Thailand and Cambodia need a 'Jimmy Carter' mediator

February 18, 2011
By Pinn Siraprapasiri
Special to The Nation

"The reason why so few people are agreeable in conversation is that each is thinking more about what he intends to say than about what others are saying, and we never listen when we are eager to speak." Francois La Rochefoucauld.

This is probably why it is so difficult in a quarrel for people to realise there is usually common ground upon which they all can agree. The protracted border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia is in part because of the eagerness of both sides to win this seemingly zero-sum game. The exchanges last week, unfortunately not in well-intended form between the governments of Thailand and Cambodia, were fatal and resulted in casualties and losses. France offered to help mediate. But our prime minister brushed off the offer.

The UN and Asean, under their charters, are required to offer good offices to member countries in conflict. A third-party intervention - either as facilitator, mediator or manipulator, depending on their interests, resources and relationship with the parties to conflict - is often sought when a dispute is protracted and complex, when the parties' own attempts have reached deadlock, when neither party seeks the use of force, and when both are ready to cooperate to break the stalemate.

While third-party intervention can be carried out by either independent individuals or official representatives of a government or organisation, the world usually looks to principal agents of global governance such as the UN, or to regional organisations such as Nato, the EU, or in this case Asean, to catapult the parties to conflict to a peaceful end.

A facilitator encourages communication. A mediator, essentially another party in a negotiation, helps structure agenda and reduces tension through the negotiation. A manipulator moves the negotiation forward by changing parties' expectations and hovers with carrots and sticks. But nothing is carved in stone. A facilitator can become a mediator as the deadline draws near, and a mediator can become a manipulator when his or her interests and stake in the negotiation are high. While the roles can be fuzzy, they rarely escape these categories: a catalyst, translator, resource-expander, bearer of bad news, agent of reality or scapegoat.

Ultimately, a third party is expected to help remove structural, strategic, psychological, institutional and cultural barriers that make ears numb, eyes dull and words misconstrued.

The task of the mediator is not easy. Arthur Meyer said, "the sea that he sails is only roughly charted, and its changing contours are not clearly discernible. He has no science of navigation, no fund inherited from the experience of others. He is a solitary artist recognising at most a few guiding stars, and depending on his personal powers of divination".

Parties to conflict usually resort to a mediator over bringing a matter to The Hague because it is inexpensive, flexible, less risky, less damaging, and a good gesture. Moreover, parties to conflict sometimes prefer a mediator standing between them, so that when things go wrong, as they can, at least there is someone else to blame.

What then are the reasons for a third party to enter and risk ending up a scapegoat? A mediator offers assistance or accepts an invitation to intervene with mixed motives. He may take on the task simply to fulfil his duty. He may need to safeguard his country's or organisation's interests. He can be selfless or expect reputation and favour in return.

In the negotiation between Egypt and Israel at Camp David in September 1978, Jimmy Carter quickly understood the tension and enmity between Anwar Sadat and Menachim Begin, and used shuttle diplomacy to keep both parties talking without them actually meeting. When the worst-case scenario took place, when Sadat, outraged by Begin's unyielding nature, was ready to walk away, Carter played his trump card, warning Sadat that if he left, "it will mean first of all an end to the relationship between the US and Egypt. There is no way we can explain this to our people. It would mean an end to this peacekeeping effort, into which I have put so much investment. It would probably mean an end to my presidency because this whole effort will be discredited. And last but not least, it will mean the end of something that is very precious to me: my friendship with you".

Not all mediators can pull this off as credibly and effectively as Carter did.

A few interesting accounts of international mediation are worth exploring. Nato played a facilitator role during the second Cod War between the UK and Iceland over the latter's fishery limits in 1972-73. An agreement was reached and the British fleet backed out from Iceland's boundary in 1973, although the third Cod War took place in 1976 when Iceland expanded its limit to 200 nautical miles. Italian Cardinal Antonio Samore was appointed by the Vatican to help ease tensions between Argentina and Chile over the Beagle Channel in 1978. Like Carter, he also used shuttle diplomacy to draw out compromises from both parties, and it resulted in the Act of Montevideo.

Closer to home, Asean offered a stage for negotiation and settlement for the South China Sea disputes among China, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. Asean also played a role in setting up Cambodia's government in the early 1990s. While the principle of non-intervention, distrust, and a long history of regional conflict have made Asean a meek organisation, it is still a strong candidate for the Thailand-Cambodia case. Unlike France and Unesco, Asean does not have a stake in this dispute. Asean's role in regional development should be sufficient to bring both parties to negotiation.

The situation is now ripe for intervention. But Cambodia prefers the UN, probably due to the nationality of the current Asean secretary-general. Therefore, Asean must choose carefully who it wishes to nominate as a representative. While Thailand is ready to accept Asean's help, Cambodia is looking for someone truly impartial. One candidate is Indonesia's foreign minister Marty Natalegawa, also chairman of Asean. Foreign ministers and former diplomats of other Asean countries should also be considered. Now it is a matter of finding our Jimmy Carter.

Pinn Siraprapasiri is a lecturer in international relations at the Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University.