Ho Chi Minh alias Nguyen Sinh Cung and also known as Nguyen Ai Quoc, mastermind of Cambodia genocide18/01/2010 (Updated 19/01/2010)
Written by Kok Sap
Originally posted at http://khamerlogue.wordpress.com
The Confucius era sage said, the nation flourish that the ruler listens to people; the nation perish that the ruler listens to spirits. Exactly, this was happening during DK struggle for power and stability of its regime.
Nowadays, Cambodia is ruled by the DK rebels and collaborators alike. Deeply, Cambodia conscience is torn. The current regime is not much different than its predecessor, a one man show. That man wants Cambodians to say he is the savior. But in reality, he was more of a lackey of Hanoi. He condemns the opposing view and dehumanized his dissenters as ingrate of animal like. Further he declared 7 January was his second birthday and all of Cambodia origins. As it seems those who know don’t say, those who say don’t know. In fact, not to all Cambodians agree with his claim. There are survivors who fled Cambodia to safety during Yuon invasion in December 1978 prior to the 7 January 1979 occupation day. They were not the privileged or affiliated with the toppled DK regime. They survived and lived tragic and catastrophic regime to the end, except, they did not wait around for Yuon bo doi to liberate them. They liberated families and themselves at their own conscience and responsibilities.
These people disagreed and would not kneel down to accept the stocked line,”7 January 1979 was the second birthday for Cambodia people and 17 April 1975 was a victory for Cambodia.” They are, in the sense, the truly freed. They saw 17 April and 7 January as Hanoi conspiracy plan and personal conveniences. Many still believe the only true liberation was 18 March 1970 when people would fight and die for Cambodia best interest.
During the internal power struggle and the course of Yuon’s invasion, there were independent minded individuals who were unafraid to make sacrifices and to risk getting killed by both DK’s elements and Yuon’s collaborators to seek freedom. Also they lost loved ones to Pol Pot-Sihanouk regime as well. Of course, they had to leave Cambodia to avoid last minute killing,some were alone and others brought families along. They were small in number but their actions were truly self-initiated and determined to survive and fight for their humanity. Same time, they were seen as enemies of, both Viet Minh and Viet Cong’s regime, DK and PRK.
Like it or not, the handful folks were the source of the initial resistance to fight both DK and PRK for freedom. Their families’ members were forced at gun point to go with either side of the warring factions. Some were involuntarily armed by the DK or Yuon’s lackeys and fled. Some had found the abandoned weapons and ammunitions on their ways to the west jungle border. Before major exodus in mid 1979, with whatever weapons in possession, they were set out to search for and rescue the rest of their families. They were the fighters for their families survival and own humanity.
In essence, they were invisible and not mentioned anywhere in history. They fell through the crack with unique experience of self sustenance and survival. Yet, they were not immune from either Siam’s or DK’s and Yuon’s persecution. They were the forgotten braves, the freed who sought out the liberty in according to a Mexican revolutionary verse, “I rather die on my own feet than live on my knees.” They were labeled and painted as enemies to both DK and Yuon’s regime and illegal entrants to Siam territory.
Unlike the thousands who bought or bribed their ways to be admitted in Siam controlled refugee camps, they were not the economic hardship or displaced persons. In UN definition, they were truly political refugees. They survived endless humiliation and contempt which were brought upon them by the assimilated Thais of Khmer origin living along borderline. They were true refugees with uncertain hope and country. Worst, folks were not permitted and granted asylum to stay in Thailand.
Being who they were, they refused to be enlisted and exploited by Siam Military Task Force dirty agendas. They were imprisoned by Siam border police and rescued by ICRC then placed in UNHCR protected camps apart from those in newly built refugee camps along Siam border.
All were poor and sickened from malaria and food deprivation. For them the refugee life, in a restricted camp, was not a thrill one: they were forbidden to speak to foreign delegates/visitors or press without prior authorization. They were classified political refugees with special UNHCR issued identity card for food ration.
Each morning they must line up in order to receive few Aspirin or other fever pills from Siam Red Cross then food ration afterward. The ration for an adult was 1 1/2 can of rice per day with small portion of salty rotten fishes and greens. And for a child received one can of rice per day.
Once in awhile, family would receive small ration of sugar and tiny bar of soap per person. No charcoal or firewood provided for cooking. Camp administrative did not distribute ICRC issued clothes and detergent except only poor quality blankets to them. Thrice weekly, in the afternoon, under strict supervision one family was allowed one person out to search for and transport back firewood from the nearby bushes along the Gulf of Siam.
Weekly, the camp security officers would search building and family allotted living area for excessive rice or whatever else. If they found some saved rice or salt in any family place, the head of family would be interrogated and punished. The allegation was the excessive or left over rice must be intended for not good purpose.
In mid 1979, these people were divided by criterion to resettle and live in Switzerland, Austria, Argentina, Brazil, France, and a handful went to Red China. The unselected ones remain in camp for long time until the US resolved legislation to accept and resettle them in early 80’s. The visa indicated as political asylum under specific refugee act codes.
