By Khmer Democrat, Phnom Penh
ECCC Cases 003 and 004 Series
Is civil party applicant Ms. Theary C. Seng correct in saying that Meas Muth and Sou Met are in Case 003 and Im Chaem and two other district chiefs are in Case 004? See ECCC Timeline by Theary C. Seng. Are Cambodian scholar Steve Heder and international lawyer Brian Tittemore correct in naming Meas Muth and Sou Met as senior leaders to be prosecuted? See http://www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/khmerrouge.pdf?rd=1. This series will provide in full the section on Meas Muth and Sou Met from the report Seven Candidates for Prosecution: Accountability for the Crimes of the Khmer Rouge.
ECCC Cases 003 and 004 Series
Is civil party applicant Ms. Theary C. Seng correct in saying that Meas Muth and Sou Met are in Case 003 and Im Chaem and two other district chiefs are in Case 004? See ECCC Timeline by Theary C. Seng. Are Cambodian scholar Steve Heder and international lawyer Brian Tittemore correct in naming Meas Muth and Sou Met as senior leaders to be prosecuted? See http://www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/khmerrouge.pdf?rd=1. This series will provide in full the section on Meas Muth and Sou Met from the report Seven Candidates for Prosecution: Accountability for the Crimes of the Khmer Rouge.
Sou Met and Meah Mut
ii. Minutes of General Staff Meetings
Who are Meas Muth and Sou Met? Part 2
iii. Reports and other Documents from Sou Met and Meah Mut
Who are Meas Muth and Sou Met? Part 3
b. Legal Analysis and Conclusions
ii. Superior Responsibilitya. Superior-Subordinate Relationship
While the foregoing evidence suggests that lower-level cadre in Sou Met and Meah Mut’s Divisions were the victims of executions for which Met and Mut may be held individually responsible, it also indicates that Met and Mut’s subordinates were themselves involved in perpetrating arrests of Party cadre and that Met and Mut bear responsibility for this conduct under the doctrine of superior responsibility.
Both Sou Met, the Secretary of Central Committee Division 502 which incorporated the DK air force, and Meah Mut, the Secretary of Central Committee Division 164 which incorporated the DK navy, appear to have enjoyed de jure authority over subordinates by virtue of their positions in the CPK military hierarchy, principally through the General Staff under Son Sen’s direction. In this capacity, both officials attended General Staff meetings on behalf of their Divisions, provided and received reports on activities in their and other Divisions, and received instructions from Son Sen respecting implementation of Party policies within their respective jurisdictions.
Indicia of de facto control over subordinates reinforces this evidence of de jure authority. This includes evidence indicating that Sou Met had the authority to direct the arrest and transfer of cadre. As noted, for example, notes documenting a September 30, 1976 meeting of the General Staff of the Central Committee military units state that Sou Met’s Division 502 arrested fifteen soldiers who had deserted. At a meeting on March 1, 1977, Sou Met reported that “50 no goods” from his Division had been arrested and sent to S-21.503 Most incriminating, Sou Met’s signature appears on numerous documents that facilitated the transfer of cadre and combatants from Division 502 to S-21.
Similar evidence has been identified in relation to Meah Mut, including a report from Meah Mut to Son Sen specifically describing the arrest and interrogation of suspected enemies by Mut’s subordinates in Division 164. In addition, a September 24, 1976 telegram addressed to Mut from Division 164’s then Deputy Secretary, Deum reported that “after we took the measures against the enemy that you decided …. five of them fled into the forest, were pursued and arrested by us.”
Finally, a substantial number of confessions – those from sixty-seven Division 502 cadre and combatants and twenty-four Division 164 prisoners – were found in the S-21 archives. Taken together with Sou Met and Meah Mut’s apparent enthusiasm for implementing Party policy, as expressed at various General Staff meetings, this appears to constitute probative circumstantial evidence that Met and Mut exercised sufficient de facto control to compel subordinates in their Divisions to effect the arrests and transfer of cadre suspected of being traitors.
Both Sou Met, the Secretary of Central Committee Division 502 which incorporated the DK air force, and Meah Mut, the Secretary of Central Committee Division 164 which incorporated the DK navy, appear to have enjoyed de jure authority over subordinates by virtue of their positions in the CPK military hierarchy, principally through the General Staff under Son Sen’s direction. In this capacity, both officials attended General Staff meetings on behalf of their Divisions, provided and received reports on activities in their and other Divisions, and received instructions from Son Sen respecting implementation of Party policies within their respective jurisdictions.
Indicia of de facto control over subordinates reinforces this evidence of de jure authority. This includes evidence indicating that Sou Met had the authority to direct the arrest and transfer of cadre. As noted, for example, notes documenting a September 30, 1976 meeting of the General Staff of the Central Committee military units state that Sou Met’s Division 502 arrested fifteen soldiers who had deserted. At a meeting on March 1, 1977, Sou Met reported that “50 no goods” from his Division had been arrested and sent to S-21.503 Most incriminating, Sou Met’s signature appears on numerous documents that facilitated the transfer of cadre and combatants from Division 502 to S-21.
Similar evidence has been identified in relation to Meah Mut, including a report from Meah Mut to Son Sen specifically describing the arrest and interrogation of suspected enemies by Mut’s subordinates in Division 164. In addition, a September 24, 1976 telegram addressed to Mut from Division 164’s then Deputy Secretary, Deum reported that “after we took the measures against the enemy that you decided …. five of them fled into the forest, were pursued and arrested by us.”
Finally, a substantial number of confessions – those from sixty-seven Division 502 cadre and combatants and twenty-four Division 164 prisoners – were found in the S-21 archives. Taken together with Sou Met and Meah Mut’s apparent enthusiasm for implementing Party policy, as expressed at various General Staff meetings, this appears to constitute probative circumstantial evidence that Met and Mut exercised sufficient de facto control to compel subordinates in their Divisions to effect the arrests and transfer of cadre suspected of being traitors.
[ to be continued ]
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