 |
| Agriculture map |
 |
| Ethnolinguistic Groups map |
 |
| Bathymetry and Areas Subject to Flooding map |
 |
| Industry, Mining and Electric Power map |
 |
| Transportation map |
Showing posts with label Indochina. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Indochina. Show all posts
Monday, April 02, 2012
Various Maps of Indochina prepared by the CIA in the 70s
Saturday, February 04, 2012
Henry Kissinger, China And Third Indo-China War – Analysis
February 2, 2012
By V. Suryanarayan
SAAG
By V. Suryanarayan
SAAG
“Ideology had disappeared from the conflicts. The communist power centres were conducting a balance-of–power contest based not on ideology, but on national interest.” – Kisssinger, On China
“There had been an amazing cynicism and duplicity on the Chinese side. And they preach against imperialism and act themselves in the old imperialist and expansionist way. Altogether their policy seems to be one of unabashed chauvinism.” - Jawaharlal Nehru, Speech in Lok Sabha, December 10, 1962
The much awaited book, On China, written by scholar diplomat Henry Kissinger, not only makes fascinating reading, it is an invaluable reference material for students of international relations. From July 1971, when Kissinger made his first secret visit to China, he has maintained excellent equations with successive generations of Chinese leaders. He views contemporary history of China as a continuation of the past and describes the rationale behind Chinese thinking, diplomacy, strategy and negotiations.
This essay is a re-evaluation of the Third Indo-China War based on the writings of Henry Kissinger. The author has also referred to the Memoirs of Singapore statesman Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 1965-2000, and the recently published autobiography of former President of Singapore SR Nathan, who was associated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the Third Indo-China War. The book is entitled An Unexpected Journey, Path to Presidency. Few preliminary observations are in order before analyzing the subject under scrutiny.
Significance of Vietnamese Revolution
The revolution in Vietnam, under the inspiring leadership of Ho Chih Minh, is one of the most brilliant chapters in the history of twentieth century. With massive aid from both Soviet Union and China, but with only their reluctant assent and occasionally even against their wishes, the heroic people of Vietnam humbled the United States and struck a death blow to imperialism and neo-colonialism. During the Third Indo-China War there was a vicious attempt to distort the true nature of the Vietnamese revolution, malign and vilify the Vietnamese leaders as war mongers and legitimize, in retrospect, the American military intervention in Vietnam. We must be on our guard against this distortion of history.
Sunday, December 25, 2011
Indochina economies on the path to reform and liberalisation [-Dream on in Cambodia's case?]
By JOHN LOH
The Star Online (Malaysia)
[Cambodia's] 15 million population, more than half of which is below 21 years of age, is one of the world's poorest, a situation that led to it becoming a substantial recipient of aid money. The Asian Development Bank and even China are among its benefactors. China also happens to be one of Cambodia's largest sources of FDI.
IN many ways, the Indochina region comprising Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar is akin to an emerging giant.
Racked by decades of civil war, military rule and socialism, the region has, for the longest time, been a political and economic outcast; its instability a bane to foreign investors and economic progress.
But these countries, led by Vietnam, have been quietly plotting a return to the world stage. Vietnam's gross domestic product (GDP), for instance, grew 8% annually between 1990 and 1997, and then 7% between 2000 and 2005, making it one of the fastest growing economies in the world.
The low base, of course, is one reason for this. Yet, Indochina remains on the margins of our imagination, drowned out by the din of its powerhouse neighbours China and India, and the ever-pressing woes of debt in the United States and Europe.
Wednesday, September 28, 2011
Sacrava's Political Cartoon: Hanoi, Go Home!
 |
| Cartoon by Sacrava (on the web at http://sacrava.blogspot.com) |
Thursday, March 04, 2010
War correspondents plan Cambodia reunion
The event will include correspondents who covered Cambodia from 1970, when the Lon Nol government was inaugurated, to 1975, when the regime collapsed and gave way to the Khmer Rouge. [AFP]Thursday, March 04, 2010
Radio Australia News
A group of war correspondents plans to hold a reunion next month in Phnom Penh in memory of colleagues who died in Cambodia during the Indo-China War in the early 1970s.
One of the organizers of the event is Chhang Song, an information minister during the US-backed Lon Nol government. [KI-Media note: Chhang Song is currently an advisor of Hun Xen, even though he lives in Long Beach, California]
He says the event will include correspondents who covered Cambodia from 1970, when the Lon Nol government was inaugurated, to 1975, when the regime collapsed and gave way to the Khmer Rouge.
Another organizer, Carl Robinson, a former Associated Press correspondent says while there had been reunions in Ho Chi Minh City, formerly Saigon, among war correspondents who covered the Vietnam War, this will be the first in Cambodia.
Mr Robinson, who was based in Saigon from 1968 through 1975, says between April 1970 and April 1975, 33 foreign journalists and 21 Cambodian journalists were killed or went missing while covering stories.
One of the organizers of the event is Chhang Song, an information minister during the US-backed Lon Nol government. [KI-Media note: Chhang Song is currently an advisor of Hun Xen, even though he lives in Long Beach, California]
He says the event will include correspondents who covered Cambodia from 1970, when the Lon Nol government was inaugurated, to 1975, when the regime collapsed and gave way to the Khmer Rouge.
Another organizer, Carl Robinson, a former Associated Press correspondent says while there had been reunions in Ho Chi Minh City, formerly Saigon, among war correspondents who covered the Vietnam War, this will be the first in Cambodia.
Mr Robinson, who was based in Saigon from 1968 through 1975, says between April 1970 and April 1975, 33 foreign journalists and 21 Cambodian journalists were killed or went missing while covering stories.
Wednesday, August 12, 2009
Concerns as US cosies up to Indochina
The Straits Times
NEW YORK, Aug 12 — When United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton signed the Asean Treaty of Amity and Cooperation at a meeting in the Thai resort city of Phuket last month, most commentators in the region saw it as a positive move.
Any evidence of renewed US interest in South-east Asia was surely welcome, particularly when, as in this case, it came in the form of an undertaking not to interfere in the internal affairs of Asean member states.
Many South-east Asian countries, hoping to benefit from China’s economic growth without becoming smothered by Beijing’s growing military strength, have long regarded the US as a force for stability. This is particularly true with respect to the South China Sea, where vital trade routes cut across conflicting territorial claims.
But not everyone is likely to be equally enthusiastic about America’s renewed attention to South-east Asia. After all, Clinton did more than sign a treaty. She also held an unprecedented ministerial meeting with Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Thailand almost immediately afterwards.
In doing so, she triggered a change in the region’s geopolitical environment that had implications well beyond the immediate aim of challenging Beijing’s influence.
Much of the focus of the ministerial meeting was on developments affecting the Mekong River, which runs from south-east China and then through Myanmar, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia before reaching its delta in Vietnam. China has in recent years built a series of controversial hydroelectric dams on the upper reaches of the Mekong that many believe could have a serious impact on the environment further downstream.
Until now, mindful of Beijing’s growing power and influence, Indochinese governments have expressed only muffled concern.
According to the US Department of State, Washington will spend more than US$7 million (RM24.6 million) this year on environmental programmes in the Mekong Region. The Obama administration is also seeking Congressional approval for an additional US$15 million for assistance related to improving food security next year. More funds may be allocated for other programmes in the future.
Many countries, both inside and outside the strategically important sub-region, can now be expected to spend the next few months assessing just how far the involvement of a powerful new player in the Mekong region may impact on their own foreign policies.
