Showing posts with label US Terrorism concern. Show all posts
Showing posts with label US Terrorism concern. Show all posts
Sunday, March 04, 2012
Tuesday, July 20, 2010
In Cambodia, American diplomats sat down with criminals in the name of peace and security
Hun Xen shaking hands with Obama in Singapore on November 15, 2009 during the the 1st ASEAN-US leaders Meeting (Photo: Kao Kim Hourn)U.S. Terrorist List System Constrains Peacebuilding Efforts
19 Jul 2010
Joshua Gross
World Politics Review
The Supreme Court's recent ruling on Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project tightens the straightjacket that our current terrorist list system has placed on American diplomats and social scientists. In a 6-3 decision, the court ruled that the First Amendment does not protect groups or individuals who provide "expert advice or assistance" or "training" for pacific means to proscribed terrorist groups. For non-governmental peacebuilding groups that conduct workshops and promote dialogue as critical elements of their work, this decision is catastrophic. Now, even individuals who, through direct communication, urge proscribed terrorist groups to disarm and participate in negotiations are vulnerable to prosecution in a U.S. court.
Chief Justice John Roberts argued that the 2001 Patriot Act's broad definition of material support to terrorism was necessary to block "aid that makes the attacks more likely to occur." However, this betrays a misunderstanding of what practitioners of peacebuilding actually do. Unlike humanitarian support, which could potentially free up resources for military spending by providing free food and social services, the services provided by peacebuilding groups cannot be diverted.
Part of the problem is the lists themselves. Beginning with the U.S. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the U.S. created a series of overlapping terrorist lists managed by different government agencies, including the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list, the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (.pdf) (SDN) list and the Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL). Such lists are an important element of U.S. counterterrorism policy. But they are a blunt instrument -- too calcified, too bureaucratic, and too resistant to modification when political realities shift. All of the groups on the terrorist lists are dangerous and violent, but some less so than others. The lists force the U.S. to adopt a uniform policy that disregards the variety among terrorist entities in size, location, ideology and capabilities -- and the differences in how they might respond to incentives and disincentives.
An example of how the practical consequences of the terrorist list system can hinder a promising peace process can be found in Nepal. In 2003, the country's Maoist insurgency was added to the TEL and SDN lists. The U.S. ambassador announced that the fight against the Maoists was now part of the Global War on Terror, speciously linking the group to al-Qaida.
While the proscription of the Maoists provided no tangible benefit for U.S. national security, it handcuffed efforts by Americans, both inside and outside government, to support the fragile peace process. A peace accord was signed in 2006, ending a brutal decade-long civil war. Shortly thereafter, the Maoists won a plurality of seats in Nepal's first post-conflict democratic election. However, partially due to the legal tangle created by the terrorist lists, the U.S. Embassy was unable to capitalize on the Maoist decision to commit to the ceasefire and peace process. In proscribing the Maoists, the U.S. lost a crucial early opportunity to identify and strengthen the pragmatists within the Maoist leadership and isolate the elements that opposed negotiations.
On the ground, the lists have strained relations between U.S. embassies and non-governmental conflict resolution organizations operating in fragile states. NGO officials and social scientists engaged in field research have complained that State Department and Justice Department lawyers provide contradictory or vague guidance. Peacebuilding experts argue that their work with armed groups is dependent upon trust, which is hard-won and easily lost. In Nepal, the proscription of the Maoists complicated or categorically severed these personal relations. As a result, considerable institutional knowledge and communication channels were lost.
"U.S. law cuts Americans out of the dialogue process," said one scholar who preferred to remain anonymous. "We are not telling them how to build a bomb. You can't even give them advice on how to change their direction and move toward nonviolence."
The process of designating terrorist groups should be better calibrated to fight terror, while anticipating the potential for engaging armed groups inclined toward moderation and political participation. Instead, the current system creates perverse political incentives for listing a group, to burnish terror-fighting credentials, while de-listing a group can lead to accusations of being "soft on terror."
