Closing Order of Case 002 against Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith

In preparation for the start of trial hearings beginning on 27 June 2011 of Case 002 against the surviving Khmer Rouge senior leaders Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary and Ieng Thirith, KI Media is starting a new series in posting installations of the public document of the Closing Order of Case 002.  The Closing Order of the Co-Investigating Judges forms the basic document from which all the parties (Co-Prosecutors, Co-Lead Lawyers for all civil parties, Defense Lawyers) will be making their arguments before the Trial Chamber judges (one Cambodian President, 2 Cambodian Judges, 2 UN judges).  Up until now, the hearings involving these four surviving senior Khmer Rouge leaders have been in the Pre-Trial Chamber over issues of pre-trial detention and jurisdictional issues.  Beginning in June 2011, the Trial Chamber will hear the substantive arguments over the criminal charges (e.g. genocide, crimes against humanity, penal code of 1956).  Available in Khmer and French.  Contact the ECCC for a free copy.

CLOSING ORDER

of Co-Investigating Judges You Bunleng and Marcel Lemonde, 15 September 2010

C. SECURITY CENTRES AND EXECUTION SITES

178. One of these five policies was to implement and defend the CPK socialist revolution through the reeducation of "bad-elements" and the killing of "enemies", both inside and outside the Party ranks, by whatever means necessary.⁵⁶⁸ As it took power, the CPK destroyed the existing legal and judicial structures.⁵⁶⁹ By 17 April 1975, the CPK had replaced these structures with a network of security centres and execution sites in the areas over which it had taken control, in order to detain and reeducate or kill those who were suspected of engaging in activities against the State.⁵⁷⁰ By the end of the CPK regime, approximately 200 security centres and countless execution sites had been established, located in every Zone throughout Cambodia and at all levels of the CPK administration structure, including at the Party Centre.⁵⁷¹ Of these, the Co-Investigating Judges were seized of eleven security centres (S-21 security centre, Au Kanseng security centre, Koh Kyang security centre, Kok Kduoch security centre, Kraing Ta Chan security centre, North Zone security centre, Prey Damrei Srot security centre, Phnom Kraol security centre, Sang security centre, Wat Kirirum security centre, Wat Tlork security centre) and three execution sites, in addition to Choeung Ek, related to S-21: (Execution Sites in District 12, Steung Tauch and Tuol Po Chrey execution sites).

179. The two key objectives of security centres and execution sites were to reeducate bad-elements and "smash" enemies. In its common usage, to "smash" meant to "kill".⁵⁷² However, in the context of a security centre, it meant to secretly arrest, interrogate, torture, and execute.⁵⁷³ Similarly, "sweep" was a term used to describe arrests,⁵⁷⁴ usually followed by executions.⁵⁷⁵ Chapter VII of the Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea entitled "Justice" illustrates the CPK's concern to protect the State from subversion.⁵⁷⁶ Article 10 of this chapter refers to two forms of activity that posed a threat to the State and their corresponding penalties: "[d]angerous activities in opposition to the people's State must be condemned to the highest degree", whereas "[o]ther cases are subject to constructive reeducation in the framework of the State's or people's organizations".⁵⁷⁷ A person suspected of the former category of activity was deemed to be an "enemy" who had to be "smashed",⁵⁷⁸ whereas a person falling within the latter category was considered a "bad-element" who would be reeducated as prescribed by the Constitution.⁵⁷⁹ Security centres detained both "enemies" and "bad-elements" and usually labelled them "serious" and "light" prisoners respectively.⁵⁸⁰

180. The CPK used several methods to identify those who had carried out "activities against the State", including requiring people to write biographies and attend self-criticism meetings. Persons arrested and interrogated at a security centre were required to name other members of their alleged "network", routinely under torture, which was practiced in security centres nationwide, even prior to 17 April 1975.⁵⁸¹ The methods of interrogation were given different labels ranging from "cold", "chewing" to "hot".⁵⁸² These methods appear to have been taught to security centre cadres by the sector and district cadres and were commonly understood terms.⁵⁸³ Further, interrogators routinely asked detainees the same questions at different security centres, such as whether they were agents of the CIA. The order to interrogate along these lines originated from the Centre and Zone levels⁵⁸⁴ and reflected the Party Centre's fear that the CIA was conspiring with the Vietnamese to overthrow the CPK regime.⁵⁸⁵ The establishment of security centres and execution sites was therefore a key means by which the CPK did "whatever it [took] to cause the oppressed classes to be victorious over the oppressor classes".⁵⁸⁶

181.           As set out below, the list of those whom the Party suspected of engaging in activities against the State broadened and evolved over time as a result of domestic developments and the international armed conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam. The CPK considered itself under constant threat of invasion and annexation by Vietnamese forces and entered into the international armed conflict with Vietnam in pursuance of its policy to defend itself from external enemies.