Laos and Cambodia probably have the most to gain. They are relatively weak states heavily dependent upon foreign aid to finance economic development. For them, greater competition between China and the United States holds out the possibility of additional development funds and more favourable trade and investment agreements.
Even Myanmar could benefit if the US decides that strategic issues outweigh concerns over Yangon’s dismal human rights record.
Vietnam and Thailand, on the other hand, are likely to worry about the possible dilution of their own roles even as they welcome Washington’s attempt to limit China’s influence. The US will need to be sensitive to these fears as it works to extend its influence in the sub-region.
Much of Vietnam’s history has been shaped by concerns that China was attempting to dominate it. But Hanoi also has regional ambitions of its own. Vietnam maintains a ‘special relationship’ with Laos, for example, a link formalised in a 1977 treaty of friendship and cooperation.
Hanoi’s regional ambitions can also be seen in its willingness to overthrow the pro-Beijing Khmer Rouge government in Phnom Penh in 1976.
Historically, Bangkok’s relations with Beijing have been much better. Even so, Thai officials have watched with dismay in recent years as Indochina’s growing trade with China has turned what was once seen as a potential ‘baht zone’ into a likely ‘yuan zone’ market. And with the US now in the picture, could the US dollar come to dominate the region instead?
Further afield, Washington’s allies in the region face a similarly challenging task. Japan, for example, held the first of what it hoped would be a series of regular meetings with the foreign ministers of the Mekong basin countries in Tokyo in January. It has also proposed a summit meeting with the Indochinese states later this year.
With the US more active in the sub-region, Japan may have trouble keeping these countries interested in a relationship with Tokyo.
Australia is in a comparable position. One of the few Western countries to maintain an embassy in Vientiane throughout the uncertainties of the 1970s and 1980s, Canberra has focused much of its diplomatic efforts on cultivating the countries of Indochina. For example, Australia financed a major bridge across the Mekong River linking Laos and Thailand in the early 1990s.
With the US now reportedly willing to spend large sums to acquire a similar level of goodwill, will Canberra be able to compete?
One possible response would be for Washington’s allies to propose the establishment of some form of international development commission through which efforts to contain Chinese influence in the sub-region as well as advance their collective interests there could be coordinated.
What is certain is that with the US now ready to give Indochina a higher priority, the sub-region’s geopolitics are going to be very different.
Any evidence of renewed US interest in South-east Asia was surely welcome, particularly when, as in this case, it came in the form of an undertaking not to interfere in the internal affairs of Asean member states.
Many South-east Asian countries, hoping to benefit from China’s economic growth without becoming smothered by Beijing’s growing military strength, have long regarded the US as a force for stability. This is particularly true with respect to the South China Sea, where vital trade routes cut across conflicting territorial claims.
But not everyone is likely to be equally enthusiastic about America’s renewed attention to South-east Asia. After all, Clinton did more than sign a treaty. She also held an unprecedented ministerial meeting with Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Thailand almost immediately afterwards.
In doing so, she triggered a change in the region’s geopolitical environment that had implications well beyond the immediate aim of challenging Beijing’s influence.
Much of the focus of the ministerial meeting was on developments affecting the Mekong River, which runs from south-east China and then through Myanmar, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia before reaching its delta in Vietnam. China has in recent years built a series of controversial hydroelectric dams on the upper reaches of the Mekong that many believe could have a serious impact on the environment further downstream.
Until now, mindful of Beijing’s growing power and influence, Indochinese governments have expressed only muffled concern.
According to the US Department of State, Washington will spend more than US$7 million (RM24.6 million) this year on environmental programmes in the Mekong Region. The Obama administration is also seeking Congressional approval for an additional US$15 million for assistance related to improving food security next year. More funds may be allocated for other programmes in the future.
Many countries, both inside and outside the strategically important sub-region, can now be expected to spend the next few months assessing just how far the involvement of a powerful new player in the Mekong region may impact on their own foreign policies.
Laos and Cambodia probably have the most to gain. They are relatively weak states heavily dependent upon foreign aid to finance economic development. For them, greater competition between China and the United States holds out the possibility of additional development funds and more favourable trade and investment agreements.
Even Myanmar could benefit if the US decides that strategic issues outweigh concerns over Yangon’s dismal human rights record.
Vietnam and Thailand, on the other hand, are likely to worry about the possible dilution of their own roles even as they welcome Washington’s attempt to limit China’s influence. The US will need to be sensitive to these fears as it works to extend its influence in the sub-region.
Much of Vietnam’s history has been shaped by concerns that China was attempting to dominate it. But Hanoi also has regional ambitions of its own. Vietnam maintains a ‘special relationship’ with Laos, for example, a link formalised in a 1977 treaty of friendship and cooperation.
Hanoi’s regional ambitions can also be seen in its willingness to overthrow the pro-Beijing Khmer Rouge government in Phnom Penh in 1976.
Historically, Bangkok’s relations with Beijing have been much better. Even so, Thai officials have watched with dismay in recent years as Indochina’s growing trade with China has turned what was once seen as a potential ‘baht zone’ into a likely ‘yuan zone’ market. And with the US now in the picture, could the US dollar come to dominate the region instead?
Further afield, Washington’s allies in the region face a similarly challenging task. Japan, for example, held the first of what it hoped would be a series of regular meetings with the foreign ministers of the Mekong basin countries in Tokyo in January. It has also proposed a summit meeting with the Indochinese states later this year.
With the US more active in the sub-region, Japan may have trouble keeping these countries interested in a relationship with Tokyo.
Australia is in a comparable position. One of the few Western countries to maintain an embassy in Vientiane throughout the uncertainties of the 1970s and 1980s, Canberra has focused much of its diplomatic efforts on cultivating the countries of Indochina. For example, Australia financed a major bridge across the Mekong River linking Laos and Thailand in the early 1990s.
With the US now reportedly willing to spend large sums to acquire a similar level of goodwill, will Canberra be able to compete?
One possible response would be for Washington’s allies to propose the establishment of some form of international development commission through which efforts to contain Chinese influence in the sub-region as well as advance their collective interests there could be coordinated.
What is certain is that with the US now ready to give Indochina a higher priority, the sub-region’s geopolitics are going to be very different.
Tuesday, November 06, 2007
Typhoon Peipah to affect Cambodia
Satellite map over Southeast Asia as of 06 November 2007 (Source: CNN)PHNOM PENH, Nov. 6 (Xinhua) -- The Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology has asked the public to take storm precautions as Typhoon Peipah, which has recently hit the Philippines, is expected to strike the Indochinese Peninsula in the next few days, local press reported on Tuesday.
Water Resources Minister Lim Kean Hor on Monday asked the Cambodian people to be vigilant against the storm which will bring heavy rain and strong winds to Cambodia over Nov. 8 to 10, reported Cambodian-language newspaper the Kampuchea Thmey.
Long Saravuth, director of the ministry's meteorology department, said that the storm would bring less rain, but heavy winds and cold weather.
Lim Kean Hor said that the storm would affect Preah Vihear, Ratanakiri, Mondulkiri, Stung Treng, Kompong Cham, Kandal, Svay Rieng, Takeo, Prey Veng, Kampot, Kompong Thom, and Pursat provinces.
He added that the typhoon began in the Pacific Ocean and then blew across the Philippines to the South China Sea.
Peipah left at least six people dead after landing at Luzon in the Philippines on Sunday.
Water Resources Minister Lim Kean Hor on Monday asked the Cambodian people to be vigilant against the storm which will bring heavy rain and strong winds to Cambodia over Nov. 8 to 10, reported Cambodian-language newspaper the Kampuchea Thmey.
Long Saravuth, director of the ministry's meteorology department, said that the storm would bring less rain, but heavy winds and cold weather.