Congress could begin the needed reforms, though, by amending the U.S. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Armed groups that meet certain positive criteria, such as commitments to ceasefires or active involvement in peace accords, should be offered some variation of probationary status as an incentive for continued constructive behavior. This sliding scale would have been useful in Nepal, where the U.S. Embassy could have rewarded the Maoists for their initial steps toward moderation without entirely removing the symbolic stigma of U.S. sanctions. U.S. planners in Afghanistan might find the complications encountered in Nepal to be instructive when contemplating political outreach to the Taliban.
The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) at the Department of Treasury has the authority to issue licenses that permit diplomats, NGO employees, and social scientists to engage proscribed groups in activities that otherwise would be prohibited. OFAC should proactively open a direct channel to these groups while concurrently facilitating and expediting specific requests. For their part, peacebuilding organizations should revisit their monitoring standards and demonstrate a higher level of due diligence and transparency in reporting their interactions with armed groups to OFAC. Even those with good intentions can be misled by empty promises of future moderation by terrorist groups.
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project was yet another missed opportunity to fix a misguided and heavy-handed U.S. counterterrorism policy. Not every counterterrorism campaign ends with the eradication of the terrorist group. The best-case scenario for many insurgency-afflicted governments is to strike a deal. In Sierra Leone, Cambodia, and Mozambique, American diplomats sat down with criminals in the name of peace and security. Private-sector groups and individuals should not be prosecuted for similarly promoting peaceful solutions to protracted conflict. The U.S. experience in Nepal demonstrates how cutting off the possibility for engagement can become a self-fulfilling prophecy, neutralizing incentives for an armed group to undergo the difficult transformation into a legitimate and nonviolent political party.
Joshua Gross is a recent graduate of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and the former director of Media Relations at the Embassy of Afghanistan in Washington, D.C. This essay was adapted from a forthcoming study of U.S. conflict management in Nepal. The author can be contacted at joshuarobert144@yahoo.com.
Chief Justice John Roberts argued that the 2001 Patriot Act's broad definition of material support to terrorism was necessary to block "aid that makes the attacks more likely to occur." However, this betrays a misunderstanding of what practitioners of peacebuilding actually do. Unlike humanitarian support, which could potentially free up resources for military spending by providing free food and social services, the services provided by peacebuilding groups cannot be diverted.
Part of the problem is the lists themselves. Beginning with the U.S. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the U.S. created a series of overlapping terrorist lists managed by different government agencies, including the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list, the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (.pdf) (SDN) list and the Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL). Such lists are an important element of U.S. counterterrorism policy. But they are a blunt instrument -- too calcified, too bureaucratic, and too resistant to modification when political realities shift. All of the groups on the terrorist lists are dangerous and violent, but some less so than others. The lists force the U.S. to adopt a uniform policy that disregards the variety among terrorist entities in size, location, ideology and capabilities -- and the differences in how they might respond to incentives and disincentives.
An example of how the practical consequences of the terrorist list system can hinder a promising peace process can be found in Nepal. In 2003, the country's Maoist insurgency was added to the TEL and SDN lists. The U.S. ambassador announced that the fight against the Maoists was now part of the Global War on Terror, speciously linking the group to al-Qaida.
While the proscription of the Maoists provided no tangible benefit for U.S. national security, it handcuffed efforts by Americans, both inside and outside government, to support the fragile peace process. A peace accord was signed in 2006, ending a brutal decade-long civil war. Shortly thereafter, the Maoists won a plurality of seats in Nepal's first post-conflict democratic election. However, partially due to the legal tangle created by the terrorist lists, the U.S. Embassy was unable to capitalize on the Maoist decision to commit to the ceasefire and peace process. In proscribing the Maoists, the U.S. lost a crucial early opportunity to identify and strengthen the pragmatists within the Maoist leadership and isolate the elements that opposed negotiations.
