How to deal with the problem of Thai Cambodian relations: Thailand's MFA secret document

Source: Thaksin's Twitter website

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(TRANSLATION)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Most Top Secret - Most Urgent

Sri Ayudhaya Road Bangkok 10400
16 November 2009

SUBJECT: How to deal with the problem of Thai Cambodian relations

TO: the Prime Minister

ATTENTION: MFA's top secret report, Most Urgent MFA 1302/2318, dated November 10 2009

ATTACHED:

1. The document's procedure on how to deal with the problem of Thai-Cambodia relations.
2. Signal Tables and Response Levels to preventive measures and the appropriate actions of the Cambodian Government accordingly.

In reference to Cambodian reaction and a proposal on how to deal with the situation and its impact in full details.

MFA would like to propose the solutions on how to proceed with an attachment as follows:

1. An analysis from Cambodian Government's point of view:

• 1.1 Police Lt-Colonel Thaksin Shinawatra is "The Main Threat" intending to threaten the survival of the government by creating the deterioration of political situation by applying two-pronged strategies, the alliances with Cambodian PM and Thai opposition especially the UDD to reduce the effectiveness of our governance to the point of chaos and helplessness. However, Cambodian reaction to this point has been only diplomatic moves not of extreme measures, but a series of provocations to force Thailand to overreact.
• 1.2 The incidents involved are the conflict between two governments. Thailand must not be trapped by Cambodian Government's argument that this conflict are personal among the PM and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Cambodian Prime Minister.
• 1.3 Whether the problematic situation between Cambodia and Thailand continues, it does not depend on the Cambodian PM but will depend on the Thai internal conditions. Cambodian PM will benefit from Police Lt Colonel Thaksin regardless of how it ends. Therefore, the stabilities of every branch of the government and all parts of Thai societies working together, are the most important components to alleviate the problems.

2. Operating procedures:

To prevent the situation from turning into Police Lt Colonel Thaksin and the Cambodian PM's advantages, MFA proposes these procedures:

• 2.1 (De-escalation) Prevention or avoidance of the violent situation by
• proceeding with care without overreaction or respond with sufficient reason or condition in incremental proportion with meaning. In essence, we do not have to react to every newspaper article.
• 2.2 All government departments should share and communicate with each other before the Cambodian Government distort or spin the news.
• 2.3 Government must lead in total unity in order for Cambodian PM to
• realize that Police Lt Colonel Thaksin has no chance to return to power and his personal relationship with Cambodian PM can not be sustained while at the same time Cambodia will lose tangible benefits with Thailand in the long run whether it is mutual trade, investment or tourist issues.
• 2.4 Separate and divide Police Lt Colonel Thaksin, Cambodian PM, and the opposition in Thailand by reducing the opposition's base of support. Thai Government must give responses without affecting the civilians' morale by making its cases and speak softly in order to win the heart and mind of the people and we should use our remaining time in speeding all its legal cases against Police Lt Colonel Thaksin.

3.End Game:

Thai Government's objective should be normalization of Thai Cambodian relations not regime change. However, since Police Lt Colonel Thaksin intends to destabilize the government, it is necessary to deal with the root of the problem by (1) eliminating the Main Threat (2) Dividing and minimizing the level of cooperation between Police Lt Colonel Thaksin and Cambodian PM. Therefore the future could develop into three scenarios:

3.1 Best case Scenario

Maintain Status Quo in order that Police Lt Colonel Thaksin and Cambodia PM are unable to operate their plans to make the situation worse by following the operating procedures mentioned above and then wait for our allies or friend to assist us to reducing the tension.

3.2 Medium case scenario

• 3.2.1 Each side retaliates with incremental intensity to gain the advantage.
• 3.2.2 If Cambodia takes more extreme measures which interfere with our internal affairs, we should take retaliating measures (1) which will not affect both our national interests and interests of the people on both sides and (2) which are proportionate, and (3) which are not damaging our long-termed relation of the people on both sides.
• 3.2.3 At the same time, the Government must not reveal our retaliatory measures in advance because (1) Cambodia will have sufficient time to respond (2) it will appear as if we prearrange our responses in order to hassle Cambodia. However, MFA arranges detailed level of retaliation table by pointing out positives and negatives in the attached paper.

3.3 (Worst case scenario)

If Police Lt Colonel Thaksin and Cambodian PM create any incidents which cause any loss of life and properties, such actions are deemed severe threat to our sovereignty and security of Thailand whether it involves the creation of government in exile which constitutes clearly the interference in the internal affairs of Thailand. In such case, it is necessary for Thai Government to sever the diplomatic relations as well as use military means to defend itself.

4. Suggestions:

If these procedures are approved, Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggests that PM issue orders to:

• 4.1 Synchronize all government departments, full consultations
• should take place before any policies towards Cambodia are carried out.
• 4.2 Make sure the agreed policies are followed.
• 4.3 All public announcements should conform in accordance with the agreed policies.

Sincerely,

Mr Kasit Pirom
Foreign Minister