In preparation for the start of trial hearings beginning on 27 June 2011 of Case 002 against the surviving Khmer Rouge senior leaders Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary and Ieng Thirith, KI Media is starting a new series in posting installations of the public document of the Closing Order of Case 002. The Closing Order of the Co-Investigating Judges forms the basic document from which all the parties (Co-Prosecutors, Co-Lead Lawyers for all civil parties, Defense Lawyers) will be making their arguments before the Trial Chamber judges (one Cambodian President, 2 Cambodian Judges, 2 UN judges). Up until now, the hearings involving these four surviving senior Khmer Rouge leaders have been in the Pre-Trial Chamber over issues of pre-trial detention and jurisdictional issues. Beginning in June 2011, the Trial Chamber will hear the substantive arguments over the criminal charges (e.g. genocide, crimes against humanity, penal code of 1956). Available in Khmer and French. Contact the ECCC for a free copy.
CLOSING ORDER
of Co-Investigating Judges You Bunleng and Marcel Lemonde, 15 September 2010
A. MOVEMENT OF THE POPULATION
158. One of the five policies was to implement and defend the CPK socialist revolution through the movement of the population from towns and cities to rural areas, as well as from one rural area to another, by whatever means necessary. The movement by the CPK of people began prior to 17 April 1975 and continued until at least 6 January 1979. The Co-Investigating Judges were specifically seized of three major phases of movement: the movement of people out of Phnom Penh (Phase 1); the Central (Old North), Southwest, West and East Zones (Phase 2); and the East Zone (Phase 3).
159. One of the objectives of the population movements was to fulfil the labour requirements of the cooperatives and worksites.468 The CPK declared that it also had the objectives of providing food supplies to the population and protecting it from security threats. A CPK Party document dated September 1975 reflects another major objective: to deprive city dwellers and former civil servants of their economic and political status and transform them into peasants,469 thus "preserving the revolutionary achievements" 470 Population movements
were therefore a key means used by the CPK to achieve "whatever can be done that is a gain for the revolution". 471
Dates and Participation
162. Prior to 1975, the CPK had implemented a policy of removing people from the towns and cities that came under their control: people were moved totally or partially from urban areas in Steung Treng, Kratie, Banam and Udong in the Northeast, North and East Zones and Sector 5 05.472 Publications of the Revolutionary Flag reflect that the CPK deliberately moved the population from urban to rural areas.473
163. This policy was implemented, in particular, on or around 17 April 1975 (Phase 1); from the latter part of 1975 until some time in 1977 (Phase 2); and from late 1977 throughout 1978 (Phase 3).
164. With respect to Phase 1, Pol Pot played a key role in the decision to move the entire population out of Phnom Penh.474 The plans to prepare the reception of the residents of Phnom Penh were disseminated before its implementation.475 There was further involvement of members of the Party Centre476 in the development of this plan during meetings in late March or early April 1975.477 These were followed by meetings during which lower level cadre were informed of the decision.478 Some CPK soldiers were informed of the attack on Phnom Penh in advance, generally via their military superiors in accordance with the command structure,479 however others only received the order to remove people from the capital shortly after their arrival.480481 The evacuation of the population of Phnom Penh was not a singular phenomenon but constituted part of a wider pattern of population movements from cities after 17 April 1975.