On the ground, the lists have strained relations between U.S. embassies and non-governmental conflict resolution organizations operating in fragile states. NGO officials and social scientists engaged in field research have complained that State Department and Justice Department lawyers provide contradictory or vague guidance. Peacebuilding experts argue that their work with armed groups is dependent upon trust, which is hard-won and easily lost. In Nepal, the proscription of the Maoists complicated or categorically severed these personal relations. As a result, considerable institutional knowledge and communication channels were lost.
"U.S. law cuts Americans out of the dialogue process," said one scholar who preferred to remain anonymous. "We are not telling them how to build a bomb. You can't even give them advice on how to change their direction and move toward nonviolence."
The process of designating terrorist groups should be better calibrated to fight terror, while anticipating the potential for engaging armed groups inclined toward moderation and political participation. Instead, the current system creates perverse political incentives for listing a group, to burnish terror-fighting credentials, while de-listing a group can lead to accusations of being "soft on terror."
Congress could begin the needed reforms, though, by amending the U.S. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Armed groups that meet certain positive criteria, such as commitments to ceasefires or active involvement in peace accords, should be offered some variation of probationary status as an incentive for continued constructive behavior. This sliding scale would have been useful in Nepal, where the U.S. Embassy could have rewarded the Maoists for their initial steps toward moderation without entirely removing the symbolic stigma of U.S. sanctions. U.S. planners in Afghanistan might find the complications encountered in Nepal to be instructive when contemplating political outreach to the Taliban.
The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) at the Department of Treasury has the authority to issue licenses that permit diplomats, NGO employees, and social scientists to engage proscribed groups in activities that otherwise would be prohibited. OFAC should proactively open a direct channel to these groups while concurrently facilitating and expediting specific requests. For their part, peacebuilding organizations should revisit their monitoring standards and demonstrate a higher level of due diligence and transparency in reporting their interactions with armed groups to OFAC. Even those with good intentions can be misled by empty promises of future moderation by terrorist groups.
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project was yet another missed opportunity to fix a misguided and heavy-handed U.S. counterterrorism policy. Not every counterterrorism campaign ends with the eradication of the terrorist group. The best-case scenario for many insurgency-afflicted governments is to strike a deal. In Sierra Leone, Cambodia, and Mozambique, American diplomats sat down with criminals in the name of peace and security. Private-sector groups and individuals should not be prosecuted for similarly promoting peaceful solutions to protracted conflict. The U.S. experience in Nepal demonstrates how cutting off the possibility for engagement can become a self-fulfilling prophecy, neutralizing incentives for an armed group to undergo the difficult transformation into a legitimate and nonviolent political party.
Joshua Gross is a recent graduate of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and the former director of Media Relations at the Embassy of Afghanistan in Washington, D.C. This essay was adapted from a forthcoming study of U.S. conflict management in Nepal. The author can be contacted at joshuarobert144@yahoo.com.
Tuesday, December 30, 2008
Why Al Qaeda isn't gaining a foothold in Cambodia
Village Elder: Yousuf Bin Abetalip, one of Cambodia's 400,000 Muslims. (Photo: David Montero)The post-Khmer Rouge nation is a portrait of tolerance for Muslims, but the US worries that this could change.
December 30, 2008
By David Montero
Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
CHROYAMONTREY, Cambodia - In this village, and others like it throughout Cambodia, Muslims and non-Muslims live side by side in harmony, their existences unmarred by the toxic cocktail of government repression, separatist ambitions, and growing radicalism characteristic of many neighboring countries.
"I've been living with Muslim neighbors since I was young," says resident Ouk Ros. "When there's a marriage, we join together in the party."
Still, as money and influence from the Persian Gulf pours into Cambodia, many fear that pockets of the 400,000 strong Muslim community could fall into the orbit of a less-tolerant form of Islam.
