ASEAN military intelligence meeting opens [in Phnom Penh]

March 27, 2012
VNA

The 9th ASEAN Military Intelligence Informal Meeting (AMIIM-9) opened in Phnom Penh , Cambodia on March 27, drawing the participation of intelligence leaders of ten member countries.

The Vietnamese delegation was led by Lieut. Gen. Luu Duc Huy, Director of the General Department of Military Intelligence under the Ministry of National Defence.

In his opening remark, General Chea Tara, Deputy Commander of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) cum Director of the RCAF Research and Intelligence Bureau, said that intelligence cooperation plays an important role in strengthening and consolidating relations between member countries.

Cambodia’s desired Cooperation with East Germany’s Stasi in the 1980s: the History of failed Requests

Chea Sim (l) laughing with Hun Xen (r) (Photo: Reuters)

Geschichte, Wissenschaft
5. September 2010
By Markus Karbaum

The Ministry for State Security, (German: Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, commonly known as the Stasi (IPA: [ˈʃtaziː]) (abbreviation German: Staatssicherheit, literally State Security), was the official state security service of East Germany. The MfS was headquartered in East Berlin, with an extensive complex in Berlin-Lichtenberg and several smaller facilities throughout the city. It was widely regarded as one of the most effective and repressive intelligence and secret police agencies in the world. The MfS motto was "Schild und Schwert der Partei" (Shield and Sword of the Party), that is the ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED). (Source: Wikipedia.org)
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In most communist countries, effective intelligence capacities have been crucial for their internal stability. Especially, the Ministry of State Security (in short MfS or Stasi) of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was famous for its ability to control its own people – even in Southeast Asia. Although the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) has had an elaborate network of informers since the early 1980s, the political leaders sought assistance to strengthen its security apparatus. Due to ideological similarities – both states were pro Soviet – rumours have persisted for a long time that Cambodian intelligence officials had been trained by the Stasi in the 1980s. However, after examining and evaluating the relevant dossiers in Berlin, this assumption has not been proved.

In August 1980, the first attempt was started to build up cooperation between both socialist countries. In a letter dated on August 25th, East Germany’s Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer reported a Cambodian request to Colonel General Friedrich Dickel, GDR’s Minister of Interior, and Erich Mielke, Minister of State Security: “[…] The comrades from Kampuchea are interested in studying the design and functionality of the intelligence institutions, issues of combating espionage and the activities of counterrevolutionary powers, the functions of police forces, issues of investigating crimes as well as issues of criminal proceedings and the penal system.” (Unofficial translation by the author, see dossier MfS Abt. X No. 384 in Stasi archive BStU, Berlin.) The answer was formulated on September 4th: This request required long-term consideration, as stated in the memo (probably written by a civil servant in the Stasi headquarters). In a conversation with the Minister of Interior Dickel during an official visit in East Germany on April 15th, 1981 again former PRK’s Minister of Interior Chea Sim, by now president of the Senate and the ruling Cambodian People’s Party, expressed insistently the request to get support from the Stasi in education and training of cadres as well as in building up and training of the security institutions.

However, this request was immediately and irrevocably refused (as noted, the Cambodian delegation didn’t take the point of view of their counterparts into account and seemed to be incorrigible) because it seemed that it was not compatible with Vietnam’s security interests as the occupying force in Cambodia in that time. It appears that for the GDR, the bilateral relationship with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was more important than with the PRK and should not be jeopardised. And friction was probably if East Germany and Cambodia would establish cooperation in intelligence issues just less than two years after Vietnam had invaded its neighbour.

In a personal exchange of views with the author, historian Bernd Schäfer from Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars agrees with that assumption and underlines that the GDR perceived Cambodia as a part of Vietnam. Schäfer also notes the beginning East German-Chinese rapprochement in the early 1980s. A stronger involvement through intelligence activities in Kampuchea could foil the attempt for better bilateral relations. Furthermore, the Stasi came closer to its capacity limits in international cooperation during these times: The support of the socialist government in Laos – which, in fact, was recognised as an independent player and thereby very differently from its neighbour Cambodia – required significant resources in that region already. In addition, the backing of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua also appeared new on the agenda of the Stasi. (Of course, the Stasi has never admitted its limitations.)

