Historical Context for Vietnamization of Cambodia (e.g. Viettel/Metfone; Hun Sen's rise to power)

Brother Enemy–the War after the War

A History of Indochina Since the Fall of Saigon

By Nayan Chanda

(MacMillan Publishing Co., New York, 1986)

 

Excerpts from Chapter 10 (A Red Christmas)

Getting Ready for the Final Act

If Peking's military preparations in southern China did not attract U.S. attention, the Vietnamese buildup along the Cambodian border did.  By October 12, Vietnamese divisions, including some elite units, were deployed in Dac Lac, Tay Ninh, and An Giang provinces bordering Cambodia…

Vietnamese preparedness also involved cautious measures against threats from Cambodia.  They took quite seriously the possibility of a Cambodia air attack on Ho Chi Minh City—less than thirty minutes from Phnom Penh by air…

The fast evolving political and diplomatic situation also added a new urgency to Vietnamese military planning.  As the Vietnamese would later admit, they were concerned by clear signs of a moderate Khmer Rouge approach toward the world… In the fall of 1978, under Chinese prodding, Cambodia had come out of its isolationist, xenophobic cocoon and begun a campaign to improve its bloody image…

Cambodian deputy premier Ieng Sary had set out on a trip to Southeast Asia calling for closer ties, especially with Thailand…

A Prince for All Seasons

Politically a matter of greater Vietnamese concern was the indication that the Khmer Rouge were toward an eventual political rehabilitation of Prince Sihanouk.  While visiting the UN in October [1978], Ieng Sary had distributed photographs of the prince at an “intimate banquet to honor the patriots” in Phnom Penh in September.

The Vietnamese feared not only that restoration of Sihanouk would make the Khmer Rouge less of a pariah but that it would also counter Hanoi’s own plan of using his name to win domestic and international support of the anti-Pol Pot resistance…

The failure to enlist the support of one of Sihanouk’s progeny [Ranariddh] or any known non-Communist Cambodian figure to lend respectability to the Hanoi-backed resistance and Phnom Penh’s public relations offensive meant a considerable narrowing of the Vietnamese window of opportunity… If the Vietnamese army had to march in to install a guerilla government in Cambodia, Hanoi calculated, it was now or never.

With the military alliance with Moscow sealed and diplomatic maneuvering over, the Vietnamese turned their full attention to the final preparation for the Cambodian operation.  Events had moved faster than Hanoi leaders had foreseen.  Some two hundred former Khmer Rouge cadres and Hanoi-trained Cambodian exiles who had gathered in South Vietnam were determined to fight Pol Pot but had not yet ironed out political differences in order to be able to form a new Cambodian Communist party to lead the struggle.  But time was pressing.  The Vietnamese could not afford to sit around until a party congress was held and a new party leadership was formed.  Even without a party, a Cambodian liberation front had to be announced to the world before the Vietnamese army could move into action.

The political indoctrination and military training of Khmers begun since early 1978 now moved to a fever pitch.  One way of telescoping the process and eliminating delays caused by linguistic barriers was to enlist the aid of the important Khmer minority living in the Mekong Delta—known as Khmer Krom, or southern Khmer.  Although politically they had always been suspect in Hanoi’s eyes, because of their bilingual ability they were seen as useful auxiliaries to be used with the Vietnamese army inside Cambodia.  Major Say Pak, a Cambodian Communist who had lived in Hanoi since 1954, arrived in the delta province of Bac Lieu in November 1978 to recruit Khmer Krom youth.  Every week for a month he held meetings in a pagoda to urge them to join in the Cambodian liberation movement.  After total liberation, he promised the youth, “you will be holding responsible positions in the government.”  After an induction ceremony, five hundred youths were sent to Ca Mau for military training.  In January 1979 the group would accompany Vietnamese units in their drive into Cambodia’s Takeo province.

[ to be continued ]