"There are some organizations here from the Middle East that are very radical and that are very intolerant, and they are trying very hard to change the attitude and the atmosphere of the Muslim population here," the outgoing US Ambassador, Joseph Mussomeli warned in August.
A unique confluence of modern history, geography, and government initiative have combined to foster tolerance in Cambodia, many observers here say.
In Thailand and the Philippines, Muslim communities are concentrated in separate – and often disadvantaged – territories, which are byproducts of ancient kingdoms to which Muslims once belonged. Separatists in Thailand's south have been fighting for greater autonomy since 2004 and in the Mindanao area of the Philippines since the 1970s.
But Cambodia's Muslims, sometimes referred to as Chams – a reference to an ancient empire of warriors, the Kingdom of Champa – have always lived dispersed throughout the country.
"We don't have any separate lands, and we don't want any separate lands," says Osman Ysa, the author of two books on Cambodia's Cham population. "We consider this country as our own."
To date, Muslims here have also eschewed radical politics, although not without exception. In 2003, authorities arrested a Cambodian citizen, as well as an Egyptian and two Thai nationals, all suspected of ties to Jemaah Islamiyah, an Al-Qaeda affiliate based in South Asia.
Cambodia's unique and dark modern history helps explain why the dominant form of Islam remains both peaceful and accommodating, Muslim leaders say. When the ultra-Communist Khmer Rouge seized power in 1975, they outlawed religion and set about decimating the Muslim population. By 1979, when the Khmer Rouge fell, about 500,000 Muslims had been killed – nearly 70 percent – according to one of Mr. Ysa's studies.
As a result, the violence of Al Qaeda today reminds Muslim leaders of the Khmer Rouge of yesterday.
"When Cambodia was controlled by Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge look liked Al Qaeda," says Sley Ry, the director of religious education at the Cambodian Islamic center, Cambodia's largest Islamic school, located near Phnom Penh.
"We've already suffered a lot.... We are very disappointed by Al Qaeda because God tells: 'Don't kill people,' " adds Yousuf Bin Abetalip, an elder of Choy Changua, a village just outside of Phnom Penh, where about 300 Muslim families live.
Buddhism is the state religion in this country of 14 million, but the country's constitution enshrines freedom of worship. Unlike in China, where the Communist government has been accused of limiting the freedom of Muslims to worship, the government of Prime Minister Hun Sen has built large mosques and provided free radio airtime for Muslim programming.
Beyond such overtures, Muslims enjoy real political power. About a dozen serve in top political offices. Mr. Sen even has his own advisor on Muslim affairs.
But there are fears that Cambodia's moderate form of Islam could be contested. In recent months, ties between Cambodia and the Persian Gulf have grown as the Gulf States look to Cambodia as a potential buyer of oil and supplier of food. In September, the government of Kuwait pledged $546 million in soft loans, while Qatar pledged $200 million. Kuwait has also earmarked $5 million to refurbish a mosque in Phnom Penh.
There are fears that the money could open the door to private individuals and foundations who seek to influence the Muslim community here. Whether founded or not, in January, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) opened its first office in Cambodia, citing the potential for terrorism.
"Cambodia is an important country to us for the potential of persons transiting Cambodia – using Cambodia as a spot for utilizing terrorism," FBI director Robert Mueller said, inaugurating the new office.
In September, the prime minister announced a new law to more tightly control nongovernmental organizations. Sen's reasoning: "Terrorists might come to the Royal Government of Cambodia and hide themselves under the banners of nongovernment organizations."
Some critics contend the law is not aimed at terrorists, but nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that routinely criticize Sen's administration.
"It's not only to control the terrorists groups, but also to control NGOs in general," says Thun Saray, the director of Adhoc, a human rights organization based in Phnom Penh.
As concern over terrorism grows, Muslims here, including Mr. Abetalip, say they will be the first to prevent it. "If there's any Cambodian people who want to follow Al Qaeda, we will straight away arrest them and bring them to the government."