In abroad, the small pocketed groups are neither the sympathizers nor the empathizers of post 18 March regimes. Then they were the aliens in own land and homes since Viet Cong attacked Cambodia back in 1970. They did not see Yuon as their liberators or 7 January 1979 as their second birthday. They saw either one was to make their Cambodia a living hell on earth. They saw tragic death of millions was a turning point in Cambodia tragic war and Yuon neo-colonial policy.
In spite of 1954 Geneva conference agreements, Viet Minh never left Cambodia. Subsequently 17 April 1975 brought in Viet Cong’s genocide and the enslavement for the entire Cambodia. Then it came 7 January 1979 day. It might have stopped Pol Pot-Sihanouk from killing more but Yuon’s subjugation and enslavement appeared no lesser evil to Cambodia.
In the early 80’s Yuon’s Kor-5 plan had killed hundred thousands. It was resulted countless orphaned children and widower of broken heart. Then the peace negotiation was arranged by Indonesia and France to end Yuon occupation and civil war. Presently Hun Sen boasts it's his ideas to realize it. To true historical view, Hun Sen was not the person that made it happened. It’s Sihanouk who was a principle in such agreement. The world may dislike Sihanouk in person but his acquired diplomatic skills and seasoned politics can put the world perspective into his favor.
Besides it was the Supreme National Council majority rule and agreement, with the blessing from sponsors Indonesia and France, to push UN peacekeeping and military cantonment process into Cambodia before its general election held in 1993.
For history, neither Yuon’s 17 April nor 7 January day would justify Hanoi sponsored crimes against Cambodia and its people since early 1800. During the occupation, Cambodians were raped, killed and robbed by bo doi or agents in day light. To say the least, Hanoi couldn’t careless if Cambodia extinct or fell off the earth.
The world humanity, in records, came to rescue and feed Cambodia after 1979. While Cambodians were starved to death, yet Yuon made sure Phnom Penh split up and sent the World Food Program supplies to Hanoi armies ( details in book, ’Quality of Mercy’ by William Shawcross) .
In his foreign policy records since 1984, Hun Sen has had personally spoken to and has begged many overseas Cambodians included some of the forgotten braves who visited families to help appealing to US or UN security council for reconsideration to recognize his regime then. It’s rather shameful for Hun Sen to live on his knees and continue to lie to his own people about Yuon's false liberation. Obviously,liar lives own lies and believes no one noticed the difference.
Nowadays, Cambodia is ruled by the DK rebels and collaborators alike. Deeply, Cambodia conscience is torn. The current regime is not much different than its predecessor, a one man show. That man wants Cambodians to say he is the savior. But in reality, he was more of a lackey of Hanoi. He condemns the opposing view and dehumanized his dissenters as ingrate of animal like. Further he declared 7 January was his second birthday and all of Cambodia origins. As it seems those who know don’t say, those who say don’t know. In fact, not to all Cambodians agree with his claim. There are survivors who fled Cambodia to safety during Yuon invasion in December 1978 prior to the 7 January 1979 occupation day. They were not the privileged or affiliated with the toppled DK regime. They survived and lived tragic and catastrophic regime to the end, except, they did not wait around for Yuon bo doi to liberate them. They liberated families and themselves at their own conscience and responsibilities.
These people disagreed and would not kneel down to accept the stocked line,”7 January 1979 was the second birthday for Cambodia people and 17 April 1975 was a victory for Cambodia.” They are, in the sense, the truly freed. They saw 17 April and 7 January as Hanoi conspiracy plan and personal conveniences. Many still believe the only true liberation was 18 March 1970 when people would fight and die for Cambodia best interest.
During the internal power struggle and the course of Yuon’s invasion, there were independent minded individuals who were unafraid to make sacrifices and to risk getting killed by both DK’s elements and Yuon’s collaborators to seek freedom. Also they lost loved ones to Pol Pot-Sihanouk regime as well. Of course, they had to leave Cambodia to avoid last minute killing,some were alone and others brought families along. They were small in number but their actions were truly self-initiated and determined to survive and fight for their humanity. Same time, they were seen as enemies of, both Viet Minh and Viet Cong’s regime, DK and PRK.
Like it or not, the handful folks were the source of the initial resistance to fight both DK and PRK for freedom. Their families’ members were forced at gun point to go with either side of the warring factions. Some were involuntarily armed by the DK or Yuon’s lackeys and fled. Some had found the abandoned weapons and ammunitions on their ways to the west jungle border. Before major exodus in mid 1979, with whatever weapons in possession, they were set out to search for and rescue the rest of their families. They were the fighters for their families survival and own humanity.
In essence, they were invisible and not mentioned anywhere in history. They fell through the crack with unique experience of self sustenance and survival. Yet, they were not immune from either Siam’s or DK’s and Yuon’s persecution. They were the forgotten braves, the freed who sought out the liberty in according to a Mexican revolutionary verse, “I rather die on my own feet than live on my knees.” They were labeled and painted as enemies to both DK and Yuon’s regime and illegal entrants to Siam territory.
