both the U.N. and the Cambodians could conduct a detailed investigation with the specific mandate of identifying corrupt practices. The initial audit report would be circulated to the U.N. and the Cambodian government, senior ECCC management, and donor nations, with only an executive summary made public. Subsequent quarterly audits would, however, be published in full. This would provide an incentive to quietly “clean house” of the corrupt individuals and practices identified in the first report. Absent cooperation on this matter, however, the U.N. should make public its prima facie review of the June 2008 allegations, suitably redacted to protect the identities of named individuals.

3) Human rights monitors, NGOs and reporters must be allowed to keep their sources confidential.

Civil society, including human rights monitors and journalists, often play a critical role in calling out wrongs and abuses of power by institutions funded by public money. While this role is often a necessary pre-requisite to action—like investigations—their unique role must be respected. This includes ensuring that their ability to protect their sources—those who come forward with information about potential wrongdoing—remains intact. With the ECCC, a real danger exists that NGOs and other monitors may be compelled in the course of the legal proceedings at the tribunal to identify their confidential sources. Such disclosure would undermine the tribunal by imperiling the safety of sources and chilling potential critics and whistleblowers.

Such a testimonial privilege need not be absolute. Rather, a qualified privilege should be recognized in those situations where the communications were made in the course of a confidential relationship producing a reasonable expectation of privacy and non-disclosure, and that confidentiality is essential to the nature and type of the relationship with the confidant. The risk of being compelled to reveal sources may result in NGOs and monitors choosing to leave Cambodia or face a jail sentence rather than be forced to identify their sources. The departure of such groups would be a disaster for anyone who values the watchdog role such groups perform.

4) Ensure adequate whistleblower protections for those reporting wrongdoing.

In those situations where a whistleblower is willing for her identity to be made public, or where her identity becomes known without her permission, there must be a clear guarantee that such persons will be free from all forms of retribution. Absent this assurance, those brave individuals who have come forward with allegations of corrupt practices lay dangerously exposed. These protections must carry the full weight of the international community – empty promises from the Cambodian government alone to not persecute whistleblowers will ring entirely hollow without international mandate.

The choice before the tribunal is quite clear: Proceeding with the trials without adequately addressing the allegations of corruption and political interference risks tainting the entire process and casting a shadow over any legal outcomes. That would be a disservice to the people of Cambodia—for whom the ECCC should provide an exemplar of a court operating to international standards. It would also be a disservice to the future of international justice, and would establish a precedent of U.N. acquiescence to regimes seeking to profit from and control internationally-backed tribunals.

John A. Hall is a professor at Chapman University School of Law, Orange, Calif., and a research fellow at the Center for Global Trade & Development.