December 30, 2008
By David Montero
Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
CHROYAMONTREY, Cambodia - In this village, and others like it throughout Cambodia, Muslims and non-Muslims live side by side in harmony, their existences unmarred by the toxic cocktail of government repression, separatist ambitions, and growing radicalism characteristic of many neighboring countries.
"I've been living with Muslim neighbors since I was young," says resident Ouk Ros. "When there's a marriage, we join together in the party."
Still, as money and influence from the Persian Gulf pours into Cambodia, many fear that pockets of the 400,000 strong Muslim community could fall into the orbit of a less-tolerant form of Islam.
"There are some organizations here from the Middle East that are very radical and that are very intolerant, and they are trying very hard to change the attitude and the atmosphere of the Muslim population here," the outgoing US Ambassador, Joseph Mussomeli warned in August.
A unique confluence of modern history, geography, and government initiative have combined to foster tolerance in Cambodia, many observers here say.
In Thailand and the Philippines, Muslim communities are concentrated in separate – and often disadvantaged – territories, which are byproducts of ancient kingdoms to which Muslims once belonged. Separatists in Thailand's south have been fighting for greater autonomy since 2004 and in the Mindanao area of the Philippines since the 1970s.
But Cambodia's Muslims, sometimes referred to as Chams – a reference to an ancient empire of warriors, the Kingdom of Champa – have always lived dispersed throughout the country.
"We don't have any separate lands, and we don't want any separate lands," says Osman Ysa, the author of two books on Cambodia's Cham population. "We consider this country as our own."
To date, Muslims here have also eschewed radical politics, although not without exception. In 2003, authorities arrested a Cambodian citizen, as well as an Egyptian and two Thai nationals, all suspected of ties to Jemaah Islamiyah, an Al-Qaeda affiliate based in South Asia.
Cambodia's unique and dark modern history helps explain why the dominant form of Islam remains both peaceful and accommodating, Muslim leaders say. When the ultra-Communist Khmer Rouge seized power in 1975, they outlawed religion and set about decimating the Muslim population. By 1979, when the Khmer Rouge fell, about 500,000 Muslims had been killed – nearly 70 percent – according to one of Mr. Ysa's studies.
As a result, the violence of Al Qaeda today reminds Muslim leaders of the Khmer Rouge of yesterday.
"When Cambodia was controlled by Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge look liked Al Qaeda," says Sley Ry, the director of religious education at the Cambodian Islamic center, Cambodia's largest Islamic school, located near Phnom Penh.
"We've already suffered a lot.... We are very disappointed by Al Qaeda because God tells: 'Don't kill people,' " adds Yousuf Bin Abetalip, an elder of Choy Changua, a village just outside of Phnom Penh, where about 300 Muslim families live.
Buddhism is the state religion in this country of 14 million, but the country's constitution enshrines freedom of worship. Unlike in China, where the Communist government has been accused of limiting the freedom of Muslims to worship, the government of Prime Minister Hun Sen has built large mosques and provided free radio airtime for Muslim programming.
Beyond such overtures, Muslims enjoy real political power. About a dozen serve in top political offices. Mr. Sen even has his own advisor on Muslim affairs.
But there are fears that Cambodia's moderate form of Islam could be contested. In recent months, ties between Cambodia and the Persian Gulf have grown as the Gulf States look to Cambodia as a potential buyer of oil and supplier of food. In September, the government of Kuwait pledged $546 million in soft loans, while Qatar pledged $200 million. Kuwait has also earmarked $5 million to refurbish a mosque in Phnom Penh.
There are fears that the money could open the door to private individuals and foundations who seek to influence the Muslim community here. Whether founded or not, in January, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) opened its first office in Cambodia, citing the potential for terrorism.
"Cambodia is an important country to us for the potential of persons transiting Cambodia – using Cambodia as a spot for utilizing terrorism," FBI director Robert Mueller said, inaugurating the new office.