Unlike the thousands who bought or bribed their ways to be admitted in Siam controlled refugee camps, they were not the economic hardship or displaced persons. In UN definition, they were truly political refugees. They survived endless humiliation and contempt which were brought upon them by the assimilated Thais of Khmer origin living along borderline. They were true refugees with uncertain hope and country. Worst, folks were not permitted and granted asylum to stay in Thailand.
Being who they were, they refused to be enlisted and exploited by Siam Military Task Force dirty agendas. They were imprisoned by Siam border police and rescued by ICRC then placed in UNHCR protected camps apart from those in newly built refugee camps along Siam border.
All were poor and sickened from malaria and food deprivation. For them the refugee life, in a restricted camp, was not a thrill one: they were forbidden to speak to foreign delegates/visitors or press without prior authorization. They were classified political refugees with special UNHCR issued identity card for food ration.
Each morning they must line up in order to receive few Aspirin or other fever pills from Siam Red Cross then food ration afterward. The ration for an adult was 1 1/2 can of rice per day with small portion of salty rotten fishes and greens. And for a child received one can of rice per day.
Once in awhile, family would receive small ration of sugar and tiny bar of soap per person. No charcoal or firewood provided for cooking. Camp administrative did not distribute ICRC issued clothes and detergent except only poor quality blankets to them. Thrice weekly, in the afternoon, under strict supervision one family was allowed one person out to search for and transport back firewood from the nearby bushes along the Gulf of Siam.
Weekly, the camp security officers would search building and family allotted living area for excessive rice or whatever else. If they found some saved rice or salt in any family place, the head of family would be interrogated and punished. The allegation was the excessive or left over rice must be intended for not good purpose.
In mid 1979, these people were divided by criterion to resettle and live in Switzerland, Austria, Argentina, Brazil, France, and a handful went to Red China. The unselected ones remain in camp for long time until the US resolved legislation to accept and resettle them in early 80’s. The visa indicated as political asylum under specific refugee act codes.
In abroad, the small pocketed groups are neither the sympathizers nor the empathizers of post 18 March regimes. Then they were the aliens in own land and homes since Viet Cong attacked Cambodia back in 1970. They did not see Yuon as their liberators or 7 January 1979 as their second birthday. They saw either one was to make their Cambodia a living hell on earth. They saw tragic death of millions was a turning point in Cambodia tragic war and Yuon neo-colonial policy.
In spite of 1954 Geneva conference agreements, Viet Minh never left Cambodia. Subsequently 17 April 1975 brought in Viet Cong’s genocide and the enslavement for the entire Cambodia. Then it came 7 January 1979 day. It might have stopped Pol Pot-Sihanouk from killing more but Yuon’s subjugation and enslavement appeared no lesser evil to Cambodia.
In the early 80’s Yuon’s Kor-5 plan had killed hundred thousands. It was resulted countless orphaned children and widower of broken heart. Then the peace negotiation was arranged by Indonesia and France to end Yuon occupation and civil war. Presently Hun Sen boasts it's his ideas to realize it. To true historical view, Hun Sen was not the person that made it happened. It’s Sihanouk who was a principle in such agreement. The world may dislike Sihanouk in person but his acquired diplomatic skills and seasoned politics can put the world perspective into his favor.
Besides it was the Supreme National Council majority rule and agreement, with the blessing from sponsors Indonesia and France, to push UN peacekeeping and military cantonment process into Cambodia before its general election held in 1993.
For history, neither Yuon’s 17 April nor 7 January day would justify Hanoi sponsored crimes against Cambodia and its people since early 1800. During the occupation, Cambodians were raped, killed and robbed by bo doi or agents in day light. To say the least, Hanoi couldn’t careless if Cambodia extinct or fell off the earth.
The world humanity, in records, came to rescue and feed Cambodia after 1979. While Cambodians were starved to death, yet Yuon made sure Phnom Penh split up and sent the World Food Program supplies to Hanoi armies ( details in book, ’Quality of Mercy’ by William Shawcross) .
In his foreign policy records since 1984, Hun Sen has had personally spoken to and has begged many overseas Cambodians included some of the forgotten braves who visited families to help appealing to US or UN security council for reconsideration to recognize his regime then. It’s rather shameful for Hun Sen to live on his knees and continue to lie to his own people about Yuon's false liberation. Obviously,liar lives own lies and believes no one noticed the difference.
30 comments:
Although it is a coinside view, liberation or invasion.
The one who knows never considered
7th of January as liberation in Camboidia.
7th of January was done by a foreigner troupe.
It called "Invasion" and not "Liberation."
I have repeated several time with my statement, the genocied regime was created by our master Vietnam, they were fully support, operated in Cambodia during Vietnam war, later on, we had all evidence, witness necessary to clearify the fact. Thus, strategies called one arrow killed two birds.
