Op-Ed by Jayakhmer
Posted online
In my last article, I mentioned casually that relation between Cambodia and the U.S was strained at best. Since this pivotal moment changed the faith of the country, I decided to investigate further. The evidences contradict the popular notion that Norodom Sihanouk was hastily and readily embraced the North Viet Nam and China in the sixties.
I know that Norodom Sihanouk was "no angel." That does not give us the rights to make a gross generalization about all his conducts. If we continue to let our passion dominates our otherwise rational selves, we are vulnerable to repeat the mistakes our predecessors committed again and again.
American's attitude about the Cambodia's border issues played and important role in this matter. To achieve its objective which was defeating the Vietcong, America was indifferent about violations of Cambodia's borders by its neighbors Viet Nam and Thailand despite endless complains from the former king.
Thailand repeatedly occupied Preah Vihea at the time. "According to the White Book of the Cambodian Foreign Ministry, from 1962 to May 1969....the Saigon authority committed 7,178 violations of Cambodian territory (165 by sea, 1864 by land, and 5149 by air), killed or wounded 983 Khmers..."
The diplomatic tensions between the U.S. and Cambodia in the spring of 1964 alone tell us that Norodom Sihanouk was not hasty. He was unsuccessful in his attempt.
February 8, 1964 Norodom Sihanouk held the U.S. responsible for "the South Vietnamese attack on a Cambodian village on Feb. 4," and the former king asked the US to finance truce observation posts along the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border. February 11, 1964 Norodom Sihanouk proposed, "An international conference to guarantee Cambodia's neutrality." By February 13, the former king warned that, "If the US does not agree to an international conference by May, he would sever diplomatic relations with Washington and possibly sign assistance agreements with 'certain great friendly countries'. [Referring to China and North Vietnam]" Basically, the warning was if the U.S. does not take the former king's proposal seriously he would support the Vietcong. Here is a piece of Dean Rusk's telegraph from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom on March 22, 1964. "To sum up, I think it is possible that your and my approach to these issues differs somewhat because of our different situations. We are heavily engaged in South Viet-Nam and are taking casualties every week in an effort to keep that country from going communist. Further, the Thais obviously rely more heavily upon our bilateral commitments than upon the general structure of SEATO in which they think non-regional members will be negligent of Thai security. Our regional stakes in Southeast Asia are so great that it is not easy for us to cooperate with the non-regional members of SEATO at the expense of South Viet-Nam and Thailand. I do not see how the United States can come to a general Geneva Conference without Saigon and Bangkok. Since Sihanouk's initiative was aimed at both these countries, I do not see how a conference could produce any worthwhile result unless they were present. You may believe that we have unlimited influence in Saigon and Bangkok, but this is simply not the case. Were we to try to drag these two countries kicking and screaming to a Geneva Conference, the situation in Saigon might well collapse through fear of neutralization and Thailand might well decide that we are wholly unreliable and that their only course is to make their peace with the communists in the North. This is the heart of the matter as I see it, and should not be glossed over by purely procedural considerations as to whether it is congenial to have a conference. If the issue is whether an unbalanced Sihanouk will irrationally turn to the communist North, we must balance this against the impact of a complete loss of morale in South Viet-Nam and Thailand." America was uneven handed and indifference when it came to resolving Cambodia territorial issues.
Could Norodom Sihanouk side with a hesitated America who sided with the perceived enemies of Cambodia at the time? The answer to this question demands our rationality. We all knew too well of the faith and consequences of this pivotal moment.
I know that Norodom Sihanouk was "no angel." That does not give us the rights to make a gross generalization about all his conducts. If we continue to let our passion dominates our otherwise rational selves, we are vulnerable to repeat the mistakes our predecessors committed again and again.
American's attitude about the Cambodia's border issues played and important role in this matter. To achieve its objective which was defeating the Vietcong, America was indifferent about violations of Cambodia's borders by its neighbors Viet Nam and Thailand despite endless complains from the former king.
Thailand repeatedly occupied Preah Vihea at the time. "According to the White Book of the Cambodian Foreign Ministry, from 1962 to May 1969....the Saigon authority committed 7,178 violations of Cambodian territory (165 by sea, 1864 by land, and 5149 by air), killed or wounded 983 Khmers..."
The diplomatic tensions between the U.S. and Cambodia in the spring of 1964 alone tell us that Norodom Sihanouk was not hasty. He was unsuccessful in his attempt.
February 8, 1964 Norodom Sihanouk held the U.S. responsible for "the South Vietnamese attack on a Cambodian village on Feb. 4," and the former king asked the US to finance truce observation posts along the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border. February 11, 1964 Norodom Sihanouk proposed, "An international conference to guarantee Cambodia's neutrality." By February 13, the former king warned that, "If the US does not agree to an international conference by May, he would sever diplomatic relations with Washington and possibly sign assistance agreements with 'certain great friendly countries'. [Referring to China and North Vietnam]" Basically, the warning was if the U.S. does not take the former king's proposal seriously he would support the Vietcong. Here is a piece of Dean Rusk's telegraph from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom on March 22, 1964. "To sum up, I think it is possible that your and my approach to these issues differs somewhat because of our different situations. We are heavily engaged in South Viet-Nam and are taking casualties every week in an effort to keep that country from going communist. Further, the Thais obviously rely more heavily upon our bilateral commitments than upon the general structure of SEATO in which they think non-regional members will be negligent of Thai security. Our regional stakes in Southeast Asia are so great that it is not easy for us to cooperate with the non-regional members of SEATO at the expense of South Viet-Nam and Thailand. I do not see how the United States can come to a general Geneva Conference without Saigon and Bangkok. Since Sihanouk's initiative was aimed at both these countries, I do not see how a conference could produce any worthwhile result unless they were present. You may believe that we have unlimited influence in Saigon and Bangkok, but this is simply not the case. Were we to try to drag these two countries kicking and screaming to a Geneva Conference, the situation in Saigon might well collapse through fear of neutralization and Thailand might well decide that we are wholly unreliable and that their only course is to make their peace with the communists in the North. This is the heart of the matter as I see it, and should not be glossed over by purely procedural considerations as to whether it is congenial to have a conference. If the issue is whether an unbalanced Sihanouk will irrationally turn to the communist North, we must balance this against the impact of a complete loss of morale in South Viet-Nam and Thailand." America was uneven handed and indifference when it came to resolving Cambodia territorial issues.
Could Norodom Sihanouk side with a hesitated America who sided with the perceived enemies of Cambodia at the time? The answer to this question demands our rationality. We all knew too well of the faith and consequences of this pivotal moment.