Lim Kean Hor said that the storm would affect Preah Vihear, Ratanakiri, Mondulkiri, Stung Treng, Kompong Cham, Kandal, Svay Rieng, Takeo, Prey Veng, Kampot, Kompong Thom, and Pursat provinces.
He added that the typhoon began in the Pacific Ocean and then blew across the Philippines to the South China Sea.
Peipah left at least six people dead after landing at Luzon in the Philippines on Sunday.
Tuesday, October 30, 2007
Combining Forces to Defeat Oppressive Regimes
2007-10-29
By Ann Shibler
The John Birch Society
Standing for Family and Freedom
By Ann Shibler
The John Birch Society
Standing for Family and Freedom
ARTICLE SYNOPSIS:
At a recent meeting, several Asian and Cuban human rights organizations gathered together to discuss the human rights violations and oppression rampant in their homelands.
Follow this link to the original source: "Cuban, Asian Groups Discuss Evils of Communism"
COMMENTARY:
In mid-October in Miami, Florida, the Southeast Asian Democracy League and the Cuban Liberty Council (CLC) along with three other Cuban expatriate organizations came together to support a common cause: the removal of all militarily imposed totalitarian dictatorships.
The Southeast Asian Democracy League consists of the Bangladesh Democracy League, the Sam Rainsy Party of Cambodia, the Force of Vietnamese People for Freedom and Democracy, and the Government of Laos Abroad. All of these groups represent nations that have been conquered by totalitarian regimes.
Founded by Cuban expatriates who escaped from Castro’s Cuba, the CLC was established in 2001 to promote and support the Cuban exile community in the United States and opposition parties inside Cuba. They were joined by Municipios de Cuba en el Exilio, the Cuban Political Prisoners Council, and the Junta Patriotica Cubana. Together they represent the majority of Cubans who are against Castro’s Communist regime.
Featured speakers at the conference related stories of persecution and suffering in Cuba and in Asia. Dr. Charles Chang, prime minister of the Government of Laos Abroad, explained the atrocities committed against the Hmong people, especially children, by the communist Pathet Lao party. Meanwhile, in Bangladesh, according to Dr. Muhammed Chowdhurry, a military dictatorship operates behind the scenes and the people are arrested and terrorized. Free elections are impossible and popular political leaders have been jailed.
The Chinese communist party has long been particularly repressive. Among many other victim groups in China is the Falun Gong, whose practitioners are routinely hunted down and persecuted. A spokesperson from the Coalition to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong described the imprisonment and torture of millions of Falun Gong practitioners. And in Vietnam, the Montagnards, a small ethnic minority that helped the United States during the Vietnam War, is now physically persecuted by the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP). The VCP specializes in slavery and human trafficking, and the country still has no freedom of religion or the press, or, for that matter, any measurable degree of political freedom.
Delegates at the forum pledged to work together to break the stranglehold totalitarian regimes have on the people of their various homelands. The meeting of these dissident groups serves as a reminder that, throughout much of the world, many people remain under the yoke of oppressive and tyrannical regimes. That they met in Florida, in the USA, should remind Americans of the freedoms they yet enjoy and should be committed to protecting.
Ann Shibler is the Editorial Assistant for The New American magazine, a publication of the John Birch Society.
At a recent meeting, several Asian and Cuban human rights organizations gathered together to discuss the human rights violations and oppression rampant in their homelands.
Follow this link to the original source: "Cuban, Asian Groups Discuss Evils of Communism"
COMMENTARY:
In mid-October in Miami, Florida, the Southeast Asian Democracy League and the Cuban Liberty Council (CLC) along with three other Cuban expatriate organizations came together to support a common cause: the removal of all militarily imposed totalitarian dictatorships.
The Southeast Asian Democracy League consists of the Bangladesh Democracy League, the Sam Rainsy Party of Cambodia, the Force of Vietnamese People for Freedom and Democracy, and the Government of Laos Abroad. All of these groups represent nations that have been conquered by totalitarian regimes.
Founded by Cuban expatriates who escaped from Castro’s Cuba, the CLC was established in 2001 to promote and support the Cuban exile community in the United States and opposition parties inside Cuba. They were joined by Municipios de Cuba en el Exilio, the Cuban Political Prisoners Council, and the Junta Patriotica Cubana. Together they represent the majority of Cubans who are against Castro’s Communist regime.
Featured speakers at the conference related stories of persecution and suffering in Cuba and in Asia. Dr. Charles Chang, prime minister of the Government of Laos Abroad, explained the atrocities committed against the Hmong people, especially children, by the communist Pathet Lao party. Meanwhile, in Bangladesh, according to Dr. Muhammed Chowdhurry, a military dictatorship operates behind the scenes and the people are arrested and terrorized. Free elections are impossible and popular political leaders have been jailed.
The Chinese communist party has long been particularly repressive. Among many other victim groups in China is the Falun Gong, whose practitioners are routinely hunted down and persecuted. A spokesperson from the Coalition to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong described the imprisonment and torture of millions of Falun Gong practitioners. And in Vietnam, the Montagnards, a small ethnic minority that helped the United States during the Vietnam War, is now physically persecuted by the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP). The VCP specializes in slavery and human trafficking, and the country still has no freedom of religion or the press, or, for that matter, any measurable degree of political freedom.
Delegates at the forum pledged to work together to break the stranglehold totalitarian regimes have on the people of their various homelands. The meeting of these dissident groups serves as a reminder that, throughout much of the world, many people remain under the yoke of oppressive and tyrannical regimes. That they met in Florida, in the USA, should remind Americans of the freedoms they yet enjoy and should be committed to protecting.
Ann Shibler is the Editorial Assistant for The New American magazine, a publication of the John Birch Society.
Saturday, October 20, 2007
Wednesday, October 03, 2007
Norodom Sihanouk: The Turning Point II
Sun, 30 Sep 2007
Op-Ed by Jayakhmer
Posted online
Op-Ed by Jayakhmer
Posted online
In my last article, I mentioned casually that relation between Cambodia and the U.S was strained at best. Since this pivotal moment changed the faith of the country, I decided to investigate further. The evidences contradict the popular notion that Norodom Sihanouk was hastily and readily embraced the North Viet Nam and China in the sixties.
I know that Norodom Sihanouk was "no angel." That does not give us the rights to make a gross generalization about all his conducts. If we continue to let our passion dominates our otherwise rational selves, we are vulnerable to repeat the mistakes our predecessors committed again and again.
American's attitude about the Cambodia's border issues played and important role in this matter. To achieve its objective which was defeating the Vietcong, America was indifferent about violations of Cambodia's borders by its neighbors Viet Nam and Thailand despite endless complains from the former king.
Thailand repeatedly occupied Preah Vihea at the time. "According to the White Book of the Cambodian Foreign Ministry, from 1962 to May 1969....the Saigon authority committed 7,178 violations of Cambodian territory (165 by sea, 1864 by land, and 5149 by air), killed or wounded 983 Khmers..."
The diplomatic tensions between the U.S. and Cambodia in the spring of 1964 alone tell us that Norodom Sihanouk was not hasty. He was unsuccessful in his attempt.