(Signed) Hun Xen, Chea Xim, Heng Xamrin
Khmer and viet have always been good friends,but the wicked one are the Chiness and the USA and they used khmer to attack viet because viet choose to be part of the USSR. Anyway, half of the Khmer population are now vietkhmer, we might as well be one. we must promote unity, by treating each other kindly. Without viet's help we would not be who we are today. So, stop calling each other's name. we need one another if we want to be more successful. K. intelligent
The picture we see here is Xihanouk's God!
It's not right to say that 7:28PM.
Sihanouk was fucked by him, yes,
may be it was a bad move but that doesn't proves that he is as bad as that.
We should blame Yuons and CPP members but not him.
Son Ngoc Thanh was a great man. He is very patriotic man. He opposed to Ho Chi Minh idea of requesting to come in inside Cambodia to chase the French out and Uncle Son Ngoc Thanh refused.
Thanks to his view!!!
But still the leaders after him didn't understand a thing about YOUN!!
Some can send a crook in your house, and then themself can break in your house to liberates you. Liberation ? No! Invasion !
I was there in Cambodia then escape from the Vietcong invasion then escape to Thailand... and I believe every word! The truth need to be told!
There was Khmer and Khmer Krom soldiers were side by side with YOUN to advance a full scale of invasion of our country or to oust Pol Pot regime.
Unfortunately, I said side by side that isn't mean that the YOUN is right next to you. They have Khmer Krom ahead of them with poorly equipped and the YOUN was very well equipped stay behind and carefully watch those Khmer Krom soldiers if they suspected of not doing the job. My beloved Khmer and Khmer Krom soldiers were using as shield for the YOUN and confronted with Khmer Rouge armies.
When the victory arrived they (YOUN) continue to slaughter and killing Khmer regardless. Until the 1985s they created Kor 5 (K-5) and thousand and hundred of thousand of innocent Khmer died of diseases, starvation, mines and many other obstacle. They chopped the trees and to fight the Khmer Resistance troops on the border.
YOUN took all these responsibility from day one.
Khmer Siem Reap,
The strangers that are so closed to us are the ones that we should be careful about most... Vietnam close relationship with Cambodia is not because Vietnam wants to help Cambodia... Remember "there is no such thing as free lunch." Whatever January 7th, there is no free lunch for Cambodia from Vietnam.
Motherfucker Ah Goat Face Ho Chi minh SEE ach CoQ killer evil!
Uncle Ho is the greatest teacher of the century. He taught his fellow people to keep stealing, invading, killing, pleasing with dirty tricks and uses all means as necessary, includes offering their young daughter's pussy to benefit their nation. Believe it or not they have been very successful and none of them ever reject these philosophies
Uncle Ho rank #1 in my book: The Greatest Thieve of the century. I admire him and we should all learn from this.
Uncle Ho image should be printed on a toilet paper!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2:27aM DON'T SHOW THE FACE OF MOTHERFUCKER HO SHIT IN MY HOUSE!
THAT THE FACE OF EVIL!
"It's not right to say that 7:28PM.
Sihanouk was fucked by him, yes,
may be it was a bad move but that doesn't proves that he is as bad as that.
We should blame Yuons and CPP members but not him.
8:47 PM"
Isn't the dog cover his ass by selling cambodia to Hun Xen from 1993 to now?
don't use your braine just mad like the old dog!
Do am ah saker ank kersy!
Serious trouble between Hanoi and the Khmer Rouge under Pol Pot began at the end of the Second Indochina War when both PAVN troops and the Khmer Rouge engaged in "island grabbing" and seizures of each other's territory, chiefly small areas in dispute between Vietnam and Cambodia for decades. What goaded Hanoi to take decisive action was Pol Pot's determination to indoctrinate all Khmer with hatred for Vietnam, thus making Hanoi's goal of eventual Indochinese federation even more difficult to accomplish. Vietnam's Political Bureau had several options in "solving the Pol Pot problem," as it was officially termed. Vietnam's wartime relationship with the Khmer Rouge had been one of domination, in which control had been maintained through the intercession of native Khmers, numbering approximately five thousand, who had lived and trained in North Vietnam. The Political Bureau reasoned that by controlling the Khmer Rouge "five thousand" faction it could control the Khmer (Kampuchean) Communist Party, which in turn would control the Cambodian state and society. This strategy broke down when most of the Khmer communist cadres trained in Vietnam were executed by Pol Pot.
In another effort, the Political Bureau dispatched Le Duan to Phnom Penh soon after the end of the war for a stern meeting with Pol Pot, but his efforts to persuade or intimidate failed. A series of punitive military strikes followed with the objective of triggering the overthrow of Pol Pot. Some of these assaults, such as the one in the Parrot's Beak (see Glossary) region in 1977, involved as many as 90,000 PAVN troops, but they came to nothing. There also were covert Vietnamese attempts to eliminate Pol Pot by bribing his bodyguards to assassinate him.