In the end of the decade, Vietnam’s withdrawal from Cambodia caused new concerns in the People’s Republic of Kampuchea. According to the dossiers, in 1988 the GDR was approached by the PRK on intelligence cooperation again. On June 23rd Ney Penha, then Cambodian Minister of Interior and member of the Politbüro of the Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP) invited East Germany’s Ambassador Rolf Dach to an informal meeting in the ministry. One day later, in a classified document signed by ambassador Dach the main topics were summarized: “[…] The conversation was introduced by comrade Ney Penha. […] Comrade Ney Penha informed the GDR’s ambassador that the Politbüro has instructed him to talk personally to the ambassadors of the GDR, Czechoslovakia and the Hungarian People’s Republic in order to request approval for a visit to these three countries at the end of August/beginning September 1988 to exchange experiences regarding the work of the MoI [Ministry of Interior] and the MfS [Ministry of State Security]. In the framework of realizing the policy of national reconciliation with the Khmer opposition, the party [the KPRP] is preparing itself to defend the revolutionary achievements of Kampuchea. For that, the MoI takes on the roll of great importance. Therefore, one is interested in quickly ascertaining knowledge about usable practical experiences of the East European socialist brother countries. In relation to the complete withdrawal of all Vietnamese volunteers by 1990 and all Vietnamese civil advisors by the end of 1989, this cooperation has inherently great importance […]. According to the situation in his ministry, comrade Ney Penha briefed that it is under the supervision of the Council of Ministers, but led by the Central Committee. […] All reports are sent to the Politbüro, in parts to the Council of Ministers. […] Currently, the police section [of the MoI] is involved in the maintenance of public order, safeguarding traffic, the protection of political, cultural and sporting events, the protection of [foreign] diplomatic branches, the ministries and central institutions. The security section starts to perceive the tasks of counterintelligence, the analysis of adverse activities, the protection of air and maritime traffic. It works on the analysis of the public opinion and handles the preliminary work for the decision-making of strategic issues. The police-section has made a bigger and more obvious improvement to the security section. To strengthen the cardres and staff of both sections, they are partly integrated into combat units at the border and participate in combats. […] In stressing national reconciliation again, comrade Ney Penha mentioned that it would be better to find a way not to share power. Due to the fact that it is difficult to realize such a way, the progressive powers of Kampuchea have to prepare for a longer historical period in which tricky challenges have to be solved. This assignment of tasks should provide the basis for the visit and the exchange of experiences with socialist brother countries.” (Unofficial translation by the author, see dossier MfS Abt. X No. 743 in Stasi archive BStU, Berlin.)

Mielke’s answer to ambassador Dach from July 7th, 1988 was short, but unambiguous: “Due to the fact that there are no preconditions for exchange of experiences at the present time, we don’t want to initialize anything. If there are any inquires, notify that there is still no answer from the headquarters. By the MfS there will be no coordination with the institutions of Czechoslovakia and the Hungarian People’s Republic.” (Unofficial translation by the author, see dossier MfS Abt. X No. 743 in Stasi archive BStU, Berlin.)

The dossiers don’t mention whether the requests in Czechoslovakia or Hungry were more successful. However, due to the end of socialism in both countries in the following years it should be assumed that – even in the case of a positive reaction – there was no sustained cooperation between the Cambodian Ministry of Interior and its counterparts in oversee. The economic and financial crisis in the eastern hemisphere also led to constraints of the countries’ intelligence capacities. The Stasi, too, had to choose focuses for its international commitment and still Cambodia did not obtain priority (in contrast, for example, to North Korea).

On can summarize that although there was an ideological conformity, the relationship between the GDR and the PRK was not close enough for far-reaching cooperation in security and intelligence issues. On the basis of the dossiers examined, however, it is not possible to prove this entirely, but after the overall evaluation, this conclusion seems to be most appropriate.

Dr. Markus Karbaum is a Political Scientist from Berlin, Germany. This is a modified excerpt from his PhD-thesis “Cambodia under Hun Sen. Informal Institutions, Political Culture and Legitimacy of Power” (English translation of the original German title) which was published in 2008.

Hun Sen Said Creating New Intelligence Unit To Spy on Opposition Politicians

05 Nov 07
By Den Sorin
Moneakseka Khmer
Translated from Khmer and posted online

Although the Interior Ministry currently has so many departments and bureaus relating to anti-terrorist intelligence, information gathering, and news investigation, they appear to be insufficient for the protection of the rulers' power since it appears that the following saying is vindicated: "An evil doer always feels like being followed by a shadow." Therefore, in order to protect his own power, the ruler needs to create as many supplementary intelligence forces or spies as possible.