February 8, 1964 Norodom Sihanouk held the U.S. responsible for "the South Vietnamese attack on a Cambodian village on Feb. 4," and the former king asked the US to finance truce observation posts along the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border. February 11, 1964 Norodom Sihanouk proposed, "An international conference to guarantee Cambodia's neutrality." By February 13, the former king warned that, "If the US does not agree to an international conference by May, he would sever diplomatic relations with Washington and possibly sign assistance agreements with 'certain great friendly countries'. [Referring to China and North Vietnam]" Basically, the warning was if the U.S. does not take the former king's proposal seriously he would support the Vietcong. Here is a piece of Dean Rusk's telegraph from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom on March 22, 1964. "To sum up, I think it is possible that your and my approach to these issues differs somewhat because of our different situations. We are heavily engaged in South Viet-Nam and are taking casualties every week in an effort to keep that country from going communist. Further, the Thais obviously rely more heavily upon our bilateral commitments than upon the general structure of SEATO in which they think non-regional members will be negligent of Thai security. Our regional stakes in Southeast Asia are so great that it is not easy for us to cooperate with the non-regional members of SEATO at the expense of South Viet-Nam and Thailand. I do not see how the United States can come to a general Geneva Conference without Saigon and Bangkok. Since Sihanouk's initiative was aimed at both these countries, I do not see how a conference could produce any worthwhile result unless they were present. You may believe that we have unlimited influence in Saigon and Bangkok, but this is simply not the case. Were we to try to drag these two countries kicking and screaming to a Geneva Conference, the situation in Saigon might well collapse through fear of neutralization and Thailand might well decide that we are wholly unreliable and that their only course is to make their peace with the communists in the North. This is the heart of the matter as I see it, and should not be glossed over by purely procedural considerations as to whether it is congenial to have a conference. If the issue is whether an unbalanced Sihanouk will irrationally turn to the communist North, we must balance this against the impact of a complete loss of morale in South Viet-Nam and Thailand." America was uneven handed and indifference when it came to resolving Cambodia territorial issues.
Could Norodom Sihanouk side with a hesitated America who sided with the perceived enemies of Cambodia at the time? The answer to this question demands our rationality. We all knew too well of the faith and consequences of this pivotal moment.
I know that Norodom Sihanouk was "no angel." That does not give us the rights to make a gross generalization about all his conducts. If we continue to let our passion dominates our otherwise rational selves, we are vulnerable to repeat the mistakes our predecessors committed again and again.
American's attitude about the Cambodia's border issues played and important role in this matter. To achieve its objective which was defeating the Vietcong, America was indifferent about violations of Cambodia's borders by its neighbors Viet Nam and Thailand despite endless complains from the former king.
Thailand repeatedly occupied Preah Vihea at the time. "According to the White Book of the Cambodian Foreign Ministry, from 1962 to May 1969....the Saigon authority committed 7,178 violations of Cambodian territory (165 by sea, 1864 by land, and 5149 by air), killed or wounded 983 Khmers..."
The diplomatic tensions between the U.S. and Cambodia in the spring of 1964 alone tell us that Norodom Sihanouk was not hasty. He was unsuccessful in his attempt.
February 8, 1964 Norodom Sihanouk held the U.S. responsible for "the South Vietnamese attack on a Cambodian village on Feb. 4," and the former king asked the US to finance truce observation posts along the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border. February 11, 1964 Norodom Sihanouk proposed, "An international conference to guarantee Cambodia's neutrality." By February 13, the former king warned that, "If the US does not agree to an international conference by May, he would sever diplomatic relations with Washington and possibly sign assistance agreements with 'certain great friendly countries'. [Referring to China and North Vietnam]" Basically, the warning was if the U.S. does not take the former king's proposal seriously he would support the Vietcong. Here is a piece of Dean Rusk's telegraph from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom on March 22, 1964. "To sum up, I think it is possible that your and my approach to these issues differs somewhat because of our different situations. We are heavily engaged in South Viet-Nam and are taking casualties every week in an effort to keep that country from going communist. Further, the Thais obviously rely more heavily upon our bilateral commitments than upon the general structure of SEATO in which they think non-regional members will be negligent of Thai security. Our regional stakes in Southeast Asia are so great that it is not easy for us to cooperate with the non-regional members of SEATO at the expense of South Viet-Nam and Thailand. I do not see how the United States can come to a general Geneva Conference without Saigon and Bangkok. Since Sihanouk's initiative was aimed at both these countries, I do not see how a conference could produce any worthwhile result unless they were present. You may believe that we have unlimited influence in Saigon and Bangkok, but this is simply not the case. Were we to try to drag these two countries kicking and screaming to a Geneva Conference, the situation in Saigon might well collapse through fear of neutralization and Thailand might well decide that we are wholly unreliable and that their only course is to make their peace with the communists in the North. This is the heart of the matter as I see it, and should not be glossed over by purely procedural considerations as to whether it is congenial to have a conference. If the issue is whether an unbalanced Sihanouk will irrationally turn to the communist North, we must balance this against the impact of a complete loss of morale in South Viet-Nam and Thailand." America was uneven handed and indifference when it came to resolving Cambodia territorial issues.
Could Norodom Sihanouk side with a hesitated America who sided with the perceived enemies of Cambodia at the time? The answer to this question demands our rationality. We all knew too well of the faith and consequences of this pivotal moment.
Monday, May 21, 2007
Japan revs up its Indochina diplomacy
May 22, 2007
By Hisane Masaki
Asia Times (Hong Kong)
By Hisane Masaki
Asia Times (Hong Kong)
TOKYO - Amid intensifying rivalry between Tokyo and Beijing over influence in Asia, Japan is revving up its drive to strengthen relations with countries in Indochina, an economically backward but geopolitically important part of the region.
The target countries are Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, which are collectively referred to as the "CLV" countries. To be sure, these countries are all relatively small in terms of economic size and represent a tiny fraction of East Asia's economy.
Their combined gross domestic product (GDP) was only about US$62 billion in 2005, with Vietnam, the biggest of the three, accounting for about 85% of the total, with $52.8 billion. The combined GDP of Japan, mainland China, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) totaled nearly $9 trillion in 2005.
But their location, with China and India, the world's two most populous countries, looming over them has made the CLV nations much more important for Japan's Asia policy than their economic figures suggest. In addition, for countries outside ASEAN such as Japan and China, assistance in the development of the CLV nations, the least developed of the ASEAN nations along with Myanmar, has become an increasingly important avenue to strengthened ties with the entire ASEAN and thereby their clout in the region. ASEAN groups Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam and has a combined population of some 530 million.
Last week, Japan invited Laotian Prime Minister Bouasone Bouphavanh. During his four-day trip, Bouasone met with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and other Japanese officials to discuss bilateral relations and regional and global issues. Bouasone also had an audience with Emperor Akihito. For Laos as well as Cambodia and Vietnam, Japan is by far the biggest aid donor.
Among other things, Abe and Bouasone agreed to accelerate negotiations on an investment treaty between the two countries to conclude it at an early date, according to their joint press statement. The treaty is aimed at encouraging Japanese investment in the landlocked nation.
The two leaders also emphasized the importance of an enhanced integration of the Laotian economy into the world economy. Abe expressed his support of Laos' accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Cambodia and Vietnam already joined the WTO, in October 2004 and in January this year, respectively.
In addition to bilateral relations, Abe and Bouasone discussed regional and global issues, including the issue of North Korea's nuclear program and Laos' accession to the International Whaling Commission (IWC). Laos has diplomatic ties with North Korea, while Japan does not. Japan wants Laos to use its relations with Pyongyang to help resolve the issues of the reclusive Stalinist state's past abductions of Japanese citizens as well as its nuclear ambitions.
At the IWC, Japan is leading the pro-whaling camp, calling for the lifting of a moratorium on commercial whaling. Abe told Bouasone that he welcomes his country's decision to join the IWC and looks forward to cooperating with Laos at the IWC. But Bouasone did not make it clear which side his nation will take - pro-whaling or anti-whaling.