Finally, in early 1978, Hanoi returned to tested methods of revolutionary guerrilla warfare. Special PAVN teams recruited volunteers for a future Khmer liberation army from Khmer refugee camps in southern Vietnam. About 300 of the most promising were taken to Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon), installed in the former Cambodian embassy building, and organized into armed propaganda teams, with Khmer Rouge defector Heng Samrin in charge of training. The plan, according to program defectors, was to send armed propaganda teams, like the Kampuchea Liberation Front, into Cambodian provinces along the Vietnamese border to infiltrate Khmer villages and begin organization and mobilization work. A Radio Liberation broadcast unit would be established, a liberated area would be proclaimed, and eventually a Provisional Revolutionary Government of Kampuchea would be formed that would then dispatch emissaries abroad in search of support. In late 1978, however, this revolutionary guerrilla war strategy was suddenly abandoned in favor of a full-scale, blitzkrieg-style attack on Cambodia. Later it became evident that the idea for the attack had come from young PAVN officers, many of whom had been trained in Moscow, who had assured the Political Bureau that the matter could be resolved in a maximum of six months. The Political Bureau's decision to attempt a military solution in Cambodia was taken against the advice of General Giap and probably most of the other older PAVN generals. to be continue..
PAVN struck across the Cambodian border from the Parrot's Beak area of Vietnam on Christmas Day 1978. The drive was characterized by a highly visible Soviet-style offensive with tank-led infantry that plunged suddenly across the border, drove to the Thai border, and then fanned out to occupy Cambodia within days. Heng Samrin and his 300 Khmer cadres proceeded to form a new government, called the People's Republic of Kampuchea, in Phnom Penh, and began building an army to take over from the occupying PAVN by 1990. The first indication to the PAVN high command in Hanoi that it was in fact trapped in a protracted conflict came in the summer of 1979, when a major pacification drive, launched by PAVN forces using some 170,000 troops, proved to be inconclusive. It was only in the wake of that drive that PAVN settled down to the slow task of pacifying Cambodia.
Officially, PAVN troops in Cambodia were volunteers, performing what were called their "internationalist duties." The number involved decreased over the years, from 220,000 in January 1979 to 140,000 in January 1987. As the war progressed, Hanoi officials increasingly portrayed it as a struggle against China and labeled the Khmer insurgent forces as Chinese surrogates. By late 1982, they had begun to portray the war as a thing of the past, claiming that Vietnamese dominance had become irreversible, with only mopping up of scattered pockets of opposition yet to accomplish. The Cambodian resistance, however, continued, never able to challenge PAVN seriously, certainly not able to drive it from the country, but still gaining in strength. By 1987 the resistance was stronger than it had been at any time since 1979. To reduce strain on its system and to quiet outside criticism, PAVN lowered the profile of the war. There were fewer military sweeps into guerrilla lairs and greater use of artillery, more static guard duty, and less road patrolling. Military forces concentrated on keeping open the lines of communication, guarding the towns, and building up Phnom Penh's fledgling army--the Khmer People's Revolutionary Armed Forces (KPRAF). At the same time, increments of PAVN forces were withdrawn from Cambodia each year in what the Chinese press labeled the "annual semi-withdrawal performance." By 1986 Hanoi was stating that all PAVN forces would be withdrawn from Cambodia by 1990, a decision officials insisted was "absolute and without conditions."
In retrospect, Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia appears to have been a serious mistake. Apparently it was a decision hastily taken in the belief that a quick, successful takeover would force the Chinese to accept the new situation as a fait accompli. The undertaking was also based on the estimate that Pol Pot had neither the political base nor the military power to resist a traumatic assault, which would shatter his capability to govern and cause the Khmer people to rally overwhelmingly to the new government. Assumptions proved wrong, and the strategy failed. The invasion did not solve the Pol Pot problem, but rather bogged Vietnam down in a costly war that tarnished its image abroad and undermined relations with China that might otherwise have been salvaged. The war drained the economy and continued to be one of Vietnam's unsolved national security problems in late 1987.
The ‘Triangle’ area is only one of many places that the Vietnamese expansionists have moved into in order to exploit the natural resources of Laos; e.g., there are six hydroelectric dams that were constructed and are owned and operated by the Vietnamese to power Vietnam’s booming economy.
In Cambodia, China is competing with Vietnam and constructing roads in Stung Treng, exploiting forests in Mondulkiri, and developing mining exploration units in Ratanakkiri. Vietnam views the Triangle area for its potential for growing cash crops and establishing vast plantations fast-growing trees, coffee, tea and rubber to earn export dollars. Both the Vietnamese and Laotian regimes have voiced policies of using ethnic minorities in these regions for cheap labor for plantations established on their ancestral lands.
Vietnam’s parastatal company EVN (Electricity of Viet Nam) is planning to build five hydroelectric dams on the Sesan River in Stung Treng Province. The dams will have a total production capacity of 818 megawatts. The estimated production capacities and costs of the five dams are: 1) 420 MW, costing $611 million; 2) 180 MW, costing $387 million; 3) 90 MW at $164 million; and 4&5) 64 MW each, costing $114 million each.