165. With respect to Phase 2, the plan to send people to the North and North West Zones is evidenced from a visit of the CPK Standing Committee to that area before or around August 1975.482 This visit gave rise to the following report: "the labour force must be increased. Three or four hundred thousand more would not be enough. The current strength of one million persons can only work 50 per cent. It's imperative to add four or five hundred thousand more".483 A September 1975 Party document stated that "new people" needed to be relocated out of areas where temporary over-concentrations of them had resulted in food shortages. The document specifies that a permanent solution to this problem had to be effected starting in November 1975 and adjusted to production requirements.484 Witnesses485 and documents486487 describes a decision of the CPK Centre regarding Phase 2 of the movement of population.488 The former head of the Central Zone Telegram Unit (formerly the North Zone) explains that the East Zone "had to send the report from the Zone to Pol Pot of the Centre level first, and then waited for Pol Pot instruction. KE Pauk [Secretary of the Central Zone (formerly the North Zone)] received this telegram from the Centre, not directly from the East Zone".489 provide further evidence as to how the CPK Centre was involved in these movements. Telegram #15 dated November 1975 sent to Pol Pot
166. With respect to Phase 3, although the CPK may have displaced part of the population of the East Zone within the zone or to other zones for reasons relating to food production490 or the conflict with Vietnam,491 there is also evidence of massive displacements during the East Zone purge, as set out below.492
167. Between 1976 and 1978, following the phases 2 and 3 of the movement of population, the Northwest Zone had problems of overpopulation and famine, as set out in the section of this Closing Order regarding Factual Findings of Crimes. The Centre was informed of this situation by visits to the field of its representatives493 and by reports from the secretaries of the zone in which this problem was discussed. 494
B. COOPERATIVES AND WORKSITES
168. One of the five policies was to implement and defend the socialist revolution through the establishment and operation of cooperatives and worksites by whatever means necessary. Cooperatives and worksites were set up throughout Cambodia before 1975, from the early stages of the CPK control over certain parts of the territory. These cooperatives and worksites continued until at least 6 January 1979. The Co-Investigating Judges were specifically seized of six worksites and cooperatives: Trapeang Thma Dam worksite, Kampong Chhang Airport construction site, 1st January Dam worksite, Srae Ambel government worksite, the Tram Kok Cooperatives and Prey Sar worksite (S-24).
169. One of the objectives in establishing cooperatives and worksites was to put the population to work in order to provide food for internal consumption and for export.495 This involved, amongst other activities: rapidly increasing the production of paddy to three tons per hectare per crop;496 creating a country-wide irrigation network;497 increasing production of other products such as rubber498 and salt;499500 These matters were to be achieved regardless of their impact on the population; in some cases, such as where the land was not able to support the three tons per hectare target for rice production, it was physically impossible to implement the CPK objectives.501 Another objective of this policy was to further the policy relating to detecting, defending against, reeducating and "smashing" the enemy as set out below.502 For example, a February 1976 broadcast cited military functions as one of the six tasks of cooperatives.503 The January 1976 DK Constitution formally established that the populations in cooperatives were duty-bound to defend the country.504 From 1978, cooperatives were increasingly tasked with smashing the "enemies", whom the CPK believed to be hidden within them.505 A further objective of the cooperatives and worksites was to eliminate the private sphere,506 thus destroying the existing social structure and replacing it with a collectivism regime507 in which there was no allowance for individual or family interests.508 Cooperatives and worksites were therefore a key means used by the CPK to achieve and to do "whatever must be done to serve production" 59 and building infrastructure such as airfields or dams.
Dates and Participation
170. The establishment of collective agricultural production by the CPK began around 1970, expanding as the CPK strengthened its control over Cambodian territory.510 By 1973 a number of cooperatives had been established.511 In May 1975, a conference was held with CPK representatives from throughout the country, at which Pol Pot and other senior leaders decided that the establishment of socialist revolution in Cambodia required a focus on agriculture and industry, which was to be achieved through continued establishment of cooperatives and the construction of canals and dams. The latter project was to be launched in 1976.512