In other countries of this world, intelligence forces work against terrorism and provide protection for social security because they monitor cross-border criminals and local felons who attempt to conduct terrorist acts against humanity. In Cambodia, however, the intelligence forces are created for killing fellow Cambodians only. For instance, the intelligence forces have been used to abduct this or that individual so that the victims would blindly denounce one another.

According to a foreign security observer, the Cambodian intelligence forces were created to monitor just fellow Cambodians, in particular the opposition politicians and political parties. This is because the ruling party wants to know whether the politicians are making contact with each other or what activities the political parties are conducting. Besides, they are being used to monitor the activists of political parties. If any political party activist is found to be making progress that could constitute an obstacle to the ruling party, the special intelligence forces would be told to suppress him immediately.

Therefore, the intelligence forces are not working to guarantee security or prevent and fight terrorism. They are used only to protect the powers that be, to serve the interests of the ruling party, and to spy on fellow Cambodians. In the long run, this practice causes Cambodians to mistrust fellow Cambodians because they do not know to whom they belong. This is because even among the motorcycle-taxi drivers or waiters at swanky restaurants frequented by celebrities are many intelligence agents. Therefore, the Cambodian rulers' drive at causing Cambodians to mistrust one another has also caused disunity in the Cambodian society, turning it into easy prey for interference and annexation by neighboring countries because a divided Cambodia is weak like a single shop stick that can be broken easily. Some people suspect that this is a trick of the Vietnamese who are pulling strings in a way that Cambodians would no longer trust their fellow Cambodians and that the Cambodian society would be divided. In reality, these days the Vietnamese have been penetrating the country everywhere but no Cambodian intelligence forces are monitoring their movements. They do not care whatever the Vietnamese are doing; but they closely monitor their own Cambodian people.

Nowadays, it is observed that Cambodians who are the masters of the country are afraid to speak up about the problems of their own country because they are wary of their neighbors, but the Vietnamese can do whatever they please in Cambodia. The security situation observer said that Cambodia is now on the world's blacklist as a haven for criminals because the intelligence forces here are inefficient since their activities are not geared for suppressing crimes in general. They are used to monitor fellow Cambodians only.

A high-ranked Interior Ministry official said that a new intelligence department has not yet been officially announced but it has already been created with its internal structures under construction. The same official further revealed that this intelligence department shall be directly subordinate to National Police Department Commissioner-General Hok Langdi. However, at the start, before the structures are fully in place, this department is placed under the temporary jurisdiction of the Central Security Department [CSD] headed by 3-star Gen. Un Sam-oeun. Previously, Un Sam-oeun was head of the Anti-Terrorist Department [ATD], but Hok Langdi transferred him to heads the CSD instead. Now the ATD must be temporarily under the CSD and under the direct control of Hok Langdi.

The high-ranked Interior Ministry official said that in the past Hun Sen used the Military Intelligence Unit [MIU] that Mol Roeup headed. But Mol Roeup is now very sick and lately the MIU has not been fulfilling its mission very well. Hun Se, therefore, decided to create a department within the police ranks personally controlled by Hok Langdi.

The same Interior Ministry official said that in the past the police forces that performed intelligence work came from the General Information Department of Chhai Sinarith, the Anti-Terrorist Forces of Bit Kimhong, the Crime Suppression Forces of Mak Chito, and the Central Security Forces of Sok Phal, which are now under Un Sam-oeun. Sometimes all these different branches of forces came near to clashing with one another over personal interests. Now Hun Sen has created another intelligence department for spying on various political parties.

The foreign security situation observer said that during the war Cambodian forces fought and killed each other on the battlefields and they fought their fellow people after the war ended by creating various forces to kill each other. Therefore, during nearly half a century the Cambodians were killing one another from the time of war to the time of peace.

Although an Interior Ministry official told a foreign newspaper that the newly created intelligence department was for collecting news and information concerning war crimes and would work in close cooperation with international investigating agencies, exchanging information with one another to fight international terrorism, for the immediate future it monitors the activities of political activists or the political activities of various political parties in the country. This department is instead being used to conduct threats and intimidations against political activists before the election because this department is being hastily formed so that it can take shape before the 2008 fourth general election.