Construction on these dams is expected to begin in 2012 upon the completion of the Japanese-funded highway connecting the port of Da Nang in Vietnam with the northeastern provinces of Cambodia, and the southeastern provinces of Laos.8
Corruption and a lack of progress in combating it remain a major blight on Asia's restructuring efforts following the 1997 crisis. Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam also lost ground in 2007, according to Transparency International. The strong correlation between corruption and poverty means that the benefits of growth are concentrated among the politically connected and bypass many who most need it.9
Given the level of corruption among officials in Vietnam and Cambodia, it is expected that several Cambodian and Vietnamese officials will become very, very wealthy from these projects. The dams would be constructed, owned and operated by Vietnamese, and the electricity generated from these hydroelectric plants will be forwarded and sold to Vietnamese power plants. Purportedly, electricity would be resold to Cambodia at a “cheap price.” One has to be very naive to believe that Vietnam will sell any electricity to Cambodia at a cheaper price than in Vietnam, given that county’s level of corruption, rate of economic growth and the need for cheap energy to fuel its economy; its needs are increasing by 10-15% annually.
Another reason for its expansion into Laos and Cambodia is Vietnam’s conflict between food production, industrialization and building dams to power its economic growth. In the last five years, Vietnam has lost 300,000 hectares of irrigated rice due to industrial development, including a vast amount lost through the construction of dams. This is creating a looming shortage of rice needed to feed it burgeoning population.
The construction of dams results in the displacement of large numbers of indigenous populations that farm the fertile soils in the river basins. These people are then either relocated to marginally productive lands, or receive no land at all; thus they fall victim to abject poverty. Vietnam has a history of doing this as well as corrupt officials absconding with relocation funds, leaving the victims with little or nothing; e.g., the Muong Lay Dam in North Vietnam.10 Those who choose to remain behind to farm the basins below the dams find that two or three times a year,uncontrolled spillage from the dams will flood their fields, destroy their crops and drown their livestock.
The Se San River originates in the Central Highlands of Vietnam and flows into Cambodia where it meets the Mekong River. In 1993, the Vietnamese government started construction on the first dam on the river -- Yali Falls Dam -- which was completed in 2000.
While the dam was under construction from 1996-2000, erratic releases of water resulted in flash flooding downstream, causing deaths to people and livestock and destruction of rice fields and vegetable gardens. Since 2000, operation of the dam has resulted in rapid and daily fluctuations in the river’s flow downstream in Cambodia’s Ratanakiri and Stung Treng provinces. It is estimated that at least 36 people have drowned due to erratic releases of water from the dam, and at least 55,000 people have been adversely affected -- suffering millions of dollars in damages due to lost rice production, drowned livestock, lost fishing income, and damages to rice reserves, boats, fishing gear and houses. Over 3,500 people have relocated to other areas without compensation.11
In addition, more than 6,700 people were resettled to make way for Yali Falls Dam (in Vietnam, ed.). According to a 2001 study by Vietnam’s Center for Natural Resources and Environmental Studies, people displaced by the dam have suffered from severe shortages of food and other hardships since the dam flooded their homes and land in 1999.
Affected communities (in Vietnam, ed.) have not received compensation for their losses, and there are no plans to provide them with compensation for past or future impacts. In Cambodia, communities have formed the Se San Protection Network to press for compensation and changes to the dam’s operating regime to minimize downstream damages. Despite the unresolved issues, the government of Vietnam has embarked on an ambitious plan to build up to five more dams on the Sesan River. The International Rivers Network is working to support the Se San Protection Network in their request for reparations and a halt to future dam construction on the Se San River.12
Although he’s dead, Hanoi is well on its way in the implementation of Ho Chi Minh’s 1930 aspirations of creating a Soviet-style Indochina.
Cambodia is presently ruled by Hanoi’s marionette Prime Minister Hun Sen and his Vietnamese communist-backed corrupt cabal. In terms of “real politick”, Hun Sen’s Premiership -- albeit obtained illegally, first by a coup d'état in 1997 and then appointed by bought-and-paid-for National Assemblies in 1998 and 2003 --de facto international recognition as the “legitimate” representative government of Cambodia. Therefore, the Paris Peace Agreement of October 23rd, 1991, or any other accord/agreement, is at present moot. Thus, nothing can be done at this time about violations of Cambodia’s territorial integrity until a democratic or another form of government representing the true aspirations of the Cambodian people is elected. At that time, the new Cambodian government can take these matters to the international court for abrogation of these unfair and illegal treaties and agreements made by the illegitimate, corrupt and immoral regime of Hun Sen and the Cambodian People's Party (CPP). continues to receive
________
Paper presented by Michael Benge at the National Conference 2007 to commemorate and assess “The Paris Peace Agreement” of October 23rd, 1991 (with attached “Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambodia”). October 20 & 21, 2007.