On Friday, the day after Bouasone left Tokyo, Japan announced that Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen would make a four-day visit to Japan starting on June 13. During the visit, the countries are expected to sign an investment treaty aimed at encouraging Japanese investments in Cambodia. Japan has signed such treaties with 11 countries, including China, Russia and South Korea.
In November, Vietnamese President Nguyen Minh Triet is scheduled to pay a visit to Japan. Last October, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung also came to Tokyo as the first official foreign guest invited by the government of Abe, who took office in September. The leaders issued a statement calling for a "strategic partnership" for peace and prosperity in Asia.
Tug-of-war
Amid growing talk of creating an East Asian Community in recent years, Japan and China have been jockeying for the leadership role in what will be the long and arduous process of community-building. The two Asian powers have competed for stronger and closer ties with ASEAN. Although the 10 ASEAN members are much smaller than Japan and China in economic size individually, they wield a strong voice in East Asian affairs as a group.
As East Asia began to move toward greater regional economic integration several years ago, China had a head start over Japan in strengthening ties with ASEAN by signing a free-trade agreement (FTA). The Sino-ASEAN FTA took effect in July 2005. Japan and ASEAN are still negotiating an FTA, although they are expected to ink the deal this year.
Two-way trade between China and ASEAN has been growing at a much faster pace than that between Japan and ASEAN. China's investment in ASEAN is also surging sharply, although the amount is still dwarfed by Japan's investment in the grouping.
China has taken a lead over Japan on the political front as well. China signed ASEAN's 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in October 2003, a few months before Japan did. Japan initially balked at signing the ASEAN treaty, which provides for, among other things, peaceful settlement of conflicts and non-interference in internal affairs, out of political consideration to its most important ally, the United States.
In 2001, China signed a "Declaration of Conduct" with ASEAN to prevent conflicts in the South China Sea, where China, four of the ASEAN members - Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei - and Taiwan claim all or part of the Spratly Islands. In March 2005, China agreed with Vietnam and the Philippines to explore for oil in the disputed waters.
These aggressive Chinese peace overtures toward ASEAN apparently reflect a desire to assuage the perception of China among some in ASEAN as the most serious security threat to their countries and thereby to forge closer ties with the grouping. Cementing ties with ASEAN in general - and the joint oil-exploration agreement with Vietnam and the Philippines in particular - is also seen as part of efforts to preempt a possible US-led containment of China.
The Sino-Japanese tug-of-war over greater influence in Southeast Asia has also opened a new front - the Mekong River basin. Moves by Japan and China to help the development of the Mekong River basin have intensified in recent years.
The 4,425-kilometer Mekong River originates in Tibet and flows through China's Yunnan province, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam into the South China Sea. It is the main artery for Indochina. The Mekong basin, abundant in natural and human resources, has attracted much attention as an untapped frontier for development since the early 1990s, after an end to the civil war in Cambodia and other Cold War hostilities in the region.
The Mekong region is increasingly seen by many Japanese and Chinese companies as a promising investment destination. But for Japan and China, assistance in the development of the Mekong region has also become a very important avenue to strengthened ties with the entire ASEAN.
For ASEAN, correcting the so-called "ASEAN divide" - the huge gap in wealth between rich and poor members - is a high priority as the grouping accelerates its economic integration with an ultimate goal of creating a fully integrated ASEAN Economic Community by 2015. Per capita income of Myanmar, for example, is less than one-hundredth of that of Singapore. The Mekong River's development is widely believed to hold the key to the development of war-battered Indochina as a whole.
In the early 1990s, after years of civil war ended in Cambodia, Japan took the leadership role in efforts to develop the Mekong region, backed by its huge aid money, and secured a strong influence in the region. Japan also hosted an international peace conference for Cambodia in June 1990. It was the first time since the end of World War II that Japan had hosted an international conference to discuss peace in a third country. The warring factions in Cambodia signed a peace agreement in Paris in October the following year.
In 1992, Japan enacted a historic law enabling its Self-Defense Forces to participate in United Nations-sponsored peacekeeping operations abroad. Under the law, SDF troops were dispatched to join UN peacekeeping efforts in Cambodia prior to the country's first postwar election in the spring of 1993. It marked the first overseas mission for SDF troops. Sending troops abroad had previously been a taboo in Japan because of the country's war-renouncing, post-World War II constitution.
With the turn of the millennium, however, China began to turn the tables on Japan, while Japan rested on its laurels. China has aggressively cozied up to individual ASEAN members, including in Indochina, as well as ASEAN as a whole in recent years. A greater commitment to the development of the Mekong region is part of such efforts. Unlike Vietnam, which has a relatively large economy, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar have been heavily reliant on Thailand for economic growth. But Thailand's influence in Indochina has been eroded since the 1997-98 Asian economic crisis, and China has filled the gap.
Among other initiatives, China hosted the second summit of the Asian Development Bank (ADB)-sponsored Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Economic Cooperation program in Kunming, capital of China's Yunnan province, in July 2005. The GMS has Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, Thailand and China as full members.
China has also offered financial and other assistance programs for the development of the GMS, has forgiven more than $1 billion in debts owed by Cambodia to China, and has expanded preferential tariffs for imports from Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. China has set up a special fund totaling $20 million within the ADB for poverty alleviation of the region. China has also provided military as well as economic aid to Myanmar in defiance of international criticism of that military-ruled country.
It would be fair to note, though, that China has attached a particular importance to the development of the Mekong region, primarily for domestic reasons. China hopes to turn the poorer western part of the vast country into a magnet for domestic and foreign investors and thereby to correct the widening gap in wealth with the flourishing eastern coastal areas, an issue that could threaten the country's political stability and even the rule of the Chinese Communist Party.
Japan has funded infrastructure projects transcending national borders in Indochina on its own or in partnership with the ADB. China has also stepped up financial assistance for the development of that region, flexing its rapidly growing economic muscles.
Two big highway projects crisscrossing Indochina are seen by many as a symbol of the intensifying race for regional influence between Japan and China. One is the East-West Corridor project, led by Japan, to build a major highway, including the Second Mekong Friendship Bridge over the river, to link the port of Da Nang in central Vietnam, Savannakhet in southern Laos, Mukdahan in northeastern Thailand and then Mawlamyine in southern Myanmar. This project was almost completed at the end of last year.
The other is the North-South Corridor project, led by China, to build a highway linking Kunming and Bangkok via Laos. This project is expected to be completed by the end of next year. Japan balked at funding the Chinese-led project, partly for fear of lending China a hand to increase its influence southward in Indochina.
Apparently alarmed by China's rapidly growing political as well as economic influence, then-prime minister Junichiro Koizumi of Japan held talks with his counterparts from the CLV nations in Vientiane, the capital of Laos, in November 2004 for the first ever Japan-CLV summit. The second Japan-CLV summit was held in December 2005 in Kuala Lumpur.
At a foreign ministerial meeting between Japan and the CLV nations in the Philippines in January, Tokyo conveyed to the CLV nations its plan to host a ministerial meeting of Japan and five countries in the Mekong region, including the CLV nations, during fiscal 2007, which started in April, to discuss further cooperation for the region's development. In their talks last week, Abe also explained to Bouasone Japan's decision to make the Mekong region a priority target area for its economic assistance and expand aid for Laos and other regional countries over the next three years.
China remains by far the most powerful magnet for Japanese and other foreign investors in Asia. But Japanese companies have been on an investment spree in Vietnam as well in the past couple of years. Vietnam's economic size and population pale before China's. But the nation has even cheaper labor. Vietnam has become an increasingly popular investment destination for Japanese firms seeking to reduce their excessive dependence on China and spread their business risks in Asia.
