Gen. Ke Kimyan sacked as the RCAF commander-in-chief

Gen. Ke Kimyan (R), seen here being briefed by his officers.

"If he was withdrawn from his post without real reason, there could be a reaction from soldiers and commanders," - A three-star RCAF general

Written by Post Staff
Friday, 23 January 2009
Phnom Penh Post

GENERAL Ke Kim Yan, commander-in-chief of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces and long-time loyalist of Cambodian People's Party President Chea Sim, has been removed from his post in a sweeping reshuffle of the Kingdom's military leadership.

According to a royal decree broadcast Thursday on Apsara Television, Ke Kim Yan's deputy, General Pol Saroeun, has been appointed commander-in-chief, and seven officers have been bumped up to the post of deputy commander-in-chief, including Hun Sen loyalists General Kun Kim and General Meas Sophea.

When contacted by the Post Thursday, Pol Saroeun confirmed he had been promoted. When asked how he felt about it, he replied: "I am modest."

Nem Sowath, Cabinet chief for the Ministry of Defence, said that it was a routine reshuffle of the Kingdom's top brass. "There has been no problem," he said.

He added that Ke Kim Yan had led the army for many years and had made "enviable achievements" since being appointed to the post.

Kem Sokha, president of the Human Rights Party , said the reshuffle was likely a result of internal CPP power politics.

"We have long heard rumours that Prime Minister Hun Sen had plans to remove Ke Kim Yan from commander of RCAF because of an internal dispute," he said, referring to speculation that has abounded since 1997 when reports of Ke Kim Yan's death in the factional fighting sent his family fleeing to Thailand. Although the reports proved erronrous, it later emerged Ke Kim Yan had disputed an order to deploy the army on the streets of Phnom Penh.

In 1999, when Hun Sen appointed Kun Kim to the general staff, observers cast it as a move by the prime minister to tighten his grip on RCAF.

A three-star RCAF general who declined to be named said that he was "very surprised" to hear of the transfer.

"If he was withdrawn from his post without real reason, there could be a reaction from soldiers and commanders," he said.

But Nguon Nhel, first deputy president of the National Assembly, denied the move was a sign of internal divisions in the party. "There is no such dispute in the CPP," Nguon Nhel said. "If there was a dispute, the CPP would not have such support."

Ke Kim Yan could not be reached for comment Thursday.

Mr. Hun Sen’s Unchallenged Supremacy

23rd January, 2009
Opinion by Khmerization

“The sacking of Gen. Ke Kimyan should send shiver down the spines of some political and military heavyweights who are on the wrong side of Mr. Hun Sen’s. If Gen. Ke Kimyan can be sacked, no one else is safe. Mr. Hun Sen will not stop there. Next could be Mr. Sar Kheng, the Minister of Interior and Gen. Tea Banh, the Minister of Defence. The fate of Mr. Chea Sim’s faction, of which the CPP’s old guards and party founders belong to, is near its end. They will not survive past the next election in 2013.”

Mr. Hun Sen’s sacking of Gen. Ke Kimyan from his post as the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces has been viewed by many observers as another attempt by Mr. Hun Sen to solidify his power base in the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). The sacking has probably resulted from an internal squabbling and a power struggle between the Chea Sim’s faction, of which Gen. Ke Kimyan belongs to, and Mr. Hun Sen’s faction. The sacking has changed the CPP’s internal political and military landscape dramatically. In short, it is the beginning of the demise of the Chea Sim’s faction politically and militarily, because the new commander-in-Chief, Gen. Pol Saroeun and seven other Deputy Commander-in-Chiefs, are all Mr. Hun Sen’s loyalists.

Gen. Ke Kimyan, one of the most honest and best Cambodian military leaders, has been a thorn in Mr. Hun Sen’s eyes for a long time. He wanted to lead the Cambodian army professionally and relatively independent of politics. He has resisted Hun Sen’s attempt to monopolise his control on the army. He has resisted Mr. Hun Sen’s orders to send troops to counter Gen. Serey Kosal’s threats of a partition of Battambang province during a brief military clash in 1995 between the troops loyal to the CPP and troops loyal to the Funcinpec Party. He has refused to participate in a military coup against Prince Ranariddh’s Funcinpec Party in 1997.

Mr. Hun Sen has been reportedly attempted to remove Gen. Ke Kimyan from his post after the 1998 election and replaced him with his own son, Hun Manet. After the 2003 election, Hun Sen again attempted to sack Gen. Ke Kimyan, but, both times, he failed.

Gen. Ke Kimyan has so far weathered Mr. Hun Sen’s storm unscathed, until yesterday. His military career, if not over, will be reduced to a powerless and idle role. He will be languishing in a military limbo for years to come. His fate might not be any different from police Gen. Heng Pov’s, who had a fallout with the late Gen. Hok Lundy and then with Mr. Hun Sen and was jailed for 35 years.

What does the sacking of Gen. Ke Kimyan mean? The consequence of the sacking would be manifolds. It would mean a deepened political divisions between Mr. Chea Sim’s and Mr. Hun Sen’s faction of the CPP. It will cause some internal military mistrusts and a disquietness within the military ranks. Many middle- and lower-ranked military officers will be very angry because Gen. Ke Kimyan is very popular and loved by the lower ranks. On the contrary, the new appointees, in particular Gen. Kun Kim, are disliked by the lower ranks.

The sacking of Gen. Ke Kimyan should send shiver down the spines of some political and military heavyweights who are on the wrong side of Mr. Hun Sen’s. If Gen. Ke Kimyan can be sacked, no one else is safe. Mr. Hun Sen will not stop there. Next could be Mr. Sar Kheng, the Minister of Interior and Gen. Tea Banh, the Minister of Defence. The fate of Mr. Chea Sim’s faction, of which the CPP’s old guards and party founders belong to, is near its end. They will not survive past the next election in 2013.

Mr. Hun Sen’s political conquest will only end when he has achieved his political and military supremacy in Cambodia. He has so far secured 90% control of the political and military power base as well as the police and the bureaucracy. His political conquest will only be halted when he will achieve total control of his political and military power in Cambodia or when his life ended.

I would not be surprised if one day Mr. Hun Sen died in a helicopter crash just like the fate of his most loyal lieutenant, Gen. Hok Lundy. He has angered too many people within the CPP, especially the old guards and the party founders, who are currently sidelined by Mr. Hun Sen in favours of the young turks. And I am not surprised if plots to assassinate him are on the making from now on and I can predict that they will be hatched any time.

Now Mr. Hun Sen has achieved near total control of the Cambodian military and police as well as the civil administration. Now he can be dubbed as the emperor, or, to be exact, the Caesar of Cambodian politics.