Mr. Benge is a retired Foreign Service Officer who spent over 16 years in South East Asia, 11 years in Viet Nam, and five years as a Prisoner of the North Vietnamese -- ‘68-73 – in South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam. Mr. Benge is a student of South East Asian politics, is very active in advocating for human rights and religious freedom for the people there, and has written extensively on these subjects. He resides in Falls Church, VA, and can be contacted through email at: Bengemike@aol.com
The conciliatory gestures of Hanoi and of Phnom Penh were part of a spate of proposals and counterproposals made in 1985. On April 9, Malaysia suggested "proximity," or indirect, talks between the CGDK and the Heng Samrin regime. Vietnam, the PRK, and the Soviet Union reacted favorably. Sihanouk voiced "personal" support for indirect negotiations. He was, however, uncertain whether his CGDK partners and unnamed foreign powers would go along with the Malaysian proposal because such talks, indirect as they might be, not only would imply de facto recognition of the Phnom Penh regime but also would obscure the question of Vietnamese occupation. ASEAN's deputy foreign ministers met in Bangkok in May, nevertheless; they endorsed the Malaysian plan and referred the matter to CGDK's representatives in Bangkok. At the time of the ASEAN meeting, Sihanouk released a memorandum that called for unconditional peace talks among all Cambodian factions and for the formation of a reconciliation government comprising both the CGDK and the Heng Samrin regime.
During the ensuing diplomatic exchanges, the Malaysian plan was discarded. The ASEAN foreign ministers, who met in Kuala Lumpur from July 8 to July 9, 1985, adopted a Thai compromise proposal that called for "a form of indirect or proximity talks" between the CGDK and Vietnam. The proposal noted that the Heng Samrin regime could attend the talks only as part of the Vietnamese delegation. The CGDK, China, and the United States backed the Thai proposal, but Phnom Penh and Hanoi rejected it as a scheme to restore the Pol Pot faction to power.
In yet another attempt to break the Cambodian impasse, Indonesia offered in November 1985 to host an informal "cocktail party" for all warring Cambodian factions. (At that time Indonesia served as ASEAN's official "interlocutor" with Vietnam.) Indonesia apparently had concluded that such an informal gathering was timely in view of two recent developments: the Khmer Rouge announcement in July that it would acquiesce, if necessary, to being excluded from a future Cambodian coalition government; and Hanoi's disclosure in August that it would complete its withdrawal from Cambodia by 1990 (five years sooner than had been indicated in its April 1985 announcement), even in the absence of a political settlement on the Cambodian issue at that time. Another notable development was the Khmer Rouge disclosure in September that Pol Pot had stepped down from his post as commander in chief of the armed forces to take up a lesser military post. On December 30, Khieu Samphan stated that Pol Pot's political-military role would cease permanently upon Hanoi's consenting to complete its withdrawal by the end of 1990. Hanoi, in an apparent departure from its previous stand, pledged that its pullout would be completed as soon as the Khmer Rouge forces disarmed.
In 1986 the Cambodian stalemate continued amid further recriminations and new conciliatory gestures. On March 17, the CGDK issued an eight-point peace plan that included the Heng Samrin regime in a projected four-party Cambodian government. The plan called for a two-phase Vietnamese withdrawal; for a cease-fire to allow an orderly withdrawal--both the cease-fire and the withdrawal to be supervised by a UN observer group, for the initiation of negotiations, following the first phase of the withdrawal, and for the formation of an interim four-party coalition government with Sihanouk as president and Son Sann as prime minister. According to the plan, the coalition government would then hold free elections under UN supervision to set up a liberal, democratic, and nonaligned Cambodia, the neutrality of which would be guaranteed by the UN for the first two or three years. The new Cambodia would welcome aid from all countries for economic reconstruction and would sign a nonaggression and peaceful coexistence treaty with Vietnam. Hanoi and Phnom Penh denounced the plan and labeled it as a vain attempt by China to counter the PRK's "rapid advance." Sihanouk shared some of the misgivings about the plan, fearing that, without sufficient safeguards, the Khmer Rouge would dominate the quadripartite government that emerged. Perhaps to allay such misgivings, China signaled the possibility of ending its aid to the Khmer Rouge if Vietnam withdrew from Cambodia.
In late October 1986, Hanoi, through an Austrian intermediary, suggested two-stage peace negotiations to Sihanouk. In the first stage, there were to be preliminary talks in Vienna among all Cambodian parties, including the Khmer Rouge (Pol Pot, however, was to be excluded). The second phase was to be an international conference that included the contending Cambodian factions, as well as Vietnam, and other interested countries. Sihanouk responded with a counterproposal that called for his meeting with a top-level Vietnamese leader. This meeting was to be followed by an all- Cambodian session and then by an international conference. According to unconfirmed reports, Pol Pot, now gravely ill, had been transferred to Beijing shortly after Hanoi's offer to Sihanouk. If these reports were true, Pol Pot's role within the Khmer Rouge camp may have ended with his illness.