The investment pact between Japan and Vietnam took effect in late 2004. Japan and Vietnam also kicked off FTA negotiations in January, separately from FTA negotiations between Japan and the entire ASEAN. Vietnam was also admitted to the WTO in January. WTO membership, which obliges Vietnam to open its markets wider to foreign competition and make its trade and investment rules and regulations fully compatible with international norms, is expected to fuel Japanese and other foreign investment in the country.
Meanwhile, Japan and Cambodia are expected to sign an investment treaty next month, and a similar pact between Japan and Laos is also in the works. Investment treaties, coupled with the full opening of the East-West and North-South corridors to traffic, might give a boost to Japanese investment in Laos and Cambodia as well as Vietnam.
In his talks with Abe last week, Bouasone expressed "his strong wish and commitment to develop special economic zones in other areas besides Savannakhet to make full use of the Second Mekong Friendship Bridge and highways under the East-West Economic Corridor framework", according to their joint press statement. Many Japanese-funded companies in Thailand are becoming more interested in investing in neighboring Laos to take advantage of the closeness between the Thai and Lao languages - many Lao people can speak or read Thai - as well as much cheaper labor in Laos.
Meanwhile, with the construction of infrastructure such as roads and bridges and simplification of customs procedures progressing between China and Vietnam as well as within Indochina, international forwarders have begun to move to establish land transportation networks linking China and Southeast Asia. TNT of the Netherlands, for example, is preparing to complete a 4,000-kilometer-long truck transportation network from Singapore to China via Vietnam by the end of this year. Nippon Express Co, Japan's largest forwarder, also plans to activate a 7,000km network liking the Chinese commercial hub of Shanghai and Singapore early next year.
Japan's new tack
Amid an intensifying tug-of-war between Tokyo and Beijing over influence in Asia, Japan has taken a new tack recently to regain some of the ground lost to China.
Since his inauguration last September, Abe has advocated a more assertive foreign policy and further strengthening of the security alliance with the United States. He has also vowed to seek revisions of the postwar pacifist constitution to allow the nation to play a greater role in the international security arena, especially in step with the US.
In what is widely seen as a thinly veiled snub to China, among other countries, the Abe government has also been aggressively pursuing what it dubs "a value-oriented diplomacy", advocating strengthened relations with countries that share common values, such as freedom, democracy, market economy, respect for human rights and the rule of law. Abe has put particular emphasis on strengthened ties with India and Australia as well as with the US.
Foreign Minister Taro Aso also unveiled his "arc of freedom and prosperity" initiative last November to enhance Japan's relations with emerging democracies in Asia and Europe and actively support their democratic and economic development. In a speech unveiling the initiative, Aso expressed a strong desire to build such an arch "around the outer rim of the Eurasian continent through diplomacy that emphasizes values".
"This region includes countries whose systems have been undergoing great changes now that the confrontation between the East and the West has ended," Aso said.
When Aso announced this initiative, the CLV countries drew particular attention because they were the first names he specifically mentioned as his target nations and regions. "Concretely speaking, what I have in mind right now is Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, for example," he said.
In a speech titled "On the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity", delivered in March at a meeting of a Tokyo-based think-tank, Aso noted that while Abe and he visited Europe in January, he had his senior vice minister, Katsuhito Asano, attend the Japan-CLV foreign ministers' meeting in the Philippines.
To be sure, the CLV nations may be among what Aso said are "countries whose systems have been undergoing great changes" since the end of the Cold War. But the CLV nations, especially Vietnam and Laos, still have a long way to go toward democratic reforms. Like China and North Korea, Vietnam and Laos are one-party states ruled by communist parties.
"Freedom in the World 2007", the latest of annual surveys of political rights and civil liberties released early this year by Freedom House, an independent freedom watchdog based in the US, gave the CLV nations dismal ratings. Ratings range from 1 (the most free) to 7 (the least free). Among the CLV nations, Laos received the worst ratings - 7 for political rights and 6 for civil liberties, the same ratings China received. Vietnam's scores were 7 for political rights and 5 for civil liberties and Cambodia's 6 for political rights and 5 for civil liberties.
Meanwhile, Myanmar was given the ratings of 7 for both political rights and civil liberties, the same ratings given to North Korea. Thailand, another neighbor of the CLV nations, also saw its ratings lowered to 7 for political rights and 4 for civil liberties, because of a military coup last year that ousted a democratically elected premier.
Last September, the United Nations Security Council voted 10-4, with one abstention, to add Myanmar to its formal agenda. China and Russia are among the four members that voted against the move. Japan, which served a two-year term as a non-permanent council member until the end of last year, voted for the anti-Myanmar move.
Myanmar has been under strong pressure from the US and Europe over human rights and democracy. The country's military rulers have kept Nobel Peace Prize laureate and pro-democracy champion Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest for much of the past two decades. Despite the decision last September, the UN has so far failed to take specific action against Myanmar. In January, China and Russia vetoed a US-drafted council resolution that would have demanded Myanmar's military regime end political repression.
Japan has long advocated a policy of "constructive engagement" with Myanmar, rather than isolating that country, to encourage progress on human rights and democracy. Japan's vote for the anti-Myanmar move at the UN signaled a significant departure from what the US and Europe have often grumbled was Tokyo's too soft a policy toward Myanmar. But such a policy shift may be inevitable if Japan, a self-proclaimed Asian champion of freedom and democracy, is to match its words with deeds in pursuing its "value-oriented diplomacy".
Hisane Masaki is a Tokyo-based journalist, commentator and scholar on international politics and economy. Masaki's e-mail address is yiu45535@nifty.com.
The target countries are Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, which are collectively referred to as the "CLV" countries. To be sure, these countries are all relatively small in terms of economic size and represent a tiny fraction of East Asia's economy.
Their combined gross domestic product (GDP) was only about US$62 billion in 2005, with Vietnam, the biggest of the three, accounting for about 85% of the total, with $52.8 billion. The combined GDP of Japan, mainland China, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) totaled nearly $9 trillion in 2005.
But their location, with China and India, the world's two most populous countries, looming over them has made the CLV nations much more important for Japan's Asia policy than their economic figures suggest. In addition, for countries outside ASEAN such as Japan and China, assistance in the development of the CLV nations, the least developed of the ASEAN nations along with Myanmar, has become an increasingly important avenue to strengthened ties with the entire ASEAN and thereby their clout in the region. ASEAN groups Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam and has a combined population of some 530 million.
Last week, Japan invited Laotian Prime Minister Bouasone Bouphavanh. During his four-day trip, Bouasone met with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and other Japanese officials to discuss bilateral relations and regional and global issues. Bouasone also had an audience with Emperor Akihito. For Laos as well as Cambodia and Vietnam, Japan is by far the biggest aid donor.
Among other things, Abe and Bouasone agreed to accelerate negotiations on an investment treaty between the two countries to conclude it at an early date, according to their joint press statement. The treaty is aimed at encouraging Japanese investment in the landlocked nation.
The two leaders also emphasized the importance of an enhanced integration of the Laotian economy into the world economy. Abe expressed his support of Laos' accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Cambodia and Vietnam already joined the WTO, in October 2004 and in January this year, respectively.
In addition to bilateral relations, Abe and Bouasone discussed regional and global issues, including the issue of North Korea's nuclear program and Laos' accession to the International Whaling Commission (IWC). Laos has diplomatic ties with North Korea, while Japan does not. Japan wants Laos to use its relations with Pyongyang to help resolve the issues of the reclusive Stalinist state's past abductions of Japanese citizens as well as its nuclear ambitions.