171. The Standing Committee formulated this policy, as reflected in a series of meetings at which they gave instructions on matters such as rice rations,513 targets for production of rice and other products514 or the construction of water systems.515 On 26 August 1975, the CPK Standing Committee reported on a visit to the Northwest Zone where it became aware of the poor living and working conditions, including food shortages, starvation,516 and lack of medicine,517 concluding that "it's imperative to strengthen and expand the cooperatives"5118 and that the Southwest had "little hope (little land, little water, no good paddy)"519 On 2 November 1975, the Standing Committee considered training for agricultural machinery520 and salt production.521 On 22 February 1976, the Standing Committee gave instructions relating to the transport and distribution of rice, increasing salt production, the construction of railroads and hydroelectric facilities522 and the building of Kampong Chhnang Airport.523 During a meeting from 19 to 21 April 1976, the Standing Committee stated that it would go down to the bases in May 1976,524 and stressed that the Standing Committee must work with the ministries to "explain about the general stances of the Party and to provide timely instructions".525 At the same meeting, the Standing Committee established a number of committees surrounding Office 870,526 with responsibilities in relation to agriculture, commerce and economics,527 and gave instructions on matters such as foreign trade negotiations with North Korea and China,528 the expansion of rubber production and early season rice yields, and building and distributing water pumps. On 30 May 1976, the Standing Committee established guidelines for the agricultural production action of the army, which was considered as having the "joint duty to build the country".531 Finally, in August 1976, the Standing Committee developed a four-year plan to build socialism in all fields including rapid agricultural development.532
172. The Council of Ministers also affirmed the need to "do whatever we possibly could to produce 3 tons of crops per hectare",533 which required that "the Standing Committee must make sure it goes down to the rice fields frequently, at least 15 days each month" 534 At a Council of Ministers meeting on 22 April 1976, it was noted that the task of the Cambodian government was to "build the country in every sector, economics, agriculture, industry, communication, social affairs, health, etc ... in concert, according to Party objectives. Do whatever is necessary so that each ministry, each office, each unit makes sure it fulfils its tasks well, in quantity, in the momentum of the great miraculous leap". 535 At a meeting on 31 May 1976, details from visits to "many bases" were reported, including progress on dike systems,536 rice production from specific districts,537 and matters relating to canals and fertilizer.538 At this meeting, the Council of Ministers noted a shortage of rice rations and "human diseases", but stated that they would be able to resolve the issue.539
173. The People's Representative Assembly similarly endorsed this policy on 11-13 April 1976, which called for "the entire people to be on the offensive on every battlefield of production in every sector, especially in agriculture, aiming to produce the maximum amount of rice... to push the building of our country even faster in a great and miraculous leap" 540 Purported representatives of the workers,541 peasants,542 and army543 expressed their resolve to support this policy. A major Party gathering elaborated the three tons per hectare objective in early November 1975 and, thereafter, it became "the common resolution for the entire Party, the whole population and the whole Revolutionary Army" 544 Army units regularly held meetings at which this policy was discussed and details of its implementation were reported.545
174. CPK directives546 and CPK meetings also addressed this policy.547 For example, minutes from a meeting on 8 March 1976 note that instructions were issued regarding the agricultural situation in Sectors 106 and 103, and the goal of exporting rice from Sector 106 by 1977,548 requiring regular reporting on all details of its implementation.549 Rice shortages and disease, and the serious adverse effects on the working strength of people in worksites, were also reported at this meeting.550 "at the end of the season when there are many shortages, those shortages will impact their health and labour strength".551 Telegrams were also sent to the Centre reporting on the policy relating to cooperatives and worksites, including the working conditions such as food shortages and starvation.552 Instructions were issued that people were to be issued a ration of two cans of rice per day, but it was noted that,
175. A number of specific problems related to health and their adverse effect on this policy were discussed at an ad hoc CPK meeting dated 10 June 1976. People's living standards, resulting diseases, significant shortfalls of medicine throughout the country were noted; the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs was reminded of its duties with respect to this policy; and instructions were issued to address these problems.553554 Health issues were further discussed by Pol Pot with medical workers from the zone, sectors and military gathered at the first National Medical Conference held in October 197 8.
176. The policy of forming cooperatives and worksites was also disseminated through radio broadcasts555 and the Revolutionary Flag magazines.556 A 1975 issue of Revolutionary Flag stated that "the Party has to rebuild a new economy in the most rapid manner that is mainly depending on agriculture"551 and that "the labour forces shall be organized for consecutive projects"55 In 1976, Revolutionary Flag magazines stated that the Party assessed the economic situation monthly559 and that food shortages and diseases had persisted during that year, but that problems had been resolved and "the majority of districts" had enough to eat.560 Later in 1978, however, it was recorded that the previous assertions of agricultural success had been exaggerated, the failures being blamed on internal enemies.561
177. Although serious health562 and food problems563 arose following the establishment of the CPK regime, the CPK leaders had not provided for adequate systems to respond to these problems564 and did not accept international aid,565 except for the limited support primarily available from China.566 On the contrary, the CPK policies were focused on isolation and the self-sufficiency of the national economy.567
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