A new phase in the Cambodian peace strategies began in 1987. At the beginning of the year Hanoi renewed its October bid to Sihanouk. Hanoi appeared eager to seek a way out of the Cambodian imbroglio, but continued to argue that Vietnam had "security interests" in Cambodia and that China was the main threat to Southeast Asia. It also was evident that Hanoi was attempting to split ASEAN's consensus on Cambodia by claiming that Indonesia and Malaysia had a correct view of the Chinese threat while rejecting the view of Thailand and Singapore that Vietnam was ASEAN's principal nemesis in the region.
In addition, as Soviet interest in Cambodia grew, there was speculation among observers that Moscow might involve itself in the quest for a negotiated settlement. A visit to Phnom Penh in March 1987 by Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze signaled a departure from Moscow's long-standing position that it was only "a third party" to the Cambodian conflict. It also constituted tacit acknowledgment that the Soviet Union had been supporting--at least indirectly--Vietnam's presence in Cambodia through economic and military aid, which totaled the equivalent of US$2 billion per year.
The Heng Samrin regime became more assertive in articulating its policy options than it had been before. It became known in early April that Hun Sen had sent word to Sihanouk suggesting a meeting in Canberra, or Paris, or Stockholm at the prince's convenience. (It was Hun Sen's second effort to initiate such a dialogue. In 1984 he had proposed a similar meeting, but Sihanouk had declined because of objections by China and by his CGDK partners.)
Sihanouk's one-year leave of absence from the CGDK, effective May 7, 1987, was a good sign for Cambodia because he could now freely explore possibilities for a settlement without squabbling with his coalition partners. On June 23, Sihanouk agreed to see Hun Sen in Pyongyang, but two days later, hours after Chinese acting premier Wan Li had met with Sihanouk's wife, Princess Monique, Sihanouk abruptly canceled the meeting. China apparently objected to any negotiations as long as Vietnam kept troops in Cambodia. Sihanouk said in July that he preferred to talk first with a Vietnamese leader because the Cambodian conflict was between the Khmer and the Vietnamese and not among the Cambodian factions. He said that he would not mind meeting with Hun Sen, however, as long as the initiative for such a meeting came from Hun Sen or his regime and not from Hanoi.
Events occurred rapidly in the summer of 1987. In June UN secretary general Javier Perez de Cuellar issued a compromise plan that called for a phased Vietnamese withdrawal; for national reconciliation leading to the formation of a new coalition government with Sihanouk as president; for a complete Vietnamese pullout and for free elections; and for special provisions to deal with the armed Cambodian factions. On July 1, while ostensibly on vacation in the Soviet Union, Hun Sen had talks with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. The two agreed that "the realities which prevail in the region" must not be ignored in any plan for Cambodian settlement. On July 25, the Khmer Rouge faction publicly disavowed any intention to return to power at the expense of other factions and stated that to do so would jeopardize its national union policy and would alienate "friends in the world."
Hanoi, meanwhile, continued to put off discussions about its presence in Cambodia, thereby forcing the resistance to deal directly with the Heng Samrin regime. Between July 27 and July 29, Vietnam's foreign minister, Nguyen Co Thach, conferred with his Indonesian counterpart in Ho Chi Minh City and called for "an informal meeting" or cocktail party of all Cambodian factions without any preconditions. The cocktail party, to be held in Jakarta, was to be followed by a conference of all concerned countries, including Vietnam. On July 30, Heng Samrin journeyed to Moscow to consult with Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev. Then in an interview published in the Italian Communist Party daily L'Unita on August 12, Hun Sen sought to exonerate the Soviet Union from blame for Cambodia's plight and instead blamed China for the country's difficulties. Referring to the proposed meeting with Sihanouk, Hun Sen insinuated that Sihanouk had "bosses" who would not let him engage freely in a dialogue. On August 13, the Indochinese governments endorsed "the Ho Chi Minh formula" (Hanoi's term for Indonesia's original cocktail party idea) as a significant "breakthrough" toward a peaceful settlement in Cambodia.
The ASEAN foreign ministers met informally on August 16 to discuss the cocktail party idea, and they forged a compromise that papered over some of the differences among the six member states concerning the Cambodia situation. Even this attempt to achieve unanimity proved fruitless, however, as Hanoi rejected the ASEAN suggestion.
black dog eater, from dog head to dog shit. why he's so smart invading foreign country for more dog, especially in cambodia.
ah sdach kbotjet ning ah hun xen ah heng xamrin ahchea sim lok tekdeiy khmer eoay youn ah slap teiyhoong
Ucle A-Ho can control Cambodia from Hell....hahahahah
ពួកអាឆ្កែយួន។ ពួកឯងចង់លេបទឹកដីខ្មែររឺ?
Anonymous said...
ah sdach kbotjet ning ah hun xen ah heng xamrin ahchea sim lok tekdeiy khmer eoay youn ah slap teiyhoong
10:26 AM
The mother fucker not smart but just evil! and the fucking so called leaders of Cambodia are so stupid mother fuckers not vote by the people!
Kor 5 or Crime of vietnam must be filed and take it to court.
Post a Comment