At the IWC, Japan is leading the pro-whaling camp, calling for the lifting of a moratorium on commercial whaling. Abe told Bouasone that he welcomes his country's decision to join the IWC and looks forward to cooperating with Laos at the IWC. But Bouasone did not make it clear which side his nation will take - pro-whaling or anti-whaling.
On Friday, the day after Bouasone left Tokyo, Japan announced that Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen would make a four-day visit to Japan starting on June 13. During the visit, the countries are expected to sign an investment treaty aimed at encouraging Japanese investments in Cambodia. Japan has signed such treaties with 11 countries, including China, Russia and South Korea.
In November, Vietnamese President Nguyen Minh Triet is scheduled to pay a visit to Japan. Last October, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung also came to Tokyo as the first official foreign guest invited by the government of Abe, who took office in September. The leaders issued a statement calling for a "strategic partnership" for peace and prosperity in Asia.
Tug-of-war
Amid growing talk of creating an East Asian Community in recent years, Japan and China have been jockeying for the leadership role in what will be the long and arduous process of community-building. The two Asian powers have competed for stronger and closer ties with ASEAN. Although the 10 ASEAN members are much smaller than Japan and China in economic size individually, they wield a strong voice in East Asian affairs as a group.
As East Asia began to move toward greater regional economic integration several years ago, China had a head start over Japan in strengthening ties with ASEAN by signing a free-trade agreement (FTA). The Sino-ASEAN FTA took effect in July 2005. Japan and ASEAN are still negotiating an FTA, although they are expected to ink the deal this year.
Two-way trade between China and ASEAN has been growing at a much faster pace than that between Japan and ASEAN. China's investment in ASEAN is also surging sharply, although the amount is still dwarfed by Japan's investment in the grouping.
China has taken a lead over Japan on the political front as well. China signed ASEAN's 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in October 2003, a few months before Japan did. Japan initially balked at signing the ASEAN treaty, which provides for, among other things, peaceful settlement of conflicts and non-interference in internal affairs, out of political consideration to its most important ally, the United States.
In 2001, China signed a "Declaration of Conduct" with ASEAN to prevent conflicts in the South China Sea, where China, four of the ASEAN members - Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei - and Taiwan claim all or part of the Spratly Islands. In March 2005, China agreed with Vietnam and the Philippines to explore for oil in the disputed waters.
These aggressive Chinese peace overtures toward ASEAN apparently reflect a desire to assuage the perception of China among some in ASEAN as the most serious security threat to their countries and thereby to forge closer ties with the grouping. Cementing ties with ASEAN in general - and the joint oil-exploration agreement with Vietnam and the Philippines in particular - is also seen as part of efforts to preempt a possible US-led containment of China.
The Sino-Japanese tug-of-war over greater influence in Southeast Asia has also opened a new front - the Mekong River basin. Moves by Japan and China to help the development of the Mekong River basin have intensified in recent years.
The 4,425-kilometer Mekong River originates in Tibet and flows through China's Yunnan province, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam into the South China Sea. It is the main artery for Indochina. The Mekong basin, abundant in natural and human resources, has attracted much attention as an untapped frontier for development since the early 1990s, after an end to the civil war in Cambodia and other Cold War hostilities in the region.
The Mekong region is increasingly seen by many Japanese and Chinese companies as a promising investment destination. But for Japan and China, assistance in the development of the Mekong region has also become a very important avenue to strengthened ties with the entire ASEAN.
For ASEAN, correcting the so-called "ASEAN divide" - the huge gap in wealth between rich and poor members - is a high priority as the grouping accelerates its economic integration with an ultimate goal of creating a fully integrated ASEAN Economic Community by 2015. Per capita income of Myanmar, for example, is less than one-hundredth of that of Singapore. The Mekong River's development is widely believed to hold the key to the development of war-battered Indochina as a whole.
In the early 1990s, after years of civil war ended in Cambodia, Japan took the leadership role in efforts to develop the Mekong region, backed by its huge aid money, and secured a strong influence in the region. Japan also hosted an international peace conference for Cambodia in June 1990. It was the first time since the end of World War II that Japan had hosted an international conference to discuss peace in a third country. The warring factions in Cambodia signed a peace agreement in Paris in October the following year.
In 1992, Japan enacted a historic law enabling its Self-Defense Forces to participate in United Nations-sponsored peacekeeping operations abroad. Under the law, SDF troops were dispatched to join UN peacekeeping efforts in Cambodia prior to the country's first postwar election in the spring of 1993. It marked the first overseas mission for SDF troops. Sending troops abroad had previously been a taboo in Japan because of the country's war-renouncing, post-World War II constitution.
With the turn of the millennium, however, China began to turn the tables on Japan, while Japan rested on its laurels. China has aggressively cozied up to individual ASEAN members, including in Indochina, as well as ASEAN as a whole in recent years. A greater commitment to the development of the Mekong region is part of such efforts. Unlike Vietnam, which has a relatively large economy, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar have been heavily reliant on Thailand for economic growth. But Thailand's influence in Indochina has been eroded since the 1997-98 Asian economic crisis, and China has filled the gap.
Among other initiatives, China hosted the second summit of the Asian Development Bank (ADB)-sponsored Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Economic Cooperation program in Kunming, capital of China's Yunnan province, in July 2005. The GMS has Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, Thailand and China as full members.
China has also offered financial and other assistance programs for the development of the GMS, has forgiven more than $1 billion in debts owed by Cambodia to China, and has expanded preferential tariffs for imports from Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. China has set up a special fund totaling $20 million within the ADB for poverty alleviation of the region. China has also provided military as well as economic aid to Myanmar in defiance of international criticism of that military-ruled country.
It would be fair to note, though, that China has attached a particular importance to the development of the Mekong region, primarily for domestic reasons. China hopes to turn the poorer western part of the vast country into a magnet for domestic and foreign investors and thereby to correct the widening gap in wealth with the flourishing eastern coastal areas, an issue that could threaten the country's political stability and even the rule of the Chinese Communist Party.
Japan has funded infrastructure projects transcending national borders in Indochina on its own or in partnership with the ADB. China has also stepped up financial assistance for the development of that region, flexing its rapidly growing economic muscles.
Two big highway projects crisscrossing Indochina are seen by many as a symbol of the intensifying race for regional influence between Japan and China. One is the East-West Corridor project, led by Japan, to build a major highway, including the Second Mekong Friendship Bridge over the river, to link the port of Da Nang in central Vietnam, Savannakhet in southern Laos, Mukdahan in northeastern Thailand and then Mawlamyine in southern Myanmar. This project was almost completed at the end of last year.
The other is the North-South Corridor project, led by China, to build a highway linking Kunming and Bangkok via Laos. This project is expected to be completed by the end of next year. Japan balked at funding the Chinese-led project, partly for fear of lending China a hand to increase its influence southward in Indochina.
Apparently alarmed by China's rapidly growing political as well as economic influence, then-prime minister Junichiro Koizumi of Japan held talks with his counterparts from the CLV nations in Vientiane, the capital of Laos, in November 2004 for the first ever Japan-CLV summit. The second Japan-CLV summit was held in December 2005 in Kuala Lumpur.
At a foreign ministerial meeting between Japan and the CLV nations in the Philippines in January, Tokyo conveyed to the CLV nations its plan to host a ministerial meeting of Japan and five countries in the Mekong region, including the CLV nations, during fiscal 2007, which started in April, to discuss further cooperation for the region's development. In their talks last week, Abe also explained to Bouasone Japan's decision to make the Mekong region a priority target area for its economic assistance and expand aid for Laos and other regional countries over the next three years.