In September, the prime minister announced a new law to more tightly control nongovernmental organizations. Sen's reasoning: "Terrorists might come to the Royal Government of Cambodia and hide themselves under the banners of nongovernment organizations."
Some critics contend the law is not aimed at terrorists, but nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that routinely criticize Sen's administration.
"It's not only to control the terrorists groups, but also to control NGOs in general," says Thun Saray, the director of Adhoc, a human rights organization based in Phnom Penh.
As concern over terrorism grows, Muslims here, including Mr. Abetalip, say they will be the first to prevent it. "If there's any Cambodian people who want to follow Al Qaeda, we will straight away arrest them and bring them to the government."
Monday, May 05, 2008
Instead of being concerned about Cham population, the US should step in to help them and provide them with much needed resources
‘Dangerous elements’ in Cham population: US reportMonday, 05 May 2008
Craig Guthrie
The Mekong Times
The US government’s country report on Cambodia’s counter-terrorism efforts in 2007 has praised the government for its anti-terrorism efforts, but warned fatal flaws in society, border control and dangerous elements in the nation’s Cham Muslim present a terrorism threat.
“Cambodia’s political leadership demonstrated a strong commitment to take aggressive action against terrorists [in 2007] … However, Cambodia’s ability to investigate potential terrorist activities was limited by a lack of training and resources,” said the US Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism’s country report for Cambodia, released Apr 30.
“[P]orous borders, endemic corruption, massive poverty, high unemployment, a poor education system and disaffected elements in the Cham Muslim population … leave the country vulnerable to terrorism and terrorist influence,” it added.
Cham Muslims, which make up approximately five percent of the population, are not considered politically active, but the government feared last year that Cham areas were again being used as “safe havens” for terrorists, according to the report.
The report cites the case of Bali bomber Hambali, a key member of Jemaah Islamiya who it said took refuge in a Muslim school in Kandal province in 2002-2003.
Ahmed Yahya, the leader of the Cambodian Islamic Association and an ethnic Cham, strongly disagreed with the US State Department’s charges against his people.
“I don’t know why the State Department continues to cite the case of the Kandal school and I don’t know why it continues to try and give Cham Muslims a bad image… Sometimes they say we are good, sometimes bad,” he said.
There has been no rise in fundamentalism amongst Cambodian Cham Muslims, who are only concerned with improving their living standards, said Ahmed Yahya. “I am in communication with the communities each day and there are no terrorist sympathies among them,” he stressed.
“Cambodia’s political leadership demonstrated a strong commitment to take aggressive action against terrorists [in 2007] … However, Cambodia’s ability to investigate potential terrorist activities was limited by a lack of training and resources,” said the US Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism’s country report for Cambodia, released Apr 30.
“[P]orous borders, endemic corruption, massive poverty, high unemployment, a poor education system and disaffected elements in the Cham Muslim population … leave the country vulnerable to terrorism and terrorist influence,” it added.
Cham Muslims, which make up approximately five percent of the population, are not considered politically active, but the government feared last year that Cham areas were again being used as “safe havens” for terrorists, according to the report.
The report cites the case of Bali bomber Hambali, a key member of Jemaah Islamiya who it said took refuge in a Muslim school in Kandal province in 2002-2003.
Ahmed Yahya, the leader of the Cambodian Islamic Association and an ethnic Cham, strongly disagreed with the US State Department’s charges against his people.
“I don’t know why the State Department continues to cite the case of the Kandal school and I don’t know why it continues to try and give Cham Muslims a bad image… Sometimes they say we are good, sometimes bad,” he said.
There has been no rise in fundamentalism amongst Cambodian Cham Muslims, who are only concerned with improving their living standards, said Ahmed Yahya. “I am in communication with the communities each day and there are no terrorist sympathies among them,” he stressed.
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