Concerns as US cosies up to Indochina

The Straits Times

NEW YORK, Aug 12 — When United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton signed the Asean Treaty of Amity and Cooperation at a meeting in the Thai resort city of Phuket last month, most commentators in the region saw it as a positive move.

Any evidence of renewed US interest in South-east Asia was surely welcome, particularly when, as in this case, it came in the form of an undertaking not to interfere in the internal affairs of Asean member states.

Many South-east Asian countries, hoping to benefit from China’s economic growth without becoming smothered by Beijing’s growing military strength, have long regarded the US as a force for stability. This is particularly true with respect to the South China Sea, where vital trade routes cut across conflicting territorial claims.

But not everyone is likely to be equally enthusiastic about America’s renewed attention to South-east Asia. After all, Clinton did more than sign a treaty. She also held an unprecedented ministerial meeting with Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Thailand almost immediately afterwards.

In doing so, she triggered a change in the region’s geopolitical environment that had implications well beyond the immediate aim of challenging Beijing’s influence.

Much of the focus of the ministerial meeting was on developments affecting the Mekong River, which runs from south-east China and then through Myanmar, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia before reaching its delta in Vietnam. China has in recent years built a series of controversial hydroelectric dams on the upper reaches of the Mekong that many believe could have a serious impact on the environment further downstream.

Until now, mindful of Beijing’s growing power and influence, Indochinese governments have expressed only muffled concern.

According to the US Department of State, Washington will spend more than US$7 million (RM24.6 million) this year on environmental programmes in the Mekong Region. The Obama administration is also seeking Congressional approval for an additional US$15 million for assistance related to improving food security next year. More funds may be allocated for other programmes in the future.

Many countries, both inside and outside the strategically important sub-region, can now be expected to spend the next few months assessing just how far the involvement of a powerful new player in the Mekong region may impact on their own foreign policies.

Laos and Cambodia probably have the most to gain. They are relatively weak states heavily dependent upon foreign aid to finance economic development. For them, greater competition between China and the United States holds out the possibility of additional development funds and more favourable trade and investment agreements.

Even Myanmar could benefit if the US decides that strategic issues outweigh concerns over Yangon’s dismal human rights record.

Vietnam and Thailand, on the other hand, are likely to worry about the possible dilution of their own roles even as they welcome Washington’s attempt to limit China’s influence. The US will need to be sensitive to these fears as it works to extend its influence in the sub-region.

Much of Vietnam’s history has been shaped by concerns that China was attempting to dominate it. But Hanoi also has regional ambitions of its own. Vietnam maintains a ‘special relationship’ with Laos, for example, a link formalised in a 1977 treaty of friendship and cooperation.

Hanoi’s regional ambitions can also be seen in its willingness to overthrow the pro-Beijing Khmer Rouge government in Phnom Penh in 1976.

Historically, Bangkok’s relations with Beijing have been much better. Even so, Thai officials have watched with dismay in recent years as Indochina’s growing trade with China has turned what was once seen as a potential ‘baht zone’ into a likely ‘yuan zone’ market. And with the US now in the picture, could the US dollar come to dominate the region instead?

Further afield, Washington’s allies in the region face a similarly challenging task. Japan, for example, held the first of what it hoped would be a series of regular meetings with the foreign ministers of the Mekong basin countries in Tokyo in January. It has also proposed a summit meeting with the Indochinese states later this year.

With the US more active in the sub-region, Japan may have trouble keeping these countries interested in a relationship with Tokyo.

Australia is in a comparable position. One of the few Western countries to maintain an embassy in Vientiane throughout the uncertainties of the 1970s and 1980s, Canberra has focused much of its diplomatic efforts on cultivating the countries of Indochina. For example, Australia financed a major bridge across the Mekong River linking Laos and Thailand in the early 1990s.

With the US now reportedly willing to spend large sums to acquire a similar level of goodwill, will Canberra be able to compete?

One possible response would be for Washington’s allies to propose the establishment of some form of international development commission through which efforts to contain Chinese influence in the sub-region as well as advance their collective interests there could be coordinated.

What is certain is that with the US now ready to give Indochina a higher priority, the sub-region’s geopolitics are going to be very different.