China remains by far the most powerful magnet for Japanese and other foreign investors in Asia. But Japanese companies have been on an investment spree in Vietnam as well in the past couple of years. Vietnam's economic size and population pale before China's. But the nation has even cheaper labor. Vietnam has become an increasingly popular investment destination for Japanese firms seeking to reduce their excessive dependence on China and spread their business risks in Asia.
The investment pact between Japan and Vietnam took effect in late 2004. Japan and Vietnam also kicked off FTA negotiations in January, separately from FTA negotiations between Japan and the entire ASEAN. Vietnam was also admitted to the WTO in January. WTO membership, which obliges Vietnam to open its markets wider to foreign competition and make its trade and investment rules and regulations fully compatible with international norms, is expected to fuel Japanese and other foreign investment in the country.
Meanwhile, Japan and Cambodia are expected to sign an investment treaty next month, and a similar pact between Japan and Laos is also in the works. Investment treaties, coupled with the full opening of the East-West and North-South corridors to traffic, might give a boost to Japanese investment in Laos and Cambodia as well as Vietnam.
In his talks with Abe last week, Bouasone expressed "his strong wish and commitment to develop special economic zones in other areas besides Savannakhet to make full use of the Second Mekong Friendship Bridge and highways under the East-West Economic Corridor framework", according to their joint press statement. Many Japanese-funded companies in Thailand are becoming more interested in investing in neighboring Laos to take advantage of the closeness between the Thai and Lao languages - many Lao people can speak or read Thai - as well as much cheaper labor in Laos.
Meanwhile, with the construction of infrastructure such as roads and bridges and simplification of customs procedures progressing between China and Vietnam as well as within Indochina, international forwarders have begun to move to establish land transportation networks linking China and Southeast Asia. TNT of the Netherlands, for example, is preparing to complete a 4,000-kilometer-long truck transportation network from Singapore to China via Vietnam by the end of this year. Nippon Express Co, Japan's largest forwarder, also plans to activate a 7,000km network liking the Chinese commercial hub of Shanghai and Singapore early next year.
Japan's new tack
Amid an intensifying tug-of-war between Tokyo and Beijing over influence in Asia, Japan has taken a new tack recently to regain some of the ground lost to China.
Since his inauguration last September, Abe has advocated a more assertive foreign policy and further strengthening of the security alliance with the United States. He has also vowed to seek revisions of the postwar pacifist constitution to allow the nation to play a greater role in the international security arena, especially in step with the US.
In what is widely seen as a thinly veiled snub to China, among other countries, the Abe government has also been aggressively pursuing what it dubs "a value-oriented diplomacy", advocating strengthened relations with countries that share common values, such as freedom, democracy, market economy, respect for human rights and the rule of law. Abe has put particular emphasis on strengthened ties with India and Australia as well as with the US.
Foreign Minister Taro Aso also unveiled his "arc of freedom and prosperity" initiative last November to enhance Japan's relations with emerging democracies in Asia and Europe and actively support their democratic and economic development. In a speech unveiling the initiative, Aso expressed a strong desire to build such an arch "around the outer rim of the Eurasian continent through diplomacy that emphasizes values".
"This region includes countries whose systems have been undergoing great changes now that the confrontation between the East and the West has ended," Aso said.
When Aso announced this initiative, the CLV countries drew particular attention because they were the first names he specifically mentioned as his target nations and regions. "Concretely speaking, what I have in mind right now is Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, for example," he said.
In a speech titled "On the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity", delivered in March at a meeting of a Tokyo-based think-tank, Aso noted that while Abe and he visited Europe in January, he had his senior vice minister, Katsuhito Asano, attend the Japan-CLV foreign ministers' meeting in the Philippines.
To be sure, the CLV nations may be among what Aso said are "countries whose systems have been undergoing great changes" since the end of the Cold War. But the CLV nations, especially Vietnam and Laos, still have a long way to go toward democratic reforms. Like China and North Korea, Vietnam and Laos are one-party states ruled by communist parties.
"Freedom in the World 2007", the latest of annual surveys of political rights and civil liberties released early this year by Freedom House, an independent freedom watchdog based in the US, gave the CLV nations dismal ratings. Ratings range from 1 (the most free) to 7 (the least free). Among the CLV nations, Laos received the worst ratings - 7 for political rights and 6 for civil liberties, the same ratings China received. Vietnam's scores were 7 for political rights and 5 for civil liberties and Cambodia's 6 for political rights and 5 for civil liberties.
Meanwhile, Myanmar was given the ratings of 7 for both political rights and civil liberties, the same ratings given to North Korea. Thailand, another neighbor of the CLV nations, also saw its ratings lowered to 7 for political rights and 4 for civil liberties, because of a military coup last year that ousted a democratically elected premier.
Last September, the United Nations Security Council voted 10-4, with one abstention, to add Myanmar to its formal agenda. China and Russia are among the four members that voted against the move. Japan, which served a two-year term as a non-permanent council member until the end of last year, voted for the anti-Myanmar move.
Myanmar has been under strong pressure from the US and Europe over human rights and democracy. The country's military rulers have kept Nobel Peace Prize laureate and pro-democracy champion Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest for much of the past two decades. Despite the decision last September, the UN has so far failed to take specific action against Myanmar. In January, China and Russia vetoed a US-drafted council resolution that would have demanded Myanmar's military regime end political repression.
Japan has long advocated a policy of "constructive engagement" with Myanmar, rather than isolating that country, to encourage progress on human rights and democracy. Japan's vote for the anti-Myanmar move at the UN signaled a significant departure from what the US and Europe have often grumbled was Tokyo's too soft a policy toward Myanmar. But such a policy shift may be inevitable if Japan, a self-proclaimed Asian champion of freedom and democracy, is to match its words with deeds in pursuing its "value-oriented diplomacy".
Hisane Masaki is a Tokyo-based journalist, commentator and scholar on international politics and economy. Masaki's e-mail address is yiu45535@nifty.com.
Monday, March 12, 2007
VN defense minister on tour inspection of Indochina
March 12, 2007
Vietnamese defense minister visits Laos, Cambodia
Vietnamese defense minister visits Laos, Cambodia
Vietnamese Defense Minister Phung Quang Thanh left Monday morning for official visits to Laos and Cambodia, Vietnam News Agency reported.
Thanh, also member of the Political Bureau under the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee, is to visit the two neighbor countries from March 12-19.
His trips are made at the invitation of his Lao and Cambodian counterparts who are also deputy prime ministers.
Source: Xinhua
Thanh, also member of the Political Bureau under the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee, is to visit the two neighbor countries from March 12-19.
His trips are made at the invitation of his Lao and Cambodian counterparts who are also deputy prime ministers.
Source: Xinhua
Vietnam pushes for the first conference on the development of Indochina?
10-03-2007
Development meeting set up
VNS
Development meeting set up
VNS
HA NOI — The first conference of the general co-ordinating committee which oversees the development of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia will be held either late this month or early next month in Gia Lai Province.
The Government Office on Thursday issued document No 1216/VPCP/QHQT to publish the Prime Minister’s plans to organise the conference, under which he agreed that the Ministry of Planning and Investment would preside over and co-operate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as local departments, to hold the conference.
The Government Office on Thursday issued document No 1216/VPCP/QHQT to publish the Prime Minister’s plans to organise the conference, under which he agreed that the Ministry of Planning and Investment would preside over and co-operate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as local departments, to hold the conference.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
